23CA1549 Peo v King 05-07-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1549 El Paso County District Court No. 21CR5056 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge Honorable Gilbert A. Martinez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Noel Lavertt King, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division II Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 7, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Noel Lavertt King, Jr., appeals his conviction for
one count of first degree burglary and two counts of violation of a
protection order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In 2021, King was restrained by two protection orders that
prevented him from contacting his wife, contacting his two
daughters, or going near the family home. In the early morning of
September 3, King entered the home and assaulted the protected
parties. Police arrived after a 911 call and arrested King.
¶3 In relevant part, the charges brought against King included
violations of the protection orders and burglary by unlawfully
entering the home with the intent to violate the protection orders.
¶4 During trial, the court granted the prosecution’s request to
take judicial notice of the facts that King had been advised of the
two protection orders and that the protection orders remained
active on September 3.
¶5 The jury found King guilty of one count of first degree
burglary, two counts of violation of a protection order, and six
1 counts not raised on appeal.1 See § 18-4-202(1), C.R.S. 2025;
§ 18-6-803.5(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The trial court sentenced him to a
controlling sentence of twelve years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.
II. Analysis
¶6 On appeal, King claims that the trial court (1) improperly took
judicial notice and (2) violated his due process rights. We consider
each contention in turn.
A. Improper Judicial Notice
¶7 King contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
taking judicial notice under CRE 201 of the adjudicative facts that
King had had actual knowledge of the two protection orders and
that the protection orders remained in effect on September 3, 2021.
We agree as to the former.
1 These unchallenged counts are two counts of child abuse, one
count of second degree assault, two counts of third degree assault, and one count of obstruction of telephone or telegraph service. See § 18‑6‑401(1)(a), (7)(a)(III), (7)(a)(V), C.R.S. 2025; § 18‑3‑203(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025; § 18‑3‑204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; § 18‑9‑306.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. The jury also found King not guilty of one count of child abuse, one count of second degree assault, two counts of third degree assault, and one count of a crime of violence sentence enhancer. See § 18-6-401(1)(a), (7)(a)(V); § 18-3-203(1)(g); § 18-3-204(1)(a); § 18‑1.3‑406(2)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2025.
2 1. Additional Background
¶8 During trial, the prosecution admitted into evidence two
mandatory protection orders against King, issued in El Paso County
Case Nos. 21M3966 and 21M2394 on July 28 and May 17, 2021,
respectively. The prosecutor noted that minute orders in each case
indicated that King had been advised of and had acknowledged
each protection order. In pertinent part, the protection orders
stated that they remained active until their respective cases reached
a disposition, which occurred in both cases on April 21, 2022. Both
cases were sealed shortly after that date.
¶9 At the end of the prosecution’s case and outside the presence
of the jury, the prosecutor moved the trial court to take judicial
notice of the minute orders from the prior cases. Defense counsel
objected, stating that judicial notice “has to be an undisputed fact.”
Defense counsel argued that the facts were disputed because the
court records were sealed and no witness had identified King as the
individual who was advised.
¶ 10 The trial court reviewed the court records and read the minute
orders aloud:
3 [Case No. 21M3966:] Advised defendant via video advisement. Defendant advised of charges, possible penalties and mandatory protection order on the record. Advised of Senate Bill 13[-]197. Defendant acknowledged [protection order], waives right to hearing on the protection order provisions pertain[ing] to S.B. 13[-]197. . . .
[Case No. 21M2394:] Advised of possible penalties and mandatory protection order on the record. Advised of Senate Bill 13[-]197. Advised per House Bill 21-1255. Affidavit provided set for compliance hearing. Defendant acknowledged [protection order], waives right to hearing on the protection order provisions pertaining to S.B. 13[-]197 . . . .
(Emphasis added.) The court then overruled King’s objection and
ruled that it would take judicial notice of the facts contained in the
minute orders.
¶ 11 Defense counsel objected again and said that “the records
were not viewable because they are sealed” but also asked the court
“to take judicial notice of the dates [on which the cases] were
dismissed.” The court overruled her objection but granted her
request to include the dismissal dates.
