Peo v. Loaiza

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1728
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1728 Peo v Loaiza 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1728 La Plata County District Court No. 23CR5028 Honorable Nathaniel Baca, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Patricia Delcarmen Loaiza,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Johnson and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Alternate Defense Counsel, Florissant, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Patricia Delcarmen Loaiza, appeals her sentence

for second degree assault. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Loaiza was charged with multiple offenses stemming from

allegations that she stabbed her husband in the back and neck

with a scalpel, almost killing him.

¶3 Loaiza pleaded guilty to second degree assault. The remaining

counts were dismissed, as well as five other criminal cases. As part

of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to leave sentencing open

to the district court — with probation and community corrections

as available sentencing alternatives to the Department of

Corrections (DOC). The court accepted the plea agreement and

sentenced Loaiza to sixteen years in the DOC, the maximum

sentence allowable under the plea.

II. Discussion

¶4 Loaiza contends that the district court abused its sentencing

discretion because the court based her sentence, in part, on factual

findings that were unsupported by competent evidence in the record

and failed to give any consideration to her rehabilitative potential.

We disagree.

1 A. Standard of Review

¶5 We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Dominguez, 2021 COA 76, ¶ 9. A court abuses

its discretion if “it fails to consider the nature of the offense, the

character and rehabilitative potential of the offender, the

development of respect for the law and the deterrence of crime, and

the protection of the public.” People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d

1130, 1137 (Colo. App. 2008). Likewise, a court abuses its

discretion if its decision is based on an erroneous understanding or

application of the law. Margerum v. People, 2019 CO 100, ¶ 9.

B. Analysis

¶6 A district court is given “wide latitude in its sentencing

decisions.” People v. Tresco, 2019 COA 61, ¶ 30 (citation omitted).

In exercising its sentencing discretion, the court need not “explicitly

refer to each of the factors it considered,” People v. Koehler, 30 P.3d

694, 698 (Colo. App. 2000), and need only state the primary factual

considerations bearing on its decision, see People v. Watkins, 613

P.2d 633, 637 (Colo. 1980). A record is sufficient to affirm a

sentencing decision if it contains evidence to support the reasons

for the sentence, a reasonable explanation of the sentence imposed,

2 and information that permits the conclusion that the court

considered all essential factors. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d at 1137.

“If the sentence is within the range required by law, is based on

appropriate considerations as reflected in the record, and is

factually supported by the circumstances of the case,” we must

uphold it. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708 (Colo. 1990). Only

under exceptional circumstances will we substitute our judgment

for that of the district court in sentencing matters. Id.

¶7 Loaiza raises two claims of error, both of which we reject.

¶8 First, Loaiza asserts that the district court’s sentencing

determination was based on factual findings that were unsupported

by competent evidence in the record — namely, that her recent

criminal conduct had escalated and that she lacked remorse and

accountability for her crime.

¶9 Regarding Loaiza’s escalation, it is true that her last criminal

conviction — her fourth DUI offense — occurred thirteen years ago.

But Loaiza was charged with five other criminal cases within two

weeks of the stabbing — with charges that included violation of a

protection order, criminal mischief, theft, and stalking. And while

none of these cases resulted in convictions (each of them was

3 dismissed as part of her plea), the district court was entitled to

consider them. See People v. Newman, 91 P.3d 369, 372 (Colo.

2004) (describing appropriate considerations for sentencing courts,

including “conduct for which charges were filed but later dismissed

as part of a plea agreement”).

¶ 10 The record also supports the district court’s finding that

Loaiza lacked remorse and accountability for the stabbing. During

Loaiza’s allocution — besides repeating her sentiment concerning

the victim’s character for untruthfulness, as previously relayed in

the presentence investigation report — Loaiza outright denied ever

stabbing the victim in the neck. Instead, she suggested that the

victim “inflicted that injury himself.” Later during the sentencing

hearing, she added, “I was hoping that the doctor would know the

difference between the weapon or whatever was used in those two

wounds. I feel that he inflicted more on himself, and he wanted to

make sure that it looked like I was going to kill him.” And she

asserted that the victim was not “tak[ing] accountability for his

behavior.” Moreover, any remorse and accountability Loaiza did

show at the hearing came after the court stated its concern, in

4 response to these statements, that Loaiza wasn’t “really taking any

responsibility for this action.”

¶ 11 Second, we reject Loaiza’s assertion that the district court

failed to consider all of the relevant sentencing factors by placing

undue emphasis on her escalating criminal conduct and lack of

remorse or accountability, to the exclusion of her potential for

rehabilitation through a community-based sentence.

¶ 12 In sentencing Loaiza, the district court acknowledged that

Loaiza “had a rough life,” has “been through a horrible situation,”

and was “in a relationship where [she was] controlled and kind of

manipulated and didn’t have the ability to make decisions on [her]

own and really [was] in a position that no one should be in.”

However, the court also reflected on the serious nature of the crime,

noting that Loaiza almost killed the victim and it was “an extreme

act that no one deserves.” Further, the court considered, but

ultimately rejected, the imposition of a community-based sentence

given Loaiza’s demonstrated “pattern of not really following court

orders,” in part, based on the five pending protection order violation

charges. And the court found that both Loaiza’s failure to take

responsibility and her lack of appreciation for the seriousness of the

5 offense were “very concerning.” In balancing these considerations,

the court arrived at a sixteen-year sentence.

¶ 13 Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district

court abused its sentencing discretion. The court expressly

considered all evidence presented at the sentencing hearing,

including mitigating information about Loaiza’s personal hardships

and her rehabilitative potential. That the court found “aggravating

factors to be more compelling than any arguably mitigating factors

does not constitute an abuse of discretion or indicate that the

[district] court failed to consider evidence of mitigation.” Linares-

Guzman, 195 P.3d at 1137.

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.