Peo v. Greggs

Opinion

24CA0524 Peo v Greggs 02-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0524 Larimer County District Court No. 16CR1884 Honorable Stephen J. Jouard, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lawrence Greggs,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Tara Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Maya Arriaga Martin, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Lawrence Greggs, pleaded guilty to second degree

murder and aggravated robbery. After successful postconviction

proceedings, the court resentenced him to sixty-four years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections. He now appeals this

sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2016, Greggs arranged a meeting with Devon

Smeltz, the victim, to buy drugs. Greggs and a couple of his

friends, Michael Gresham and Joshua Baker, planned a trip from

Ohio to Colorado to meet with Smeltz. Before heading to Colorado,

the group drove to Kentucky in a rented Jeep, where Greggs traded

drugs for an AR-15 rifle. Then they headed to Colorado with Greggs

updating Smeltz about their whereabouts along the way. The group

eventually arrived at a Walmart parking lot in Colorado around 2:40

a.m., where they had planned to buy drugs from Smeltz. Greggs

parked the Jeep next to Smeltz’s white Mercedes.

¶3 After an alleged altercation in the parking lot, Greggs shot

Smeltz in the torso five times. Smeltz was still “twitching” after the

first five shots, so Greggs returned to the Jeep to reload his gun,

“with the assistance of . . . Baker.” Greggs then fired two more

1 shots “into the back of Smeltz’s head.” Gresham and Greggs moved

Smeltz’s dead body to the backseat of his Mercedes. Shortly after

the shooting, both Greggs and Gresham recorded cell phone videos

seeming to boast about the shooting. The group then stole Smeltz’s

clothing, jewelry, gun, and car, and headed toward Smeltz’s home,

with Smeltz’s body still in the backseat of the Mercedes.

¶4 When they got to Smeltz’s home, Greggs broke a window in an

attempt to get inside. However, the group quickly realized that

Smeltz’s mother and her dog were home, so they fled. Smeltz’s

mother called the police after she heard a “loud crash” and “saw a

shadowy figure in the backyard.” She told the police that she was

concerned because her son was missing and that he was involved in

some “sketchy” drug activity. At some point, the group dumped

Smeltz’s body at a dairy farm. The police eventually declared

Smeltz a missing person.

¶5 The day after the killing, the Illinois State Patrol pulled over

the Jeep and Smeltz’s Mercedes. Baker and Gresham were in the

Mercedes and Greggs was driving the Jeep. Troopers noticed blood

in the backseat of the Mercedes, which they later determined

belonged to Smeltz. When interviewed, Greggs, Gresham, and

2 Baker gave inconsistent statements and did not reveal the location

of Smeltz’s body.

¶6 After an investigation, the prosecution charged Greggs with

first degree murder after deliberation, first degree felony murder,

aggravated robbery, criminal attempt to commit second degree

burglary, tampering with physical evidence, and abuse of a corpse.

See § 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. 2016;1

§ 18-4-302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-4-203(1), (2)(a), C.R.S. 2025;

§ 18-2-101, C.R.S. 2025; § 18-8-610(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025;

§ 18-13-101, C.R.S. 2016.2

¶7 Greggs resolved the case through a plea deal. He signed a plea

agreement and pleaded guilty to an amended count of second

degree murder and the aggravated robbery count. See

§ 18-3-103(1), C.R.S. 2025; § 18-4-302(1)(b). The plea agreement

indicated a sentencing range of sixteen to eighty years in the

1 Felony murder was reclassified as second degree murder in 2021.

See Ch. 58, secs. 1-2, §§ 18-3-102, -103 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 235-36.

2 Abuse of a corpse was reclassified from a class 2 misdemeanor to

a class 6 felony in 2020. See Ch. 100, sec. 2, § 18-13-101, 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 387-88.

3 custody of the Department of Corrections. The court sentenced

Greggs to a total of eighty years, forty-eight years for second degree

murder and thirty-two years for aggravated robbery, with the

sentences running consecutively.

¶8 Greggs later filed a timely Crim. P. 35(c) motion for

postconviction relief. He argued that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel at his sentencing hearing and asked that the

court appoint him counsel for the postconviction proceedings,

“schedule an evidentiary hearing on all claims, and grant [him]

postconviction relief.” Greggs later moved for a proportionality

review during the postconviction proceedings.

