Peo v. Gutierrez-Barraza

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 23CA1824
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1824 Peo v Gutierrez-Barraza 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1824 Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR1757 Honorable LaQunya L. Baker, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Gregoryo Gutierrez-Barraza,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM* J. Jones and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Dilyn K. Myers, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Gregoryo Gutierrez-Barraza, appeals the trial

court’s restitution order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One afternoon in August 2021, J.L.M-S. (the victim) parked

his car in front of an apartment complex clubhouse where he

worked as a maintenance employee. He left his car unlocked and

entered the clubhouse to collect apartment keys. At around the

same time, Gutierrez-Barraza broke into the victim’s unoccupied

car and took a tool bag from the front passenger seat.

¶3 Observing Gutierrez-Barraza walking away with the tool bag,

the victim confronted Gutierrez-Barraza. Gutierrez-Barraza then

ran through the apartment complex before the victim caught up

with him. After the victim demanded the return of his tools,

Gutierrez-Barraza brandished a knife. Fearing for his life, the

victim ran for “about [twenty] or [thirty] seconds” back to the

clubhouse.

¶4 The paramedics who responded to the scene checked the

victim’s pulse and examined him for chest pain he was experiencing

“from running and from the adrenaline of the suspect scaring him

with the knife.” The paramedics told the victim that his symptoms

1 didn’t look serious but nonetheless offered to take him to the

hospital. The victim declined this offer and decided to wait and see

whether his chest pain would subside.

¶5 When the victim’s condition hadn’t improved by the next

morning, he went to see his primary care doctor. The doctor

ordered x-rays and prescribed two medications to relieve the chest

pain. While going to get x-rays, the victim fainted and was taken to

the emergency room. After further testing, he was diagnosed with

pneumonia.

¶6 The People charged Gutierrez-Barraza with one count each of

aggravated robbery, felony menacing, first degree criminal trespass,

theft, and a crime of violence sentence enhancer for using a deadly

weapon during the incident. The parties eventually resolved the

case through a plea agreement. In exchange for the dismissal of his

original charges, Gutierrez-Barraza pleaded guilty to an added

count of attempted aggravated robbery (menacing with a deadly

weapon), a class 4 felony. See §§ 18-4-302(1)(b), (3), 18-2-101(4),

C.R.S. 2024. Additionally, Gutierrez-Barraza admitted liability for

restitution, stipulated to causation, and agreed to pay restitution

2 for all pecuniary losses suffered by the victim, including those

losses arising out of the dismissed charges.

¶7 The trial court approved the plea agreement after confirming

that Gutierrez-Barraza understood its terms. The court then

sentenced him to a four-year term in the custody of the Department

of Corrections, suspended upon his successful completion of three

years of supervised probation.1 The court further ordered

(1) Gutierrez-Barraza to pay restitution, (2) the prosecution to

submit a motion for a specific restitution amount within forty-five

days, and (3) Gutierrez-Barraza to file any objection within fifteen

days of the prosecution’s motion.

¶8 The prosecution filed a timely motion for restitution in the

amount of $1,341.46. This figure encompassed certain medical

expenses that the victim’s insurance carrier hadn’t covered in

connection with the treatment the victim received the day after the

robbery. Specifically, the victim incurred $1,329.80 for seeing his

primary care doctor and receiving emergency room attention that

ultimately resulted in his pneumonia diagnosis. The remaining

1 Gutierrez-Barraza stipulated to this sentence as part of his guilty

plea.

3 $11.66 represented the amount of copays that the victim had paid

for his prescribed chest pain medications.

¶9 Gutierrez-Barraza objected to the prosecution’s restitution

motion and requested an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the

trial court found that Gutierrez-Barraza’s criminal conduct was the

proximate cause of the victim’s medical expenses. Accordingly, the

court granted the prosecution’s request and ordered

Gutierrez-Barraza to pay $1,341.46 in restitution to the victim.

II. Analysis

¶ 10 On appeal, Gutierrez-Barraza contends that the trial court’s

restitution award must be vacated because (1) the prosecution

failed to present sufficient evidence proving that he proximately

caused the victim’s claimed medical expenses, and (2) the court’s

proximate cause determination as to those expenses was clearly

erroneous. We decline to consider the merits of these contentions

because the record establishes that he waived his right to challenge

proximate cause under the plea agreement.

