23CA0985 Peo v Juarez 10-31-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0985 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR2407 Honorable Eric M. Johnson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Janet R. Juarez,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Welling and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 31, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Randy C. Canney, Salida, Colorado; Casey A. Krizman, Denver, Colorado; Michael S. Axt, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Janet R. Juarez, appeals the sentence imposed
following her guilty plea to one count of second degree murder. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Juarez killed her husband when she shot him three times,
once in the head and twice in the back of his neck/upper back.
The prosecution charged Juarez with one count of first degree
murder.
¶3 In exchange for dismissal of the first degree murder count,
Juarez pleaded guilty to an added count of second degree murder
under a sudden heat of passion, in violation of section
18-3-103(1)(a), (3)(b), C.R.S. 2024, and agreed that sentencing
would be open to the court, but that the applicable sentencing
range was between ten and thirty-two years in prison.
¶4 From her arrest through her sentencing, Juarez maintained
that she was a victim of domestic violence and that on the day of
the shooting she was experiencing severe hyperglycemia and
diabetic ketoacidosis as a consequence of the victim having
prevented her from accessing her insulin, which she needed to
manage her type 1 diabetes. Before sentencing, the court reviewed
1 numerous letters from the victim’s and Juarez’s friends and family,
as well as reports from experts in domestic violence and
endocrinology and Juarez’s treating psychologist. At the sentencing
hearing, the court indicated that it took all of that information into
consideration, it believed the prosecution had considered Juarez’s
mitigation evidence in offering her the plea agreement, and it
recognized that Juarez did not pose a continuing threat to society
and would have the opportunity to get out prison at some point
because of the plea agreement. However, noting that Juarez took
another human life, the court sentenced her to thirty-two years in
prison.
II. Discussion
¶5 Juarez contends that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed the maximum sentence authorized by statute.
Specifically, she argues that the court did not explain its reasoning
for imposing the maximum allowable sentence and failed to
properly consider her mitigation evidence because it believed that
the prosecution’s plea offer took that into consideration. Based on
our review of the record, the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
2 A. Plea Proviso Does Not Bar Juarez’s Appeal
¶6 As an initial matter, we note and reject the People’s assertion
that the plea proviso portion of section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2024,
bars Juarez’s appeal of her sentence.
¶7 As relevant here, section 18-1-409(1) provides that any person
convicted of a non-class 1 felony “shall have the right to one
appellate review of the propriety of the sentence;” but, in what is
often referred to as the plea proviso provision of that statute,
appellate review of the propriety of a sentence is barred “if the
sentence is within a range agreed upon by the parties pursuant to a
plea agreement.” Id.
¶8 Contrary to the People’s argument, Juarez’s plea agreement
did not include “a range agreed upon by the parties.” Rather, the
plea agreement informed Juarez that the offense to which she was
pleading guilty — second degree murder with heat of passion as a
mitigator — was a class 3 felony that was both an extraordinary
risk crime and a crime of violence and was punishable by ten to
thirty-two years in prison. See §§ 18-3-103(1)(a), (3)(b), (4) (making
the offense a class 3 felony and subject to crime of violence
sentencing), 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (10) (setting forth the
3 presumptive range for a class 3 felony as four to twelve years in
prison, but increasing the top of that range by four years because
it’s an extraordinary risk crime), 18-1.3-406(1), (2)(a) (mandating a
sentence of at least the midpoint to twice the maximum of the
presumptive range for crimes of violence), C.R.S. 2024.
¶9 However, the plea agreement left sentencing “open” and, other
than reciting the applicable statutory sentencing range, did not
contain “a range agreed upon by the parties.” Thus, the plea
proviso provision in section 18-1-409(1) does not bar our review of
the propriety of Juarez’s sentence. See People v. O’Dell, 53 P.3d
655, 657 (Colo. App. 2001) (The plea proviso did not apply because
“[t]he plain language of [section] 18-1-409(1) requires an agreement
by the parties to a sentencing range,” and, “although [the]
defendant was advised of the penalties applicable to the offenses to
which he was pleading guilty, there is no indication in the record
that his plea agreement included any type of agreed sentencing
range or cap.”). But see People v. Scofield, 74 P.3d 385, 386-87
(Colo. App. 2002) (the plea proviso did apply where the parties
“expressly agreed upon” a sentencing range, even though that range
was the same as the statutory aggravated sentencing range).
4 B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 10 A review of the propriety of the sentence “involves the intrinsic
fairness or appropriateness of the sentence itself.” People v.
Malacara, 606 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Colo. 1980).
