23CA0923 Peo v Goldman 04-10-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0923 Boulder County District Court No. 21CR241 Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Yechezkel Meir Goldman,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Harris and Yun, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 10, 2025
Michael T. Dougherty, District Attorney, Adam Kendall, Chief Trial Deputy, Ryan Day, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 The People appeal the district court’s order dismissing their
case against defendant, Yechezkel Meir Goldman, on the grounds
that there was not a substantial probability he would be restored to
competency to stand trial in the reasonably foreseeable future. We
reverse and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
¶2 In February 2021, the prosecution charged Goldman with a
single count of stalking, a class 5 felony. See § 18-3-602(1)(c),
(3)(a), C.R.S. 2024. According to the probable cause affidavit for his
arrest, Goldman had stalked his father’s massage therapist for
roughly three years. During that period, the prosecution alleged,
Goldman had shown up at the victim’s work and had sent her
unwanted emails about engaging in a personal relationship with
him. Goldman was released on a personal recognizance bond
shortly after his arrest.
¶3 In June, defense counsel filed a motion to determine
Goldman’s competency to stand trial. The district court made a
preliminary finding of incompetency and ordered the Colorado
1 Department of Human Services to perform an out-of-custody
competency evaluation of Goldman.1
¶4 Dr. Amanda Ferguson, a licensed psychologist, completed the
initial evaluation. Dr. Ferguson determined that Goldman met the
diagnostic criteria for “unspecified schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorder” and “unspecified personality disorder.” She also
indicated that erotomanic delusional disorder was under
consideration as a diagnosis. She opined that Goldman was
incompetent to proceed because his delusional beliefs about the
case and his perceived relationship with the victim significantly
impacted his ability to understand the nature of the criminal
proceedings and to effectively assist in his defense. But Dr.
Ferguson also opined that, while Goldman hadn’t been prescribed
psychotropic medications to treat his conditions, there was a fair
chance that he would be restored to competency with the use of
those medications.
1 The Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (then known as
the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo) coordinated the evaluation.
2 ¶5 Based on this report, the district court found Goldman
incompetent to proceed and ordered outpatient competency
restoration therapy as a condition of his bond. The court also
ordered the Department to provide periodic reports detailing the
status of Goldman’s competency. Over the next eighteen months,
Dr. Ferguson completed six additional competency evaluations.2 In
each report, she opined that Goldman remained incompetent to
stand trial and that the likelihood of his restoration was “fair” with
the use of psychotropic medications but “poor” or “guarded” without
such treatment. Dr. Ferguson stated that a psychiatric assessment
and prescribed medications were “strongly recommended” under
these circumstances. In each of these reports, Dr. Ferguson also
stated that, in her opinion, “there is a substantial probability that
Mr. Goldman will be restored to competency within the reasonably
foreseeable future.”
¶6 Relying on Dr. Ferguson’s recommendations, the district court
granted the prosecution’s request for a psychiatric and medication
2 Dr. Ferguson also completed an eighth evaluation and filed a
report, dated two weeks after the court dismissed the case, that contained the same conclusions as the others.
3 evaluation of Goldman and for the appointment of a court liaison to
assist him with finding a prescribing physician for any medications
recommended under the evaluation. Dr. Leah Brar, a forensic
psychiatrist, completed the evaluation and opined that
(1) psychiatric medications were “clinically indicated” because they
constituted a “first-line treatment” of delusional disorder;
(2) Goldman didn’t meet the “criteria for involuntary treatment
under Colorado statutes”; and (3) Goldman’s prognosis for
restoration to competency was “at least fair” with antipsychotic
medications and “poor” without any form of treatment “as untreated
delusions may persist for many years.”
¶7 Less than a week later, Goldman moved to dismiss the case
under section 16-8.5-116(4), C.R.S. 2022 (repealed 2024),3
asserting that dismissal was required because he was incompetent
to proceed and there was no substantial probability of restoring him
3 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the version of section
16-8.5-116, C.R.S. 2022, that was in effect when the district court dismissed the case. The General Assembly has since amended the relevant provisions twice, ultimately repealing subsection (4). See Ch. 423, sec. 3, § 16-8.5-116(10), 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 2484-85; Ch. 372, sec. 12, § 16-8.5-116(3)-(4), 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 2515-16.
4 to competency in the reasonably foreseeable future. In April 2023,
the district court granted Goldman’s motion to dismiss after a
hearing. It determined that Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Brar opined that
Goldman could be restored to competency only if he were to adhere
to a psychotropic medication regimen. And because Goldman,
among other things, wasn’t (1) prescribed such treatment;
(2) ordered by the court to take psychotropic medications; or
(3) inclined to medicate voluntarily, the court reasoned that there
was no substantial probability that he would be restored to
competency in the reasonably foreseeable future.