A. Relevant Restitution Law

¶ 11 As a general matter, all judgments of conviction must include

an order regarding restitution. § 18-1.3-603(1), C.R.S. 2024.

4 “Restitution” is defined in relevant part as “any pecuniary loss

suffered by a victim” that “includes but is not limited to all

out-of-pocket expenses . . . proximately caused by an offender’s

conduct and that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in

money.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. The prosecution bears

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence both the

victim’s losses and that those losses were proximately caused by

the defendant’s unlawful conduct. People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57,

¶ 12.

¶ 12 Proximate cause in the restitution context means a cause that,

in natural and probable sequence, produced the claimed loss and

without which the loss wouldn’t have been sustained. Id. at ¶ 13.

A defendant’s conduct doesn’t have to be the “only, nearest, or last

cause” to be deemed a proximate cause. People v. Lopez, 97 P.3d

277, 280 (Colo. App. 2004). However, a defendant generally may be

ordered to pay restitution only for those pecuniary losses

proximately caused by the unlawful conduct that constituted the

basis of the defendant’s conviction. People v. Poot-Baca, 2023 COA

112, ¶ 45. Consequently, unless otherwise agreed, “a district court

may not award restitution for damages arising from criminal

5 conduct (1) of which the defendant was acquitted; (2) for which the

defendant was never criminally charged; or (3) which underlies a

dismissed charge.” Id. (quoting People v. Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 13).

B. Additional Background – the Restitution Hearing

¶ 13 At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented the

testimony of the victim in support of its restitution request. The

victim recounted the incident and the circumstances informing his

decision to seek medical help the next day.

¶ 14 The victim testified that, before his encounter with

Gutierrez-Barraza, he had no symptoms of the subsequently

diagnosed pneumonia, hadn’t been under any treatment for chest

complications, and had “felt perfectly fine to work.” He said he

started to experience chest pain when, out of fear that

Gutierrez-Barraza would try to hurt him with the knife, he ran back

to the clubhouse. The victim testified that while he ran only “a

small distance,” he didn’t feel well when he got to the clubhouse.

He said, “I couldn’t breathe, and the pain that I was feeling in my

chest prevented me from . . . standing up. I had to be sitting

down.” The victim explained that he didn’t go to the hospital

immediately because he wanted to see whether his symptoms would

6 subside. He further explained that he went to see his primary care

doctor the next morning “because all afternoon and night [the day

before he] couldn’t go to sleep. [He] had to lay down -- or sit down

[on] a couch.”

¶ 15 The victim testified that he passed out during that visit and

was taken to the emergency room because he “had so much pain

that [he] couldn’t breathe anymore.” He said the treating

physicians in the emergency room determined that he suffered from

pneumonia and “that the pain [he] was experiencing was because of

the clogged lung.” And the victim acknowledged that the physicians

didn’t inform him whether his condition had existed before the

incident or was caused by it.

¶ 16 The prosecution also introduced a medical bill that the

hospital had issued to the victim and receipts for the two

medications that the primary care doctor had prescribed him,

totaling $1,341.46. The victim testified that he had incurred those

expenses.

¶ 17 In closing argument, Gutierrez-Barraza’s attorney disputed

that Gutierrez-Barraza’s conduct was the proximate cause of the

victim’s medical expenses. Counsel asserted that while Gutierrez-

7 Barraza stipulated to causation in the plea agreement, that

stipulation “only extend[ed] to actual caused damages,” such as

damages pertaining to the stolen tools. On the merits, counsel

argued that the prosecution hadn’t proved that the victim sustained

chest pain and sought medical attention because Gutierrez-Barraza

chased him away, rather than because his pre-existing pneumonia

naturally started to manifest itself. Counsel contended that the

prosecution was required, but had failed, to present medical

testimony establishing more than just a “tenuous link” between his

conduct and the flareup of the victim’s pneumonia symptoms,

necessitating the hospital visit and associated pecuniary losses.

¶ 18 The trial court disagreed with Gutierrez-Barraza’s attorney.

The court said that Gutierrez-Barraza should have reasonably

expected that when he brandished the knife, the victim would

become fearful and try to run away from the situation. The court

also reasoned that the fact that the victim went to the hospital

within twenty-four hours of the robbery suggested that

Gutierrez-Barraza’s criminal conduct exacerbated the victim’s

pneumonia, not that the pneumonia by itself caused the chest pain.