¶ 11 The trial court has extremely broad discretion when, as here,
it imposes a sentence within the statutory range. People v. Rice,
2015 COA 168, ¶ 8; see also Allman v. People, 2019 CO 78, ¶ 22.
We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion because the
sentencing court is more familiar with the circumstances of the
case, see People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 71, and that familiarity
places the sentencing court “in the best position to fix a sentence
that reflects a balance of the relevant considerations,” People v.
Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 507 (Colo. 1986).
¶ 12 Thus, we will not disturb this kind of sentencing decision on
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion by
imposing a sentence that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair or is based on an erroneous construction of the law. People
v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20, ¶ 16.
¶ 13 In exercising its sentencing discretion, the court should
consider, among other things, the nature of the offender’s crime and
5 the events surrounding the criminal conduct, the nature and extent
of the victim’s injuries, the offender’s character, rehabilitative
potential and criminal history, any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, and the protection of the public. Torrez, ¶ 73;
People v.
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23CA0985 Peo v Juarez 10-31-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0985 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR2407 Honorable Eric M. Johnson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Janet R. Juarez,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Welling and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 31, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Randy C. Canney, Salida, Colorado; Casey A. Krizman, Denver, Colorado; Michael S. Axt, Denver, Colorado for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Janet R. Juarez, appeals the sentence imposed
following her guilty plea to one count of second degree murder. We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Juarez killed her husband when she shot him three times,
once in the head and twice in the back of his neck/upper back.
The prosecution charged Juarez with one count of first degree
murder.
¶3 In exchange for dismissal of the first degree murder count,
Juarez pleaded guilty to an added count of second degree murder
under a sudden heat of passion, in violation of section
18-3-103(1)(a), (3)(b), C.R.S. 2024, and agreed that sentencing
would be open to the court, but that the applicable sentencing
range was between ten and thirty-two years in prison.
¶4 From her arrest through her sentencing, Juarez maintained
that she was a victim of domestic violence and that on the day of
the shooting she was experiencing severe hyperglycemia and
diabetic ketoacidosis as a consequence of the victim having
prevented her from accessing her insulin, which she needed to
manage her type 1 diabetes. Before sentencing, the court reviewed
1 numerous letters from the victim’s and Juarez’s friends and family,
as well as reports from experts in domestic violence and
endocrinology and Juarez’s treating psychologist. At the sentencing
hearing, the court indicated that it took all of that information into
consideration, it believed the prosecution had considered Juarez’s
mitigation evidence in offering her the plea agreement, and it
recognized that Juarez did not pose a continuing threat to society
and would have the opportunity to get out prison at some point
because of the plea agreement. However, noting that Juarez took
another human life, the court sentenced her to thirty-two years in
prison.
II. Discussion
¶5 Juarez contends that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed the maximum sentence authorized by statute.
Specifically, she argues that the court did not explain its reasoning
for imposing the maximum allowable sentence and failed to
properly consider her mitigation evidence because it believed that
the prosecution’s plea offer took that into consideration. Based on
our review of the record, the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
2 A. Plea Proviso Does Not Bar Juarez’s Appeal
¶6 As an initial matter, we note and reject the People’s assertion
that the plea proviso portion of section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2024,
bars Juarez’s appeal of her sentence.
¶7 As relevant here, section 18-1-409(1) provides that any person
convicted of a non-class 1 felony “shall have the right to one
appellate review of the propriety of the sentence;” but, in what is
often referred to as the plea proviso provision of that statute,
appellate review of the propriety of a sentence is barred “if the
sentence is within a range agreed upon by the parties pursuant to a
plea agreement.” Id.
¶8 Contrary to the People’s argument, Juarez’s plea agreement
did not include “a range agreed upon by the parties.” Rather, the
plea agreement informed Juarez that the offense to which she was
pleading guilty — second degree murder with heat of passion as a
mitigator — was a class 3 felony that was both an extraordinary
risk crime and a crime of violence and was punishable by ten to
thirty-two years in prison. See §§ 18-3-103(1)(a), (3)(b), (4) (making
the offense a class 3 felony and subject to crime of violence
sentencing), 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (10) (setting forth the
3 presumptive range for a class 3 felony as four to twelve years in
prison, but increasing the top of that range by four years because
it’s an extraordinary risk crime), 18-1.3-406(1), (2)(a) (mandating a
sentence of at least the midpoint to twice the maximum of the
presumptive range for crimes of violence), C.R.S. 2024.