¶9 The court appointed counsel for Greggs. After the evidentiary

hearing, the court determined that Gregg’s sentence was not grossly

disproportionate. However, concluding that Greggs had received

ineffective assistance of counsel, the court granted Gregg’s petition

in part and vacated his sentence.

¶ 10 The prosecution appealed the court’s decision, and a division

of this court affirmed. People v. Greggs, (Colo. App. No. 21CA1255,

Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). On remand,

the court resentenced Greggs to a total of sixty-four years:

4 forty-eight years for the second degree murder and a consecutive

sixteen years for the aggravated robbery.

¶ 11 Greggs now appeals this new sentence.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 Greggs, who is Black, contends that the court did not provide

an adequate record to justify the sentencing disparity between him

and his white codefendant, Baker. The People, however, argue we

should not reach this contention on the merits because the plea

proviso in section 18-1-409(1), C.R.S. 2025, bars review of his

sentence. Greggs counters that the plea proviso does not preclude

appellate review because he did not agree to a sentencing range. He

also argues that the plea proviso does not apply under Sullivan v.

People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 26, because he is appealing the manner in

which his sentence was imposed, not just the propriety of his

sentence. We agree with the People.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 13 A person convicted of a felony, “other than a class 1 felony in

which a death sentence is automatically reviewed,” has the right to

appeal their sentence. § 18-1-409(1). A sentencing appeal can

challenge: (1) the propriety of the sentence, which includes “the

5 nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the public

interest”; and (2) “the manner in which the sentence was imposed,”

which includes the “sufficiency and accuracy of the information on

which [the sentence] was based.” Id.

¶ 14 However, “if the sentence is within a range agreed upon by the

parties pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant shall not have

the right of appellate review of the propriety of the sentence.” Id.

This exception is commonly known as the “plea proviso.” Sullivan,

¶ 1. Whether this exception applies, and therefore bars appellate

review, “is a question of statutory construction. Questions of

statutory construction are legal questions subject to de novo

review.” Id. at ¶ 10.

¶ 15 When a district court imposes a sentence, it must “state on

[the] record the basic reasons for imposing the sentence.” People v.

Hoover, 165 P.3d 784, 802 (Colo. App. 2006) (alteration in original)

(quoting People v. Watkins, 613 P.2d 633, 637 (Colo. 1980)). While

the court “must consider the nature of the offense, the character

and rehabilitative potential of the offender, the development of

respect for the law, the deterrence of crime, and the protection of

the public,” the court’s statement need not be lengthy. People v.

6 Alley, 232 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2010). It should, however,

“include the primary factual considerations bearing on the judge’s

sentencing decision.” Id. (quoting Watkins, 613 P.2d at 637).

Because the sentencing court’s familiarity with a case makes it

better suited to impose a sentence, on appeal the “court’s

sentencing decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of

discretion.” People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030, 1042 (Colo. 1998).

B. Section 18-1-409(1)

1. Greggs Waived His Right to an Appeal

¶ 16 The People argue that we should not reach the merits of

Greggs’s appeal because it is barred by the plea proviso. They claim

that the plea proviso applies because Greggs signed a plea

agreement containing an agreed-upon sentencing range. Greggs

argues, however, that his appeal is not barred by the plea proviso

because the plea agreement reflected “open sentences in the

aggravated sentencing range,” and the court was to determine the

length, terms, and conditions. And because he agreed to these

“open sentences,” he asserts that the parties did not agree to a

sentencing range.

¶ 17 The plea agreement reads as follows:

7 THE UNDERSIGNED PARTIES hereby agree and stipulate to the following:

1. That the People will file an Amended Count 1 – MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Class 2 Felony.

• The penalty range for Amended Count 1, a Class 2 felony, is incarceration from eight to twenty-four years in the presumptive range, or up to forty-eight years if aggravated circumstances exist . . . .

2. That the defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to Amended Count 1 and a plea of guilty to Count 3 – AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, a Class 3 Felony.

• The penalty range for Count 3, a Class 3 felony, which is an extraordinary risk crime, is incarceration from four to sixteen years in the presumptive range, or up to thirty-two years if aggravated circumstances exist . . . .

3. That sentencing on the defendant’s plea of guilty to Amended Count 1 and Count 3 shall be left open to the discretion of the Court with the following terms and conditions:

a. That the defendant stipulates that he is the proximate cause of all financial loss . . . [and] agrees to pay restitution . . . .

b. That the defendant, for consideration of this plea bargain, waives all rights under Rule 35(b) . . . .

c. That the defendant shall remain law abiding.

