Peo v. Hasadinratana

2021 COA 66

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 20, 2021
• Docket: 19CA1114
• Status: Published

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY May 13, 2021

2021COA66

No. 19CA1114, Peo v Hasadinratana — Crimes — Possession of Weapons by Previous Offenders; Criminal Law — Affirmative Defenses — Choice of Evils

A division of the court of appeals holds that, in People v.

Carbajal, 2014 CO 60, 328 P.3d 104, our supreme court implicitly

overruled the holding in People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728 (Colo. App.

2011). In this case, the division specifically holds that a defendant

charged with possession of a weapon by a previous offender cannot

assert the affirmative defense of choice of evils based solely on a

showing that he or she possessed a firearm while walking in what is

generally known as a high crime neighborhood. Because such a

showing, without more, does not establish the threat of imminent

harm, which Carbajal held is required to assert a choice of evils

defense, the division affirms the defendant’s judgment of conviction. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA66

Court of Appeals No. 19CA1114 El Paso County District Court No. 18CR2188 Honorable Jann P. DuBois, Judge Honorable Scott B. Epstein, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Payut Cody Hasadinratana,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Pawar and Taubman*, JJ., concur

Announced May 13, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Daniel E. Rheiner, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sarah R. Rowlands, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020. ¶1 In People v. Carbajal, 2014 CO 60, 328 P.3d 104, our supreme

court held that defendants charged with possession of a weapon by

a previous offender (POWPO) pursuant to section 18-12-108, C.R.S.

2020, are entitled to the affirmative defense of choice of evils only if

they possessed the weapon to defend themselves, their homes, or

their property from what they reasonably believed to be a threat of

imminent harm.

¶2 The Carbajal court did not address the effect of its decision on

People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728 (Colo. App. 2011), which read the

choice of evils affirmative defense more expansively than did the

majority in Carbajal. Specifically, in DeWitt, a division of this court

held that a defendant was entitled to an affirmative defense

instruction to POWPO based on a “general fear for his personal

safety,” coupled with fear related to “specific trends of violence and

incidents in the areas where he regularly walked and in the stores

that he regularly visited.” 275 P.3d at 734.

¶3 We hold that the reasoning of DeWitt cannot be squared with

Carbajal. For that reason, we decide that Carbajal implicitly

overruled DeWitt to the extent DeWitt stands for the proposition that

defendants charged with POWPO are entitled to assert the

1 affirmative defense of choice of evils based solely on a showing that

they possessed a firearm while walking in what is generally known

as a high-crime neighborhood.

¶4 Defendant, Payut Cody Hasadinratana, directly appeals his

conviction for POWPO. He contends that the district court erred by

declining to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of choice of

evils. In light of our reading of Carbajal, we disagree and affirm his

judgment of conviction.

I. Background

¶5 According to the affidavit of probable cause in support of

Hasadinratana’s arrest, police were dispatched to an inn based on a

report of a physical disturbance involving two men with guns and

masks. The reporting party said the suspects could be found by a

nearby gas station. A police officer arrived and saw Hasadinratana,

who matched the description of one of the suspects, walking away

from the inn toward the gas station. When the officer stopped him,

Hasadinratana told the officer he had a gun in his possession. The

officer found the gun in the waistband of Hasadinratana’s pants.

¶6 Because Hasadinratana had a prior felony conviction, the

prosecution charged him with POWPO.

2 ¶7 Hasadinratana endorsed the affirmative defense of choice of

evils under section 18-1-702, C.R.S. 2020.

¶8 At a pretrial hearing, Hasadinratana testified that he lived in a

high-crime neighborhood plagued by gang and drug activity and

violent incidents. He said the police had an active presence in the

neighborhood. He also testified that, during the thirty years he

lived in the neighborhood, he witnessed incidents of violence and

had been a crime victim. He reported that property had been stolen

from his car and his yard, and that people had tried to break into

his home while he was away. However, Hasadinratana did not

testify to any facts showing that he had a reasonable belief that he

faced a threat of imminent harm at the time of his arrest.

¶9 Following that testimony and the parties’ arguments, the

district court denied Hasadinratana’s request to assert the

affirmative defense of choice of evils, explaining,

[To be able to assert that affirmative defense to POWPO, there has to be a] specific, definite, and imminent threat, and while I would acknowledge that this defendant, because of where he lived, may have had a generalized perception that he was potentially in danger, there was nothing on this occasion that required him to arm himself since there was nothing imminent that I’ve heard.