8 Under these circumstances, the court found that Gutierrez-Barraza

proximately caused the claimed medical expenses:

I do find that based off the menacing, based off the action of brandishing that knife, based off of [the victim’s] fear from seeing that, [the victim’s] immediate response, and [the victim’s] . . . immediate reaction, I do find that [this] conduct is the proximate cause for the response — not for the pneumonia itself. . . . I think that [it] would be ridiculous for me to find that [Gutierrez-Barraza’s conduct] caused pneumonia, but it did cause [the victim], at minimum, to have to go to the doctor. And even if [the emergency room physicians] found no pneumonia whatsoever, I still would’ve found that the restitution was in place because there still would’ve been a cost for just having to be admitted, just having to sit there, just hav[ing] to see a doctor.

C. Gutierrez-Barraza Waived His Right to Challenge Proximate Cause Under the Plea Agreement

¶ 19 In challenging this ruling, Gutierrez-Barraza contends that the

prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence from which the trial

court could find that the robbery exacerbated the victim’s

pre-existing pneumonia and, therefore, was the proximate cause of

his (1) chest pain, (2) decision to go to the doctor the next day,

(3) loss of consciousness at the doctor’s office, and (4) later transfer

to the emergency room. Additionally, Gutierrez-Barraza contends

9 that because the victim’s fainting episode constituted an

independent intervening cause, the trial court erred by awarding

restitution for any medical expenses pertaining to the care that the

victim received in the emergency room. We affirm the restitution

order, though on different grounds than those relied on by the trial

court. See People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 17 (“[W]e may affirm a

trial court’s ruling on grounds different from those employed by

that court, as long as they are supported by the record.”).

Specifically, we conclude that Gutierrez-Barraza waived his right to

challenge the existence of causal connection between his unlawful

conduct and the awarded medical expenses by virtue of his plea

agreement.

1. Waiver and Standard of Review

¶ 20 Statutory rights, like those provided by the restitution statute,

can be waived. See Richardson v. People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 24.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or

privilege. People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39. A waiver may be

explicit, as when a defendant “expressly abandons an existing right

or privilege,” or it may be implied, as when a defendant “engages in

conduct that manifests an intent to relinquish a right or privilege or

10 acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Forgette v. People, 2023 CO

4, ¶ 28.

¶ 21 To determine whether Gutierrez-Barraza waived his right to

assert that his conduct wasn’t the proximate cause of the victim’s

claimed losses, we turn to the terms of his plea agreement and the

statements made at the providency hearing. See Benavidez v.

People, 986 P.2d 943, 948 (Colo. 1999) (In determining the validity

of any particular view of a plea agreement, “we look not only to the

written instruments associated with the agreement, but also to

extrinsic evidence in the form of oral statements.”). The

interpretation of a plea agreement is a question of law that we

review de novo. People v. Propst, 2021 COA 13, ¶ 11.

2. Application

¶ 22 As noted above, Gutierrez-Barraza’s plea agreement addressed

his obligation to pay restitution to the victim of his robbery. In the

part of that agreement labeled “Sentence Agreement,” the parties

included the following provision regarding restitution:

Defendant is obligated to pay restitution as defined in [section] 18-1.3-602. The defendant admits to liability, stipulates to causation, and agrees to pay restitution for all pecuniary losses suffered by all victims for all charged

11 counts, even those dismissed as part of this plea agreement. Pursuant to [section] 18-1.3-603(1)(b), defendant waives objection to the final amount of restitution being determined within [ninety-one] days following the order of conviction.

(Emphasis added.) Gutierrez-Barraza and his counsel signed this

document and dated it the same day on which the court held a

providency hearing. Then, at the providency hearing,

Gutierrez-Barraza confirmed that he had executed the plea

agreement voluntarily and after consulting with his counsel, that he

understood its terms, and that he wanted the court to accept his

guilty plea in accordance with the agreement. Based on these

representations, the court found that Gutierrez-Barraza’s guilty

plea was “made freely, voluntarily, and knowingly, and with the

assistance of [c]ounsel.” Thus, the record shows that

Gutierrez-Barraza stipulated to causation for purposes of

restitution under the plain language of his plea agreement.