8 4. That the defendant understands that both Amended Count 1 and Count 3 require crime of violence sentencing . . . . Therefore, sentencing must be to the Department of Corrections for a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range up to twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range plus any term of mandatory parole.

5. That the defendant understands that his sentence will be to the Department of Corrections and that the range of the sentence is sixteen (16) to eighty (80) years.

6. That the defendant has made this plea knowingly and voluntarily and further acknowledges by said plea of guilty that all rights of appeal are waived.

....

8. That the People will file a Motion to Dismiss Count 2 – MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a Class 1 Felony, Count 4 – CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO COMMIT SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY, a Class 4 Felony, Count 5 – TAMPERING WITH PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, a Class 6 Felony, and Count 6 – ABUSE OF A CORPSE, a Class 2 Misdemeanor.

¶ 18 It is true that the plea agreement initially states that

“sentencing . . . shall be left open to the discretion of the Court” in

paragraph three. But we cannot read this sentence in isolation.

See People v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 825, 829 (Colo. 2000) (“Courts

9 have long applied contract principles when interpreting . . . plea

agreements.”); see also Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Indus. Sys., Inc.,

208 P.3d 692, 697 (Colo. 2009) (noting courts should interpret

contracts as a whole). Indeed, the structure and plain language of

the agreement indicates that the parties agreed to a sentencing

range.

¶ 19 Paragraphs one and two of the plea agreement outline the

counts Greggs pleaded guilty to, the felony classes of those counts,

and the general sentencing ranges for each count. Then paragraph

three states that the sentencing “shall be left open to the discretion

of the [c]ourt” with certain specified terms and conditions.

Paragraph four then clarifies that because the counts are crimes of

violence, the sentencing term must be “of at least the midpoint in

the presumptive range” and up to twice the maximum term.

Paragraph five specifically states that “the defendant understands

that his sentence will be to the Department of Corrections and that

the range of the sentence is sixteen (16) to eighty (80) years.”3

3 We also note that in paragraph six of the plea agreement Greggs

agreed that he “has made this plea knowingly and voluntarily and further acknowledges by said plea of guilty that all rights of appeal are waived.”

10 Lastly, paragraph eight provides that the People will dismiss four

other counts in exchange for Greggs’s guilty plea, thus reducing his

sentencing exposure.

¶ 20 Based on all of this, we conclude that the parties agreed to a

sentencing range in the plea agreement. Therefore, Greggs cannot

challenge the propriety of his sentence. See § 18-1-409(1).

2. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Sentenced Greggs to Sixty-Four Years

¶ 21 Greggs next argues that — in spite of the plea proviso — he

can appeal his sentence because he is “challenging . . . the basis on

which his sentence was imposed.” He cites Sullivan in support of

this argument, which held that “the plea proviso does not preclude

an appeal related to the manner in which the sentence was

imposed.” Sullivan, ¶ 26. Greggs claims that he is permitted to

appeal the manner in which his sentence was imposed on three

grounds: (1) the sentencing court failed to provide a sufficient

record or explanation as to why Greggs received a longer sentence

than his codefendant, Baker; (2) “implicit or explicit racial bias”

played a role “in imposing his sentence”; and (3) the court “failed to

meaningfully engage with [the] mitigating evidence presented.”

11 ¶ 22 In Sullivan, the trial court “misstated the statutory sentencing

range” during the defendant’s sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 6. It

said that the statutory range for first degree aggravated motor

vehicle theft was three to twelve years, but the correct sentencing

range was two to six years. Id. Sullivan appealed this sentence,

claiming that the court’s misstatement affected its sentencing

decision. Id. at ¶ 7. A division of this court affirmed. Id. at ¶ 8.

The division held that the propriety of a sentence “includes within

its ambit” the manner in which the sentence was imposed, and

therefore Sullivan’s appeal was barred under section 18-1-409(1)

because he had signed a plea agreement. Sullivan, ¶ 8.

