Peo v. Irvin

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 12, 2025
• Docket: 23CA1466
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1466 Peo v Irvin 06-12-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1466 Arapahoe County District Court No. 18CR1458 Honorable Darren L. Vahle, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Marquise Antonio Irvin,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 12, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Esteban A. Martinez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Marquise Antonio Irvin, appeals the trial court’s

order denying his motions to dismiss his criminal charges under

the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA),

sections 16-14-101 to -108, C.R.S. 2024. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2018, the People charged Irvin with multiple felony

counts stemming from an armed robbery and vehicle theft.

¶3 In February 2019, because Irvin was serving a prison sentence

in an unrelated case, the Department of Corrections notified Irvin of

the detainer lodged against him for the charges in this case by

providing him with a written detainer notice and advisement of

rights. The advisement explained how to request a final disposition

of the detainer and the court’s deadline to act after receiving a

request. It also stated that, by signing the advisement, Irvin

“acknowledge[d]” that he had “read” and “fully underst[oo]d” his

UMDDA rights. Irvin signed the advisement and, later that month,

filed it with the trial court alongside a request for final disposition of

the detainer (UMDDA request).

¶4 After Irvin filed his UMDDA request, the court tried to hold a

preliminary hearing — first in March and then in April. Irvin was

1 unable to attend the March hearing due to complications with the

writ. Then, for reasons not relevant here, Irvin did not attend the

April hearing. Because the parties disputed whether Irvin had

waived his preliminary hearing by failing to attend the April

hearing, the court set a status conference the following month to

address the waiver issue.

¶5 This time, Irvin attended the May status conference. After

hearing arguments from both sides, the court concluded that Irvin

had not waived his preliminary hearing. In ruling that Irvin was

entitled to a preliminary hearing, the court acknowledged that

Irvin’s actions affected the UMDDA request:

The [People] can’t be held to the speedy if [Irvin] won’t come over. It’s not . . . the [People’s] fault if he wouldn’t come over with regard to the detainer. So I’m interested to hear from the [People] and the [d]efense on the issue of the detainer at this point. I see[] them as different issues, the right to have the [preliminary hearing] and the detainer.[1]

¶6 The People argued that Irvin had “made a waiver of his

detainer” by taking “steps to actively delay and refus[ing] to come to

1 The trial court and the parties appear to have referred to Irvin’s

UMDDA request as a detainer.

2 court.” Defense counsel didn’t challenge the People’s waiver

argument; instead, defense counsel responded, “I can let the [c]ourt

know I have spoken with [Irvin]. He is — he will withdraw the

detainer today to make this issue moot.” The court responded,

“Okay. The [c]ourt accepts the request to withdraw the detainer,

and there’s no longer a detainer in this case.” Though present,

Irvin didn’t object to the withdrawal of his UMDDA request, nor did

he express any concern or ask for clarification. The court then set

the preliminary hearing.

¶7 At the preliminary hearing, the court confirmed with defense

counsel that the UMDDA request was no longer pending. Likewise,

at the arraignment, the court again confirmed with defense counsel

that the UMDDA request had been “withdrawn” at the May 2019

status conference and was “not an issue.” Irvin was present at both

hearings and, as before, remained silent.

¶8 Years later, Irvin elected to proceed pro se (with the assistance

of advisory counsel) because, in his view, defense counsel had

withdrawn his UMDDA request without his permission. Irvin then

filed several pro se motions seeking, among other things, to dismiss

his charges for violation of the UMDDA.

3 ¶9 In August 2021, the court held a hearing to resolve Irvin’s pro

se motions. At the hearing, Irvin argued that defense counsel’s

withdrawal of his UMDDA request did not amount to a valid waiver

because neither the trial court nor defense counsel had fully

advised him of his rights under the UMDDA. In turn, because his

waiver was invalid, Irvin asserted that the UMDDA speedy trial

period had lapsed, and the court was required to dismiss his

charges for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 10 The court denied the motions to dismiss, finding that (1) Irvin

was present when defense counsel withdrew the UMDDA request;

(2) counsel represented on the record that she had conferred with

Irvin about the withdrawal; (3) the court accepted the withdrawal;

(4) Irvin didn’t object to the withdrawal or say he didn’t understand;

and (5) through counsel, Irvin gave an express, on-the-record, fully

advised waiver of his right to a speedy disposition.

