23CA0470 Peo v Hardy 02-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0470 Adams County District Court Nos. 20CR1454 & 21CR3756 Honorable Jeffrey A. Smith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ralph Marcus Hardy,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Harris and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 20, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Barbara A. Snow, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 In his notice of appeal, defendant, Ralph Marcus Hardy,
indicated he was appealing the sentences imposed in two cases,
20CR1454 and 21CR3156. Because Hardy does not raise any
issues in his appellate briefs regarding case number 21CR3156, we
dismiss that part of the appeal.
¶2 As for case number 20CR1454, Hardy appeals the sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to identify theft, a class 4 felony.
We affirm that sentence.
I. Background
¶3 In case number 20CR1454, Hardy was charged with thirty-five
felony offenses involving forgery, criminal impersonation, theft, and
identity theft, and three habitual criminal counts. As relevant here,
Hardy agreed to plead guilty to one count of identity theft with a
stipulation that he would be sentenced to eight years in the custody
of the Department of Corrections (DOC) in exchange for the
dismissal of the other counts. The district court accepted Hardy’s
guilty plea and sentenced him to eight years in DOC custody,
followed by three years of mandatory parole as required by statute.
¶4 Approximately four weeks later, Hardy filed a pro se motion to
compel specific enforcement of his plea agreement arguing that the
1 plea agreement required the three years of mandatory parole to be
included in the stipulated eight-year sentence. The district court
ordered the prosecution to respond. However, before the
prosecution filed its response or the court ruled on the motion,
Hardy filed this direct appeal of his sentence. In this appeal, he
argues that his sentence violated the plea agreement and he seeks
to withdraw his plea.
II. Interpretation of Plea Agreement
¶5 Hardy contends that his eight-year DOC sentence plus three
years of mandatory parole violates the terms of his plea agreement
because the plea agreement provided that the mandatory parole
component was included as part of the eight-year stipulated
sentence. We are not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶6 The interpretation of a plea agreement is a question of law that
we review de novo. Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 960 (Colo. 1999).
When interpreting a plea agreement, we must determine whether
the interpretation the defendant claims to have taken is reasonable.
Id.; see also People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo. 2000). We
review the meaning of a plea agreement objectively, not based on
2 the subjective understanding of the defendant, and consider what
meaning a reasonable person would have given the agreement
under the circumstances. Craig, 986 P.2d at 960-61.
¶7 The People argue that Hardy’s challenge to his sentence is
unpreserved and we should therefore review for plain error. We
need not address this issue because we perceive no error, let alone
plain error.
B. Analysis
¶8 Hardy’s signed, written request to plead guilty advised him
that his prison sentence could be as low as one year and as high as
twelve years. Following the term of years description, the document
stated: “this includes an additional mandatory period of parole of 3
years; and a possible fine of $2,000 to $500,000.” Further, the
stipulated concession in the plea agreement stated, “The People
stipulate to a sentence of eight (8) years in the Department of
Corrections to be served consecutively to [a sentence in another
case]. The Defendant agrees facts exist to support sentence
aggravation.” And, at the providency hearing, both parties
affirmatively indicated that the stipulated sentence for this case was
an eight-year DOC sentence.
3 ¶9 The plain language of the plea agreement indicates that the
parties agreed that Hardy would serve eight years in the DOC and
the advisement informed him that the sentence would include “an
additional mandatory period of parole of 3 years.” (Emphasis
added.) The inclusion of the word “additional” before the
description of the mandatory parole period makes it clear that the
prison sentence would be followed by the mandatory parole period.
See Craig, 986 P.2d at 962 (“[A]n agreement for a sentence to the
[DOC] clearly indicates that the defendant has bargained for a term
of confinement commensurate with the period specified.”). Further,
the plea agreement does not expressly indicate that the parties
agreed to include the required mandatory parole period as part of
the DOC sentence. Absent express language “indicating the parties
actually agreed to eliminate or circumvent the parole requirement”
we must construe the agreement for a stipulated sentence as
referring only to the imprisonment component of the sentence. See
People v. Seaney, 36 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo. App. 2000).
