22CA0368 Peo v Germanson 05-01-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0368 City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CR8178 Honorable David H. Goldberg, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jacob L. Germanson,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 1, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Meghan M. Morris, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Jacob L. Germanson, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of two counts
of sexual assault, one count of second degree assault
(strangulation), and one count of third degree assault. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In late October 2019, the victim, R.T., called the police to
report that her boyfriend — Germanson — had sexually assaulted
her. Less than thirty minutes later, Germanson called the police to
report that his girlfriend — R.T. — would call them to falsely report
he had sexually assaulted her. The police arrested Germanson, and
the prosecution filed a complaint and information charging1 him
with two counts of sexual assault with force under section
18-3-402(1)(a), (4), C.R.S. 2019; one count of second degree assault
for strangulation under section 18-3-203(1)(i), C.R.S. 2024; and one
count of third degree assault under section 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S.
2019.
¶3 Germanson asserted that R.T. consented to engage in sexual
intercourse with him, but that she later filed a false police report
1 For statutes that have since changed, we apply the versions in
effect at the time of the underlying incident.
1 against him because she became angry upon learning that he was
not divorced from his wife.
¶4 The case proceeded to a jury trial. As noted above, the jury
found Germanson guilty of two counts of sexual assault, one count
of second degree assault (strangulation), and one count of third
degree assault. On one of the sexual assault counts, the jury found
that Germanson caused R.T.’s submission through force or
violence, which enhanced that count from a class 4 felony to a class
3 felony under section 18-3-402(4)(a), C.R.S. 2019.
¶5 On appeal, Germanson contends that the district court abused
its discretion by (1) improperly admitting as res gestae evidence his
communications with R.T. in the days leading up to the sexual
encounter; (2) allowing a domestic violence expert (the DV expert) to
testify beyond the scope of the prosecution’s disclosure of her
anticipated testimony; and (3) permitting a sexual assault nurse
examiner (SANE) to testify beyond her expertise and allowing her to
comment on R.T.’s credibility. Germanson also contends that we
should reverse his judgment of conviction under the cumulative
error doctrine.
2 II. Standard of Review
¶6 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings — such as rulings
on admission of exhibits and expert testimony — for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo. 2011). A
court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on misapprehending or
misapplying the law. People v. Kendrick, 2017 CO 82, ¶ 36.
Determining whether a court misapprehended or misapplied the law
“does not require deference to the trial court. Instead, the trial
court’s application or interpretation of the law when making an
evidentiary ruling is a question of law we review de novo.” People v.
Dominguez, 2019 COA 78, ¶ 13.
¶7 “[W]e review nonconstitutional trial errors that were preserved
by objection for harmless error,” meaning “we reverse if the error
‘substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the
trial proceedings.’” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12 (quoting
Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986)).
¶8 We review unpreserved errors for plain error and reverse such
errors only if they “so undermined the fundamental fairness of the
trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the
3 judgment of conviction.” Hagos, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Miller, 113
P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)).
III. Admitting Evidence under the Res Gestae Doctrine
A. Additional Background
¶9 The district court held a pretrial hearing on the prosecution’s
“Notice of Intent to Introduce Res Gestae and 404(B) Evidence” and
Germanson’s response to the notice. The prosecution sought to
introduce text messages and telephone calls between R.T. and
Germanson in the two days leading up to the assault as res gestae
and CRE 404(b) evidence.
¶ 10 The court found that the communications evinced
Germanson’s “motive, opportunity, intent, and preparation” for the
charged assaults and that the communications were “res gestae of
the events and the incidents in this case as alleged in the
information and complaint.” It also found that, under People v.
Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990), the communications
related to a material fact, were logically relevant and had a tendency
to make the material fact’s existence more or less probable than
without the communications, and were not being submitted to
establish Germanson’s bad character. Considering all the evidence,
4 the court found that the communications’ probative value
outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice and concluded they were
also admissible under CRE 404(b).
¶ 11 Later, Germanson filed a motion in limine in which he asked
the court to provide a contemporaneous limiting instruction before
receiving any evidence under CRE 404(b). The court denied
Germanson’s request without prejudice, reasoning that the request
was premature, and said it would “consider a limiting instruction if
and when testimony [was] introduced and if and when [it]
determine[d] that an . . . instruction [was] appropriate.” During the
jury instruction conference, after the court admitted the
communications into evidence, Germanson proposed an instruction
to limit the communications’ purpose under CRE 404(b). The court
rejected the proposed limiting jury instruction and found that the
communications were “res gestae and not [CRE] 404(b)” evidence.
