23CA1655 Peo v Henry 01-08-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1655 City and County of Denver District Court No. 20CR5080 Honorable Kandace C. Gerdes, Judge Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Adawnous Donnil Henry,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Welling and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 8, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
M. Linton Wright, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lafayette, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Adawnous Donnil Henry, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of
distribution of controlled substances, two counts of possession of
controlled substances, illegal discharge of a firearm, and third
degree assault. He contends that the trial court reversibly erred by
(1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
a warrantless search of his house; (2) accepting his waiver of his
right to counsel; and (3) admitting evidence about suspected bomb-
making materials found in a search of his house. We disagree.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Early one morning, officers responded to reports of gunshots
in a residential area. When officers arrived on the scene, they
found a woman — later identified as Raqhel Williams — hiding
behind a vehicle on the back side of the house. Officers later
observed a handgun under the vehicle she’d been hiding behind.
¶3 Officers also found a man — later identified as Henry — in the
front yard of a neighboring house with a gunshot wound and a rifle
within his reach. He was transported to the hospital and received
medical treatment for the gunshot wound and a head injury.
1 ¶4 Williams and Henry gave investigating officers conflicting
accounts as to what had led to the shooting.
¶5 Williams told officers that she’d been using Henry’s computer
when he grabbed her by the neck and started choking her. She
said that she was able to grab a knife from Henry and swing it at
him. Then, she said, she grabbed a gun that had fallen out of his
waistband and shot at him multiple times before fleeing the house.
¶6 Henry told officers that he lived in the house and that he’d
invited Williams over, and they’d had consensual sex, after which
he fell asleep and woke up to her attempting to rob him. According
to Henry, Williams had a gun in her hand, and when he tried to
grab it, she shot him in the abdomen. Henry said he grabbed a
rifle, began shooting back, and then fled to the neighbor’s front yard
and shot toward their house to prompt them to call the police.
¶7 After their initial interviews with Henry and Williams, officers
conducted a warrantless sweep of the house. They reported that
during that initial search, they didn’t find anyone else in the house
but observed narcotics and other items of interest in plain view.
Based on these observations, they obtained a search warrant.
2 Upon executing the warrant, they seized various controlled
substances and other evidence from the house.
¶8 Henry was charged with several counts relating to the shooting
and the items found in the house. Neither Williams nor Henry
testified at trial, but the jury heard testimony about and saw video
recordings of their interviews with officers. After the trial, the jury
found Henry guilty of two counts of distribution of controlled
substances (cocaine and psilocyn), two counts of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine and
methylenedioxymethamphetamine), one count of illegal discharge of
a firearm, and one count of third degree assault.
¶9 This appeal followed.
II. Suppression Ruling
¶ 10 Henry contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless
search of the house. Specifically, he claims that the search wasn’t
justified by exigent circumstances and exceeded the scope of any
such circumstances. He also claims that the evidence presented at
trial undermined the factual findings the court had made after the
suppression hearing and, thus, that the court plainly erred by not
3 revisiting its earlier decision and excluding the challenged evidence
at trial. We disagree with both contentions.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 11 Based on the initial warrantless search of the house, officers
obtained a search warrant. The affidavit in support of the warrant
stated that, during that initial search, officers “observed narcotics,
paraphernalia, shell casings and ammunition in plain view.”
¶ 12 Henry filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized with the
search warrant based on the invalidity of the initial warrantless
search. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
concluding that the warrantless search was justified by the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and was
reasonable in scope. The court explained,
[T]here was clearly a colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another which justified a warrantless entry into the home or other premises . . . .
So the circumstances in which they found themselves were that . . . they had a call of a shooting. I have the first victim who is injured; one officer was speaking to her; Mr. Henry was lying on the ground with an obvious wound and said that somebody had shot him, and then identified the place where — I don’t mean on his physical person, but that the shooting
4 had occurred in his home. And the police had sufficient justification at that point to enter the home . . . .
....
[Officers] needed to determine if there was anybody else who could have been injured who was in the home or if the shooter was still on the premises.
¶ 13 The court further concluded that “the search that [officers]
conducted was reasonably related to the exigencies they sought to
address,” and “[t]he things that they found in this home were in
plain view.”
¶ 14 At trial, the evidence showed that drugs were found in the
house in a cooler in a trapdoor area, in a duffle bag inside a closet,
and in a pocket in William’s bag.
B. Applicable Legal Standards
¶ 15 Our review of a trial court’s suppression order presents a
mixed question of law and fact. People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15,
¶ 15. We defer to the court’s factual findings, such as findings of
historical facts underlying a search, if those findings are supported
by the record. See id. But we assess de novo the legal significance
of those facts, such as whether a search was constitutional. See
People v. Berdahl, 2019 CO 29, ¶ 18.
