Peo v. Horton

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 26, 2024
• Docket: 23CA2028
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA2028 Peo v Horton 12-26-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2028 Arapahoe County District Court No. 22CR41 Honorable Jacob A. Edson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Shantail Horton,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE Welling and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 26, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Shantail Horton, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of leaving the

scene of an accident and failure to present proof of compulsory

insurance. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 This prosecution stems from a December 2021 hit-and-run of

a pedestrian. Based on bystander observations provided the night

of the accident and investigative work conducted by a detective in

the days immediately thereafter, the police located the car believed

to be involved in the incident. A detective investigating the accident

identified Horton as the possible driver of the car. Horton was

interviewed by the investigating detective and the People

subsequently charged Horton with leaving the scene of an accident

and failure to present proof of compulsory insurance.1 The jury

convicted Horton of both charges. This appeal followed.

1 The People also charged Horton with driving under restraint. The court bifurcated this charge, and the prosecution dismissed it after trial.

1 II. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

¶3 Horton contends that the trial court erred when it denied her

motion for judgment of acquittal following the prosecution’s

case-in-chief because the prosecution presented insufficient

evidence of identity to support her convictions. We aren’t

persuaded.

A. Additional Relevant Facts

¶4 Aislinn Brooks, a bystander, testified that as she was driving

in the center lane of a three-lane road, a “silver four-door SUV”

passed her in the left-most lane and struck a pedestrian. Brooks

swerved into the right-most lane to avoid hitting the victim, who

had landed on the road in front of her car. Brooks stated that,

other than the silver SUV, no other cars were on the road. After she

pulled over, she looked in her rearview mirror and saw the silver

SUV drive away. Brooks exited her vehicle and, as she was

approaching the victim to check on him, she saw the silver SUV

stop, and saw the driver get out of the car and “scream[] and yell[]”

at the victim. Brooks testified that the driver drove in a circle,

stopped, and got out of her car to yell at the victim two more times,

driving away after the third time. She described the driver to police

2 who later arrived on the scene as a Black female with “a bushy

hairstyle.” Brooks said that the accident occurred between 8 p.m.

and 9 p.m. “when it was dark outside.”

¶5 A second bystander, Shawn Bert, was a passenger in a car

that had stopped at the scene after the victim was struck. Bert

testified that as he was walking towards the victim, he saw a

woman standing over the victim, yelling, “This is your fault. You

walked out in front of me.” Bert said he then saw the “suspect” —

the woman he saw yelling at the victim — “take off” in her car,

which he described as “some kind of crossover . . . Subaru-looking,”

“not like a full-on SUV,” and “silver or something” in color. Bert

testified that he did not see what the woman looked like because it

was very dark.

¶6 A third bystander, Steven Cohan, testified that he also stopped

at the scene after the accident and saw a car that he identified as a

“Vue.” After speaking with other bystanders who pointed out to

him the car that had hit the victim, Cohan got into his car and

“went after the vehicle.” He “saw a single person in the vehicle” who

“appeared to be” a Black woman. Cohan called 911 and provided

the police with the Vue’s license plate number.

3 ¶7 Detective Brian Taylor was assigned to investigate the case.

Detective Taylor testified that, based on the license plate number

reported by Cohan, he was able to identify the registered owner of

the car. And after talking with the car’s registered owner, he began

looking for the person who the registered owner identified as driving

that car. Detective Taylor obtained a phone number for the alleged

driver and was able to speak to the alleged driver’s family members

to leave messages with them requesting that the driver call him.

Detective Taylor testified that he specifically left messages

indicating that he was trying to reach Shantail Horton.

¶8 A female caller who identified herself as “Shantail” called

Detective Taylor and stated that she had received “a couple of

messages” to call him. “Shantail” discussed the accident in the

phone call with Detective Taylor, the recording of which was

admitted as an exhibit during trial.

¶9 During the phone call, Detective Taylor said he was calling

about a car accident, that “Shantail” had been identified as driving

a Saturn Vue, and that there was “no question” that she was the

driver. “Shantail” then said that “the man just ran out” and

“jumped in to [her] car.” “Shantail” also said that it was a

4 three-lane road; the man was in the middle lane; she honked before

getting into the left lane; and she tried to swerve, but she “thought

he kept walking and all of the sudden he was back at [her] car.”

“Shantail” further described how she “stopped, did a U-turn and

[she] came back,” exited her car, and — because she was scared

and didn’t know what to do — she left the scene. “Shantail” also

made statements indicating that the registered owner of the car was

her father and the same person who Detective Taylor testified had

identified Horton as the driver of the car.

