Peo v. Jones

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 3, 2025
• Docket: 23CA0304
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA0304 Peo v Jones 07-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0304 El Paso County District Court No. 21CR5498 Honorable William H. Moller, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jeremy Dewayne Jones,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, John Plimpton, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Jeremy Dewayne Jones appeals the judgment of conviction

entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree

murder. He contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence of his

mental state presented at trial and (2) the district court reversibly

erred by admitting twenty-one graphic photos of the victim’s

remains. We affirm the conviction.

I. Background

¶2 In 2020, Joseph Dewing and the victim — whom he called his

“wife,” though he admitted they were not “legally married” — were

hanging around the front of a 7-Eleven when Jones arrived to buy a

drink. Dewing, armed with a wooden “fighting stick” in each hand,

approached Jones as he was getting out of his car and accused him

of staring at them. The two men exchanged heated words, and

Dewing eventually struck Jones in the head with one of his sticks.

This prompted Jones to retreat to his car and leave; however,

Dewing struck the vehicle several times as it was pulling away. The

victim was not involved in the altercation.

¶3 A short time later, Dewing and the victim left the 7-Eleven on

their bicycles. Jones followed them in his car because he “didn’t

want [Dewing] to get away with hitting [him] with the sticks.” After

1 the couple turned into a narrow parking lot, Jones ran into the side

of the victim’s bicycle, causing the victim to end up under his car.

Though nobody saw the collision, Dewing and several other

witnesses testified that they heard a crash followed by the victim’s

screams.

¶4 As Jones came to a stop, Dewing got off his bicycle and yelled

something along the lines of “That’s my wife!” or “You ran over my

wife!” as he ran toward the car, where he began hitting Jones with

his fighting sticks through the open window. Jones got out of the

car to fight back and managed to take one of the sticks. During the

fight, Dewing tripped over his bicycle and fell to the ground. Jones

repeatedly hit the downed Dewing with the stick until a bystander

approached, at which point Jones stopped and got back in his car.

Dewing then banged on the side of the vehicle, saying, “Just let me

get my wife. . . . She is under your car.”

¶5 Jones drove off, while Dewing chased him yelling that his wife

was still under the car. At a nearby stop sign, Jones stopped,

exited the car, and looked under the back of his car. According to

Dewing, Jones said, “Yep, she is still underneath there.” Jones

then got back in the car and once again drove off with the victim

2 still trapped underneath. Her corpse eventually dislodged and was

left in the street. The coroner testified that the victim was likely

alive for “a significant amount of time” while being dragged under

the car.

¶6 The People charged Jones with first degree murder for the

victim and second degree assault against Dewing. At trial, Jones’s

telling of events largely aligned with Dewing’s, and he did not

dispute that the victim was killed by being dragged under his car.

Instead, he claimed that he never knew that the victim was trapped

underneath — he testified that he did not hit the victim in the

parking lot and never heard her scream; that he did not see, feel, or

hear anything wrong with his car; and that Dewing never said

anything about the victim being trapped under his car.

¶7 The jury acquitted Jones of the assault charge, but it found

him guilty of second degree murder as a lesser included offense of

the first degree murder charge.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶8 Jones first contends that there was insufficient evidence that

he knowingly caused the victim’s death. We are not persuaded.

3 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶9 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence was sufficient both in quantity and quality to sustain a

conviction. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). To

determine whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to

support a conviction, we consider “whether the relevant evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient

to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is

guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting

People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973)). In doing so, we

give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences

supported by a logical connection between the facts established and

the conclusion inferred. Id. at 1292.

¶ 10 In making this determination, we recognize that “it is the jury

which should decide the difficult questions of witness credibility

and the weight to be given to conflicting items of evidence,” People v.

Gibson, 203 P.3d 571, 575 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting People v.

Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 592 (Colo. 1982)), and we do not sit as a

thirteenth juror to reassess witness credibility or to reweigh the

4 evidence presented to the jury, see Clark, 232 P.3d at 1293;

People v. Franklin, 645 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1982) (“The determination of

the credibility of witnesses is a matter solely within the province of

the jury.”).

B. Discussion

¶ 11 A person commits second degree murder by, as relevant here,

“knowingly caus[ing] the death of a person.” § 18-3-103(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2024. “A person acts ‘knowingly’ . . . with respect to a result

of his conduct[] when he is aware that his conduct is practically

certain to cause the result.” § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 12 Jones asserts there was insufficient evidence that he

knowingly caused the victim’s death. Specifically, he asserts that

“there was no evidence that he was aware” that the victim was

under his car when he drove away. But a defendant’s mental state

can be inferred from his conduct and the circumstances

surrounding the commission of a crime. People v. Grant, 174 P.3d

798, 812 (Colo. App. 2007); see People v. Collie, 995 P.2d 765, 773

(Colo. App. 1999) (“Evidence of a defendant’s intent can ‘rarely be

proven other than by circumstantial or indirect evidence.’” (quoting

People v. Valenzuela, 825 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Colo. App. 1991))).