B. Applicable Legal Principles
¶ 12 “Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.” CRE
404(b)(1). However, under CRE 404(b)(2), “[t]his evidence may be
5 admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence
of mistake, or lack of accident.”
¶ 13 “Res gestae evidence includes the circumstances, facts and
declarations which arise from the main event and serve to illustrate
its character.” People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d 1366, 1373 (Colo.
1994), abrogated by Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8. Res gestae
evidence “also includes evidence that is closely related in both time
and nature to the charged offense.” Id.
¶ 14 After the court entered Germanson’s judgment of conviction,
the supreme court abolished the res gestae doctrine in criminal
cases, recognizing “an intrinsic-extrinsic distinction, with extrinsic
acts falling under Rule 404(b) and intrinsic acts falling outside the
Rule’s scope.” Rojas, ¶¶ 41, 44.
C. Preservation
¶ 15 Germanson contends that he preserved his objections to the
court’s admitting the evidence of the text messages and calls under
the res gestae doctrine with his motion in limine, the court’s ruling,
and the proposed limiting instruction he tendered during the jury
instruction conference. The People agree that Germanson
6 preserved his argument regarding the text messages but disagree
that he preserved his arguments challenging the admission of
evidence regarding the number of text messages and phone calls
leading up to the assault and testimony concerning certain of the
text messages. The People also assert that Germanson did not
request a contemporaneous limiting instruction at the time the
court admitted the text messages and phone calls into evidence.
D. Analysis
¶ 16 The record shows that Germanson did not object to the
prosecution’s line of questioning about the number of text messages
or phone calls, nor did he request a contemporaneous limiting
instruction when the prosecution introduced evidence regarding
such communications. Also, when Germanson requested at a
pretrial hearing a limiting instruction regarding CRE 404(b)
evidence, the court denied the request without prejudice, stating
that it would “consider a limiting instruction if and when testimony
[was] introduced.” But Germanson never requested such a limiting
instruction when the prosecution introduced testimony and exhibits
regarding the text messages and phone calls, and he did not restate
his request until the evidence had closed.
7 ¶ 17 So we conclude that Germanson did not preserve his
contentions about the number of text messages and phone calls
leading up to the assault and the lack of a limiting instruction. We
therefore apply the plain error standard in reviewing Germanson’s
contentions regarding those communications. But because
Germanson preserved his argument that the court erred by
admitting the text messages, such argument is subject to a
harmless error standard of review.
¶ 18 Germanson contends that, after Rojas, courts must determine
whether evidence previously deemed res gestae is intrinsic or
extrinsic to the charged offense. He argues that, because the
communications leading up to the assault were extrinsic to the
charges he faced and implied bad character, the court erred by
admitting the evidence as res gestae. And he argues that the court
infringed on his rights to due process and a fair trial by admitting
evidence of prior bad acts without a limiting instruction because
such evidence allowed the jury to infer guilt based on his purported
character. The People assert that the communications are intrinsic
evidence or otherwise admissible under CRE 404(b).
8 ¶ 19 Because the district court conducted a sufficient analysis
under Spoto during the pretrial hearing to permit admitting the
communications as CRE 404(b) evidence, supra Part III.A, we need
not address the evidence’s admissibility under Rojas. So we discern
no error in the court’s admitting the communications under CRE
404(b) despite its ruling that it admitted them as res gestae. See
People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (“[A]n appellate court may
affirm a lower court’s decision on any ground supported by the
record, whether relied upon or even considered by the trial court.”).
¶ 20 We also reject Germanson’s contention that the court infringed
on his right to due process and a fair trial by declining to provide
the jury with a limiting instruction. Germanson failed to request a
limiting instruction contemporaneously when the court admitted
the text messages and phone calls. And the court must do so only
when a defendant requests such an instruction. Rojas, ¶ 27 (“If a
court determines the evidence is admissible, the court must also,
upon request, contemporaneously instruct the jurors of the limited
purpose for which the evidence may be considered.”) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, we discern no error, let alone plain error, in
9 the court’s declining to give the jury a limiting instruction after the
close of evidence.
