24CA0484 Peo v Johns 07-10-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0484 Jefferson County District Court No. 05CR3194 Honorable Tamara S. Russell, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Stephen Raymond Johns,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 10, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Stephen Raymond Johns, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Stephen Raymond Johns, appeals the trial court’s
order denying his Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal
sentence. We affirm the trial court’s order but remand the case for
correction of the mittimus.
I. Background
¶2 Johns was charged with class 3 felony sexual assault in
violation of section 18-3-402(1)(a), (4)(a), C.R.S. 2005. According to
the complaint, Johns committed sexual assault in 2005. In 2006,
Johns pleaded guilty to an added class 4 felony sexual assault
charge in violation of section 18-3-402(1)(a), in exchange for
dismissal of the class 3 felony sexual assault charge. The motion to
add the second count also alleged that Johns committed sexual
assault in 2005. In his petition to enter a guilty plea, Johns stated
that he fully understood that if the court accepted his plea of guilty
to class 4 sexual assault, he “may be sentenced to an indeterminate
term of imprisonment in the Department of Corrections.” Johns
also stated in the petition that he fully understood that the court
could “grant [him] an indeterminate period of probation for a period
of at least 10 years and up to a maximum of [his] natural life.”
1 ¶3 The trial court sentenced Johns to a term of five years to life in
the custody of the Department of Corrections to be served
consecutively to a sentence in another case. He was credited for
312 days of time served. The mittimus, however, didn’t specifically
state the terms of Johns’ parole upon his release. After sentencing,
Johns moved to withdraw his plea and objected to the introduction
of prior bad acts at sentencing. The trial court denied his motion
and Johns appealed. A division of this court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. People v. Johns, (Colo. App. No. 06CA1858, Jan. 17,
2008) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
¶4 Years later, Johns filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence. In that motion, he contended that his sentence
was illegal and must be corrected to (1) “the allowable 5 years to the
Colorado Department of Corrections” and (2) reflect “parole in
accordance with §[ ]17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S. [2024] . . . which is to
be discretionary and not mandatory.” Approximately two months
after Johns filed his motion, the trial court ordered him to
supplement his Crim. P. 35(a) motion “with a short and precise
statement of two things: 1) what he believes is illegal about the
sentence imposed in 2006; and 2) what he is asking the Court to do
2 to correct it.” In his supplemental motion, Johns clarified that he is
contending that his indeterminate sentence isn’t authorized by
Colorado law and that he is subject to discretionary, not
mandatory, parole. He also requested that the court correct his
sentence by amending the mittimus. The trial court denied Johns’
Crim. P. 35(a) motion, finding that his sentence isn’t illegal. Johns
appeals this order.
II. Analysis
¶5 Johns contends that the trial court erred by denying his Crim.
P. 35(a) motion because (1) his indeterminate sentence is illegal and
(2) he is subject to a discretionary parole term but was improperly
sentenced to a mandatory parole term. We address and reject each
of Johns’ contentions in turn.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Sentencing Scheme
¶6 Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), “[t]he court may correct a sentence
that was not authorized by law or that was imposed without
jurisdiction at any time.” A sentence is illegal if it’s “inconsistent
with the terms specified by statutes.” People v. Tennyson, 2023
COA 2, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Green, 36 P.3d 125, 126 (Colo. App.
3 2001)), aff’d, 2025 CO 31. We review the legality of a sentence de
novo. Id. at ¶ 9.
¶7 The Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998
(SOLSA), sections 18-1.3-1001 to -1012, C.R.S. 2024, applies to
“any person who commits a sex offense on or after November 1,
1998.” § 18-1.3-1012. Johns pleaded guilty to having committed
sexual assault in 2005, in violation of section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S.
2005. Thus, SOLSA is applicable to Johns’ sentence and is the
statutory scheme we must follow when determining the legality of
his sentence.
B. Indeterminate Sentence
¶8 We first address Johns’ contention that the indeterminate
nature of his sentence is illegal. We disagree with this contention
and conclude that the sentence the court imposed is legal under
SOLSA.
¶9 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, SOLSA provides
that, for the offense Johns pleaded guilty to, “the district court
having jurisdiction shall sentence a sex offender to the custody of
the [Department of Corrections] for an indeterminate term of at least
the minimum of the presumptive range specified in section 18-1.3-
4 401 for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the sex
offender’s natural life.” § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis
added). Our supreme court has construed section 18-1.3-
1004(1)(a) as requiring an indeterminate sentence for a class 4
felony sex offense “consisting of an upper term of the sex offender’s
natural life and a lower term of a definite number of years, not less
than the minimum nor more than twice the maximum of the
presumptive range authorized for the class of felony of which the
defendant stands convicted.” Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274,
1279 (Colo. 2007).
¶ 10 In 2006, for persons sentenced for a class 4 felony committed
on or after July 1, 1993, the presumptive sentencing range — used
to calculate the lower limit of a sentence under SOLSA — was a
minimum of two years imprisonment and a maximum of six years
imprisonment. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2006. As noted
before, the upper limit was to be a maximum of the defendant’s
natural life. § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a); see also Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279.
