Peo v. Ibarra

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 14, 2024
• Docket: 22CA1017
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22CA1017 Peo v Ibarra 11-14-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1017 City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR1655 Honorable Martin F. Egelhoff, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jacob R. Ibarra,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO Dunn and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 14, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Daniel J. Sequeira, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jacob R. Ibarra, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of tampering

with physical evidence. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The prosecution charged Ibarra with tampering with physical

evidence and two counts of cruelty to animals after an incident that

resulted in his dog’s death. Before trial, the trial court granted the

prosecution’s motion to dismiss one of the cruelty to animals

counts.

¶3 At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Ibarra and

his friend drove with Ibarra’s dog in the bed of his pickup truck.

The dog wore a harness and was attached to the truck by its leash.

Though Ibarra or his friend periodically looked back to check on the

dog, at some point the dog jumped out of the truck. Other drivers

alerted Ibarra, who pulled over. Unfortunately, the dog suffered a

serious head injury and died on scene. Ibarra and his friend left in

Ibarra’s truck, without the dog, while bystanders called the police.

¶4 Approximately a week later, law enforcement officers found

Ibarra’s truck. The tailgate had been painted from red to black, so

it matched the rest of the black-colored truck. A temporary tag had

1 been removed from the back window (and was recovered in the front

seat). The dog’s leash was never found.

¶5 Ibarra defended the charges on a theory that the dog’s death

was an accident and he did not tamper with physical evidence. The

jury agreed in part, acquitting him of the cruelty to animals count

but convicting him of tampering with physical evidence.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶6 Ibarra argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of

tampering with physical evidence. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶7 Irrespective of preservation, we review de novo whether the

trial evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. McCoy v.

People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 27; Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807

(Colo. 2005). We must determine whether the evidence, when

viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion

by a rational fact finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo.

2010). We give the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable

2 inference that can fairly be drawn from the evidence, so long as any

inference is supported by a convincing logical connection between

the facts established and the conclusion inferred. People v. Perez,

2016 CO 12, ¶ 25; People v. Villalobos, 159 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo.

App. 2006) (“[W]here reasonable minds could differ, the evidence is

sufficient to sustain a conviction.”).

B. Analysis

¶8 As relevant here, a person commits the crime of tampering

with physical evidence “if, believing that an official proceeding is

pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or

authority, he . . . [d]estroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters

physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in

the pending or prospective official proceeding.” § 18-8-610(1)(a),

C.R.S. 2024.

¶9 Ibarra argues that there was insufficient evidence that he

acted “without legal right or authority.” Id. He asserts that,

because the evidence with which he tampered — his truck and his

dog’s leash — was his own constitutionally protected property and

“constitutionally protected rights do not suddenly cease the

moment a crime is allegedly committed,” he was permitted to

3 “exercise his own authority” over these items as he wished. In other

words, he says this statute does not apply to a person’s tampering

with their own property. We are not convinced.

¶ 10 Although ultimately raising a sufficiency-of-the-evidence

claim, Ibarra also presents a question of statutory interpretation,

which we review de novo. In construing the statute, we aim to

ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Dubois v.

People, 211 P.3d 41, 43 (Colo. 2009). Further, we presume that the

General Assembly intends “a just and reasonable result when it

enacts a statute, and a statutory construction that defeats the

legislative intent will not be followed.” People v. Carian, 2017 COA

106, ¶ 15; see § 2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 11 “The intent of the General Assembly in enacting the tampering

statute is clear: to punish attempts to subvert the administration of

justice.” People v. Rieger, 2019 COA 14, ¶ 20; see also People v.

Atencio, 140 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. App. 2005) (“[I]t is evident from the

language of [section 18-8-610] that the General Assembly intended

to criminalize behavior that interferes with an official

proceeding . . . .”). Regardless of who owns the evidence, allowing a

person to intentionally conceal, remove, or alter evidence of a crime

4 when they believe an official proceeding is pending or about to be

instituted would run contrary to the legislative intent to protect the

administration of justice.