5 ¶ 16 The United States and the Colorado Constitutions both protect
an individual’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7; People v. Oates,
698 P.2d 811, 814 (Colo. 1985). A search of a home without a
warrant is presumptively unreasonable unless it is justified by an
exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 717 (1984); People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶ 23.
¶ 17 One such exception is that a warrantless search is justified by
exigent circumstances, when “the public’s interest in a timely police
response to emergent and fast-developing situations outweighs the
individual’s privacy interests.” People v. Brunsting, 2013 CO 55,
¶ 25. As relevant here, this exception may apply if “there is a
colorable claim of an emergency situation threatening the life or
safety of another.” People v. Pate, 71 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Colo. 2003);
accord People v. Gillespie, 2024 COA 98, ¶ 41. The two
requirements to apply this exception are that (1) officers have an
objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to
protect the lives or safety of themselves or others and (2) the
manner and scope of the search is reasonable. Brunsting, ¶ 31.
6 ¶ 18 Our supreme court has identified several factors relevant to
determining whether there is a colorable claim of an emergency. Id.
at ¶ 30. These factors include
• the gravity or violent nature of the offense involved;
• whether there is probable cause to believe the suspect
committed the offense;
• whether there is strong reason to believe the suspect is
on the premises;
• whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
• the risk posed to other persons from unnecessary delay;
and
• the circumstances of the entry, including whether it was
made at night and whether it was made peaceably.
Id.; People v. Licona-Ortega, 2022 COA 27, ¶ 27.
¶ 19 When exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a
home, “[t]he scope of the permissible intrusion is determined by the
exigency justifying the initiation of the warrantless entry.” Gillespie,
¶ 41 (quoting People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)).
¶ 20 As a safeguard for an individual’s constitutional rights, the
exclusionary rule “‘forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence
7 at trial,’ as well as ‘evidence later discovered and found to be
derivative of an illegality.’” Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, ¶ 19
(first quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009);
and then quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 232 (2016)).
C. Exigent Circumstances
¶ 21 We conclude that the trial court properly denied Henry’s
motion to suppress on the basis that the warrantless search of the
house was justified by exigent circumstances.
¶ 22 Officers arrived on scene to a reported shooting and found
Williams nearby, acting “extremely hysterical” and saying she’d
been shot at. Officers also found Henry in the front yard of a
neighboring house with a gunshot wound. In addition to the violent
nature of the offense, officers in the back yard were receiving
different information than those in the front yard, making it difficult
to determine who was a victim and who was a suspect.
¶ 23 Also, while Williams and Henry both reported that they were
alone at the house, Henry made conflicting statements, some of
which suggested that the woman who had shot him could still be in
the house, and he didn’t initially provide the woman’s name.
Officers thus couldn’t be sure whether Williams was that woman or
8 whether Williams and Henry were telling the truth about no one
else being at the house. Indeed, some neighbors had reported
seeing another woman earlier, and responding officers believed
they’d heard three gunshots coming from the direction of the house
after they had made contact with Williams.
¶ 24 Based on these circumstances, officers had an objectively
reasonable basis to believe there was an immediate need to protect
the lives or safety of themselves or others. See Brunsting, ¶ 31.
Specifically, they had reasonable grounds to believe that they or the
public could be endangered if there was a shooter or another victim
inside the house. And although by the time they entered the house
they had spent about an hour tending to Williams and Henry,
getting information from them, and loudly ordering anyone in the
house to come out, there was adequate reason to suspect that
someone might still be hiding inside with a gun or might be injured
inside and unable to leave or call out — and it was reasonable for
them to conduct a sweep of the house to be sure.
¶ 25 Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the
initial warrantless search of the house was justified by the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
9 ¶ 26 We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the
manner and scope of the search were reasonable. See id. Henry
argues that the body camera video shows that “officers continue[d]
to search the home after they determined that no one else was
present.” But the hearing testimony and bodycam evidence showed
that, after officers visually cleared the rooms, they were instructed
to double-check closets, cabinets, and crawl spaces where someone
could be hiding before leaving the house. Given the exigencies of
the situation, it was reasonable for them to do so.
