24CA1474 Peo v French 05-28-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1474 City and County of Denver District Court No. 22CR5246 Honorable Eric M. Johnson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jazmine N. French,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 28, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Robert P. Borquez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jazmine N. French, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of second
degree assault. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts.
¶3 In September 2022, French rear-ended the victim, Cecelia
Soria, while traffic was at a standstill. After feeling her car get
bumped, Soria started recording a video on her cell phone. Soria
walked from her car to the back of French’s car, recording French’s
face, car, and license plate. After seeing this, French got out of her
car and knocked Soria’s phone out of her hand. Soria then pushed
French, prompting French to punch her in the face. As French
described at trial, the two then engaged in a “big old brawl.” A
short time later, French’s passenger, her daughter, also began
fighting with Soria.
¶4 The prosecution charged French with second degree assault
and first degree contributing to the delinquency of a minor. A jury
found French guilty of second degree assault but acquitted her of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The district court
sentenced French to three years of probation with the condition
1 that she enroll in anger management and conflict resolution
classes.
¶5 French now appeals.
II. Heat of Passion Jury Instruction
¶6 French contends that the district court erred by not
instructing the jury on heat of passion, a mitigating factor for
second degree assault. She asserts that Soria’s push and her
video-recording the encounter constituted highly provoking acts
that supported French’s requested instruction. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 Second degree assault is a class 4 felony. § 18-3-203(2)(b),
C.R.S. 2025. But if the defendant commits the assault in a sudden
heat of passion, the charge is reduced to a class 6 felony.
§ 18-3-203(2)(a).
¶8 To receive a heat of passion instruction, the defendant must
provide evidence that (1) the assault was performed upon a sudden
heat of passion; (2) the assault was caused by a serious and highly
provoking act of the intended victim; (3) the provoking act was
sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person;
and (4) between the provocation and the assault, an insufficient
2 amount of time passed for the voice of reason and humanity to be
heard. Id.; see People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶ 22 (citing Cassels
v. People, 92 P.3d 951, 956 (Colo. 2004)). The evidence must
“establish that an objectively reasonable person would have
similarly suffered an irresistible passion.” People v. Dooley, 944
P.2d 590, 594 (Colo. App. 1997).
¶9 The defendant must present “some credible evidence” in
support of each element to receive the instruction. People v.
Oslund, 2012 COA 62, ¶¶ 15-16 (quoting O’Shaughnessy v. People,
2012 CO 9, ¶ 11). We review de novo whether sufficient evidence
supported a requested jury instruction. O’Shaughnessy, ¶ 13.
B. Analysis
¶ 10 For two reasons, we perceive no error in the district court’s
denial of French’s requested heat of passion instruction.
¶ 11 First, Soria’s push wasn’t a serious and highly provoking act
sufficient to satisfy the second required element. See People v.
Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 94 (Colo. 2002) (the victim’s refusal of the
defendant’s marriage proposal, request that the defendant leave,
and subsequent push weren’t highly provoking acts); People v.
Holloway, 973 P.2d 721, 724 (Colo. App. 1998) (a push causing the
3 defendant’s girlfriend to fall over on a couch wasn’t a highly
provoking act). Indeed, by the time Soria pushed French, French
had already instigated physical contact by knocking Soria’s phone
out of her hand. Given this, French can’t claim that Soria’s
subsequent push provoked her. Cf. People v. Valdez, 183 P.3d 720,
723 (Colo. App. 2008) (heat of passion defense inapplicable when
the “defendant intentionally put himself in the provoking
situation”).
¶ 12 Second, we disagree with French that Soria video-recording
the incident constituted a serious and highly provoking act.
Cassels, relied on by the district court when rejecting French’s
requested instruction, is instructive. 92 P.3d at 957. There, the
supreme court concluded that the victim’s acts were highly
provoking when he followed the defendant around the apartment
acting like a “wild man,” shoved and “threaten[ed] to beat [the
defendant] severely enough to require hospitalization,” “positioned
himself in front of the only exit . . . next to an iron bar that he
previously said would make a good weapon,” and insulted the
defendant repeatedly. Id. The defendant, wearing only a towel, was
in a “highly vulnerable position.” Id.
4 ¶ 13 In contrast to the defendant in Cassels, French had no reason
to believe Soria had a weapon or intended to hurt her. Moreover,
Soria didn’t threaten French or act in a wild manner. And French
wasn’t in a highly vulnerable position. While Soria approaching
and recording French may have been unwelcome, that doesn’t
transform her behavior into a highly provoking act that will support
a heat of passion instruction. See People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d
1002, 1005, 1007 (Colo. 2003) (victim’s “decision to appear where
he allegedly knew he was unwelcome” wasn’t a highly provoking
act).
¶ 14 Even if we assumed that video-recording a person after a car
accident could constitute a highly provoking act, we conclude on
this record that it still wasn’t sufficient to excite an irresistible
passion in an objectively reasonable person. See Tardif, ¶ 22.
Absent other circumstances not present here, an objectively
reasonable person wouldn’t engage in a physical fight merely
because the victim recorded them after a fender bender. See
Sepulveda, 65 P.3d at 1007 (concluding as a matter of law that a
victim’s unwelcome presence, without more, wouldn’t excite the
passion of a reasonable person); see also Holloway, 973 P.2d at 724
5 (testimony that the defendant and victim were “arguing like they
were about to fight” didn’t establish provocation sufficient to excite
an irresistible passion in a reasonable person).