¶ 23 The record also shows that at the time he entered the

stipulation, Gutierrez-Barraza was aware that the prosecution

would seek restitution for the losses he now disputes on appeal on

proximate cause grounds. At the providency hearing, the

12 prosecutor informed the court that she had told defense counsel

“that [the prosecution] would not be requesting anything specific to

the victim’s pneumonia diagnosis outside of the initial hospital

stay.” Put differently, the prosecution had provided notice to

Gutierrez-Barraza before the entry of his guilty plea that its

restitution request would include certain specific expenses relating

to the victim’s pneumonia diagnosis. The prosecution limited its

later motion to the previously identified costs of the initial hospital

stay, excluding other costs.

¶ 24 We discern no indication that the stipulation to causation

under the plea agreement was intended to apply to “actual caused

damages” — as Gutierrez-Barraza asserted during the restitution

hearing — but not to the damages relating to the victim’s medical

treatment following the robbery. To the contrary, the plea

agreement broadly provided that Gutierrez-Barraza would pay

restitution for all pecuniary losses sustained by the victim, even

those losses that arose out of the conduct underlying the dismissed

counts. Likewise, the statements the prosecutor made during the

providency hearing suggested that Gutierrez-Barraza was agreeing

to pay restitution knowing that he would be on the hook for the

13 victim’s medical expenses. See People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA

138M, ¶ 16 (holding that the defendant waived his proximate cause

challenge to the restitution award, in part, because the prosecution

provided timely notice of the restitution amounts requested).

¶ 25 Nonetheless, Gutierrez-Barraza argues that he retained the

right to challenge causation because he didn’t agree to a specific

amount of restitution in the plea agreement and, like in People v.

Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 12, “the issue of causation is inextricably

intertwined with the issue of the proper amount of restitution.” In

other words, he posits that his general stipulation to causation

doesn’t preclude him from raising issues on appeal that dispute the

amount of the restitution award.

¶ 26 But the problem with this argument is that it mischaracterizes

the substance of Gutierrez-Barraza’s challenges to the restitution

order. See Martinez v. People, 2024 CO 6M, ¶ 20 (noting that we

consider the substance of a challenge to a restitution order, not its

form). Our review of his briefing reveals that at its core,

Gutierrez-Barraza takes issue with the trial court’s finding that he

proximately caused any of the medical expenses that the victim

sustained the day after the incident. Indeed, while

14 Gutierrez-Barraza frames some of his arguments as claims that the

evidence was insufficient to support the court’s restitution award,

he directs them solely to the issue of causation.

¶ 27 For example, Gutierrez-Barraza contends that the court erred

by awarding $1,329.80 for the victim’s hospital treatment because

the medical bill didn’t include a breakdown of services that the

victim received at the primary care doctor as opposed to the

emergency room. In doing so, however, Gutierrez-Barraza contends

that he is not responsible for the latter expenses because his

conduct wasn’t the proximate cause of the victim’s fainting, which

then led to the victim’s admission to the emergency room.

Consequently, we disagree with Gutierrez-Barraza’s argument that

his stipulation to causation doesn’t operate as a waiver because he

is challenging the amount of the restitution award.2

¶ 28 In sum, we conclude that Gutierrez-Barraza waived his right

to challenge proximate cause under the explicit terms of his plea

agreement. He may not now force the issue of proof on the very

issue he stipulated for purposes of obtaining a favorable plea. See

2 On the contrary, Gutierrez-Barraza stipulated to causation of all

pecuniary losses, without limitation.

15 People v. Quinonez, 735 P.2d 159, 164 (Colo. 1987) (“Where a

defendant agrees to make restitution at the time of entering a plea,

he cannot later disavow the agreement on the basis that there was

no showing that he had caused the victim’s injury.”), superseded by

statute on other grounds, Ch. 232, sec. 1, § 16-18.5-102(4)(a), 2000

Colo. Sess. Laws 1031-32, as stated in Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d

41 (Colo. 2009); People v. Sosa, 2019 COA 182, ¶ 30 (“Both sides

ought to be free to leverage restitution as part of a fair disposition of

the case.”). Given this conclusion, we need not consider the merits

of Gutierrez-Barraza’s argument that the trial court erred by

requiring him to pay $1,341.46 in restitution to the victim because

his conduct wasn’t the proximate cause of those losses.

III. Disposition

¶ 29 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.