¶8 In accordance with section 16-8.5-116(10), the district court
stayed its order of dismissal for twenty-one days to allow the
prosecution to take “any of the steps authorized by that subsection”
and “assess their legal options for requesting that [Goldman] be
involuntarily medicated.” However, after denying the prosecution’s
motion for reconsideration, the court dismissed the case against
Goldman.
II. Analysis
¶9 On appeal, the People contend that the district court erred by
dismissing its case on the grounds that there was no substantial
5 probability of restoring Goldman to competency because all
evidence in the record suggested that, with the use of appropriate
medications, Goldman could be restored to competency in the
reasonably foreseeable future. We agree and, therefore, reverse.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 When, as here, a district court dismisses a charge based on its
application of the controlling legal standard to undisputed facts,
our review is de novo.4 See People v. Curren, 2014 COA 59M,
¶¶ 13-14 (reviewing de novo a district court’s application of the
speedy trial statute to undisputed facts); People v. Yakas, 2019 COA
117, ¶ 15 (noting that this principle applies to a court’s ruling on a
motion to dismiss asserting a violation of the Uniform Mandatory
Disposition of Detainers Act). Likewise, we review de novo
questions of statutory interpretation. People v. Alaniz, 2016 COA
101, ¶ 22.
4 The parties dispute whether de novo or clear error review applies
to the court’s finding that there is a substantial probability that a particular defendant’s competency will be restored in the reasonably foreseeable future. However, we need not definitively resolve this dispute because the court’s finding here would fail under either standard.
6 B. Applicable Law
¶ 11 The right to due process under the United States and Colorado
Constitutions prevents the trial of an incompetent defendant. See
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996); People v. Zapotocky,
869 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Colo. 1994). In Colorado, that right is further
protected by statute. See § 16-8.5-101 to -124, C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 12 Under the statute, a defendant is incompetent to proceed if,
“as a result of a mental disability or developmental disability,” he
lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the
defense,” or he “does not have a rational and factual understanding
of the criminal proceedings.” § 16-8.5-101(12). Thus, to be
competent to stand trial, a defendant must have “both a factual
understanding and cognitive ability and perceptions and
understandings that are rational and grounded in reality.” People v.
Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936, 941 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 13 Either defense counsel or the prosecution may file a motion to
determine competency when they have reason to believe that the
defendant is incompetent to proceed. § 16-8.5-102(2)(b), C.R.S.
2022. If a district court makes a preliminary finding of
7 incompetency over a party’s objection, or it determines that it lacks
sufficient information to make such a finding, then the court must
order “that the defendant be evaluated for competency by the
[D]epartment and that the [D]epartment prepare a court-ordered
report.” § 16-8.5-103(2), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 14 After the court receives this report, it must enter a final
determination regarding the defendant’s competency to proceed.
§ 16-8.5-103(5). And if, as here, the defendant is incompetent and
on bond, and there is a substantial probability that services will
restore competency, then the court must order “that restoration to
competency take place on an outpatient basis, unless the
[D]epartment recommends inpatient restoration services.”
§ 16-8.5-111(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2022 (version effective until May 16,
2023).
¶ 15 Within ninety-one days after this order, the court must again
review the case to determine, among other things, whether there is
a substantial probability that the defendant will be restored to
§ 16-8.5-116(2)(a). The court must review the case every ninety-one
8 days thereafter until four reviews have been conducted.
§ 16-8.5-116(3).
¶ 16 After the fourth review, the court must continue to review the
defendant’s case every ninety-one days until the defendant is
restored to competency or it determines that there is no substantial
probability that the defendant will be restored to competency in the
reasonably foreseeable future. § 16-8.5-116(4). In the latter event,
“the court shall dismiss the case subject to the provisions of
subsection (10) of this section.” Id. In turn, subsection
(10) provides that prior to dismissing a case under subsection (4), a
district court must identify whether an incompetent defendant
“meets the requirements for certification pursuant to article 65 of
title 27, or for the provision of services pursuant to article 10.5 of
title 27, or whether the defendant will agree to a voluntary
commitment.” § 16-8.5-116(10). If the defendant meets the
requirements for certification or provision of services and is not
amenable to a voluntary commitment, then the court may stay the
dismissal for twenty-one days to allow the prosecution to pursue
certification proceedings or the provision of necessary services. Id.
9 C. The District Court Erred by Dismissing the Case Under Section 16-8.5-116(4)
¶ 17 The People contend that the district erred when it concluded
that there was no substantial probability that Goldman would be
restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable future
because “all evidence and evaluations indicate[d] that [he could] be
restored to competency with necessary medications.” Goldman
responds that this argument misconstrues the governing test
because the proper inquiry was whether it was likely that he would
“actually be restored to competency in the reasonably foreseeable
future,” not whether his restoration was possible in theory.