¶ 11 The trial court sentenced Johns to a term of five years to life in
the Department of Corrections. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-
1004(1)(a), the indeterminacy of the sentence — that is, that the
5 sentence’s upper limit is the rest of Johns’ natural life — is
required. See Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279. And the minimum term of
the sentence — five years — is proper because it’s not less than the
minimum term of two years for a class 4 felony in section 18-1.3-
401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2006, nor is it greater than twelve years,
which is twice the maximum of the presumptive range for a class 4
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24CA0484 Peo v Johns 07-10-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0484 Jefferson County District Court No. 05CR3194 Honorable Tamara S. Russell, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Stephen Raymond Johns,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 10, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Stephen Raymond Johns, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Stephen Raymond Johns, appeals the trial court’s
order denying his Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal
sentence. We affirm the trial court’s order but remand the case for
correction of the mittimus.
I. Background
¶2 Johns was charged with class 3 felony sexual assault in
violation of section 18-3-402(1)(a), (4)(a), C.R.S. 2005. According to
the complaint, Johns committed sexual assault in 2005. In 2006,
Johns pleaded guilty to an added class 4 felony sexual assault
charge in violation of section 18-3-402(1)(a), in exchange for
dismissal of the class 3 felony sexual assault charge. The motion to
add the second count also alleged that Johns committed sexual
assault in 2005. In his petition to enter a guilty plea, Johns stated
that he fully understood that if the court accepted his plea of guilty
to class 4 sexual assault, he “may be sentenced to an indeterminate
term of imprisonment in the Department of Corrections.” Johns
also stated in the petition that he fully understood that the court
could “grant [him] an indeterminate period of probation for a period
of at least 10 years and up to a maximum of [his] natural life.”
1 ¶3 The trial court sentenced Johns to a term of five years to life in
the custody of the Department of Corrections to be served
consecutively to a sentence in another case. He was credited for
312 days of time served. The mittimus, however, didn’t specifically
state the terms of Johns’ parole upon his release. After sentencing,
Johns moved to withdraw his plea and objected to the introduction
of prior bad acts at sentencing. The trial court denied his motion
and Johns appealed. A division of this court affirmed the trial
court’s ruling. People v. Johns, (Colo. App. No. 06CA1858, Jan. 17,
2008) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
¶4 Years later, Johns filed a Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence. In that motion, he contended that his sentence
was illegal and must be corrected to (1) “the allowable 5 years to the
Colorado Department of Corrections” and (2) reflect “parole in
accordance with §[ ]17-2-201(5)(a.5), C.R.S. [2024] . . . which is to
be discretionary and not mandatory.” Approximately two months
after Johns filed his motion, the trial court ordered him to
supplement his Crim. P. 35(a) motion “with a short and precise
statement of two things: 1) what he believes is illegal about the
sentence imposed in 2006; and 2) what he is asking the Court to do
2 to correct it.” In his supplemental motion, Johns clarified that he is
contending that his indeterminate sentence isn’t authorized by
Colorado law and that he is subject to discretionary, not
mandatory, parole. He also requested that the court correct his
sentence by amending the mittimus. The trial court denied Johns’
Crim. P. 35(a) motion, finding that his sentence isn’t illegal. Johns
appeals this order.
II. Analysis
¶5 Johns contends that the trial court erred by denying his Crim.
P. 35(a) motion because (1) his indeterminate sentence is illegal and
(2) he is subject to a discretionary parole term but was improperly
sentenced to a mandatory parole term. We address and reject each
of Johns’ contentions in turn.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Sentencing Scheme
¶6 Pursuant to Crim. P. 35(a), “[t]he court may correct a sentence
that was not authorized by law or that was imposed without
jurisdiction at any time.” A sentence is illegal if it’s “inconsistent
with the terms specified by statutes.” People v. Tennyson, 2023
COA 2, ¶ 10 (quoting People v. Green, 36 P.3d 125, 126 (Colo. App.
3 2001)), aff’d, 2025 CO 31. We review the legality of a sentence de
novo. Id. at ¶ 9.
¶7 The Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998
(SOLSA), sections 18-1.3-1001 to -1012, C.R.S. 2024, applies to
“any person who commits a sex offense on or after November 1,
1998.” § 18-1.3-1012. Johns pleaded guilty to having committed
sexual assault in 2005, in violation of section 18-3-402(1)(a), C.R.S.
2005. Thus, SOLSA is applicable to Johns’ sentence and is the
statutory scheme we must follow when determining the legality of
his sentence.
B. Indeterminate Sentence
¶8 We first address Johns’ contention that the indeterminate
nature of his sentence is illegal. We disagree with this contention
and conclude that the sentence the court imposed is legal under
SOLSA.