¶ 11 Several months later, Irvin requested counsel to represent

him. The court appointed alternate defense counsel. Counsel then

filed another motion to dismiss the charges for violation of the

UMDDA, again arguing that Irvin hadn’t waived his UMDDA request

4 because neither the trial court nor defense counsel fully advised

him, on the record, of his UMDDA rights.

¶ 12 In a written order, the court denied the motion. Incorporating

its oral ruling on Irvin’s pro se UMDDA motions, the court again

concluded that defense counsel’s withdrawal of the UMDDA request

in Irvin’s presence at the May 2019 status conference waived Irvin’s

UMDDA rights, including his right to a “formal advisement.”

¶ 13 In early 2023, a jury convicted Irvin of two counts of menacing

and one count each of attempted first degree murder, attempted

second degree murder, attempted first degree assault, aggravated

robbery, and aggravated motor vehicle theft. After finding that the

People had proved six habitual criminal counts, the court sentenced

Irvin to ninety-six years in prison.

II. The UMDDA

¶ 14 Irvin contends that the trial court erred by finding that he had

waived his UMDDA request because (1) only Irvin, not defense

counsel, had the right to waive his UMDDA request; and (2) the trial

court did not fully advise Irvin of his UMDDA rights. According to

Irvin, because his waiver was invalid, the UMDDA’s speedy trial

5 period lapsed, and the court lost jurisdiction over his case. We

disagree.

A. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶ 15 The UMDDA’s primary purpose is to give prisoners a

mechanism for insisting on the speedy and final disposition of

untried charges. People v. McKimmy, 2014 CO 76, ¶ 22. It allows

“[a]ny person who is in the custody of the department of

corrections” to “request final disposition of any untried indictment,

information, or criminal complaint pending against him in this

state.” § 16-14-102(1), C.R.S. 2024. Once the defendant makes

such a request, the trial court has 182 days to bring the defendant

to trial. § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. 2024. If it does not, the court loses

jurisdiction and must dismiss the charges with prejudice. Id.; see

also McKimmy, ¶ 22.

¶ 16 But a defendant who has made a request under the UMDDA

may later waive his right to trial within 182 days “by express waiver

on the record after full advisement by the court.” § 16-14-104(2);

see also People v. Yakas, 2019 COA 117, ¶ 13.

¶ 17 To the extent Irvin’s argument requires us to interpret the

UMDDA, statutory interpretation presents a legal question that we

6 review de novo. McKimmy, ¶ 19; Yakas, ¶ 14. Likewise, we review

de novo whether a defendant has waived his rights under the

UMDDA. Yakas, ¶ 14.

B. Defense Counsel Can Waive Statutory Rights

¶ 18 As we understand it, Irvin contends that his attorney could

not waive his speedy trial right under the UMDDA because the

statute refers only to the “prisoner” (here, Irvin) but omits the word

“attorney” or “lawyer.”

¶ 19 We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it’s

unsupported by the plain language of the UMDDA, which only

requires an express waiver, not a waiver made personally by the

defendant. See § 16-14-104(2); Yakas, ¶ 31.

¶ 20 Second, the UMDDA’s statutory speedy trial right is not among

the limited class of trial rights — such as the right to testify in one’s

own defense and the right to a jury trial — that a defendant must

personally waive. Compare Yakas, ¶ 30 (UMDDA speedy trial right

is not a “fundamental constitutional right[] requiring personal

waiver by a defendant”), and State v. McCleary, 2025 ND 24, ¶ 10

(same), with People v. Quintero-Amador, 2015 CO 59, ¶ 18 (right to

testify in own defense can only be waived by the defendant), and

7 People v. Walker, 2014 CO 6, ¶ 16 (right to jury trial can only be

waived by the defendant).