¶ 10 Detective Taylor testified that he located a silver Saturn Vue

with the same license plate number Cohan had provided parked in

front of the address listed on Horton’s driver’s license. Detective

Taylor described the Saturn Vue as a “smaller size vehicle on its

way to being an SUV,” and “a small four-door sedan . . . a smaller

compact hatchback.” He also took photographs of the car that

showed a deformity in the driver’s side molding where the driver’s

side front bumper “ha[d] become detached from the upper fender

area.” The trial court admitted a driver’s license dossier that

Detective Taylor identified as belonging to Shantail Horton, which

included her photograph and her driver’s license information.

5 Detective Taylor identified Horton in the courtroom as the same

person matching the picture on the driver’s license dossier. Finally,

Detective Taylor testified that he texted “Shantail’s” phone number,

provided his cell phone number and email address, and requested

that she email or text a copy of the Saturn Vue’s insurance to him.

But he did not receive a response to that text message, and Horton

did not provide insurance information to him or any other officer.

¶ 11 Horton moved for judgment of acquittal as to both counts,

arguing that the prosecution had failed to prove the element of

identity. In its ruling, the court recognized that “there may be some

circumstances where the jury may have some difficulties

determining inconsistencies of testimony provided, . . . which

includes the physical descriptors of the driver on scene versus

[Horton.]” However, focusing on the evidence of the silver Saturn

Vue being the vehicle that struck the victim and other

circumstantial evidence tying Horton to the accident, the court

denied Horton’s motion, finding there was sufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction on each count when the evidence was

considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

6 B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 When reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal, we review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence before a jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to

sustain a conviction. Montes-Rodriguez v. People, 241 P.3d 924,

927 (Colo. 2010). We will affirm if the relevant evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is “substantial

and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that

the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (quoting People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 127 (Colo. 1983)).

¶ 13 In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, we give the

prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be

fairly drawn from the evidence, Gorostieta v. People, 2022 CO 41,

¶ 17, and we recognize it is for the jury “to determine the difficult

questions of witness credibility and the weight to be given to

conflicting items of evidence,” People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 12.

Where reasonable minds could differ, we deem the evidence

sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Carlson, 72 P.3d 411,

416 (Colo. App. 2003); see also Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10

(noting that the appellate court does not serve as a thirteenth juror

7 during de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction and will not second-guess evidence-supported juror

findings).

¶ 14 To convict a defendant of leaving the scene of an accident

resulting in serious bodily injury, the prosecution must prove, as

relevant here, that the driver of a vehicle directly involved in an

accident that resulted in serious bodily injury to any person failed

to immediately stop their vehicle at the scene of the accident or

failed to return to and remain at the scene of the accident to provide

their contact information and render aid to the injured person. See

§§ 42-4-1601(1), 2(b), 42-4-1603(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 15 To convict a defendant of failure to present proof of insurance

after an accident, the prosecution must prove that an owner or

operator of a motor vehicle failed to present evidence of lawful

insurance after being requested to do so during any traffic

investigation by a peace officer. See § 42-4-1409(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 16 A jury must find that the prosecution has proven all elements

of a charged offense — including identity — beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Gorostieta, ¶ 18; see also People v. Watkins, 553 P.2d

819, 821 (Colo. 1976) (identity is an element which must be proven

8 beyond a reasonable doubt). A witness need not make a positive

identification of a defendant for evidence of identity to be sufficient.

People v. Jenkins, 768 P.2d 727, 729 (Colo. App. 1988). And it is

not essential that an identifying witness “be free from doubt as to

the correctness of his opinion.” Id. “Rather, uncertainty in

identification is a matter of weight and witness credibility to be

considered by the jury in reaching its determination.” Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 17 Horton argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient

evidence that she was the perpetrator of both crimes because (1) the

bystander witnesses could not accurately identify her, and

(2) Detective Taylor could not “truly identify” her because his

interview of her was not in person. Thus, she argues, the trial court

erred by denying her motion for judgment of acquittal and her

resulting convictions should be vacated. We disagree with both

contentions and conclude that sufficient evidence established

Horton’s identity.

1. Bystander Identification Testimony

¶ 18 We recognize, as the trial court did, that the bystanders’

description of the driver they witnessed at the scene of the accident

9 conflicted with other evidence presented, such as Horton’s driver’s

license photo. But we conclude that the jury reasonably could have

inferred from other circumstantial evidence presented during the

trial that Horton was the driver.