Goldman argues that the court correctly concluded that there was
no substantial probability that he would be restored to competency
in the reasonably foreseeable future after finding, among other
things, that (1) his prognosis for restoration was poor without
psychotropic medications; and (2) his condition was unlikely to
change given that he wasn’t even prescribed medications, much
10 less taking them under a court order or voluntarily.5 We agree with
the People.
¶ 18 The record shows that Goldman underwent eight psychological
competency evaluations with Dr. Ferguson and one psychiatric and
medication evaluation with Dr. Brar. All nine reports concluded
that, while Goldman was incompetent to stand trial at the time the
reports were completed, his competency could be restored in the
reasonably foreseeable future with adherence to appropriate
medications. Dr. Ferguson opined that psychotropic medications
were recommended because there was at least a “fair” chance that
Goldman would regain his competency with the use of those
medications. She noted that it was “unlikely that [Goldman’s]
mental health symptoms [would] remit spontaneously without the
use of psychotropic medications.” Dr. Ferguson concluded that
5 We note that Goldman’s answer brief addresses issues the People
didn’t raise in their opening brief. Specifically, Goldman argues that the district court properly dismissed the case because the People failed to (1) appeal the court’s ruling declining to include adherence to psychotropic medications as a condition of his bond; and (2) pursue, let alone establish the requirements for, involuntary treatment with medication. In the reply brief, the People clarify that these are not issues on appeal. We thus need not address them. See People v. Zweygardt, 2012 COA 119, ¶ 47 (not addressing an issue the appellant didn’t present for appellate review).
11 there was a substantial probability that Goldman “[would] be
restored to competency within the reasonably foreseeable future”
and “[would] be restored to competency and [would] likely remain
competent with the use of medications.”
¶ 19 Dr. Brar’s opinion was no different. Dr. Brar stated that
antipsychotic medications were “clinically indicated” because they
constituted a “first-line treatment” for delusional disorder. She
opined that, with antipsychotic medications, Goldman’s clinical
prognosis “should be at least fair.” However, “[w]ithout any form of
treatment,” Dr. Brar opined, “his prognosis [was] poor as untreated
delusions may persist for many years.” Under these circumstances,
Dr. Brar concluded that if Goldman “were to engage in treatment
with antipsychotic medications, he [could] indeed be restored in the
¶ 20 True, both doctors noted that there were challenges to treating
Goldman with psychiatric medications. Dr. Brar pointed out that
Goldman had told her that he was disinterested in taking the
medications. Similarly, Dr. Ferguson noted that Goldman had a
“limited insight into his psychiatric disorder and it [was] unclear if
he [would] be willing to take medications in the future.” Moreover,
12 Dr. Ferguson reported that “while some symptoms of psychosis
tend to respond well to psychotropic medications, Mr. Goldman
displayed delusional beliefs, which may be somewhat resistant to
psychotropic medications.” But Dr. Brar noted that “[s]tudies have
indicated that delusions may at least partially respond to
antipsychotics.”
¶ 21 Regardless, Dr. Ferguson and Dr. Brar unequivocally
concluded that Goldman could be restored to competency in the
reasonably foreseeable future if he were to take antipsychotic
medications. Thus, while both doctors acknowledged that such a
treatment wasn’t certain to render Goldman competent to proceed,
the likelihood of Goldman’s restoration to competency with the use
of medications was more than just a “theoretical possibility.”
Despite this, the district court concluded that there was no
substantial probability that Goldman would be restored to
¶ 22 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered Dr.
Ferguson’s and Dr. Brar’s opinions and determined that “without
psychotropic medication[s], there was not a substantial probability
that [Goldman would] be restored to competency in the foreseeable
13 future.” And because Goldman wasn’t, among other
things, prescribed such medications, inclined to take them
voluntarily, or ordered by the court to medicate, the court
concluded that he was necessarily unlikely to be restored to
competency in the reasonably foreseeable future. We think the
court erroneously dismissed this case under section 16-8.5-116(4)
for three reasons.
¶ 23 First, the court relied almost exclusively on the fact that
Goldman wasn’t voluntarily medicating and was disinclined to take
medications in the future to conclude that he was unlikely to be
restored to competency. Put differently, the court dismissed
Goldman’s felony charge because it found that he wasn’t willing or
able6 to address his mental health conditions with the treatments
that the two doctors had recommended. This approach left
Goldman’s condition untreated, which contradicts the statute’s
objective of improving the health of defendants. See Ch. 389, sec.
1(2), 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 1837.
6 As the reports indicated, individuals with Goldman’s condition
frequently have poor insight into their condition, making their voluntary use of medication challenging.