5 ¶ 13 The evidence presented to the jury included the following:

• Jones chose to follow Dewing and the victim in his car

because he “didn’t want [Dewing] to get away with hitting

[him] with the sticks.”

• Jones accelerated toward the couple as they entered the

parking lot. Security camera footage showed the victim

clearly illuminated by Jones’s headlights as he sped

toward her. Although no one witnessed the collision (and

it was not captured by the camera), there was expert

testimony that Jones’s car had paint on the front wheel

that was “indistinguishable” from the paint on the

victim’s bicycle and that the bicycle had damage

consistent with being hit by the car.

• Jones admitted that his car window was partially rolled

down and his radio was off. Multiple witnesses —

including one person who was down the street from the

vehicle — testified that they heard a loud crash, and

multiple witnesses testified that they heard the victim’s

loud screams. Most notably, Jones tried to call a friend

6 before the collision; that friend testified that he received a

voicemail in which he could hear a woman screaming.

• Dewing testified that he repeatedly yelled, “[You] just ran

over my wife!” as he approached Jones’s car window after

the crash and that he banged on the car while yelling

that his wife was under the car when Jones began to

drive away.

• A witness testified that she saw “something in the front of

[Jones’s] car because the front tires were not making

traction[]” and she could hear “that there was something

underneath” that was making a “squishing sound.”

Similarly, Dewing testified that he heard a “scraping

sound” like “something dragging . . . across the ground”

as Jones drove away.

• Dewing chased Jones while yelling that his wife was

under the car as Jones drove away. A security camera

captured Jones eventually stopping at a stop sign, getting

out, and looking underneath his car. Dewing testified

that Jones then said, “Yep, she is still underneath there.”

7 ¶ 14 We conclude that this evidence was sufficient for a rational

jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones knew the victim

was under his car as he drove away from the parking lot.

¶ 15 We recognize that Jones testified that he was unaware that the

victim was beneath his car. But evidence is not rendered

insufficient just because it is conflicting. See People v. Moya,

899 P.2d 212, 218 (Colo. App. 1994). And as the fact finder, the

jury was free to — and evidently did — find Jones’s testimony not

credible; we may not substitute the jury’s assessment of witness

credibility with our own. See People v. McIntier, 134 P.3d 467, 471

(Colo. App. 2005) (“[I]t is the fact finder’s function in a criminal case

to . . . resolve conflicts, testimonial inconsistencies, and disputes in

the evidence.”); Clark, 232 P.3d at 1293. Moreover, once “the jury

did disbelieve [Jones], it was further entitled to consider whatever it

concluded to be perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt.”

People v. Clark, 214 P.3d 531, 538 (Colo. App. 2009) (quoting

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992) (opinion of Thomas, J.,

joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.)), aff’d on other grounds,

232 P.3d 1287 (Colo. 2010).

8 ¶ 16 We are not persuaded otherwise by Jones’s reliance on the

“equipoise principle” articulated in United States v. Goldesberry,

128 F.4th 1183 (10th Cir. 2025). This principle requires reversal of

a conviction when the evidence is in “equipoise,” meaning the

evidence “gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a

theory of guilt and a theory of innocence.’” Id. at 1193 (quoting

United States v. Lovern, 590 F.3d 1095, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009)).

¶ 17 Jones has not identified, nor are we aware of, any Colorado

state court cases that have adopted the “equipoise principle.”

Indeed, the principle appears to “sit[] in tension with our standard

of deference to the jury” by “allow[ing] courts to usurp the jury’s

function.” Id. at 1206 (Eid, J., dissenting); see People v. Carlson,

72 P.3d 411, 416 (Colo. App. 2003) (“Where reasonable minds could

differ, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.”). But more

importantly, the evidence here is not in equipoise because, as

outlined above, there was ample affirmative evidence from which

the jury could infer Jones knew the victim was under his car. Cf.

Goldesberry, 128 F.4th at 1198 (“Even if the jury discounted

evidence favorable to [the defendant], . . . the government would

still have no affirmative evidence of mens rea.”).

9 ¶ 18 Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as we must, a reasonable fact finder could find that

Jones knowingly caused the victim’s death.

III. Admission of Victim Photos

¶ 19 Jones next contends that the district court abused its

discretion by admitting twenty-one photos of the victim’s remains.

He argues that the number of photos was unfairly prejudicial and

unnecessary. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 20 The district court has broad discretion in determining the

admissibility of evidence based on its relevance, probative value,

and prejudicial impact. People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 20. We

review these evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

People v. Quillen, 2023 COA 22M, ¶ 14. The district court abuses

its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or if the court misapplies the law. Id.

¶ 21 Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” CRE 401. But relevant evidence may be excluded if

10 its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. CRE 403.

¶ 22 The balancing test under Rule 403 favors the admission of

evidence. People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d 365, 370 (Colo. App. 2007).

Thus, when reviewing a district court’s exercise of discretion under

Rule 403, an appellate court must afford the evidence the

maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact finder

and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected. Id.