IV. Expert Testimony
A. Applicable Legal Principles
1. Crim. P. 16 Disclosure
¶ 21 Crim. P. 16(I)(d)(3) addresses discretionary disclosures in
criminal cases and states that
[w]here the interests of justice would be served, the court may order the prosecution to disclose the underlying facts or data supporting the opinion in that particular case of an expert endorsed as a witness. If a report has not been prepared by that expert to aid in compliance with other discovery obligations of this rule, the court may order the party calling that expert to provide a written summary of the testimony describing the witness’s opinions and the bases and reasons therefor, including results of physical or mental examination and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons. The intent of this section is to allow the defense sufficient meaningful information to conduct effective cross-examination under CRE 705.
¶ 22 While disclosures under Crim. P. 16(I)(d)(3) are discretionary,
it is “better practice for the prosecution to specifically identify . . .
an expert witness.” People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 930 (Colo. App.
2011).
10 2. CRE 702
¶ 23 Expert testimony is admissible under CRE 702 if the proffered
testimony is reliable, the expert is qualified to opine on such
matters, and the expert testimony is relevant. People v. Shreck, 22
P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001). A trial court’s reliability inquiry “should
be broad in nature and consider the totality of the circumstances of
each specific case.” Id. at 78; see Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105,
1114 (Colo. 1999) (experience-based expertise is subject to the
standards of CRE 702). And expert testimony is relevant —
meaning it is useful to the jury — when it assists the jury “to either
understand other evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” People
v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 379 (Colo. 2007). A court must balance
its discretion to allow expert witness testimony with its obligation to
ensure that the probative value of the expert’s testimony is not
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See id.
B. Scope of the DV Expert’s Testimony
1. Additional Background
¶ 24 Before trial, Germanson requested an order requiring the
prosecution to disclose certain materials and information related to
any expert witness the prosecution may endorse. And before trial,
11 the prosecution filed an “Endorsed List of Witnesses” (the witness
list) that included the DV expert, the DV expert’s curriculum vitae,
and a statement of her opinions. In the statement, the DV expert
said that she usually testified regarding “general information about
domestic violence” and identified eight specific issues regarding
domestic violence, including “pattern of abuse” and “domestic
violence dynamics.”
¶ 25 Germanson objected to the DV expert’s endorsement as an
expert witness in the field of domestic violence under CRE 702 and
requested a pretrial hearing on the proper scope of the DV expert’s
testimony. Among other points, he argued that, because R.T. had
“specifically reported that there were not prior acts of domestic
violence” in her relationship with Germanson, the DV expert’s
proposed testimony regarding the pattern of abuse and domestic
violence dynamics would unduly prejudice Germanson by allowing
the jury to infer past acts of domestic violence.
¶ 26 As relevant here, in its response to Germanson’s objection, the
prosecution argued that “[t]he defendant’s power and control over
the victim helps to explain behaviors that, when viewed in isolation,
might conflict with what an ordinary juror might intuitively expect.”
12 The prosecution provided examples of such behaviors, such as
Germanson (1) ordering R.T. to make him food; (2) isolating R.T.
from her family; (3) prohibiting R.T. from going to work; (4) calling
R.T. repeatedly on the phone; (5) making demands of R.T. regarding
her behavior and her role as his girlfriend; and (6) threatening to
harm himself with his gun. The prosecution argued that “[a]ll of
these behaviors [were] part of a power and control dynamic and
help to explain certain counter-intuitive dynamics and behaviors
exhibited by the victim, which could not be explained without
explicit reference to the power and control dynamic and cycle of
violence.”
¶ 27 At the hearing on Germanson’s objection to the DV expert’s
testimony, the court ruled as follows:
[T]he pattern of abuse and dynamics and the cycle of violence and pattern of abuse, even if this is the first act, doesn’t preclude the testimony. Rather, as I understand it from the disclosures, the facts in this case, and my understanding of [this] witness[] in relation to the Cooper2 case, the dynamics of power and control and mechanism of power doesn’t necessarily need to be predicated upon a prior act of domestic violence but can be explained
2 The court was referencing People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69.
13 as part of a continuum which culminates in an act of domestic violence.