¶ 12 At the end of the trial, the court provided the jury with the
following instruction on judicial notice and the court’s judicially
noticed facts from the minute orders:
4 A party may ask the [c]ourt to take judicial notice of certain facts. When the [c]ourt takes judicial notice of a fact, it means that the [c]ourt has allowed the fact into evidence without requiring proof of it. You may, but are not required to, accept any fact judicially noticed by the [c]ourt. It is entirely your decision to determine what weight, if any, shall be given to the evidence.
In this case, the [c]ourt has taken judicial notice of the following facts:
Regarding [the protection order in El Paso County Case No. 21M3966]: On July 28, 2021, the Defendant, Noel King, was advised of the mandatory protection order and acknowledged it. The mandatory protection order was still active on September 2-3, 2021.
Regarding [the protection order in El Paso County Case No. 21M2394]: On May 12, 2021, the Defendant, Noel King, was advised of the mandatory protection order and acknowledged it. The mandatory protection order was still active on September 2-3, 2021.
Both cases associated with the protection orders . . . were dismissed on April 21, 2022.
¶ 13 The court further instructed the jury that, as an element of
first degree burglary, the prosecution had to prove that King
intentionally committed the crime of violation of a protection order.
And it instructed that one of the elements of violation of a
protection order was that King had “been personally served with a
5 protection order that identified [King] as a restrained person, or
otherwise ha[d] acquired from the court or law enforcement
personnel actual knowledge of the contents of a protection order
that identified [King] as a restrained person.” See
§ 18-6-803.5(1)(a).
2. Standard of Review
¶ 14 We review a trial court’s decision to take judicial notice under
Rule 201 for an abuse of discretion. People v. Sena, 2016 COA 161,
¶ 22. “A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an erroneous
understanding or application of the law.” Id. (quoting People v.
Orozco, 210 P.3d 472, 475 (Colo. App. 2009)).
¶ 15 If a nonconstitutional trial error was preserved by objection,
we review it for harmless error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12.
Under this standard, if we determine a trial court erred, we will
reverse the judgment only if the error “substantially influenced the
verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.” Id. (quoting
Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986)). That means “an
objected-to trial error is harmless if there is no reasonable
6 possibility that it contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” Pernell
v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶ 22.
3. Applicable Law
¶ 16 Under Rule 201(b), a trial court may take judicial notice of a
fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” As it
relates to court files, a trial court can take judicial notice of
adjudicative facts in its own court records if those facts merely
establish “that various proceedings or actions have already taken
place.” Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10, ¶ 12. This, for example, may
include “such things as a calendar date, the term of a public office,
and matters found in statistical charts.” Id. at ¶ 10.
¶ 17 However, the truth or accuracy of an adjudicative fact isn’t
indisputable just because it is specifically sourced from court
records. Id. Rather, a fact is indisputable if it is commonly
verifiable, meaning any error in the particular source “can be easily
demonstrated.” Id. While “the occurrence of [a] legal proceeding or
other court action itself” is commonly verifiable, “the resolution of a
7 factual matter at issue in a prior judicial proceeding” is not, making
the latter adjudicative fact an improper subject for judicial notice.
Id. at ¶ 17.
4. Preservation
¶ 18 We are unconvinced by the People’s assertion that King failed
to preserve this issue by not directing the trial court to consider the
specific parameters of Doyle. King wasn’t required to cite case law
in his objection to preserve his issue for appellate review. See
People v. Salas, 2017 COA 63, ¶ 29 (holding that formulaic
language is not required for preservation). And King objected that
the minute orders weren’t “properly judicially noticed” because they
weren’t “undisputed,” which sufficiently called the court’s attention
to the issue. Further, defense counsel argued that there had “not
been any witnesses presented to identify the individual who was
advised as Mr. King” in the minute orders. After this exchange, the
court ruled on the propriety of the judicial notice, preserving the
contention for appeal. See People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 31
(“Where, despite imprecision in the objection, the trial court
actually rules on the claim raised on appeal, and makes findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the claim is sufficiently preserved.”).