¶ 10 That the advisement also used the phrase “this includes” after
stating the length of the prison sentence does not alter our
conclusion. The “this includes” language preceded both the
4 description of mandatory parole and the possibility of a fine. It
would be unreasonable to think that a fine would also be included
in the prison sentence rather than a sanction imposed in addition
to the prison sentence. See Craig, 986 P.2d at 961.
¶ 11 Thus, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of
the plea agreement is that Hardy would serve eight years in the
DOC followed by three years of mandatory parole. See id. at 962 (A
reasonable person would understand a sentence to the DOC refers
“to the imprisonment component of a sentence only and not to
include any promises concerning mandatory parole.”).
Consequently, the court’s imposition of an eight-year DOC sentence
to be followed by three years of mandatory parole was consistent
with the plea agreement.
III. Withdrawal of Plea
¶ 12 Hardy next argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea because (1) his plea was not entered knowingly and
intelligently and (2) he received ineffective assistance from his plea
counsel. We decline to address these claims because they are not
properly before us.
5 ¶ 13 Challenges to the validity of a plea alleging that it was
unknowingly or unintelligently entered or that plea counsel
provided ineffective assistance implicate the constitutionality of the
conviction. See Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255
(Colo.
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23CA0470 Peo v Hardy 02-20-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0470 Adams County District Court Nos. 20CR1454 & 21CR3756 Honorable Jeffrey A. Smith, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ralph Marcus Hardy,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Harris and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 20, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Barbara A. Snow, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 In his notice of appeal, defendant, Ralph Marcus Hardy,
indicated he was appealing the sentences imposed in two cases,
20CR1454 and 21CR3156. Because Hardy does not raise any
issues in his appellate briefs regarding case number 21CR3156, we
dismiss that part of the appeal.
¶2 As for case number 20CR1454, Hardy appeals the sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to identify theft, a class 4 felony.
We affirm that sentence.
I. Background
¶3 In case number 20CR1454, Hardy was charged with thirty-five
felony offenses involving forgery, criminal impersonation, theft, and
identity theft, and three habitual criminal counts. As relevant here,
Hardy agreed to plead guilty to one count of identity theft with a
stipulation that he would be sentenced to eight years in the custody
of the Department of Corrections (DOC) in exchange for the
dismissal of the other counts. The district court accepted Hardy’s
guilty plea and sentenced him to eight years in DOC custody,
followed by three years of mandatory parole as required by statute.
¶4 Approximately four weeks later, Hardy filed a pro se motion to
compel specific enforcement of his plea agreement arguing that the
1 plea agreement required the three years of mandatory parole to be
included in the stipulated eight-year sentence. The district court
ordered the prosecution to respond. However, before the
prosecution filed its response or the court ruled on the motion,
Hardy filed this direct appeal of his sentence. In this appeal, he
argues that his sentence violated the plea agreement and he seeks
to withdraw his plea.
II. Interpretation of Plea Agreement
¶5 Hardy contends that his eight-year DOC sentence plus three
years of mandatory parole violates the terms of his plea agreement
because the plea agreement provided that the mandatory parole
component was included as part of the eight-year stipulated
sentence. We are not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
¶6 The interpretation of a plea agreement is a question of law that
we review de novo. Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 960 (Colo. 1999).
When interpreting a plea agreement, we must determine whether
the interpretation the defendant claims to have taken is reasonable.
Id.; see also People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo. 2000). We
review the meaning of a plea agreement objectively, not based on
2 the subjective understanding of the defendant, and consider what
meaning a reasonable person would have given the agreement
under the circumstances. Craig, 986 P.2d at 960-61.
¶7 The People argue that Hardy’s challenge to his sentence is
unpreserved and we should therefore review for plain error. We
need not address this issue because we perceive no error, let alone
plain error.