Based on my understanding of [the DV expert’s] background and training, education, and experience, she will be admitted — or will be allowed, so long as appropriate foundation is laid, because I do believe it fits this case based on my understanding of the facts as well as applying the Shreck analysis. I do believe that it is permissible under [CRE] 702 as well as 401 and 402.
¶ 28 At trial, the prosecutor asked the DV expert on direct
examination, “how do things like male privilege or gender roles fall
under the dynamic of power and control?” Defense counsel
objected and argued that the topic exceeded the scope of the
prosecution’s disclosure for the DV expert. The court overruled the
objection and permitted the DV expert to testify about gender roles
and power dynamics.
2. Analysis
¶ 29 Germanson contends that the court erred by allowing the DV
expert to testify about male privilege and gender roles because the
prosecution did not disclose those topics before trial. He contends
that the DV expert’s testimony on those topics surprised defense
counsel and impaired counsel’s ability to vigorously cross-examine
14 the DV expert and present contrary evidence. And he asserts that
the court deprived him of a fair trial by allowing the DV expert to
provide the undisclosed opinions. We are unpersuaded.
¶ 30 The People argue that, in her pretrial statement, the DV expert
disclosed that she would testify regarding power and control
dynamics in domestic violence relationships, including tactics
offenders may use to maintain power and control. They also argue
that the DV expert did not claim that her statement contained an
exhaustive list of the domestic violence topics on which she might
testify. And the prosecution provided specific examples of
Germanson’s behavior, including ordering R.T. to make him food
and commenting about R.T.’s role as his girlfriend. The People also
argue that in his previous objection to a different domestic violence
expert, Germanson had cited People v. Cooper, 2019 COA 21
(Cooper I), which was later reversed by People v. Cooper, 2021 CO
69 (Cooper II), and had acknowledged the “Power and Control
Wheel” and the use of male privilege dynamics.
¶ 31 Notably, at the pretrial hearing at which the court decided that
the DV expert could provide opinion testimony on domestic violence
so long as the prosecutor laid a proper foundation, the court cited
15 and relied on Cooper II and Shreck. In Cooper II, ¶ 52, the supreme
court held that “generalized expert testimony fits a case if it has a
sufficient logical connection to the factual issues to be helpful to the
jury while still clearing the ever-present CRE 403 admissibility bar.”
And the opinion in Cooper II, ¶¶ 22-23, reproduces the “Power and
Control Wheel,” a tool “developed by social scientists to explain the
common dynamics of domestic violence,” including male privilege.
In their discussion of the court’s reliance on Cooper II when it ruled
on Germanson’s pretrial motion regarding the scope of the DV
expert’s testimony, the People cite Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72,
¶ 36, for the proposition that defense counsel is presumed to know
substantive law.
¶ 32 Given the pretrial pleadings and hearing, which included the
prosecution’s express identification of Germanson’s behavior
demanding that R.T. cook for him and fulfill her role as a girlfriend,
defense counsel’s acknowledgment of the Power and Control Wheel
tool that includes male privilege, and the court’s reliance on Cooper
II, we cannot conclude that the prosecution’s questions to the DV
expert about gender roles and male privilege surprised defense
counsel. And if defense counsel was truly surprised by the elicited
16 testimony and believed it was prejudicial, counsel could have
contemporaneously asked the court for a continuance. See People
v. Brown, 313 P.3d 608, 617 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Defendant’s failure
to request a continuance belies any claim that he was surprised or
prejudiced by the detective’s testimony.”); People v. Graham, 678
P.2d 1043, 1047-48 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Anderson, 837 P.2d
293, 299 (Colo. App. 1992) (“[Any] claim by the defendant at the
appellate level that he was unfairly surprised and unable to prepare
adequately for cross-examination is thoroughly discredited by his
failure to move for a continuance at the trial level.” (quoting
Graham, 678 P.2d at 1048)); see also United States v. McPartlin, 595
F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) (failure of defendants to renew request for
a continuance thoroughly discredits their assertion that they were
prejudiced by the timing of disclosure).
¶ 33 We also reject Germanson’s argument that the prosecution
violated Crim. P. 16(I)(d)(3) by failing to expressly include the topics
of gender roles and male privilege in the DV expert’s statement,
even though it referred to domestic violence dynamics.