8 5. Improper Judicial Notice of King’s Knowledge of the Protection Orders
¶ 19 As to the substance of his contention, King argues that the
following were not judicially noticeable facts under Doyle: (1) King
had been advised of and had acknowledged the protection orders,
and (2) the protection orders remained active when the charged
crimes occurred.
¶ 20 Regarding whether “the Defendant, Noel King,” was present for
the advisement and acknowledgment of the protection orders, the
court strayed past the proper boundaries of Rule 201. Instead of
merely taking judicial notice to establish that the proceedings or
actions had already taken place, as reflected in court records, it
took judicial notice of adjudicative facts from the prior cases that
were subject to reasonable dispute.
¶ 21 To illustrate, in Doyle, the defendant was charged with
violating a condition of his bail bond. Doyle, ¶ 1. The trial court
took judicial notice from the court record of the fact that the
defendant failed to appear in court on a particular day as mandated
by a condition of his bond. Id. The supreme court held that the
trial court erred because it did not “merely tak[e] notice of its own
9 prior finding and the effect of that finding.” Id. at ¶ 13. Instead,
the judicial notice improperly “extended to the accuracy of the
court’s finding at that prior proceeding,” which was not beyond
reasonable questioning. Id. Thus, it concluded that the
defendant’s failure to appear was disputable and improper for
judicial notice. Id.
¶ 22 Contrast those events to the events in People v. Sa’ra, when
the trial court took judicial notice that a person with the
defendant’s name appeared for sentencing in a prior felony case.
117 P.3d 51, 55-56 (Colo. App. 2004). A division of this court held
that the judicially noticed fact there was not subject to reasonable
dispute because the trial court did not identify “that [the] defendant
was, in fact, the person who appeared before the court” in the prior
proceeding. Id. at 56; cf. Sena, ¶ 27 (holding that judicial notice of
an outstanding arrest warrant was proper because the trial court
did not take “an additional step beyond notice of the existence of a
record”).
¶ 23 Here though, the court took judicial notice of facts that were
subject to reasonable dispute. The court did not merely note that
court records indicated that an individual named Noel King was
10 advised in the prior protection order cases. The accuracy of those
facts would be readily verifiable by reference to the court records
themselves. Instead, the court went one step further and took
judicial notice that, in fact, “the Defendant, Noel King,” appeared,
was advised, and acknowledged the protection orders in the prior
cases. The accuracy of the court’s prior findings was not beyond
reasonable dispute merely because the findings were sourced from
court records. See Doyle, ¶¶ 10-12. And whether the individual
who was advised in those earlier proceedings was actually the same
Noel King was subject to reasonable dispute. Therefore, the court’s
judicial notice of these disputable facts was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 24 But with regard to the protection orders being active on
September 3, those adjudicative facts were proper subjects for
judicial notice. Regardless of whether it was the same Noel King
who appeared at the advisements, the court’s issuance of the
protective orders — which stated that they remained active until the
final dispositions of the prior cases — established when the orders
were in effect and when they expired according to the disposition
dates of the prior cases. The legal effects of the minute orders in
this respect are undisputable because they can be easily verified by
11 the court records and protection orders themselves. See Doyle,
¶ 10.
¶ 25 Nonetheless, King argues that there is no “legal effect”
exception under Doyle. But we disagree with the premise that there
is an exception at issue here. Notice of the protection orders’
effective dates and their respective cases’ disposition dates are the
type of commonly verifiable “calendar date[s]” showing that “various
proceedings or actions have already taken place.” Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12.
This makes them the exact kind of facts permissible for judicial
notice — not an exception to the rule.
¶ 26 We therefore conclude that the court erred by taking judicial
notice that King was advised in a prior proceeding, but it did not err
by taking judicial notice that the protection orders were active on a
particular date.
6. Judicial Notice of King’s Knowledge Was Not Harmless
¶ 27 Determining whether the erroneous admission of evidence is
harmless depends on several factors, including (1) whether the
evidence was important; (2) whether it was cumulative; (3) whether
there was corroborating or contradicting evidence on the point at
12 issue; and (4) how strong the prosecution’s case was overall. People
v. Faussett, 2016 COA 94M, ¶ 54. We address each factor in turn.
