22CA1894 Peo v Gresham 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1894 Larimer County District Court No. 16CR1890 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael Gresham,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
James West, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Michael Gresham, appeals the postconviction
court’s denial of several claims raised in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Gresham drove from Ohio to Colorado with two companions to
meet a Colorado drug dealer. Gresham and his companions met
the drug dealer in a parking lot where one of the companions shot
and killed the drug dealer. The three men took the drug dealer’s
car, dumped his body, and started driving their vehicle and the
drug dealer’s vehicle back to Ohio. They were pulled over in Illinois,
and police found evidence of the murder and drugs in the vehicles.
Gresham was twenty years old at the time.
¶3 Gresham was initially charged with first degree murder,
aggravated robbery, and various other counts. He pleaded guilty to
second degree murder and aggravated robbery in exchange for the
dismissal of the remaining counts. The district court sentenced
Gresham to consecutive terms for the two offenses, resulting in an
aggregate sentence of fifty-seven years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections (thirty-six years for second degree
murder and twenty-one years for aggravated robbery).
1 ¶4 Gresham then filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion challenging his
conviction and sentence. As relevant here, he argued in the motion
that his plea was not knowing or intelligent and his sentence
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment.
The postconviction court held a hearing and denied the motion.
¶5 Gresham appeals.
II. Gresham’s Plea
¶6 We review de novo the postconviction court’s ruling that
Gresham’s plea was constitutionally valid. Medina v. People, 2023
CO 46, ¶ 15. To the extent that our inquiry requires us to review
the court’s factual findings, we defer to those factual findings if they
are supported by the record. Id.
¶7 At the outset, we reject Gresham’s argument that the
postconviction court failed to rule on the propriety of his plea in
denying his motion. In a footnote in its written order, the
postconviction court explained that it “determine[d] based upon the
record that [Gresham] was, in fact, properly advised of his
rights . . . and that his guilty plea . . . was voluntary and
intelligently made.” It is of no significance that this determination
appeared in a footnote — the postconviction court clearly rejected
2 Gresham’s challenge to his plea. We now turn to the propriety of
that rejection.
¶8 Gresham argues that his plea was not knowing or intelligent
because the advisement court did not thoroughly explain the mens
rea elements of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Second
degree murder requires that the defendant knowingly causes the
death of another person. § 18-3-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. As relevant
here, aggravated robbery requires that the defendant (1) knowingly
takes a thing of value from the victim by force, threat, or
intimidation; and (2) in doing so, knowingly wounds or strikes the
victim or puts the victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury. §§ 18-
4-301(1), -302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024.
¶9 Gresham concedes that he was advised about these mens rea
elements before he pleaded guilty to them. He nevertheless argues
that had he gone to trial, the prosecution would have argued that
he was guilty as a complicitor, and therefore the advisement court
had to explain the legal doctrine of complicity to render his plea
knowing and intelligent. We disagree.
¶ 10 Gresham does not dispute that there was a factual basis for
his plea. Nor does he dispute that his advisement satisfied Crim. P.
3 11’s requirements. He cites no authority for the proposition that an
advisement that satisfies Crim. P. 11 is nevertheless
constitutionally infirm if it does not inform the defendant of the
theory of liability the prosecution might pursue at trial, and we are
aware of none.
¶ 11 Rather, due process requires only that the defendant be
advised of the true nature of the charges against him, including an
explanation of the elements of the offense to which the defendant is
pleading guilty. See People v. Cabral, 698 P.2d 234, 235 (Colo.
1985); Crim. P. 11(b). The advisement court provided such an
explanation to Gresham. We therefore conclude that Gresham’s
guilty plea was knowing and intelligent, and the postconviction
court properly denied his claim alleging that he was not properly
advised.
III. Gresham’s Sentence
¶ 12 We review the postconviction court’s denial of Gresham’s
claims challenging his sentence as a mixed question of fact and law,
deferring to the court’s factual findings that have record support
and reviewing the court’s legal conclusions de novo. See People v.