¶ 12 On a related note, we conclude that Ibarra overstates a

person’s legal right or authority over their property. Property rights

are not absolute; rather, “[p]roperty can be used even by its owner

only in accordance with law.” United States v. Balt. & O. R. Co., 333

U.S. 169, 177 (1948). Indeed, the state can restrict how a person

uses or disposes of their property in various ways. See, e.g., § 18-4-

511(1), C.R.S. 2024 (prohibiting a person from leaving litter on

public or private property); § 18-12-104, C.R.S. 2024 (prohibiting a

person from defacing a firearm’s serial number).

¶ 13 As described, the statute at issue here criminalizes tampering

with physical evidence, thereby restricting a person’s ability to alter

or dispose of property with the intent to impair its availability in an

official proceeding when the person believes such official proceeding

is pending or about to be instituted. See § 18-8-610(1)(a). Thus, a

person does not have “legal right or authority” to intentionally

impair the verity or availability of physical evidence in an official

5 proceeding by concealing, removing, or altering that evidence

merely because the person owns it.

¶ 14 This interpretation is consistent with a prior opinion from a

division of this court, which recognized that the tampering statute

applies to a person’s attempt to conceal a gun he used in a crime.

See People v. Newton, 2022 COA 59, ¶¶ 4, 32-34. The Newton

decision did not suggest that the gun at issue belonged to anyone

other than the defendant; nor did the decision suggest that

ownership of the property matters to application of the statute.

¶ 15 Indeed, Ibarra’s interpretation would defeat the legislative

intent of a just and reasonable result — and would lead instead to

an absurd result — by exempting from the tampering statute any

perpetrator who uses their own property in the commission of a

crime. Ibarra’s view of the statute would permit a perpetrator who

killed someone to freely conceal or dispose of the weapon, with the

intent to avoid criminal liability, so long as the perpetrator owned

the weapon. We will not adopt such an illogical construction of the

tampering statute. See People v. Garcia, 2016 COA 124, ¶ 9 (Courts

“avoid constructions that would lead to an illogical or absurd result,

6 along with those which would be at odds with the overall legislative

scheme.”).

¶ 16 Finally, we note that Ibarra invokes various constitutional

provisions in support of his interpretation of the tampering statute,

including a right to property that cannot be deprived without due

process of law. He concludes that the “legislature would not intend

to draft a statute that would stand in opposition to these strong

constitutional protections” and “[b]ased on the plain meaning, and

read to ensure harmony with these sensibilities, the legislature

drafted a statute that protects those who act in accordance with

their constitutionally protected property rights.” Although Ibarra

does not name the canon of statutory construction on which he

relies, he appears to rely on the “doctrine of constitutional

avoidance” (also known as the “presumption of constitutionality”).

People v. Ross, 2021 CO 9, ¶ 35 & n.6. As pertinent here, that

doctrine directs courts, where possible, to interpret ambiguous

statutes to avoid rendering them unconstitutional. See id. at ¶ 35

n.6; Mesa Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. State, 203 P.3d 519, 527

(Colo. 2009) (“A reviewing court must assume that the ‘legislative

body intends the statutes it adopts to be compatible with

7 constitutional standards.’”) (citation omitted). This doctrine does

not apply here, however, because Ibarra does not argue that the

tampering statute is ambiguous. See Ross, ¶ 35. On the contrary,

he asserts that the plain meaning of the statute is “clear” and aligns

with his view. Likewise, we do not discern ambiguity in the statute,

but we disagree with Ibarra’s interpretation of it.

¶ 17 Applying our interpretation of the tampering statute, we

conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to

permit the jury’s guilty verdict. The prosecution presented evidence

that Ibarra’s truck had been concealed and altered — the temporary

tag was no longer on the back window and the back of the truck

had been painted black. The prosecution also presented evidence

that the dog’s leash had been removed from the scene and was

never found. While Ibarra defended these actions at trial by

arguing that he repainted the truck because he had planned to sell

it, the temporary tag was on the passenger seat, and the leash was

never recovered due to a subpar investigation, matters of credibility

and conflicting evidence were solely within the jury’s province. See

People v. McIntier, 134 P.3d 467, 471 (Colo. App. 2005).