¶ 27 Finally, we reject Henry’s argument that the trial court erred
in concluding that the search was reasonable in scope, as the drugs
officers observed were in fact not in plain view. There was no
evidence before the trial court at the time of the suppression
hearing to rebut the officers’ assertions that the drugs were in plain
view. See Thompson, ¶ 15; see also People v. Singley, 2015 COA
78M, ¶ 26 (an appellate court confines itself to the evidence
developed at the suppression hearing when assessing whether the
trial court erroneously denied a defendant’s suppression motion).
Henry points out that the officers didn’t testify at the hearing that
they observed any drugs in plain view. But an officer had already
10 averred that fact in the search warrant affidavit submitted to the
court in conjunction with the hearing, and the prosecutor alluded
to it in her argument at the hearing. Henry never challenged that
averment, either in his motion to suppress or at the hearing. Thus,
we discern no error in the court’s finding that the officers observed
the drugs and other items in plain view.
D. Plain Error Regarding the Drugs Being in Plain View
¶ 28 Henry further contends that the trial court plainly erred by
admitting the evidence seized from the house during the trial
because the evidence presented at trial revealed — contrary to the
search warrant affidavit — that the drugs couldn’t have been in
plain view. See Singley, ¶ 26 (an appellate court may consider “the
entire record” if a party asserts that the trial court plainly erred in
relation to a suppression issue). We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 29 An error is plain when it is both obvious and substantial, such
that it “so undermine[d] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself
as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of
conviction.” People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 43.
¶ 30 Crim. P. 41(e) provides that a motion to suppress “shall be
made and heard before trial unless opportunity therefor did not
11 exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion,
but the court, in its discretion, may entertain the motion at the
trial.” This rule “require[s] the parties . . . to pursue discovery
vigorously prior to trial.” People v. Tyler, 874 P.2d 1037, 1039
(Colo. 1994).
¶ 31 We conclude that because the trial court would’ve had
discretion to decline to consider a renewed motion to suppress the
challenged evidence at trial had Henry brought such a motion, the
court didn’t plainly err by admitting the evidence. Indeed, if, as
Henry claims, the drugs couldn’t have been in plain view during the
initial warrantless search of the house, then that fact was
reasonably discernable prior to trial through due diligence. Thus,
the issue could’ve been raised at the suppression hearing or
otherwise in advance of trial, and the trial court could have denied
any suppression motion made at trial on the basis that it was too
late to consider the issue. See People v. Hastings, 983 P.2d 78, 82-
83 (Colo. App. 1998) (trial court properly denied as untimely a
suppression motion made during trial, even though the motion was
based on testimony not presented until the trial, because the
defendant knew about the potentially illegal search from the
12 moment it occurred), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Gorman v.
People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000).
III. Waiver of the Right to Counsel
¶ 32 Henry also contends that the trial court erred by granting his
motion to represent himself because his waiver of his right to
counsel was ineffective. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 33 During his altercation with Williams, Henry sustained a
traumatic brain injury (TBI).
¶ 34 Before trial, the issue of competency was raised, and the court
ordered an evaluation of Henry. The evaluation revealed the
following:
• Henry was diagnosed with dyslexia as a child, and he
reported having received “special education services for
dyslexia ‘most’ of his life.”
• Henry said he believed he sustained a stroke in 2020.
• Henry’s attorney indicated that Henry has difficulty
retaining information and has a history of TBI.
• The evaluator stated that Henry reported his memory had
“vanished” since “the incident” but noted that, in fact,
13 “he discussed all topics with no significant memory
impairment noted.”
• The evaluator remarked, “[O]verall, [Henry’s] thought
process was goal-directed and linear. . . . His speech was
clear and coherent. His thoughts were simple but
appeared logical. No significant confusion was noted. . . .
Throughout the evaluation, he maintained satisfactory
attention, did not evidence cognitive impairment or
disorientation, and showed no difficulty understanding
me or conveying his thoughts.”
• The evaluator added that Henry “displayed an
understanding of his current legal situation.” She went
on to describe how he was able to identify all his charges,
display an understanding of the class level of his charges,
provide responses regarding his preferred legal strategy,
note some evidentiary issues, and discuss the possible
consequences he might face if convicted.
• The evaluator opined that Henry “d[id] not currently have
a mental disability or developmental disability that
prevent[ed] him from having sufficient present ability to
14 consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding in order to assist in his defense,
or prevent[ed] him from having a rational and factual
understanding of the criminal proceedings.”
¶ 35 Based on the results of the evaluation, the trial court
concluded that Henry was competent to stand trial. At no point —
including on appeal — has Henry challenged the court’s
competency determination.
¶ 36 On multiple occasions before trial, Henry expressed a desire to
speak for himself rather than through his attorney.
¶ 37 Shortly before trial, Henry moved for a hearing under People v.
Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989), which the court granted. At the
hearing, Henry expressed a desire to waive his right to counsel and
represent himself with advisory counsel. The court gave Henry an
Arguello advisement, during which Henry indicated that he
understood the nature of the charges against him and the
consequences of representing himself. He also indicated that he
could “barely” read, write, and understand the English language,
though he later said that he could “follow” the advisement form,
which he was given a copy of at the start of the advisement, “along
15 with [the court].” The court noted that Henry seemed confused at
times but worked to further explain those topics to him. At the end
of the hearing, the court permitted the public defender’s office to
withdraw as counsel and allowed Henry to proceed pro se with
advisory counsel.
B. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 38 A defendant’s right to legal counsel is protected under both the
United States and the Colorado Constitutions. See U.S. Const.
amend. VI; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; Arguello, 772 P.2d at 92. As a
corollary to the constitutional right to counsel, “a defendant has the
alternative right to self-representation.” Arguello, 772 P.2d at 92;
see also People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1263-64 (Colo. 1985)
(“[T]he express guarantee of the right to counsel implicitly embodies
a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help . . . .”).
¶ 39 If a defendant requests to represent themself, the court must
“conduct a specific inquiry on the record to ensure that the
defendant is voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waiving the
right to counsel” before it can grant the request. Arguello, 772 P.2d
at 95; accord People v. Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 15.
16 ¶ 40 A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the record clearly shows
that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the
statutory offenses included within those charges, the range of
potential punishments, the possible defenses to the charges and
circumstances in mitigation of the charges, and all other facts
essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. People v.
Lavadie, 2021 CO 42, ¶ 28. Other factors courts consider in
determining whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent include
whether the defendant understood the requirement of complying
with procedural rules at trial, whether the court’s exchange with the
defendant consisted merely of pro forma answers to pro forma
questions, and whether the defendant was trying to delay or
manipulate the proceedings. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94-95.
¶ 41 Whether a defendant effectively waived their right to counsel,
and therefore can exercise their right to self-representation, is a
mixed question of fact and law. Lavadie, ¶ 22. On appeal, we
“accept the trial court’s findings of historic fact if those findings are
supported by competent evidence, but we assess the legal
significance of the facts de novo.” People v. Coke, 2020 CO 28, ¶ 10
(quoting People v. Davis, 2019 CO 24, ¶ 14).
17 C. Application
¶ 42 Henry doesn’t challenge whether his waiver was voluntary; he
only challenges whether it was knowing and intelligent. We agree
with the trial court’s conclusion that it was.
¶ 43 Henry continuously engaged with the court during the Arguello
advisement and at the later trial and sentencing, and he seemed to
understand what was happening overall, despite a few moments
when he expressed confusion. And to the extent that some of his
responses during the Arguello advisement may have bolstered his
current claim, the trial court — which had the opportunity to
observe his demeanor — expressed concern at one point that his
responses were “trying to make it vague and stuff to try to create
some error.”
¶ 44 Also, while Henry said he had difficulty reading, there was no
indication that this impacted the knowing and voluntary nature of
his waiver because the court read the advisement in its entirety and
provided an advisement form to Henry so he could follow along —
and he indicated that he was able to do so.
¶ 45 Finally, the fact that the court didn’t expressly consider any
potential impact of Henry’s TBI on the knowing or intelligent nature
18 of his waiver doesn’t render it ineffective. Neither Henry nor his
counsel referenced the TBI at any point during the Arguello
advisement or asked the court to expressly consider it. Moreover,
while the competency evaluation noted Henry’s history of TBI, the
evaluator’s findings — such as that Henry didn’t exhibit any
significant confusion or difficulty understanding things, displayed
an understanding of the nature of his charges and the
consequences he might face if convicted, and didn’t have a mental
or developmental disability that prevented him from having a
rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings —
were consistent with the court’s later conclusion that Henry’s
waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent.
IV. Evidence of Suspected Bomb-Making Materials
¶ 46 Lastly, Henry contends that the trial court plainly erred by
admitting evidence about suspected bomb-making materials found
in the house in violation of CRE 401, 403, and 404(b). We disagree
and conclude that any error in admitting the evidence wasn’t plain.
¶ 47 While executing a search warrant of the home, officers found
what they described as “suspected bomb-making materials.” The
19 officers contacted the bomb squad to investigate the materials,
which turned out to be substances that were legal to possess and,
when combined, could not create an explosive device. Henry thus
wasn’t charged with any offenses relating to those substances.
