24CA0037 Peo v Jackson 12-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0037 City and County of Denver District Court No. 11CR4876 Honorable Alex C. Meyers, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Billy Lawrence Jackson,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Dunn and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Billy Lawrence Jackson, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Billy Lawrence Jackson, appeals the district
court’s order granting in part and denying in part his motion to
correct the mittimus. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2011, the prosecution charged Jackson with second degree
kidnapping of a robbery victim under section 18-3-302(1), (3)(b),
C.R.S. 2011, and robbery under section 18-4-301(1), C.R.S. 2011.
The version of section 18-3-302(3) in effect at the time provided that
“[s]econd degree kidnapping is a class 2 felony if any of the
following circumstances exist: (a) [t]he person kidnapped is a victim
of a sexual offense pursuant to part 4 of this article; or (b) [t]he
person kidnapped is a victim of a robbery.”
¶3 A jury convicted Jackson as charged. The district court
sentenced him to twenty-four years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.
¶4 The district court issued a mittimus reflecting Jackson’s
convictions. The mittimus listed the charges as “KIDNAPPING
2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” under section
18-3-302(1), (3), and “ROBBERY” under section 18-4-301(1).
1 ¶5 Jackson appealed his convictions, and a division of this court
affirmed. People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1602, Mar. 19,
2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The supreme court
denied certiorari, and the mandate was issued in 2015.
¶6 Eight years later, Jackson filed a motion to amend the
mittimus. As relevant here, he argued that the charge for
“KIDNAPPING 2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” was incorrect
because there had been no allegations that he committed a sex
offense. He asserted that the error violated his due process rights
and caused him undue hardship.
¶7 The district court granted the motion in part, explaining that
“Count 1 is listed as ‘KIDNAPPING 2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/
ROBBERY,’ and Defendant correctly states he was not charged or
convicted of a sex offense of any kind.” But, the court stated, the
description for second degree kidnapping under section 18-3-302(3)
is hardcoded into the computer system to show “KIDNAPPING
2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” (showing both subsection
(3)(a) and (3)(b)), and the court “[could not] change this hard-coded
computer entry.” The court also said it was “not aware of any
undue hardship posed by this mittimus language, and Defendant
2 cites none.” Nonetheless, the court said it would amend the
mittimus with “additional language to clarify that the associated
robbery is the basis for designating the kidnapping charge as a
class 2 felony, not a sex offense.” It further stated that the order
was “intended to clarify the issue if needed as Defendant completes
his prison sentence and parole in this case.”
¶8 The court amended the mittimus by adding the following
sentence: “PER ORDER DATED 12/6/23, COUNT 1 IS AS TO
KIDNAPPING DURING THE COMMISSION OF ROBBERY ONLY,
NOT A SEX OFFENSE.”
II. Analysis
¶9 Jackson appeals the district court’s order, contending that the
kidnapping charge listed on his mittimus is ambiguous as to
whether section 18-3-302(3)(a) or (3)(b) is applicable to him, which
renders the statute void for vagueness and violates his due process
rights. He again requests an amended mittimus so that the
description of the kidnapping charge does not show “KIDNAPPING
2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY.” We discern no error in the
court’s order.
3 ¶ 10 “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders.” Crim. P. 36. Because the language of
this rule indicates that the decision to correct an error is
discretionary rather than mandatory, we review for an abuse
of discretion. Quintana v. People, 613 P.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Colo.
1980). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Rodriguez, 2022 COA
98, ¶ 12.
¶ 11 Whether a defendant was denied due process is a question of
law that we review de novo. People v. Calderon, 2014 COA 144,
¶ 23.
¶ 12 We cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by amending the mittimus as it did and by finding that it
couldn’t change the description of the kidnapping charge. This
ruling was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, but
rather was based on the court’s determination about its own
computer system. Jackson is not entitled to further amendment of
4 the mittimus because correction of the kidnapping charge’s
description isn’t possible.
¶ 13 The language in the mittimus also doesn’t violate Jackson’s
due process rights. Due process requires that defendants receive
adequate notice of the charges filed against them. See People v.
Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 455 (Colo. 2005); see also U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Here, Jackson received notice
of the charges against him through the complaint and information.
The complaint correctly identified the statute under which he was
being charged — second degree kidnapping under section
18-3-302(1), (3). It stated that “the victim was the victim of a
robbery; in violation of section 18-3-302(1), (3)(b).” And the
mittimus accurately reflects that Jackson was convicted under
section 18-3-302(1), (3).
¶ 14 Furthermore, given that the court added clarifying language,
Jackson’s claim of ambiguity fails. The mittimus clearly states that
the kidnapping was related to a robbery, not a sex offense.
¶ 15 Moreover, for all intents and purposes, Jackson received the
relief he seeks — an amended mittimus reflecting that his
kidnapping charge was unrelated to any sex offense. Because the
5 district court already made this clarification, there is no relief for
this court to grant.
¶ 16 As to Jackson’s void for vagueness challenge, Jackson’s claim
is not that the second degree kidnapping statute is vague, but
rather that the mittimus’ description of the charge under the
statute is vague. He is not challenging the constitutionality of his
convictions and is instead challenging the accuracy of the mittimus.
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24CA0037 Peo v Jackson 12-19-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0037 City and County of Denver District Court No. 11CR4876 Honorable Alex C. Meyers, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Billy Lawrence Jackson,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Dunn and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 19, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Billy Lawrence Jackson, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Billy Lawrence Jackson, appeals the district
court’s order granting in part and denying in part his motion to
correct the mittimus. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2011, the prosecution charged Jackson with second degree
kidnapping of a robbery victim under section 18-3-302(1), (3)(b),
C.R.S. 2011, and robbery under section 18-4-301(1), C.R.S. 2011.
