25CA1994 Peo v Goodson 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1994 Adams County District Court No. 23CR2901 Honorable Brett Martin, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth Clark Goodson, Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BERNARD* Grove and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 20, 2026
Brian Mason, District Attorney, Cameron Munier, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Michael Whitney, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Todd Bluth, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Ashley Munoz, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Montana Fay, Deputy State Public Defender, Brighton, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Two weeks before the trial of defendant, Kenneth Clark Goodson, the trial court reduced a murder charge against him from first degree murder to second degree murder as a sanction for a discovery violation. The prosecution appeals. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 On September 17, 2023, defendant’s wife was shot and killed. The prosecution charged defendant with first degree murder and tampering with physical evidence. ¶3 The investigating agency, the Adams County Sheriff’s Office, sent crime scene technicians to process the house where the shooting occurred. Two of the technicians were Dallas Janecek and Karin Carroll. ¶4 The defense asked for, and received, two continuances of the trial. The trial was set to begin in October 2025. ¶5 Shortly before trial, defendant filed a motion to compel the prosecution to disclose impeaching information about Janecek and Carroll, whom the prosecution had endorsed as potential witnesses. In addition to processing the scene, Carroll had also performed a trigger-pull test on the pistol used in the shooting. Another
2
technician later retested the pistol’s trigger pull and reached a significantly different result. ¶6 Defendant wrote in the motion that the prosecution had provided him with a written notice about potentially exculpatory information regarding Janecek, who had been “untruthful during an investigation that ultimately led to her resignation.” The motion added that the prosecution had not released similar information about Carroll, whom, defendant had recently learned, the sheriff’s office had fired. ¶7 At the hearing on defendant’s motion, the prosecutor said the only information he had on Carroll’s employment status came from the sheriff’s office, which informed him she had been fired, but not because she had done something that would have been potentially exculpatory in defendant’s case. The court decided defendant was entitled to the records he had requested concerning Carroll but that the prosecution had not violated its discovery obligations because it did not have “care or control over” those records; rather, they were “confidential personnel records” in the possession of the sheriff’s office. Because the court decided, relatedly, that the prosecution would not “be able to obtain these records through reasonable
3
efforts,” it authorized defendant to issue a subpoena to the sheriff’s office to deliver them to the court. ¶8 About a month before the trial was scheduled to start, the court completed an in camera review of these records and released them to both parties. ¶9 The records revealed that there had been an internal affairs investigation into Carroll’s conduct. The investigation focused on Carroll’s violations of the sheriff’s office’s policies, including allegations she had lied to a superior officer; she had not turned on her body-worn camera while working crime scenes, including the crime scene in this case; she had mishandled evidence collection and testing, including when testing firearms; and she had used controlled substances, some of which she had taken from the sheriff’s office evidence locker. The investigation also specifically mentioned this case, alleging that Carroll had lied to other investigators about whether the victim’s body had been removed from the scene at a particular time. ¶ 10 Defendant filed a motion for sanctions. After a hearing, the court decided
4
• the records from the internal affairs investigation contained potentially exculpatory and material information concerning defendant’s case;
• Crim. P. 16 and defendant’s due process rights had been violated because the sheriff’s office had not notified the prosecution about this information;
• the sheriff’s office had willfully violated its discovery obligations when it did not disclose this information to the prosecution; and
• the court would reduce the first degree murder charge to second degree murder as a sanction for the discovery violation.
II. Discovery Violation ¶ 11 The prosecution contends the court erred when it found there was a discovery violation in this case. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 12 We review a trial court’s resolution of discovery issues for an abuse of discretion. People v. Bueno, 2013 COA 151, ¶ 10, aff’d, 2018 CO 4. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is
5
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. People v. Grant, 2021 COA 53, ¶ 12. ¶ 13 In criminal cases, a prosecutor must provide the defense with certain information that is within “the possession or control of the prosecuting attorney.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(1). As is relevant to this case, Rule 16 requires the disclosure of “any material or information . . . which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce the punishment therefor.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)(holding the prosecution violates due process when it suppresses evidence favorable to a defendant that is material to either guilt or punishment). ¶ 14 A prosecutor’s disclosure obligation extends to material or information “in the possession or control . . . of any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report, or with reference to the particular case have reported, to his or her office.” Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3). Relatedly, Rule 16 states a prosecutor “shall ensure” a “flow of information” between the various investigative personnel and the prosecutor’s office so the prosecution will possess or control “all material and
6
information relevant to the accused and the offense charged.” Crim. P. 16(I)(b)(4). ¶ 15 In addition to the requirements established by Rule 16 and cases such as Brady, section 16-2.5-502, C.R.S. 2025, which became effective in 2021, is also pertinent to this case. See Ch. 420, secs. 1, 3, § 16-2.5-502, 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 2784-88. This statute mandates that law enforcement agencies notify prosecutors when a peace officer • “[k]nowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact . . . or knowingly omitted a material fact while testifying . . . during an internal affairs investigation or administrative investigation and disciplinary process,” § 16-2.5-502(2)(c)(I)(A);
• “[t]ampered with or fabricated evidence,” § 16-2.5-
502(2)(c)(I)(C); or
• “violated any policy of the law enforcement agency regarding dishonesty,” § 16-2.5-402(2)(c)(I)(D).