14 ¶ 24 More significantly, however, in reaching this conclusion the
court disregarded the fact that Goldman didn’t ever definitely
confirm whether he would or wouldn’t medicate. To be sure, he had
told Dr. Brar that he was disinterested in taking psychotropic
medications. Likewise, Dr. Ferguson reported that it was unclear
whether Goldman would be willing to medicate considering that he
had limited insight into his psychiatric disorder. And at the
hearing, the district court noted that “he does not voluntarily
consent to taking psychiatric medication.” But in response to the
court’s observation, Goldman’s counsel clarified that Goldman
hadn’t said that he would “never take[] medications” and that he
was only “waiting to see what the result of the motion to dismiss”
would be before taking a position on that issue. The court didn’t
follow up on these statements or ask Goldman to confirm his
position before ruling on his motion to dismiss the case. Instead,
the court granted Goldman’s motion primarily because he wasn’t
voluntarily medicating at the time of the hearing, even though he
hadn’t unequivocally said that he wouldn’t take the recommended
medications in the future.
15 ¶ 25 Second, while the court found that there was no court order
requiring Goldman to medicate, the parties and the court were
unclear about whether psychotropic medications were a condition
of Goldman’s bond. The prosecution argued that medication
treatment was a condition of Goldman’s bond, which would have
allowed the prosecution to seek revocation of his bond; a return to
custody; and, potentially, an order for involuntary medication if he
refused to take the medications that would likely help restore him
to competency. In support of this argument, the prosecution
directed the court to the language in its November 2022 order that
said, “It is the Court’s intention that [Goldman’s] cooperation with
any psychotropic medications that are recommended by the
[psychiatric and medication] evaluation shall become a condition of
bond.” The court observed that the order was “poorly worded”:
[The November 2022 order] did not impose a bond condition that required Mr. Goldman to respond to a hypothetical future medication recommendation by affirmatively seeking out a prescribing psychiatrist, obtaining a prescription, and then taking any medications that individual might hypothetically prescribe. At most, the [November 2022 order] stated an intention to enter future orders upon receipt of the [psychiatric and medication evaluation report]. . . . [T]he Court has not entered any
16 order requiring Mr. Goldman to take psychiatric medications as a condition of bond.
We note that despite these statements, the status of the orders
remains unclear. The plain language of the court’s November 2022
order said that Goldman’s compliance with the medication
treatment recommended under the psychiatric and medication
evaluation constituted a condition of his bond.7
¶ 26 Third, while Goldman hadn’t been prescribed medications at
the time of dismissal, such treatment wasn’t only “hypothetical.”
The record shows that the prosecution had made some progress on
the medication front. Specifically, in the November 2022 order, the
district court appointed Goldman a liaison to assist “with the
determination of an appropriate prescribing physician for any
medications or treatment recommended” under the psychiatric and
medication evaluation. But only days after Dr. Brar completed that
evaluation — recommending a specific medication treatment the
liaison could assist with obtaining a prescription for — Goldman
7 Regardless of the clarity of the record, there have been extensive
changes to the governing statutes, and this issue may not arise in the same manner on remand. We therefore express no opinion on how the district court should ultimately resolve this issue.
17 filed his motion to dismiss. The court then dismissed the
prosecution’s case in part because Goldman didn’t have a
prescription for psychiatric medications.
¶ 27 True, at the time Goldman moved to dismiss the case, he had
been facing charges for two years and had been participating in
outpatient restoration therapy at some level for about eighteen
months. But the record shows that, during that time, Goldman had
engaged only in education and psychotherapy but not the
medication that both doctors indicated would likely help restore
him to competency.8 The district court noted the challenges
associated with restoring Goldman to competency given that there
was no court order requiring him to take medications, he wasn’t
prescribed medications, and he wasn’t voluntarily medicating. The
court observed that these circumstances were causing a logjam,
where both parties were waiting for something to happen. While we
agree the court could appropriately manage the case by prodding
the parties to action, we don’t agree that it was the right junction to
8 In her report, Dr. Brar stated that while it was unclear whether
Goldman had reached the maximum benefit from education and psychotherapy, her “clinical suspicion” was that he was “unlikely to progress much further without the assistance of antipsychotics.”
18 simply dismiss the prosecution’s charge. Given the circumstances
of this case, we think that ruling was premature.
¶ 28 In sum, the district court erred when it dismissed the stalking
charge against Goldman after concluding that there was no
substantial probability that he would be restored to competency in
the reasonably foreseeable future on these facts. On remand, the
court should reinstate that charge and address anew the issue of
Goldman’s competency to proceed.
III. Disposition
¶ 29 The order of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded to
the district court to reinstate Goldman’s stalking charge and
conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE YUN concur.