8 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain

the conviction.

III. The Prosecutor’s Arguments

¶ 18 Ibarra also contends that the trial court reversibly erred

because it “allowed the State to argue that he committed tampering

when he left the scene.” He is mistaken.

A. Additional Factual Background

¶ 19 During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel

objected to the prosecutor’s anticipated argument that “leaving the

scene in a truck can support tampering.” Counsel argued that it

would be “an incorrect statement of the law” because Ibarra “was

under no legal duty to remain on scene.” The trial court initially

agreed, stating, “I’m not going to allow that argument.” Addressing

the issue again after a break, however, the court ruled that it

would, per defense counsel’s request, instruct the jury that Ibarra

“had no legal obligation to remain on the scene.” The court added,

“based upon that [instruction,] the parties can argue all reasonable

inferences to be drawn from the evidence with respect to the closing

arguments.”

9 ¶ 20 Shortly before closing arguments, and after the court granted

defense counsel’s request for a unanimity instruction for the charge

of tampering with physical evidence, the prosecutor sought

clarification, asking whether the court’s ruling “include[d] taking

the car and the leash from the scene of the crime as part of what

the People would be able to argue in closing; is that correct?” The

court responded, “I suppose you could argue all reasonable

inferences based upon the evidence.” Defense counsel objected,

and the court replied:

the statute says and [the] instruction says, [i]f a person believes there is a pending official proceeding and if the jury finds he removed physical evidence with the specific intent to impair its availability in that pending proceeding, that constitutes tampering. So I’m acquiescing and agreeing upon your request to make sure the jury understands that there’s no legal obligation to remain. You can argue that, and the prosecution can argue the opposite in terms of his behaviors, but I understand the argument and disagree with it.

B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶ 21 The parties dispute whether this claim of error was preserved

and what standard of review should apply. But we need not resolve

this dispute because we do not discern error under any standard.

10 C. Analysis

¶ 22 We disagree that the trial court permitted the prosecutor to

argue that Ibarra’s leaving the scene, in and of itself, constituted

tampering with physical evidence. Rather, the court agreed with

defense counsel that the jury could not find Ibarra guilty of

tampering solely because he left the scene, and the court provided a

jury instruction to this effect — “The defendant had no legal

obligation to remain on scene on South Santa Fe Drive on March 1,

2021.”

¶ 23 We are not persuaded that the court “circumvented [this]

instruction” by allowing the prosecutor “to effectively argue the

contrary” because the prosecutor did not make such a contrary

argument. Rather, in closing, the prosecutor argued, “[s]o the bare

fact that [Ibarra] took off in his car or in his truck is not what we

are saying amounts to tampering with physical evidence here.”

Additionally, the prosecutor explained, “[b]y leaving the scene and

not just leaving the scene, but leaving the scene with a key piece of

evidence, that leash and the car to which it was attached, [Ibarra]

tampered with physical evidence.” (Emphasis added.)

11 ¶ 24 Furthermore, we disagree that the other purportedly improper

prosecutorial statements constituted an argument that Ibarra was

guilty of tampering simply as a result of having left the scene. After

describing Ibarra’s acts of painting the truck and removing the

temporary tag, the prosecutor told the jury “you can take [Ibarra’s]

own statements to the detective as to why all of these happened.”

And then the prosecutor described how Ibarra told the detective the

reason “he left the scene of that crime” was “because he didn’t want

to go to jail.” The prosecutor argued that it “was already clear that

[Ibarra] was thinking about the criminal process and what might

happen to him.” These statements, in context, indicate nothing

more than an argument that Ibarra’s act of leaving tended to reveal

his belief that “an official proceeding [was] pending or about to be

instituted” — an element of tampering that the prosecution was

required to prove. § 18-8-610(1).

¶ 25 Accordingly, we reject this contention.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.