¶ 28 First, the improper judicially noticed fact was important
because it established a specific element of the crimes laid out in
the jury instructions. To convict King of violating a protection
order, the jury had to find that King had “actual knowledge of the
contents of a protection order that identified [King] as a restrained
person.” (Emphasis added.) See § 18-6-803.5(1)(a). Taking judicial
notice of the fact that King had been advised of and acknowledged
the protection order was directly probative of this element. And in
turn, this proof of King’s actual knowledge was directly probative of
the element for first degree burglary that King had an intent “[t]o
commit [in the home] the crime of Violation of a Protection Order.”
See § 18-4-202(1).
¶ 29 Second, the only cumulative evidence here of King’s actual
knowledge of the contents of the protection orders besides the
judicially noticed facts was his alleged signatures on the protection
13 orders.2 The signatures were each under provisions that said, “By
signing, I acknowledge receipt of this [o]rder.”
¶ 30 Third, there was some contradictory evidence on the point at
issue. It is true that King’s main theory of defense in his closing
argument focused on disputing that he knowingly violated the
protection orders because his wife gave him permission to come into
the home. See id. But while this defense didn’t directly argue that
King lacked knowledge of the protection orders, defense counsel
nonetheless contested the issue. After an officer testified to the
validity of the protection orders, King’s lawyer elicited testimony on
2 King claims that the holding of Doyle v. People, 2015 CO 10,
precludes us from analyzing any cumulative evidence. We are unpersuaded because, in Doyle, the supreme court forewent a cumulative-evidence analysis because the trial court’s jury instruction, stating that the defendant’s failure to appear was “not subject to reasonable dispute” and that “the court ha[d] accepted [that fact] as being true,” stamped the improper evidence with the trial court’s imprimatur in a way that “clearly posture[d] the judicially noticed fact . . . as something more than cumulative evidence.” Id. at ¶¶ 5, 15-17. By contrast, here, the trial court’s judicial notice instruction, stating that it had “allowed the fact[s] into evidence without requiring proof of [them]” and that the jury could “but [was] not required to, accept any fact judicially noticed by the [c]ourt,” didn’t infringe on the jury’s prerogative to determine the weight of the evidence. As a result, we may consider cumulative evidence because the judicially noticed facts here weren’t sanctioned to be “more than cumulative evidence.” Id. at ¶ 15.
14 cross-examination that the officer wasn’t present when the orders
were issued and didn’t personally know who signed them. This
presented at least some evidence to challenge King’s signatures as
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actual knowledge of
the protection orders’ contents.
¶ 31 Fourth, although the prosecution presented copies of the
protection orders, the absence of any other proof establishing his
identity suggests a lack of overall strength in the prosecution’s case
on this issue.
¶ 32 Taking these factors together, we cannot conclude that “there
is no reasonable possibility that [the error] contributed to [King]’s
conviction.” Pernell, ¶ 22. To be sure, as the People argue, the jury
could have inferred from specific details contained in the protection
orders — details that included King’s physical appearance,
relationship to the victim, and address of the home where the
crimes took place — that the signatures didn’t belong to some other
person with King’s name. But the judicially noticed facts eliminated
the need for it to do so. The judicial notice permitted the jury to
find King’s actual knowledge without requiring any inferential steps.
And indeed, the judicial notice provided some indicia of the trial
15 court’s imprimatur on the judicially noticed facts, as the jury could
reason that the facts wouldn’t have otherwise been admitted unless
the court found them valid to some degree. See Doyle, ¶¶ 15-16. It
follows that there is a reasonable possibility that the jury accepted
the clarity and authority of the judicial notice without resorting to
inferences from the other evidence, particularly given King’s
contesting of the validity of the signatures on the protection orders
and the limited evidence presented by the prosecution.3 See
Pernell, ¶ 22. Therefore, we reverse the conviction and remand the
case for retrial on the two counts of violation of a protection order
and one count of first degree burglary.