B. Analysis
¶8 Hardy’s signed, written request to plead guilty advised him
that his prison sentence could be as low as one year and as high as
twelve years. Following the term of years description, the document
stated: “this includes an additional mandatory period of parole of 3
years; and a possible fine of $2,000 to $500,000.” Further, the
stipulated concession in the plea agreement stated, “The People
stipulate to a sentence of eight (8) years in the Department of
Corrections to be served consecutively to [a sentence in another
case]. The Defendant agrees facts exist to support sentence
aggravation.” And, at the providency hearing, both parties
affirmatively indicated that the stipulated sentence for this case was
an eight-year DOC sentence.
3 ¶9 The plain language of the plea agreement indicates that the
parties agreed that Hardy would serve eight years in the DOC and
the advisement informed him that the sentence would include “an
additional mandatory period of parole of 3 years.” (Emphasis
added.) The inclusion of the word “additional” before the
description of the mandatory parole period makes it clear that the
prison sentence would be followed by the mandatory parole period.
See Craig, 986 P.2d at 962 (“[A]n agreement for a sentence to the
[DOC] clearly indicates that the defendant has bargained for a term
of confinement commensurate with the period specified.”). Further,
the plea agreement does not expressly indicate that the parties
agreed to include the required mandatory parole period as part of
the DOC sentence. Absent express language “indicating the parties
actually agreed to eliminate or circumvent the parole requirement”
we must construe the agreement for a stipulated sentence as
referring only to the imprisonment component of the sentence. See
People v. Seaney, 36 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo. App. 2000).
¶ 10 That the advisement also used the phrase “this includes” after
stating the length of the prison sentence does not alter our
conclusion. The “this includes” language preceded both the
4 description of mandatory parole and the possibility of a fine. It
would be unreasonable to think that a fine would also be included
in the prison sentence rather than a sanction imposed in addition
to the prison sentence. See Craig, 986 P.2d at 961.
¶ 11 Thus, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of
the plea agreement is that Hardy would serve eight years in the
DOC followed by three years of mandatory parole. See id. at 962 (A
reasonable person would understand a sentence to the DOC refers
“to the imprisonment component of a sentence only and not to
include any promises concerning mandatory parole.”).
Consequently, the court’s imposition of an eight-year DOC sentence
to be followed by three years of mandatory parole was consistent
with the plea agreement.
III. Withdrawal of Plea
¶ 12 Hardy next argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea because (1) his plea was not entered knowingly and
intelligently and (2) he received ineffective assistance from his plea
counsel. We decline to address these claims because they are not
properly before us.
5 ¶ 13 Challenges to the validity of a plea alleging that it was
unknowingly or unintelligently entered or that plea counsel
provided ineffective assistance implicate the constitutionality of the
conviction. See Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255
(Colo. 2011) (“[T]o be constitutionally valid, a defendant must enter
his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”); Dunlap v.
People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2007) (criminal defendants are
constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel).
Thus, a defendant who believes that his guilty plea was entered
unknowingly or unintelligently, or that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel during the plea process, may seek to
withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing pursuant to Crim. P.
32(d). See Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 14; see also People v.
Kirk, 221 P.3d 63, 64 (Colo. App. 2009). After sentencing, the
proper avenue to withdraw a guilty plea is through a Crim. P. 35(c)
motion. Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I) (providing postconviction relief for
claims that a conviction was obtained in violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States or Colorado); see also Kirk,
221 P.3d at 64-65. Filing a direct appeal to assert that a plea was
unconstitutionally obtained either because it was unintelligently
6 entered or because counsel was ineffective, without pursuing either
of these remedies, is improper. See Kirk. 221 P.3d at 65.
¶ 14 Because Hardy did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
before sentencing or pursue postconviction relief after sentencing,
we decline to address his constitutional challenges to his plea for
the first time on direct appeal. See id.; see also Hodges v. People,
158 P.3d 922, 927 (Colo. 2007) (ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are appropriately brought in a Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction
motion, not on direct appeal).
IV. Disposition
¶ 15 We dismiss the appeal in case number 21CR3156 and affirm
the sentence in case number 20CR1454.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE GROVE concur.