¶9 However, the plea agreement left sentencing “open” and, other
than reciting the applicable statutory sentencing range, did not
contain “a range agreed upon by the parties.” Thus, the plea
proviso provision in section 18-1-409(1) does not bar our review of
the propriety of Juarez’s sentence. See People v. O’Dell, 53 P.3d
655, 657 (Colo. App. 2001) (The plea proviso did not apply because
“[t]he plain language of [section] 18-1-409(1) requires an agreement
by the parties to a sentencing range,” and, “although [the]
defendant was advised of the penalties applicable to the offenses to
which he was pleading guilty, there is no indication in the record
that his plea agreement included any type of agreed sentencing
range or cap.”). But see People v. Scofield, 74 P.3d 385, 386-87
(Colo. App. 2002) (the plea proviso did apply where the parties
“expressly agreed upon” a sentencing range, even though that range
was the same as the statutory aggravated sentencing range).
4 B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 10 A review of the propriety of the sentence “involves the intrinsic
fairness or appropriateness of the sentence itself.” People v.
Malacara, 606 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Colo. 1980).
¶ 11 The trial court has extremely broad discretion when, as here,
it imposes a sentence within the statutory range. People v. Rice,
2015 COA 168, ¶ 8; see also Allman v. People, 2019 CO 78, ¶ 22.
We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion because the
sentencing court is more familiar with the circumstances of the
case, see People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 71, and that familiarity
places the sentencing court “in the best position to fix a sentence
that reflects a balance of the relevant considerations,” People v.
Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 507 (Colo. 1986).
¶ 12 Thus, we will not disturb this kind of sentencing decision on
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion by
imposing a sentence that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair or is based on an erroneous construction of the law. People
v. Herrera, 2014 COA 20, ¶ 16.
¶ 13 In exercising its sentencing discretion, the court should
consider, among other things, the nature of the offender’s crime and
5 the events surrounding the criminal conduct, the nature and extent
of the victim’s injuries, the offender’s character, rehabilitative
potential and criminal history, any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, and the protection of the public. Torrez, ¶ 73;
People v. Maestas, 224 P.3d 405, 409 (Colo. App. 2009). When
weighing those factors, however, the court need not expressly refer
to each factor it considers and need only provide a reasonable
explanation for its sentence. See Torrez, ¶ 74. A trial court can
properly find that certain factors are more compelling than others
and may conclude that “the circumstances of the crime alone . . .
justify the imposition of a particularly harsh sentence.” Id.
¶ 14 We must uphold the sentence if it is (1) within the range
required by law; (2) based on appropriate considerations as
reflected in the record; and (3) factually supported by the
circumstances of the case. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 708
(Colo. 1990). We will substitute our judgment for the trial court’s
judgment as to the appropriate sentence “only in truly exceptional
circumstances.” People v. Cole, 926 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. App.
1996); see also People v. Tresco, 2019 COA 61, ¶ 31.
6 C. Analysis
¶ 15 In determining Juarez’s sentence, the court stated that it had
read and re-read all of the experts’ reports and . . . reached the conclusion that, for the most part, everything that has been said and argued was taken into consideration by the prosecution in deciding to offer second degree murder, heat of passion, the history of domestic violence, you know, everything [Juarez’s domestic violence expert] was talking about, the psychological reports.
¶ 16 The court then acknowledged that Juarez admitted to having
ended a life under a sudden heat of passion and, as a result, she
was not facing a sentence of life in prison. Further, the court
agreed with defense counsel that Juarez did not pose a threat to the
general public because this offense occurred as part of a specific
situation. However, the court found that “[i]n the end, . . . indeed,
for taking the life of another human being, a term of 32 years in the
Department of Corrections has absolutely been earned.”
¶ 17 We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
decision to impose a thirty-two-year sentence.
¶ 18 In sentencing Juarez, the court indicated that it had read all of
Juarez’s mitigation evidence. And although it did not expressly
recount that evidence, there is no indication in the record that the
7 court ignored it. Further, while the court could have made more
extensive findings in support of its decision, it is not required to
discuss every factor relevant to its decision and only needs to
provide a reasonable explanation for its sentencing decision. See
Torrez, ¶ 74. The court indicated it believed that Juarez’s action in
taking another person’s life warranted the thirty-two-year sentence.
Because the district court can properly determine that the
circumstances of the crime alone justify a particularly harsh
sentence, see id., we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in
this case.
¶ 19 Thus, because the sentence falls within the statutory range,
was based on appropriate considerations, and is supported by the
circumstances of the case, we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the district court as to what sentence should have been
imposed. See Fuller, 791 P.2d at 708; Tresco, ¶ 31.
III. Disposition
¶ 20 We affirm Juarez’s sentence.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BROWN concur.