¶ 19 The prosecution presented testimony from Brooks that she

saw a Black woman who was driving a silver four-door SUV hit the

victim and that no other cars were there at the time. Brooks also

saw that same woman return to the scene multiple times. Cohan

testified that he followed the same car Brooks saw, which he

identified as a silver Saturn Vue, and reported the license plate of

that car to the police.

¶ 20 The prosecution also presented testimony that Detective

Taylor identified the registered owner of the car based on the license

plate number Cohan reported, and the car’s registered owner, in

turn, provided information about the potential driver of the car.

Detective Taylor contacted the potential driver of the car through

family members stating he was looking for Shantail Horton. A

woman voluntarily called Detective Taylor, identified herself as

“Shantail,” acknowledged that she had received Detective Taylor’s

messages, described the circumstances of an accident similar to

10 those described by the bystanders, acknowledged hitting someone

with a car, and confirmed that her father was the registered owner

of the car. Finally, the prosecution presented evidence that the car

was parked at Horton’s residence, had a license plate number

matching the plate number reported by Cohan and the plate

number listed on Shantail Horton’s driver’s license dossier, and had

damage to the molding on the driver’s side front bumper.

¶ 21 Viewing this evidence as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence and the

reasonable inferences from it are sufficient to support the jury’s

conclusion that Horton was the driver of the car that hit and

injured the victim, notwithstanding any uncertainty the bystanders

may have expressed in their testimony about the driver’s physical

description. And because it was within the province of the jury to

assess and weigh any conflicts or discrepancies in the bystanders’

testimony, we won’t disturb the jury’s determination. See People v.

Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 31 (noting that it is left to the fact finder to

weigh “conflicting reasonable inferences”).

¶ 22 Additionally, we reject Horton’s contention that the trial court

did not adequately consider the factors outlined in People v.

11 Martinez, 734 P.2d 126 (Colo. App. 1986), to evaluate the reliability

of the witnesses’ testimony against the “suggestive identification”

presented by Horton’s driver’s license dossier.

¶ 23 Martinez involved a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion

in limine to suppress a victim’s pretrial identification of the

defendant. In that case, a division of this court discussed the

factors that a trial court should use to evaluate whether a witness’s

pretrial identification of a defendant is reliable despite unduly

suggestive pretrial identification procedures. Martinez, 734 P.2d at

128-29. Horton, however, did not move pretrial to suppress any

witness’s identification of her. Horton never asserted — either in

her objection during trial to the admission of the dossier, or

otherwise — that any of the witnesses’ pretrial identifications were

subject to unduly suggestive pretrial procedures. At no point did

Horton raise this issue for the trial court. And in any event, “where

an in-court identification is not preceded by an impermissibly

suggestive pretrial identification procedure” and “nothing beyond

the inherent suggestiveness of the ordinary courtroom setting”

makes the identification “constitutionally suspect,” due process

12 does not require the trial court to screen the identification for

reliability. Garner v. People, 2019 CO 19, ¶ 5.

¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by not

applying the Martinez factors when considering Horton’s motion for

judgment of acquittal. See People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M, ¶ 33

(Under the plain error standard, we will reverse an unpreserved

error only if the error was obvious, substantial, and “so undermined

the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt

on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.”) (citation omitted).

2. Detective Taylor’s Identification Testimony

¶ 25 Horton also asserts that Detective Taylor could not “truly

identify” her because he only interviewed her by phone. We aren’t

¶ 26 As already discussed, sufficient and substantial circumstantial

evidence connected Horton to the car identified as being involved in

the accident, and Detective Taylor’s investigation led him to

Horton’s family members, with whom he left messages stating he

was looking for her. Horton identified herself to Detective Taylor,

acknowledged the messages that had been left with her family

members, stated she left the scene of an accident where a man was

13 hit, and acknowledged numerous other factual circumstances

consistent with testimony provided by the bystander witnesses.

“With regard to a phone call, self-identification is sufficient to

establish the identity of a party to the call when it is coupled with

additional circumstantial evidence.” People v. Dutton, 2014 COA

51, ¶ 14.

¶ 27 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence — considered as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution — was

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

jury that Horton was the individual driving the car who left the

scene of the accident and failed to provide police with the car’s

insurance. Thus, the trial court did not err when it denied Horton’s

motion for judgment of acquittal.

III. Disposition

¶ 28 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BROWN concur.