Peo v. Karp

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0572
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0572 Peo v Karp 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0572 Mesa County District Court No. 18CR2163 Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Steven Joshua Karp,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Allison S. Block, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Steven Joshua Karp, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Steven Joshua Karp, appeals the postconviction

court’s orders denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing

and his motion to reconsider that ruling. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Police stopped a vehicle in which Karp was a passenger. Karp

got out of the vehicle, and a police officer observed Karp holding a

syringe loaded with what the officer suspected was

methamphetamine. The officer removed several small containers

from Karp’s person that the officer presumed also contained

methamphetamine. Karp spontaneously admitted to carrying

drugs.

¶3 The prosecution charged Karp with possession with intent to

manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, possession of

drug paraphernalia, and three habitual criminal counts. Karp

pleaded guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or

distribute a controlled substance, § 18-18-405(1), (2)(c)(II), C.R.S.

2025, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges, and

the parties stipulated to a six-year sentence to community

corrections.

1 ¶4 On April 22, 2019, the district court sentenced Karp to six

years in community corrections. He later filed a motion to convert

his community corrections sentence to a Department of Corrections

(DOC) sentence. In August 2021 the court resentenced him to six

years in the custody of the DOC with applicable credit for time

served.

¶5 Later that year, Karp filed a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence

reconsideration, which the postconviction court denied.

¶6 In January 2025, Karp filed a motion to correct an illegal

sentence under Rule 35(a), asserting that his sentence was illegal

because the district court had failed to consider restitution. Citing

People v. Rosales, the postconviction court granted the motion and

amended the judgment of conviction to reflect that no restitution

was ever sought or requested. See 134 P.3d 429, 431 (Colo. App.

2005) (“Absent a specific finding that the victim did not suffer a

pecuniary loss, restitution is a mandatory part of the sentence.”).

¶7 On February 10, 2025, Karp filed a pro se Rule 35(c) motion

alleging that his guilty plea was coerced and plea counsel was

ineffective. Specifically, he argued that plea counsel used Karp’s

mental disorders and addiction against him to coerce him into a

2 plea agreement with threats of habitual criminal charges. The

postconviction court denied the motion without a hearing. The

court found that the motion was untimely with no justifiable excuse

or excusable neglect for the delay. It also found that, even if the

motion had been timely, it failed on the merits.

¶8 Karp filed a motion to reconsider the postconviction court’s

denial of his Rule 35(c) motion. He asserted a new claim that there

was a conflict of interest because the Mesa County Combined

Courts now employed plea counsel. The court denied the motion,

finding no proper legal basis for recusal.

II. Analysis

¶9 Karp contends that the postconviction court erred by denying

his Rule 35(c) motion and motion to reconsider. We disagree.

¶ 10 We review de novo a postconviction court’s denial of a Rule

35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

¶ 11 Rule 35(c) claims are subject to the time bar identified in

section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025. Except for class 1 felony

convictions, a Rule 35(c) motion is time barred if filed more than

three years after the conviction is final, unless the defendant can

establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect (or another

3 statutory exception) to permit an untimely motion. See

§ 16-5-402(1), (2)(d). Where, as here, the defendant does not file a

direct appeal, a conviction is final when the district court sentences

the defendant and enters the judgment. People v. Collier, 151 P.3d

668, 671 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 12 Thus, Karp had until April 22, 2022 — three years after

sentencing — to file his Rule 35(c) motion. Because Karp filed his

motion in February 2025 and did not allege facts showing justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect, or any other statutory exception, his

motion was time barred.

¶ 13 We recognize that when a court corrects an illegal sentence, as

the postconviction court did here in January 2025, a new

three-year period begins to run for a defendant to pursue a certain

type of Rule 35(c) claim. Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, ¶ 3.

However, the new time period only allows “defendants to raise

arguments [in their Rule 35(c) motions] addressing how the

illegality in their sentence potentially affected the original

conviction.” Id. But in his Rule 35(c) motion, Karp argued only

that his plea was coerced and plea counsel was ineffective; he did

not assert any arguments regarding restitution or how the illegality

4 in his original sentence pertaining to restitution affected his

conviction.

¶ 14 Therefore, the postconviction court did not err by denying

Karp’s Rule 35(c) motion as untimely.

¶ 15 The postconviction court also did not err by denying Karp’s

motion to reconsider because “[t]he rules of criminal procedure do

not authorize a motion to reconsider postconviction orders.” People

v. Thomas, 195 P.3d 1162, 1164 (Colo. App. 2008). Karp’s motion

to reconsider was essentially a successive motion for postconviction

relief that is procedurally barred by Rule 35(c)(3)(VI). See Thomas,

195 P.3d at 1165. Karp does not assert an exception to that rule,

and we perceive none that could apply here.

¶ 16 Finally, to the extent Karp raises issues on appeal that he did

not raise in the postconviction court, we decline to address them.

See Cali, ¶ 34 (“[A]lthough we will broadly construe a pro se

litigant’s pleadings to effectuate the substance, rather than the

form, of those pleadings, we will not consider issues not raised

before the district court in a motion for postconviction relief.”).

5 III. Disposition

¶ 17 The orders are affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.