¶ 48 Henry’s theory of defense as to the drug charges was that the
drugs had been planted in the house and that the police
investigation wasn’t sufficiently thorough. He specifically
questioned why officers didn’t run specific tests, search particular
areas, or collect certain evidence.
¶ 49 The prosecution called the bomb squad supervisor to testify at
trial about the investigation of the suspected bomb-making
materials. The supervisor testified that the bomb squad was called
to the house to “look at the chemicals and make sure that they were
safe to be moved and make sure that they were not anything
explosive.” On cross-examination, he clarified that the bomb squad
didn’t find any actual explosives and that the substances found
were legal to possess.
¶ 50 On redirect examination, the prosecutor elicited the following
testimony from the bomb squad supervisor:
20 [The substances] were three of four chemicals that were needed [to make a bomb]. So if there was one more chemical, which would be charcoal, you could make black powder, then confine that in something, and then it would become an improvised explosive device.
But the individual precursors by themselves are legal to possess and not enough to consist of an improvised explosive device as we found them and what we found at the scene.
¶ 51 These materials were mentioned a handful of other times at
trial, once by Henry himself, but Henry never lodged an objection.
¶ 52 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6, ¶ 8. A trial court abuses
its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair or if it misapplies the law. Id.
¶ 53 In the absence of a contemporary objection, we will reverse an
error only if it amounts to plain error — in other words, if the error
was “obvious, substantial, and ‘so undermined the fundamental
fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability
of the judgment of conviction.’” People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M,
¶ 33 (quoting People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1203 (Colo. 2011)).
21 ¶ 54 As a general rule, evidence is admissible if it is relevant, CRE
402, meaning it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”
CRE 401. However, relevant evidence may still be excluded if the
risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
CRE 403. Moreover, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts isn’t
“admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in conformity with the
character.” CRE 404(b)(1). To determine whether such evidence is
admissible for other purposes, a court must apply the four-part test
outlined in People v. Spoto, considering whether (1) the evidence
relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is logically relevant;
(3) that relevance is independent of the prohibited inference that the
defendant has a bad character and acted in conformity with that
character; and (4) the evidence’s probative value isn’t substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 795 P.2d 1314, 1318
(Colo. 1990).
22 C. Application
¶ 55 We conclude that the trial court didn’t err by admitting the
testimony generally referencing the suspected bomb-making
materials because that testimony was relevant to rebut Henry’s
assertion that the police investigation was inadequate. Specifically,
it was relevant to explain the officers’ actions during the
investigation of the house and why there was a pause in the police
investigation while the bomb squad cleared the house.
¶ 56 However, we conclude that the trial court should not have
allowed the bomb squad supervisor’s testimony on redirect
indicating that there was only one substance missing to create an
explosive device. That testimony had no logical relevance
independent of the impermissible inference that Henry acted in
conformity with a bad character trait. Thus, admitting the
testimony was not consistent with the law. See id.; Abad, ¶ 8.
¶ 57 This error was not plain, however, for two reasons.
¶ 58 First, the references to suspected bomb-making materials were
largely fleeting, and one of those references was made by Henry
himself in his cross-examination of one of the officers. The instance
of the prosecution using the materials as impermissible character
23 evidence occurred only once in the course of a five-day trial. And
the prosecutor didn’t mention the materials in opening statements
or closing arguments.
¶ 59 Second, the evidence supporting the convictions was
overwhelming. As to the drug convictions, multiple officers testified
that when Williams was questioned following the incident, she said
she’d observed Henry sell drugs from the house earlier in the day.
Moreover, the drugs underlying the charged offenses were found in
a cooler in the house where Henry was staying. That same cooler
also contained items often used in the distribution of drugs — such
as a scale, small bags, and cash in different denominations — and
multiple pieces of mail addressed to Henry. And an expert testified
that the amount of drugs and the other items found with the drugs
were indicative of narcotic sales.
¶ 60 As to the illegal discharge of a firearm conviction, officer
testimony and bodycam video showed that officers found Henry
with a rifle. Officer testimony and bodycam video also showed that
when questioned at the scene, Henry admitted to shooting into the
neighbor’s house to prompt them to call 911. There was also
evidence of bullet holes found in the neighbor’s house.
24 ¶ 61 Finally, as to the assault conviction, one of the officers testified
that Williams reported that Henry choked her. Photos taken that
night show cuts and bruises on Williams’s neck and arms. And an
officer testified that he observed these injuries, as well as petechiae
in her eyes, and that they were consistent with being choked.
¶ 62 Accordingly, the error wasn’t so substantial as to call into
question the validity of Henry’s convictions.
V. Disposition
¶ 63 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.