3 ¶ 10 Hasadinratana filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, among

other things, that “[t]he accused need not present evidence of

imminent threat, just that the weapon was possessed for a

constitutionally protected purpose, i.e. defense of person or

property.” He repeated that argument on the morning of the first

day of trial.

¶ 11 The district court denied the motion to reconsider and

reaffirmed its ruling that, because Hasadinratana had not

presented evidence of a threat of imminent harm, he would not be

allowed to assert the affirmative defense of choice of evils at trial.

However, over the prosecutor’s objection, the court granted

Hasadinratana’s request for the following theory of defense

instruction:

It is the defense theory of the case that Mr. Hasadinratana carried a weapon for what he believed was a constitutionally protected purpose, namely, to protect person and property. Notwithstanding a prior felony conviction, Mr. Hasadinratana believed he was justified in carrying a weapon under a belief of threat of harm to person or property.

¶ 12 The jury found Hasadinratana guilty of POWPO and the court

sentenced him to three years of probation.

4 II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 To be entitled to assert an affirmative defense, a defendant

must present “some credible evidence” supporting the defense.

§ 18-1-407(1), C.R.S. 2020; People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO 83, ¶ 16,

428 P.3d 541, 544. This burden is “relatively lenient.” DeGreat,

¶ 22, 428 P.3d at 545. In determining whether a defendant met the

burden, we view the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to

him. Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951, 955 (Colo. 2004) (citing

Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973, 979 (Colo. 2003)). Also,

because the jury decides the credibility of evidence, the burden can

be met even if the only supporting evidence is “highly improbable”

testimony from the defendant. DeGreat, ¶ 22, 428 P.3d at 545

(quoting Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 579 (Colo. 1991)).

¶ 14 However, as a matter of law, a trial court need not give an

affirmative defense instruction if the record contains no evidence to

support it because, in the absence of supporting evidence, there is

no issue of fact for the jury to resolve. O’Shaughnessy v. People,

2012 CO 9, ¶ 13, 269 P.3d 1233, 1236.

5 ¶ 15 Whether a defendant has met his burden of showing

entitlement to an affirmative defense presents a question of law that

we review de novo. DeGreat, ¶ 16, 428 P.3d at 544.

III. Analysis

¶ 16 Hasadinratana relies primarily on DeWitt to support his

argument that he presented sufficient evidence to entitle him to

assert a choice of evils affirmative defense. Before we address

DeWitt, we discuss the relevant supreme court precedent and model

jury instructions.

¶ 17 In 1975, in People v. Blue, the supreme court held that the

POWPO statute was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power

and did not facially violate article II, section 13, of the Colorado

Constitution, which protects a person’s right to bear arms. 190

Colo. 95, 102-04, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975). The court

explained that a defendant charged with POWPO can assert the

affirmative defense of choice of evils, which allows the possession of

a weapon “to avoid an imminent public or private injury.” Id. at

103, 544 P.2d at 391 (quoting § 18-1-702).

¶ 18 Two years later, the supreme court noted that Blue left open

the question of whether the POWPO statute could be

6 unconstitutional as applied in a particular case. See People v. Ford,

193 Colo. 459, 461, 568 P.2d 26, 28 (1977). To reconcile the

POWPO statute with the constitutional right to bear arms, the

supreme court held in Ford that a defendant charged with POWPO

“who presents competent evidence showing that his purpose in

possessing weapons was the defense of his home, person, and

property thereby raises an affirmative defense.” Id. at 462, 568

P.2d at 28.

¶ 19 Based on Ford, a model criminal jury instruction for an

affirmative defense to POWPO was subsequently adopted that read,

“[i]t is an affirmative defense to the crime of [POWPO] that the

defendant possessed the weapon for the purpose of defending his

[home] [person] [property].” CJI-Crim. 7:63 (1983). The same

model instruction appeared in the 2008 update to the model

instructions. See COLJI-Crim. H:51 (2008).

¶ 20 In Carbajal, the supreme court considered whether a trial

court erred by adding the following italicized clause to the model

instruction: “It is an affirmative defense to the charge of possession

of a weapon by a previous offender that the defendant possessed a

firearm for the purpose of defending himself, home, or property from

7 what he reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm.”

Carbajal, ¶ 7, 328 P.3d at 106 (emphasis added).