¶ 16 The notification requirement is triggered when (1) the peace officer is “a potential witness in a pending criminal prosecution in which a criminal defendant has been formally charged,” § 16-2.5-
7
502(2)(c)(II)(A); (2) the peace officer “is under a concurrent criminal or administrative investigation regarding an allegation related to the peace officer’s involvement in the defendant’s pending criminal case,” § 16-2.5-502(2)(c)(II)(B); and (3) “[t]he result of the concurrent criminal or administrative investigation, if sustained, would require disclosure,” § 16-2.5-502(2)(c)(II)(C). ¶ 17 Notices sent to prosecutors’ offices under this statute must contain the following language: “This notification is to inform you that there is information in the law enforcement agency’s possession regarding [name of peace officer] that may affect the peace officer’s credibility in court.” § 16-2.5-502(2)(d)(I)(C). Section 16-2.5-502(3)(d) states each prosecutor’s office must “[e]stablish a process to timely notify a defense attorney or defendant of credibility disclosure notification records” under Rule 16. See Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2), (I)(a)(3), (I)(b)(4); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
B. Analysis
¶ 18 We conclude, for the following reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion when it decided that the sheriff’s office’s records were within the prosecution’s constructive possession and that the sheriff’s office violated both Rule 16 and section 16-2.5-502
8
when it did not notify the prosecution of the records’ existence. The court’s decisions were not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or a misapplication of the law. See Grant, ¶ 12. ¶ 19 The prosecution concedes Carroll’s disciplinary records were potentially exculpatory and material, but it asserts the records were not in the prosecution’s “possession or control.” But this ignores Rule 16’s constructive possession provision. See Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(3); Solano v. Newman, 2024 COA 93M, ¶ 44 (“[C]ase law has consistently held that the prosecutor is in constructive custody or possession of information held by law enforcement officials who assisted with the case.”). Since the prosecution does not dispute the court’s determination that the sheriff’s office was within the scope of Rule 16(I)(a)(3) for the purposes of defendant’s case, the prosecution constructively possessed those records for the purposes of Rule 16. ¶ 20 The sheriff’s office had a duty to inform the prosecution of the records’ potentially exculpatory contents, see § 16-2.5- 502(2)(d)(I)(C), and the prosecution, in turn, had a duty to turn the potentially exculpatory information over to defendant, see § 16-2.5- 502(3)(d); Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2), (I)(a)(3), (I)(b)(4); Brady, 373 U.S. at
9
87; see also People v. Dist. Ct., 793 P.2d 163, 167 (Colo. 1990)(stating the prosecution’s lack of knowledge of exculpatory evidence is “not a defense to . . . a discovery violation” because it must “promulgate and enforce rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve all discoverable evidence”); Grant, ¶¶ 32-37 (holding the prosecution was in constructive possession of records it had not originally known were in the custody of an out-of-state police department). ¶ 21 The records containing the potentially exculpatory information were generated during an internal affairs investigation. We know the records of such investigations are, as a general matter, presumptively confidential. See Martinelli v. Dist. Ct., 612 P.2d 1083, 1088-89 (Colo. 1980)(concluding a court should examine records from an internal affairs investigation in camera to determine whether there is relevant information in them). Indeed, following the lead of Martinelli and cases such as People v. Walker, 666 P.2d 113, 122 (Colo. 1983), and People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 671 (Colo. 2010), the court in this case authorized a subpoena under Crim. P. 17(c) to obtain the internal affairs records pertaining
10
to Carroll, reviewed those records in camera, and then released them to the parties. ¶ 22 We also know the Martinelli presumption of maintaining the official information privilege is rebutted when an internal affairs investigation turns up information covered by section 16-2.5-502; Crim. P. 16(I)(a)(2), (I)(a)(3), and (I)(b)(4); and Brady. See, e.g., People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 174 (Colo. App. 2001)(“[E]xculpatory evidence includes evidence which bears on the credibility of a witness the prosecution intends to call at trial.”). As the trial court noted, the internal affairs investigation in this case generated information the sheriff’s office should have promptly disclosed to the prosecution under section 16-2.5-502 without the need for a subpoena under Crim. P. 17(c).
III. Choice of Sanction ¶ 23 The prosecution also contends, even if there were a discovery violation, the court nonetheless erred when it reduced the first degree murder charge to second degree murder as a sanction. We are not persuaded.
11
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶ 24 We review a trial court’s imposition of discovery violation sanctions for an abuse of discretion, and we give “great deference” to its decision. Bueno, ¶ 10 (citation omitted). ¶ 25 Rule 16(III)(g) allows a court to sanction a party for failing to comply with its discovery obligations by, among other things, ordering sanctions “as [the court] deems just under the circumstances.” Crim. P. 16(III)(g). “[A] court should impose the least severe sanction that ensures compliance with the discovery rules and protects the defendant’s right to due process.” Grant, ¶ 39. However, if there is “willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect demonstrating a need for modification of a party’s discovery practices,” sanctions may be deterrent or punitive. People v. Whittington, 2024 CO 65, ¶ 19 (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
¶ 26 The prosecution asserts the record does not support the court’s determination that the sheriff’s office committed a “willful violation” of the law, meaning the court should not have imposed a punitive sanction. We are not persuaded.