¶ 21 We therefore conclude that Irvin’s defense counsel could

validly waive his statutory UMDDA rights.

C. Defense Counsel Waived the UMDDA’s Required Advisement

¶ 22 In relevant part, section 16-14-104(2) states:

Any prisoner who requests disposition pursuant to section 16-14-102 may waive the right to disposition within the [182-day timeframe] by express waiver on the record after full advisement by the court.

(Emphasis added.) Relying on the italicized portion above, Irvin

insists that defense counsel could not waive his UMDDA request

“without an advisement by the court.”

¶ 23 A division of this court considered and rejected this argument

in Yakas. There, the defendant filed a pro se request under the

UMDDA. Yakas, ¶ 4. Later, defense counsel informed the trial

court that the defendant planned to withdraw this request. Id. at

¶ 5. At the next hearing and in the defendant’s presence, the court

confirmed with defense counsel that the defendant wanted to

withdraw the request. Id. at ¶ 7. After defense counsel declined

8 “any further advisement on the record,” the court found that the

request had been withdrawn. Id.

¶ 24 On appeal, the division held that defense counsel could waive

the UMDDA’s advisement requirement. Id. at ¶ 34. It then

concluded that because counsel had withdrawn the request under

the UMDDA in the defendant’s presence — and the defendant didn’t

object or otherwise disagree — counsel had waived the UMDDA’s

advisement requirement. Id. at ¶¶ 34-38.

¶ 25 Yakas largely settles the matter. Indeed, like the defendant in

Yakas, Irvin was present when defense counsel withdrew his

UMDDA request, and he didn’t object or otherwise express any

confusion or disagreement. Instead, even after acknowledging in

writing that he was aware of and understood his UMDDA rights,

Irvin remained silent. And, in some ways, the facts here are more

compelling than in Yakas because — unlike the withdrawal in

Yakas — Irvin’s defense counsel represented that she had “spoken

with” Irvin and that “he will withdraw” the UMDDA request “today.”2

2 Also different than Yakas, Irvin had two more opportunities to

object to the withdrawal when the court raised the UMDDA request at the preliminary hearing and the arraignment. But again, Irvin voiced no objection.

9 Because Irvin was aware of his UMDDA speedy trial right — the

only right the UMDDA provides — and because counsel withdrew

that right after conferring with Irvin, it’s not clear what advisement

Irvin believes the court should have given.

¶ 26 Under these circumstances, defense counsel’s broad and

express withdrawal of Irvin’s UMDDA request waived Irvin’s

statutory rights under the UMDDA, including the speedy trial and

advisement rights. See Yakas, ¶¶ 34-38; see also New York v. Hill,

528 U.S. 110, 114 (2000) (explaining that waiver is generally

presumed available for both constitutional and statutory rights and

that the “most basic rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to

waiver”) (citation omitted); Finney v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16

(“Counsel may waive a defendant’s statutory rights.”).3

¶ 27 To the extent Irvin maintains that People v. Carr, 205 P.3d 471

(Colo. App. 2008), requires a different result, we disagree. In Carr,

the division concluded that the defendant did not waive his UMDDA

3 Irvin seems to suggest that, without the advisement, the court had

no way to determine whether his waiver was voluntary. As best we can tell, Irvin never raised this issue to the trial court. Regardless, he doesn’t develop this claim, so we decline to address it. See People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34, ¶ 14 n.3 (appellate courts don’t address undeveloped arguments).

10 rights by agreeing to a trial date beyond the statutory speedy trial

deadline without any discussion of the UMDDA. Id. at 474. Thus,

Carr dealt with an implied waiver, not the express waiver through

counsel that occurred here.

¶ 28 For these reasons, we conclude that defense counsel validly

waived Irvin’s UMDDA rights, including his right to an advisement

under section 16-14-104(2).

III. Disposition

¶ 29 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.