The version of section 18-3-302(3) in effect at the time provided that
“[s]econd degree kidnapping is a class 2 felony if any of the
following circumstances exist: (a) [t]he person kidnapped is a victim
of a sexual offense pursuant to part 4 of this article; or (b) [t]he
person kidnapped is a victim of a robbery.”
¶3 A jury convicted Jackson as charged. The district court
sentenced him to twenty-four years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections.
¶4 The district court issued a mittimus reflecting Jackson’s
convictions. The mittimus listed the charges as “KIDNAPPING
2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” under section
18-3-302(1), (3), and “ROBBERY” under section 18-4-301(1).
1 ¶5 Jackson appealed his convictions, and a division of this court
affirmed. People v. Jackson, (Colo. App. No. 13CA1602, Mar. 19,
2015) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The supreme court
denied certiorari, and the mandate was issued in 2015.
¶6 Eight years later, Jackson filed a motion to amend the
mittimus. As relevant here, he argued that the charge for
“KIDNAPPING 2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” was incorrect
because there had been no allegations that he committed a sex
offense. He asserted that the error violated his due process rights
and caused him undue hardship.
¶7 The district court granted the motion in part, explaining that
“Count 1 is listed as ‘KIDNAPPING 2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/
ROBBERY,’ and Defendant correctly states he was not charged or
convicted of a sex offense of any kind.” But, the court stated, the
description for second degree kidnapping under section 18-3-302(3)
is hardcoded into the computer system to show “KIDNAPPING
2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY” (showing both subsection
(3)(a) and (3)(b)), and the court “[could not] change this hard-coded
computer entry.” The court also said it was “not aware of any
undue hardship posed by this mittimus language, and Defendant
2 cites none.” Nonetheless, the court said it would amend the
mittimus with “additional language to clarify that the associated
robbery is the basis for designating the kidnapping charge as a
class 2 felony, not a sex offense.” It further stated that the order
was “intended to clarify the issue if needed as Defendant completes
his prison sentence and parole in this case.”
¶8 The court amended the mittimus by adding the following
sentence: “PER ORDER DATED 12/6/23, COUNT 1 IS AS TO
KIDNAPPING DURING THE COMMISSION OF ROBBERY ONLY,
NOT A SEX OFFENSE.”
II. Analysis
¶9 Jackson appeals the district court’s order, contending that the
kidnapping charge listed on his mittimus is ambiguous as to
whether section 18-3-302(3)(a) or (3)(b) is applicable to him, which
renders the statute void for vagueness and violates his due process
rights. He again requests an amended mittimus so that the
description of the kidnapping charge does not show “KIDNAPPING
2-VICTIM SEX OFFENSE/ROBBERY.” We discern no error in the
court’s order.
3 ¶ 10 “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders.” Crim. P. 36. Because the language of
this rule indicates that the decision to correct an error is
discretionary rather than mandatory, we review for an abuse
of discretion. Quintana v. People, 613 P.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Colo.
1980). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Rodriguez, 2022 COA
98, ¶ 12.
¶ 11 Whether a defendant was denied due process is a question of
law that we review de novo. People v. Calderon, 2014 COA 144,
¶ 23.
¶ 12 We cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by amending the mittimus as it did and by finding that it
couldn’t change the description of the kidnapping charge. This
ruling was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, but
rather was based on the court’s determination about its own
computer system. Jackson is not entitled to further amendment of
4 the mittimus because correction of the kidnapping charge’s
description isn’t possible.
¶ 13 The language in the mittimus also doesn’t violate Jackson’s
due process rights. Due process requires that defendants receive
adequate notice of the charges filed against them. See People v.
Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 455 (Colo. 2005); see also U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Here, Jackson received notice
of the charges against him through the complaint and information.
The complaint correctly identified the statute under which he was
being charged — second degree kidnapping under section
18-3-302(1), (3). It stated that “the victim was the victim of a
robbery; in violation of section 18-3-302(1), (3)(b).” And the
mittimus accurately reflects that Jackson was convicted under
section 18-3-302(1), (3).
¶ 14 Furthermore, given that the court added clarifying language,
Jackson’s claim of ambiguity fails. The mittimus clearly states that
the kidnapping was related to a robbery, not a sex offense.
¶ 15 Moreover, for all intents and purposes, Jackson received the
relief he seeks — an amended mittimus reflecting that his
kidnapping charge was unrelated to any sex offense. Because the
5 district court already made this clarification, there is no relief for
this court to grant.
¶ 16 As to Jackson’s void for vagueness challenge, Jackson’s claim
is not that the second degree kidnapping statute is vague, but
rather that the mittimus’ description of the charge under the
statute is vague. He is not challenging the constitutionality of his
convictions and is instead challenging the accuracy of the mittimus.
But the manner in which a mittimus references a statute cannot
render the statute unconstitutionally vague. See People ex rel. Rein
v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 33 (“The essential inquiry in addressing
a void for vagueness challenge is whether the statute ‘forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of
ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and
differ as to its application.’” (quoting People v. Gross, 830 P.2d 933,
937 (Colo. 1992))).
¶ 17 Nevertheless, any constitutional claim would be cognizable
under Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I), and we don’t address such a claim for the
first time on appeal. See People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34
(“[A]lthough we will broadly construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings to
effectuate the substance, rather than the form, of those pleadings,
6 we will not consider issues not raised before the district court in a
motion for postconviction relief.”). Such a constitutional claim
would also be untimely and successive. See § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S.
2024 (requiring a Crim. P. 35(c) motion to be filed within three
years of a conviction for a non-class 1 felony); Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII)
(requiring the district court to deny any Crim. P. 35(c) claim that
could have been raised on direct appeal).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.