12
¶ 27 In making its decision, the court noted that the sheriff’s office gave the prosecution notice under section 16-2.5-502 about the investigation into Janecek but not about the investigation into Carroll, even after the prosecution inquired into Carroll’s situation. The court also noted some of Janecek’s and Carroll’s misconduct had been linked, including admissions from them that they had used marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms together; Carroll was Janecek’s training officer for a while; and there were more serious allegations of misconduct against Carroll than against Janecek, including allegations concerning this case. Though the prosecution now suggests there were “legitimate reasons” for why the sheriff’s office would provide notice about Janecek but not about Carroll, it does not explain what those reasons might be. ¶ 28 We conclude that the record supports the court’s finding that the sheriff’s office willfully violated its obligation to disclose the potentially exculpatory information about Carroll. The court listed a variety of information contained in the records that affected Carroll’s credibility, which should have prompted the sheriff’s office to send the prosecutor a section 16-2.5-502 notice concerning
13
Carroll, as it had concerning Janecek. The court found the following:
(1) Carroll told Janecek not to turn on Janecek’s body-worn camera at the crime scene in this case. Carroll was Janecek’s senior training officer. The court found that this instruction affected the integrity of the investigation and of the collection of the evidence, amounting to an intentional failure to document relative evidence.
(2) Janecek alleged that Carroll lied to other crime scene investigators about some aspects of the crime scene in this case, including whether the victim’s body had been removed, which, the court decided, called into question Carroll’s credibility as a crime scene investigator and the integrity of the collection of evidence in this case.
(3) In a different case, Janecek said Carroll collected and stored pieces of evidence from different locations of a crime scene in one bag. The court found this raised issues about Carroll’s evidence collection practices.
(4) There was a significant difference between the results of a trigger-pull test Carroll conducted in this case and a
14
test subsequently conducted on the same firearm by another crime scene investigator. The court thought the exculpatory value of this difference was limited because Carroll’s result was more favorable to defendant than the subsequent result.
(5) While employed by the sheriff’s office, Carroll violated the office’s policies by using cannabis products and psilocybin mushrooms.
(6) In violation of evidence protocols, Carroll took the psilocybin mushrooms from stored evidence in another case.
¶ 29 The court then detailed the prejudice defendant had suffered because he had not learned about Carroll’s misconduct until the eve of the third trial setting. For instance, defense had little time to investigate Carroll’s misconduct or to identify and to interview witnesses. And defendant remained in custody on a no-bond hold. ¶ 30 Likewise, the record supports — and the prosecution does not dispute — the court’s finding that the sheriff’s office violated section 16-2.5-502. (We note the sheriff’s office cited this statute in its notice concerning Janecek.) For example, the record shows that
15
Carroll “[k]nowingly made an untruthful statement concerning a material fact . . . during an internal affairs investigation,” § 16-2.5- 502(2)(c)(I)(A); “[t]ampered with or fabricated evidence,” § 16-2.5- 502(2)(c)(I)(C); and “violated [a] policy of the law enforcement agency regarding dishonesty,” § 16-2.5-402(2)(c)(I)(D). Carroll was also, in this case, “a potential witness in a pending criminal prosecution in which a criminal defendant has been formally charged,” § 16-2.5- 502(2)(c)(II)(A); she was “under a concurrent . . . administrative investigation regarding an allegation related to [her] involvement in . . . defendant’s pending criminal case,” § 16-2.5-502(2)(c)(II)(B); and “[t]he result of the concurrent . . . administrative investigation, if sustained, would require disclosure,” § 16-2.5-502(2)(c)(II)(C). ¶ 31 And the sheriff’s office was aware Carroll may have engaged in misconduct affecting more than this case. One of the internal affairs investigators wrote that there was “the potential of wide- spread evidence handling issues.” He recommended the sheriff’s office, “before proceeding” with the internal affairs case, “would need to conduct a complete audit of all major cases handled by [Carroll] at a minimum.” Such an audit would have extended the internal affairs investigation for an additional six months to a year.
16
So the investigator decided to “separate” the audit “out” and focus the internal affairs investigation on Carroll’s “[i]ntegrity, [i]nsubordination, and [d]rug [u]se.” If the auditors of the major cases determined it was necessary, they could submit the evidence from their audit for an additional internal affairs investigation. ¶ 32 We conclude, based on this record, the court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the sanction of reducing the charge of first degree murder to second degree murder. See People v. Tippet, 2023 CO 61, ¶¶ 54-55 (affirming sanction that reduced murder charge because of record supporting willfulness). We therefore will not consider whether other less serious sanctions, such as a continuance of the trial, should have been imposed instead. ¶ 33 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.