Pendleton, 2015 COA 154, ¶ 7.
4 ¶ 13 As we understand it, Gresham’s argument challenging his
sentence is based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth
Amendment. Gresham posits that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
de facto life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for
juvenile offenders. Because he was twenty at the time of the
offenses and twenty-one at sentencing, Graham contends he was
similarly situated to a juvenile offender. Thus, according to
Gresham, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the prohibition
on de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders be extended to
him. Gresham also contends that he is entitled to a more
“meaningful” proportionality review than the abbreviated review he
received, but he does not identify the reason why he believes he is
entitled to a more “meaningful” review. Because Gresham correctly
concedes that “the state of the law now” is that proportionality
review does not apply to aggregate sentences like his, we infer he is
arguing that he is entitled to a more “meaningful” review for the
same reason that he argues the prohibition on de facto LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders should be extended to him. In
other words, a more “meaningful” proportionality review could be
5 the mechanism that protects him from an unconstitutional de facto
LWOP sentence.
¶ 14 We need not consider whether the Equal Protection Clause
and Eighth Amendment combine to produce the result Gresham
claims because we disagree with the fundamental assumption of his
arguments.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
22CA1894 Peo v Gresham 06-26-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1894 Larimer County District Court No. 16CR1890 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael Gresham,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 26, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
James West, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Michael Gresham, appeals the postconviction
court’s denial of several claims raised in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Gresham drove from Ohio to Colorado with two companions to
meet a Colorado drug dealer. Gresham and his companions met
the drug dealer in a parking lot where one of the companions shot
and killed the drug dealer. The three men took the drug dealer’s
car, dumped his body, and started driving their vehicle and the
drug dealer’s vehicle back to Ohio. They were pulled over in Illinois,
and police found evidence of the murder and drugs in the vehicles.
Gresham was twenty years old at the time.
¶3 Gresham was initially charged with first degree murder,
aggravated robbery, and various other counts. He pleaded guilty to
second degree murder and aggravated robbery in exchange for the
dismissal of the remaining counts. The district court sentenced
Gresham to consecutive terms for the two offenses, resulting in an
aggregate sentence of fifty-seven years in the custody of the
Department of Corrections (thirty-six years for second degree
murder and twenty-one years for aggravated robbery).
1 ¶4 Gresham then filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion challenging his
conviction and sentence. As relevant here, he argued in the motion
that his plea was not knowing or intelligent and his sentence
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment.
The postconviction court held a hearing and denied the motion.
¶5 Gresham appeals.
II. Gresham’s Plea
¶6 We review de novo the postconviction court’s ruling that
Gresham’s plea was constitutionally valid. Medina v. People, 2023
CO 46, ¶ 15. To the extent that our inquiry requires us to review
the court’s factual findings, we defer to those factual findings if they
are supported by the record. Id.
¶7 At the outset, we reject Gresham’s argument that the
postconviction court failed to rule on the propriety of his plea in
denying his motion. In a footnote in its written order, the
postconviction court explained that it “determine[d] based upon the
record that [Gresham] was, in fact, properly advised of his
rights . . . and that his guilty plea . . . was voluntary and
intelligently made.” It is of no significance that this determination
appeared in a footnote — the postconviction court clearly rejected
2 Gresham’s challenge to his plea. We now turn to the propriety of
that rejection.
¶8 Gresham argues that his plea was not knowing or intelligent
because the advisement court did not thoroughly explain the mens
rea elements of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Second
degree murder requires that the defendant knowingly causes the
death of another person. § 18-3-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. As relevant
here, aggravated robbery requires that the defendant (1) knowingly
takes a thing of value from the victim by force, threat, or
intimidation; and (2) in doing so, knowingly wounds or strikes the
victim or puts the victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury. §§ 18-
4-301(1), -302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024.
¶9 Gresham concedes that he was advised about these mens rea
elements before he pleaded guilty to them. He nevertheless argues
that had he gone to trial, the prosecution would have argued that
he was guilty as a complicitor, and therefore the advisement court
had to explain the legal doctrine of complicity to render his plea
knowing and intelligent. We disagree.