¶ 21 The supreme court held that the trial court did not err by

adding the requirements of reasonableness and imminence to the

model instruction. See id. at ¶¶ 10-21, 328 P.3d at 106-09. After

analyzing Blue and Ford, the supreme court concluded that “the

POWPO affirmative defense is the statutory defense of choice of

evils.” Id. at ¶ 21, 328 P.3d at 109. The court reasoned that “the

choice of evils defense was the legislature’s way of preserving [the

constitutional right to bear arms] in connection with POWPO.” Id.

at ¶ 17, 328 P.3d at 108. Notably, in approving the trial court’s

modified instruction, id. at ¶ 21, 328 P.3d at 109, the court

disapproved of the then-existing model instruction for the

affirmative defense to POWPO, see id. at ¶ 20, 328 P.3d at 108-09.

¶ 22 Consistent with Carbajal, the model jury instruction was

amended again to state that the affirmative defense to POWPO

applies only if the defendant “possessed the weapon for the purpose

of defending his [her] home, person or property from what he [she]

reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm which was

about to occur because of a situation occasioned or developed

8 through no conduct of the defendant.” COLJI-Crim. H:64 (2014)

(emphasis added). (The language, “which was about to occur

because of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct

of the defendant,” mirrors language in the choice of evils statute,

section 18-1-702(1). See id. at cmt. 2 (citing Carbajal, ¶ 21 n.5, 328

P.3d at 109 n.5).)

¶ 23 Hasadinratana repeatedly argued in the district court that the

affirmative defense to POWPO has no imminence requirement

(although his tendered instruction included the imminence

requirement and tracked COLJI-Crim. H:64 (2014)).

¶ 24 In his opening brief on appeal, Hasadinratana describes

Carbajal in a single paragraph, and neither applies it nor discusses

how the imminence requirement applies to the facts in his case.

Instead, he primarily relies on DeWitt, in which a division of this

court held that the trial court erred by rejecting the defendant’s

tendered affirmative defense instruction to POWPO because “[the]

defendant not only testified to a general fear for his personal safety,

but also tied his fear to specific trends of violence and incidents in

the areas where he regularly walked and in the stores that he

regularly visited.” 275 P.3d at 734.

9 ¶ 25 In DeWitt, the defendant’s tendered affirmative defense

instruction said, “[i]t is an affirmative defense to the crime of

[POWPO] that the defendant’s purpose in possessing weapons was

the defense of his home, person, and property.” Id. at 733.

Notably, that language reflected the pre-Carbajal model instruction.

That instruction made no reference to a reasonableness or

imminence requirement. See COLJI-Crim. H:51 (2008); CJI-Crim.

7:63 (1983). Also, DeWitt does not mention the concept of

imminence or the affirmative defense of choice of evils. (The same

is true of the supreme court’s 1977 Ford opinion.)

¶ 26 Although Carbajal did not explicitly overrule DeWitt, as noted

above, we hold that Carbajal implicitly overruled DeWitt. In light of

Carbajal, we cannot follow the suggestion in DeWitt that a

defendant charged with POWPO is entitled to assert the affirmative

defense of choice of evils where the defendant showed only that he

possessed a firearm while walking in what is generally known as a

high-crime neighborhood. That scenario, without more, does not

show a threat of imminent harm. “‘Imminent’ means ‘likely to

happen without delay; impending; threatening.’” Moczygemba v.

Colorado Dep’t of Health Care Pol’y & Fin., 51 P.3d 1083, 1087

10 (Colo. App. 2002) (quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary 702

(1972)); see People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 678 (“‘Imminent’

means ‘near at hand, impending or on the point of happening.’”

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 676 (rev. 5th ed. 1979)).

¶ 27 Similarly, Hasadinratana showed only that he was walking in

what is generally known as a high-crime neighborhood at

12:45 a.m. It does not matter that police were dispatched to the

inn based on a report of a physical disturbance involving two men

with guns and masks because Hasadinratana concedes that he was

not aware of that disturbance when the officer stopped him. These

facts fall short, as a matter of law, to show that Hasadinratana

possessed the firearm to protect himself “from what he reasonably

believed to be a threat of imminent harm.” Carbajal, ¶ 21, 328 P.3d

at 109 (emphasis added); see O’Shaughnessy, ¶ 13, 269 P.3d at

1236.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.