Germanson’s argument construes the discretionary disclosure rule
too restrictively. Crim. P. 16(I)(d)(3) expressly provides that “[t]he
17 intent of this section is to allow the defense sufficient meaningful
information to conduct effective cross-examination.” (Emphasis
added.) Sufficient meaningful information does not equate to an
exhaustive list of all topics on which the expert witness may opine.
Rather, the rule permits the court to order the prosecution “to
provide a written summary of the testimony describing the witness’s
opinions and the bases and reasons therefor.” Crim. P. 16(I)(d)(3)
(emphasis added); Black’s Law Dictionary 1742 (12th ed. 2024)
(defining the noun “summary” as “[a]n abridgement or brief”).
Because the DV expert’s statement summarized her anticipated
testimony and referred to domestic violence dynamics, we conclude
that the prosecution complied with its obligation under Crim. P.
16(I)(d)(3) by providing Germanson with sufficient meaningful
information to allow him to conduct an effective cross-examination
of the DV expert.
C. SANE’s Testimony
¶ 34 The prosecution also endorsed a SANE as an expert witness in
its witness list and specified her expertise as “Sexual Assault and
Forensic Examinations to include Strangulation.” A few weeks after
18 filing the witness list, the prosecution filed a “Notice of [the SANE’s]
Expert Opinion Letter Re: Strangulation.” And a couple of days
after that, the prosecution filed a document entitled “[SANE’s]
Expert Summary,” which identified the SANE’s experience regarding
strangulation. Germanson objected to the SANE’s proffered
testimony, specifically regarding strangulation, and requested a
hearing.
¶ 35 After holding a hearing at which the prosecution and
Germanson presented arguments regarding the scope of the SANE’s
With respect to the science of trauma, assuming [the SANE] has sufficient knowledge or experience and training, that is something that fits this case, assuming that an appropriate foundation is laid and it is relevant to material not outweighed by prejudice under [CRE] 403, and I’ll require counsel to make an appropriate objection if and when the opinions are elicited. That is something that I do believe, employing a flexible approach, satisfies the Shreck analysis and all . . . four prongs of the analysis, including the mechanism of injury, again, assuming that it fits this case.
¶ 36 At trial, the prosecution offered the SANE as an expert in
sexual assault and forensic examinations, including strangulation.
Before the court accepted the SANE as an expert, defense counsel
19 conducted voir dire and asked the SANE whether she was “able to
make a diagnosis for any issues related to strangulation[] or [was] a
doctor required to do that?” The SANE responded that “[t]he doctor
generally [did] that,” and said that SANEs do not typically diagnose
patients. Following the voir dire, defense counsel said he “ha[d] no
objection to the expert being proffered in those two areas.”
¶ 37 But when the SANE testified about strangulation, defense
counsel objected as follows:
[The prosecutor:] So even if you didn’t see any marks or swelling, you’re relying on a patient report in that case?
[SANE:] Correct.
[The prosecutor:] Okay. So based on the symptoms [R.T.] reported and the injuries that you observed, would you say those are consistent with strangulation?
[SANE:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] Objection.
[The Court:] The basis?
[Defense counsel:] Improper opinion for this witness. It also comments on the credibility [of R.T.].
[The court:] Overruled
[The prosecutor:] So that was a “yes”?
20 [SANE:] Yes.
2. Preservation
¶ 38 Based on defense counsel’s objection noted above, Germanson
contends that he preserved his argument regarding the scope of the
SANE’s expertise and that her testimony improperly commented on
R.T.’s credibility. The People disagree because Germanson’s
contentions rely on his assertion that the court erred by failing to
make specific findings under Shreck — an issue that Germanson
did not raise in his trial objection.
3. Analysis
a. Scope of the SANE’s Testimony
¶ 39 We conclude that Germanson preserved his argument that the
SANE’s testimony was outside the scope of her expertise. Before
trial, Germanson objected to the SANE’s endorsement as an expert
regarding strangulation and cited Shreck. And at trial, defense
counsel contemporaneously objected to the SANE’s testimony
regarding strangulation. Thus, we employ a harmless error
standard of review. Hagos, ¶ 12.