¶9 Subject to exceptions not applicable here, SOLSA provides
that, for the offense Johns pleaded guilty to, “the district court
having jurisdiction shall sentence a sex offender to the custody of
the [Department of Corrections] for an indeterminate term of at least
the minimum of the presumptive range specified in section 18-1.3-
4 401 for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the sex
offender’s natural life.” § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis
added). Our supreme court has construed section 18-1.3-
1004(1)(a) as requiring an indeterminate sentence for a class 4
felony sex offense “consisting of an upper term of the sex offender’s
natural life and a lower term of a definite number of years, not less
than the minimum nor more than twice the maximum of the
presumptive range authorized for the class of felony of which the
defendant stands convicted.” Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274,
1279 (Colo. 2007).
¶ 10 In 2006, for persons sentenced for a class 4 felony committed
on or after July 1, 1993, the presumptive sentencing range — used
to calculate the lower limit of a sentence under SOLSA — was a
minimum of two years imprisonment and a maximum of six years
imprisonment. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2006. As noted
before, the upper limit was to be a maximum of the defendant’s
natural life. § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a); see also Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279.
¶ 11 The trial court sentenced Johns to a term of five years to life in
the Department of Corrections. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-
1004(1)(a), the indeterminacy of the sentence — that is, that the
5 sentence’s upper limit is the rest of Johns’ natural life — is
required. See Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279. And the minimum term of
the sentence — five years — is proper because it’s not less than the
minimum term of two years for a class 4 felony in section 18-1.3-
401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2006, nor is it greater than twelve years,
which is twice the maximum of the presumptive range for a class 4
felony. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2006; § 18-1.3-1004(1)(a);
see also Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279.
¶ 12 Thus, Johns’ indeterminate sentence to the Department of
Corrections is legal.
C. Parole
¶ 13 Next, we address Johns’ contention that his sentence is illegal
because the parole term imposed by the trial court is mandatory
rather than discretionary. Again, we disagree with Johns, though
we agree that the mittimus must be amended to properly reflect the
appropriate parole sentence.
¶ 14 According to SOLSA, “[t]he period of parole for any sex
offender convicted of a class 4 felony shall be an indeterminate term
of at least ten years and a maximum of the remainder of the sex
offender’s natural life.” § 18-1.3-1006(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024 (emphasis
6 added). In People v. Tucker, a division of this court examined this
provision and determined that section 18-1.3-1006(1)(b) “plainly
requires mandatory minimum periods of parole” but the “overall
statutory scheme . . . makes it clear that the [parole] board’s
decision to release offenders on parole contains elements of
discretion.” 194 P.3d 503, 504 (Colo. App. 2008); see also § 17-2-
201(5)(a.7), C.R.S. 2024 (if a person is sentenced under SOLSA for
an offense committed on or after November 1, 1998, “the [parole]
board shall grant parole or refuse to grant parole, fix the conditions
thereof, and set the duration of the term of parole granted pursuant
7 to” SOLSA).1 The Tucker court never explicitly characterized the
parole requirements under SOLSA as mandatory or discretionary.
194 P.3d at 504. Rather, the division concluded that the best
practice is to identify on the mittimus the statute under which
parole is determined rather than characterizing parole as either
mandatory or discretionary. Id.
1 Johns seemingly contends that section 17-2-201(5)(a.7), C.R.S.
2024, requiring parole to be determined pursuant to SOLSA, isn’t applicable. To support this contention, and the contention that parole must be discretionary, he also cites multiple cases in which the sexual offense occurred either before the enactment of SOLSA, see People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 349 (Colo. 2001); Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 848 (Colo. 2001), or before July 1, 2002, see People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo. App. 2007); People v. Huber, (Colo. App. No. 03CA1579, Dec. 16, 2004) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). But none of these cases render section 17-2- 201(5)(a.7) inapplicable to Johns’ sentence because the date of his class 4 sexual offense was February 2005. Currently, and at the time of Johns’ sentencing, section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) states, “Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (a.7) of this subsection (5), as to any person sentenced for conviction of an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior . . . committed on or after July 1, 1996, but prior to July 1, 2002, the [parole] board has the sole power to grant or refuse to grant parole and to fix the condition thereof . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the date of Johns’ offense was in 2005, section 17-2-201(5)(a.5) wasn’t applicable to his case; rather section 17-2-201(5)(a.7), controlled his sentence.
8 ¶ 15 In Johns’ case, the mittimus makes no mention of mandatory
or discretionary parole. Indeed, the mittimus doesn’t reference
Johns’ parole at all.
¶ 16 Because SOLSA requires an indeterminate sentence for sex
offenders and because the trial court never characterized Johns’
parole as mandatory, the trial court didn’t err by denying his Crim.
P. 35(a) motion. The trial court, however, should have stated on the
mittimus that Johns’ parole is determined according to section 18-
1.3-1006(1)(b). See Tucker, 194 P.3d at 504. We, therefore, remand
to the trial court to correct the mittimus to state that Johns’ parole
shall be determined according to section 18-1.3-1006(1)(b). See
Crim. P. 36 (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts
of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such
notice, if any, as the court orders.”).
III. Disposition
¶ 17 The order is affirmed, and we remand the case to the trial
court to correct the mittimus to state that Johns’ parole shall be
determined according to section 18-1.3-1006(1)(b).
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.