¶ 23 Photos of a victim are admissible in evidence so long as they

depict relevant facts and are not unnecessarily gruesome. People v.

Herrera, 2012 COA 13, ¶ 30. Such photos may be relevant for

various purposes, such as to portray the scene of the crime, the

victim’s appearance and condition, or any other facts a witness

could describe in words. Id. at ¶ 33. It is within the district court’s

discretion to decide whether photos are unnecessarily gruesome or

inflammatory so as to have an undue tendency to suggest a

decision on an improper basis, such as sympathy, hatred,

contempt, retribution, or horror. People v. Ruibal, 2015 COA 55,

¶¶ 41, 43; see also CRE 403.

11 B. Additional Background

¶ 24 Before opening statements, defense counsel objected to the

admission of the challenged photos, arguing that they were

extremely prejudicial but only marginally relevant because Jones

was not contesting the manner of death. The prosecutor countered

that the photos were relevant to show the crime scene and the

victim’s condition and to corroborate the coroner’s testimony that

the victim was actively bleeding (and therefore still alive) for some of

the time she was under the car. And he stated that the reason

there were so many photos was to “start . . . from a distance to

give . . . context and then move in closer” to show different angles of

individual wounds.

¶ 25 The district court recognized the potential for prejudice from “a

succession of photos showing the same injury which just tends to

inflame the emotions of the jury.” But after reviewing the photos,

the court found that they depicted “a broad-brush picture of the

scene of the event, the injuries to the victim, and then the photos

themselves show different areas of the victim’s body and do not

appear to focus on any one injury over another.” As a result, the

court overruled defense counsel’s objection, and all twenty-one

12 photos of the victim’s remains were later admitted during witness

testimony.

C. Discussion

¶ 26 Jones concedes that some of the photos “were undoubtedly

admissible.” But he contends that “[i]t was not necessary to admit

the vast majority of the[] twenty-one photographs” because “[t]he

same probative value could have been achieved by admitting a

fraction of the . . . photographs — perhaps five or fewer.” We

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting the photos.

¶ 27 As the prosecution argued, the photos were relevant for

portraying the crime scene, establishing the victim’s identity and

condition, and corroborating the coroner’s testimony regarding the

timing of the victim’s death. See Herrera, ¶ 33; see also People v.

Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 747 (Colo. 1999) (photos of homicide victims

were relevant to show, among other things, “the crime scene, the

victims’ identities, [and] the injuries to the victims”).

¶ 28 Although it is true, as Jones argues, that nobody disputed

how the victim was killed, the challenged photos were still

probative. Specifically, the photos were relevant to the coroner’s

13 testimony because whether the victim was already dead before

Jones drove away from the parking lot was a disputed issue at trial.

Additionally, the photos, which showed the extensive nature of the

victim’s injuries, were relevant to dispute Jones’s claim that the

death was accidental and that he never knew the victim was under

his car. See Ruibal, ¶¶ 47-48 (photos of a homicide victim’s head

showing the severity of the injuries were relevant to refute the

defendant’s alternative suspect theory and to prove the defendant’s

mental state by showing he acted with intent to cause serious

bodily injury).

¶ 29 There were numerous photos of the victim’s injuries because

the injuries were spread across her body. See Herrera, ¶ 34. Under

these circumstances, the sheer number of photos does not make

their admission cumulative or unduly prejudicial. See People v.

Hall, 107 P.3d 1073, 1079 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Evidence is not

‘unfairly prejudicial’ simply because it damages the defendant’s

case.”); Lira v. People, 445 P.2d 62, 64 (Colo. 1968) (evidence is

admissible, even if cumulative, if “it sheds light on a material

inquiry”) (citation omitted).

14 ¶ 30 Moreover, the photos were not rendered inadmissible simply

because they vividly presented the details of a shocking crime, see

People v. Villalobos, 159 P.3d 624, 631 (Colo. App. 2006); because

they illustrated details a witness could have described in words, see

People v. Sepeda, 581 P.2d 723, 730 (1978); or because they related

to some matters (such as the manner of death) that were not in

dispute, see Herrera, ¶ 32.

¶ 31 And, ultimately, it was up to the district court, exercising its

discretion, to determine whether the evidence was unnecessarily

gruesome or inflammatory and to decide which and how many

photos to allow. See Ruibal, ¶ 41. Although we might have reached

a different conclusion on the admission of all twenty-one photos, we

cannot say that the court exceeded its broad discretion. See

Sepeda, 581 P.2d at 729-30 (district court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting photos of the victim’s fatal wounds); Ruibal,

¶ 50 (district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

multiple color photos of the inside of the victim’s head); Villalobos,

159 P.3d at 631 (district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting a color photo showing the trajectory of a bullet through

the victim’s head, even though it showed blood around the victim’s

15 head, as the photo was not “particularly shocking or

inflammatory . . . in the context of a murder case”).

¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that the probative value of the

challenged photos was not substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice, and the district court did not err by admitting

them.

IV. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.