¶ 23 The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. The

court held that when the legislature used the phrase “‘propriety of

the sentence’ in the plea proviso,” it did not intend to prohibit

appeals challenging the propriety of the sentencing proceeding, or,

in other words, the manner in which the sentence was imposed. Id.

at ¶ 17. Accordingly, the plea proviso does not bar an appeal when

the appeal “relate[s] to the manner in which the sentence was

imposed.” Id. at ¶ 26. The manner in which a sentence was

imposed includes “‘extrinsic factors and procedures which affect the

12 determination of the sentence,’ including, ‘the sufficiency and

accuracy of the information on which the sentence was based.’” Id.

at ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Malacara, 606 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Colo.

1980)).

¶ 24 Even if we assume without deciding that his three challenges

go to the manner of the sentencing proceeding, Greggs cannot

prevail on his claim. First, Greggs argues that the court failed to

provide a sufficient explanation as to why he received a longer

sentence than Baker. But neither Sullivan nor section 18-1-409(1)

suggests that if codefendants receive dissimilar sentences, the court

must provide an additional record to explain these differences. The

plain language of section 18-1-409(1) focuses on the particular

sentence being imposed. Further, “because sentencing is

individualized, there is no requirement that codefendants receive

similar sentences.” People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112, 1117

(Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 25 Regardless, the court sufficiently explained the reasons that it

gave Greggs a longer sentence than his codefendants. The court

explained that it sentenced Greggs to sixty-four years because

13 • Greggs and his friends traveled to Colorado “armed with

several weapons,” including the murder weapon;

• Greggs shot Smeltz five times, returned to the Jeep to

reload his gun, and fired two additional shots “in an

execution-style murder”;

• Greggs recorded a video thereafter showing no remorse for

the shooting;

• Greggs did not take responsibility for shooting Smeltz

initially and claimed that Gresham was the shooter;

• Greggs was “intimately involved in a subsequent attempted

robbery of the Smeltz home and . . . discard[ed] Smeltz’s

body in a field”; and

• Greggs was the “ringleader” behind the events that occurred

given that he arranged the drug deal with Smeltz.

¶ 26 Based on the court’s explanation, we understand the basis of

its decision. Greggs played a major role in a “horrific crime” that

resulted in Smeltz’s death. He showed little remorse after the

shooting, initially failed to take responsibility for his actions, and

lied to law enforcement about who shot Smeltz. Given that the

court’s findings are sufficient for us to understand why it gave

14 Greggs a longer sentence, we reject the claim that the sentencing

proceeding was flawed on this basis.

¶ 27 Next, Greggs asserts that he “is questioning . . . the role that

implicit or explicit bias played in imposing his sentence.” He

asserts that “it is essential that a sentence imposed is free from

impermissible considerations, such as race.”

¶ 28 While we agree with this premise, and that systemic racism

can affect sentencing decisions for people of color, Greggs points us

to nothing in the record supporting his suggestion that the

resentencing proceeding was plagued by explicit racial bias from

any of the participants. And his implicit bias claim is based only on

the assertion that “[i]mplicit bias can play a role at every stage of

the criminal process.” (Citing Bernice Donald, Jeffrey Rachlinski &

Andrew Wistrich, Getting Explicit About Implicit Bias, 104

Judicature, no. 3, 2020, at 75, 77.) While undoubtedly correct, the

only thing he points to in support of his argument is that he

received a longer sentence than his white codefendant. But as we

explain above, the court detailed why it found Greggs’s behavior

more culpable than Baker’s. And while it’s true that there are facts

in the court’s analysis that cut both ways, there are also facts that

15 support its conclusion that Greggs’s behavior was more culpable.

Given the court’s reasoning — and without any other support in the

record — we see no basis for Gregg’s claim that the outcome of his

resentencing proceeding was affected by implicit racial bias. See

Mitchell v. People, 2026 CO 8, ¶ 47.

¶ 29 Finally, Greggs argues that the court failed to engage with his

mitigation evidence. But the record doesn’t support that claim.

Before resentencing Greggs, the court acknowledged the mitigation

evidence in this case. It noted that Greggs “suffered an

indescribable childhood” with very little parental support and “a

history of emotional, physical, and alleged sexual abuse.” The court

noted that Greggs’s mother was also “in and out of jail” and that

she exposed Greggs to drugs and violence. We therefore cannot say

that the court did not engage with the mitigation evidence, even if it

did not weigh such evidence as favorably as Greggs would have

liked.

¶ 30 Given all of this, we see no record evidence of error in the

resentencing proceeding.

16 III. Disposition

¶ 31 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.