¶ 40 Germanson contends that the court erred by not subjecting
the SANE’s testimony regarding strangulation to a Shreck analysis
21 when he objected to the testimony at trial. But his argument fails
to acknowledge that the court conducted a Shreck analysis at the
pretrial hearing. Also, his contention on appeal is contrary to
defense counsel’s concessions at the pretrial hearing. At the
pretrial hearing, defense counsel said,
I have no objection to [the SANE’s] qualifications. I have no objection to her testifying as to signs and symptoms of strangulation, what was observed when she conducted a strangulation examination in this case. She also has proffered expert testimony such as that because the mechanism of strangulation is preventing blood or airflow as opposed to blunt force trauma, bruising may not occur. I have no objection to that type of testimony.
¶ 41 The record supports a finding that, as CRE 702 requires, the
SANE had the necessary knowledge, experience, training, and
education to form an opinion on and testify regarding strangulation.
And the court conducted a Shreck analysis at the pretrial hearing
when Germanson initially objected to the SANE’s expertise
regarding strangulation. The court noted that the prosecution
alleged that Germanson had strangled R.T. and, assuming the
SANE had sufficient knowledge or experience and training, she
could testify regarding R.T.’s strangulation as long as the
22 prosecution laid an appropriate foundation and the relevance of the
testimony was not outweighed by prejudice under CRE 403.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion
by permitting the SANE to testify as an expert regarding
strangulation.
b. Commenting on R.T.’s Credibility
¶ 42 Defense counsel objected at trial to the SANE’s testimony
about strangulation because it “comment[ed] on the credibility [of
R.T.].”
¶ 43 “Neither a lay witness nor an expert witness may give opinion
testimony with respect to whether a witness is telling the truth on a
specific occasion.” People v. Lafferty, 9 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Colo. App.
1999). “However, under CRE 702, an expert may testify concerning
whether the victim’s behavior or demeanor is consistent with that of
typical victims of abuse.” People v. Jenkins, 83 P.3d 1122, 1127
(Colo. App. 2003). And “an expert witness may base an opinion on
facts or data perceived by or made known to him or her at or before
the hearing.” Id. (citing CRE 703).
¶ 44 Again, Germanson’s contention on appeal is contrary to
defense counsel’s pretrial hearing statement that “[the SANE] can
23 testify as to the injuries that were present or not present and
possible reasons why those injuries were present or not present in
this case.”
¶ 45 The SANE testified about her examination of R.T., which
included a physical exam that revealed R.T. had a bruise on the left
side of her jaw and swelling of her jaw. The SANE also observed
redness in the middle area of R.T.’s neck and a small bruise on
R.T.’s left upper chest. In addition, she also testified about R.T.’s
self-reported information regarding strangulation, such as
coughing, hoarseness in her voice, and tenderness in her jaw. And
the SANE testified that a patient’s self-reported symptoms help
guide the provider’s medical treatment and exam.
¶ 46 At the conclusion of the SANE’s testimony about her
examination of R.T., the prosecution asked, “So based on the
symptoms [R.T.] reported and the injuries that you observed, would
you say those are consistent with strangulation?” Defense counsel
objected that the testimony was an “[i]mproper opinion for [the
SANE]. It also comments on the credibility.”
¶ 47 We have concluded that the court did not err by qualifying the
SANE as an expert in sexual assault forensic examinations,
24 including strangulation. Because the SANE’s expertise included
strangulation, she could properly opine based on the facts or data
in this case that she used to guide her medical treatment and exam,
including her physical examination of R.T. and R.T.’s self-reported
symptoms. See CRE 703 (“The facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.
If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or
inference to be admitted.”); see also Jenkins, 83 P.3d at 1127.
¶ 48 We conclude that the SANE did not comment on R.T.’s
credibility when testifying that R.T.’s reported symptoms and the
injuries that the SANE observed were consistent with strangulation.
Instead, the SANE stated an opinion or inference based on the facts
or data in the case that she perceived or that were made known to
her at or before the trial.
V. Cumulative Error
¶ 49 Finally, Germanson argues that reversal is warranted under
the cumulative error doctrine. To reverse based on cumulative
25 error, we “must identify multiple errors that collectively prejudice
the substantial rights of the defendant, even if any single error does
not.” Howard‑Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25. We need not
conduct a cumulative error analysis because we have concluded
that the district court did not err. See People v. Conyac, 2014 COA
8M, ¶ 152 (“The doctrine of cumulative error requires that
numerous errors be committed, not merely alleged.”).
VI. Disposition
¶ 50 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.