¶ 10 Gresham does not dispute that there was a factual basis for
his plea. Nor does he dispute that his advisement satisfied Crim. P.
3 11’s requirements. He cites no authority for the proposition that an
advisement that satisfies Crim. P. 11 is nevertheless
constitutionally infirm if it does not inform the defendant of the
theory of liability the prosecution might pursue at trial, and we are
aware of none.
¶ 11 Rather, due process requires only that the defendant be
advised of the true nature of the charges against him, including an
explanation of the elements of the offense to which the defendant is
pleading guilty. See People v. Cabral, 698 P.2d 234, 235 (Colo.
1985); Crim. P. 11(b). The advisement court provided such an
explanation to Gresham. We therefore conclude that Gresham’s
guilty plea was knowing and intelligent, and the postconviction
court properly denied his claim alleging that he was not properly
advised.
III. Gresham’s Sentence
¶ 12 We review the postconviction court’s denial of Gresham’s
claims challenging his sentence as a mixed question of fact and law,
deferring to the court’s factual findings that have record support
and reviewing the court’s legal conclusions de novo. See People v.
Pendleton, 2015 COA 154, ¶ 7.
4 ¶ 13 As we understand it, Gresham’s argument challenging his
sentence is based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth
Amendment. Gresham posits that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
de facto life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for
juvenile offenders. Because he was twenty at the time of the
offenses and twenty-one at sentencing, Graham contends he was
similarly situated to a juvenile offender. Thus, according to
Gresham, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the prohibition
on de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders be extended to
him. Gresham also contends that he is entitled to a more
“meaningful” proportionality review than the abbreviated review he
received, but he does not identify the reason why he believes he is
entitled to a more “meaningful” review. Because Gresham correctly
concedes that “the state of the law now” is that proportionality
review does not apply to aggregate sentences like his, we infer he is
arguing that he is entitled to a more “meaningful” review for the
same reason that he argues the prohibition on de facto LWOP
sentences for juvenile offenders should be extended to him. In
other words, a more “meaningful” proportionality review could be
5 the mechanism that protects him from an unconstitutional de facto
LWOP sentence.
¶ 14 We need not consider whether the Equal Protection Clause
and Eighth Amendment combine to produce the result Gresham
claims because we disagree with the fundamental assumption of his
arguments. Gresham’s arguments assume — and require — that
he received a de facto LWOP sentence. In our view, however, he did
not receive a de facto life sentence.
¶ 15 A de facto LWOP sentence is one lacking a meaningful
opportunity for release within the defendant’s natural lifetime. See
People v. Lucero, 2013 COA 53, ¶ 12. Gresham’s sentence afforded
him a meaningful opportunity for release within his natural lifetime.
¶ 16 Gresham will be statutorily eligible for parole after serving
seventy-five percent of his fifty-seven-year sentence, after about
forty-three years. See § 17-22.5-403(2.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024
(establishing parole eligibility after seventy-five percent of the
sentence has been served for second degree murder and aggravated
robbery). He was twenty-one at the time of sentencing and received
almost two years of credit for time served (694 days). Thus, under
the parole statute, he will be parole eligible no later than age sixty-
6 three. Also, the postconviction court found that, considering
“earned time . . . [,] Gresham is likely to be released on parole
sometime in his 50’s.”
¶ 17 Based on Gresham’s statutory parole eligibility date and the
postconviction court’s unchallenged finding that he will likely be
released in his fifties, we conclude that Gresham has a meaningful
opportunity for release within his natural lifetime. Consequently,
he did not receive a de facto LWOP sentence.
¶ 18 This conclusion is fatal to Gresham’s arguments. Without a
de facto LWOP sentence, there is no purported Eighth Amendment
prohibition that the Equal Protection Clause could extend to
Gresham, even by way of a more “meaningful” proportionality
review. We therefore conclude that the postconviction court
properly denied Gresham’s challenge to his sentence.
IV. Disposition
¶ 19 The postconviction court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.