3 To the extent it may arise at retrial, we are unpersuaded by King’s
claims that the trial court’s judicial notice improperly emphasized the protection orders themselves by implying the orders were consistent with judicially noticed facts. In the judicial notice instruction, the protection orders were referenced generally for context, and the court did not draw the jury’s attention to any prominent aspects of the protection orders, such as the signatures. See People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 71 (“[A] trial court ‘has no duty to, and should not, select the salient points in the evidence, favorable or unfavorable, and specifically call them to the attention of the jurors.’” (quoting Wertz v. People, 418 P.2d 169, 170 (Colo. 1966))).
16 B. Due Process
¶ 33 King next argues that the trial court violated his due process
rights by taking judicial notice without providing King with
sufficient notice or an opportunity to review the sealed minute
orders. We decline to address the merits of this contention.
¶ 34 “To preserve a Colorado Constitutional argument for
appeal, . . . a defendant must make an objection sufficiently specific
to call the attention of the trial court to the potential Colorado
Constitutional error.” Martinez v. People, 244 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo.
2010); accord People v. Harmon, 2025 COA 38M, ¶ 56 (“[W]e
generally do not address constitutional arguments raised for the
first time on appeal.”) (cert. granted Mar. 30, 2026).
¶ 35 As discussed, King objected to the court taking judicial notice
of the contents of the minute orders on the basis that they
contained disputed facts. While his objection mentioned that the
records were inaccessible, King couched this inaccessibility within
his overall objection of improper judicial notice. And after the court
read the contents of the minute orders in open court, King made no
objection relating to the inaccessibility of those orders.
17 ¶ 36 Thus, we will not review the contention because King’s
objection didn’t apprise the trial court of a due process issue,
meaning the court couldn’t develop a record on the matter. See
People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, ¶¶ 14-16 (holding that we have
discretion not to review unpreserved constitutional challenges if
there isn’t a sufficiently developed record); Martinez, 244 P.3d at
140 (holding that the appellate court erred in considering a
constitutional contention because the defendant’s objection at trial
to improper testimony failed to preserve a constitutional argument
for appeal); see also Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 12 (“[I]t is not
enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal
way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work . . . .” (quoting United
States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990))). Specifically, the
record is insufficiently developed in this case because we don’t see
18 how the trial court “refus[ed] to disclose records” when it read the
contents of those records during trial.4
¶ 37 As for advance notice, Rule 201(f) allows judicial notice to “be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.” And Rule 201(e) specifically
contemplates a situation where advance notice doesn’t occur: “In
the absence of prior notification, the request [to be heard] may be
made after judicial notice has been taken.” No such request exists
in the record.
III. Disposition
¶ 38 During the pendency of this appeal, King filed a motion for
correction of the mittimus in the underlying trial court case. We
take judicial notice of the subsequent proceedings in the trial court.
See Sa’ra, 117 P.3d at 56. The trial court granted King’s request
4 The only explanation King offers for why the court’s ruling at this
particular stage of the proceedings was inappropriate is that he didn’t have access to the records, and he hadn’t received advance notice. But as we note, the court did give him access to the records by reading them in court, and he didn’t ask for additional access to them. So even if we were to consider this contention on the merits, we would reject it. In addition, King notes that defense counsel is still unable to access the minute orders from the sealed court record. We have confirmed the accuracy of the trial court’s reading of the minute orders into the record. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“A court may take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a related proceeding.”).
19 and issued an amended mittimus reflecting that he was acquitted of
the crime of violence sentence enhancer count. While the amended
mittimus appears to be correct, King’s direct appeal of his
convictions divested the trial court of jurisdiction relating to the
judgment of conviction on appeal. See People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d
841, 844 (Colo. 1982) (“Unless otherwise specifically authorized by
statute or rule, once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to issue further orders in the case relative to the
order or judgment appealed from.”).
¶ 39 The judgment of conviction for one count of first degree
burglary and two counts of violating a protection order are reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. The trial court should issue an amended mittimus
after reacquiring jurisdiction following issuance of the appellate
mandate to reflect the jury’s not guilty verdict for the crime of
violence sentence enhancer count. See Crim. P. 35(a). All other
aspects of the judgment of conviction not challenged on appeal
remain undisturbed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.