¶ 15 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the district court’s
decision rejecting French’s requested heat of passion instruction.
III. Limits on Cross-Examination
¶ 16 French contends that the district court erred by limiting her
cross-examination of Soria in violation of CRE 611(b), the
Confrontation Clause, and the party presentation principle. We
aren’t persuaded.
A. Additional Background
¶ 17 At trial, the prosecution admitted a bystander’s video of the
altercation. During Soria’s testimony, the prosecution played
segments of the video and questioned her about her actions and
observations during the fight. Defense counsel cross-examined
Soria about the video — specifically, about the movements of
French’s daughter during the altercation. During this questioning,
the following exchange occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And then [French’s daughter] moves from the passenger side of
6 [French’s] car to the driver’s — to the driver’s side. Right?
[SORIA]: I don’t know.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to approach you with that video, People’s Exhibit 1, and without any audio I’m just going to show you a brief clip on my computer.
THE COURT: I’m sorry. You’re republishing?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. I’m just showing Ms. Soria.
THE COURT: Counsel, what is it you think you’re doing? She didn’t say she doesn’t remember, so you’re not refreshing recollection. She says she doesn’t know, so she’s unaware exactly what happened.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She said she did not remember, Your Honor.
THE COURT: She said, “I don’t know.” And the exhibit speaks for itself.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, Your Honor, Ms. French has a right to cross-examine —
THE COURT: Counsel approach.
(Discussion at the bench.)
THE COURT: Counsel, you’re not going to be able to get into this. The reason she doesn’t remember is because she’s gotten punched and she’s in the middle of a fight. She did not see this part. She said, “I don’t know.” You’re not refreshing recollection. You’re not impeaching. You’re having her comment on an
7 exhibit which speaks for itself. The jury can see it.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, she — on direct examination she had the opportunity to go through this exhibit piece by piece with the district attorney, and Ms. French should have the opportunity to then cross-examine her piece by piece about this exhibit that she was questioned about on direct.
THE COURT: She said she didn’t know. Move on.
After a recess, defense counsel questioned Soria about screenshots
from the video, showing the movements of French’s daughter during
the altercation.
B. CRE 611(b)
¶ 18 French contends that the district court erred by limiting
cross-examination, in violation of CRE 611(b), because the
prosecution questioned Soria about the video during her direct
examination.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 19 CRE 611(b) limits cross-examination to the “subject matter of
the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the
witness.” But the rule must “be liberally construed to permit
cross-examination on any matter germane to the direct
8 examination, qualifying or destroying it, or tending to elucidate,
modify, explain, contradict, or rebut testimony given by the
witness.” People v. Sallis, 857 P.2d 572, 574 (Colo. App. 1993).
¶ 20 Nevertheless, a trial court has broad discretion to limit
cross-examination based on concerns about prejudice, confusion of
the issues, repetitiveness, and relevance. People v. Conyac, 2014
COA 8M, ¶ 97. Unless the court’s restriction is so severe as to
constitute a denial of the right to cross-examine the witness, the
extent to which cross-examination should be allowed falls within
the court’s discretion. Id.
¶ 21 We review a trial court’s limits on cross-examination for an
abuse of that discretion. Id. at ¶ 91.
2. Analysis
¶ 22 We perceive no abuse of discretion under CRE 611(b) in the
district court’s limitation on French’s cross-examination of Soria.
The court restricted inquiry on only one topic — the location of
French’s daughter during the altercation. That narrow restriction
fell within the district court’s broad discretion. When Soria didn’t
know the answer to defense counsel’s question, there was nothing
9 for defense counsel to impeach or refresh through the bystander’s
video recording.
¶ 23 Moreover, defense counsel did elicit testimony from Soria
about the location of French’s daughter while introducing
screenshots of the video. Thus, the court’s limit on
cross-examination wasn’t so severe as to constitute a denial of
French’s right to cross-examine Soria. See Conyac, ¶ 97.
C. Confrontation Clause
¶ 24 French contends that the district court’s limitation on her
cross-examination of Soria violated her constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against her.
¶ 25 The Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Colorado
Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Colo.
Const. art. II, § 16; People v. Campos, 2015 COA 47, ¶ 27. A court
may not “limit excessively a defendant’s cross-examination of a
witness regarding the witness’ credibility, especially
cross-examination concerning the witness’ bias, prejudice, or
10 motive for testifying.” Campos, ¶ 27 (quoting Merritt v. People, 842
P.2d 162, 167 (Colo. 1992)).
¶ 26 “The question in determining whether a restriction on
cross-examination runs afoul of the constitutional right of
confrontation is whether a ‘reasonable jury might have received a
significantly different impression of a witness’s credibility had the
court not erroneously excluded otherwise appropriate evidence.’”
People v. Dunham, 2016 COA 73, ¶ 40 (quoting Krutsinger v. People,
219 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2009)).
¶ 27 We review de novo whether a trial court violated a defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights. People v. Carter, 2015 COA 24M-2,
¶ 28. But because French didn’t raise the constitutional right to
confront witnesses as a basis for allowing her requested
cross-examination, our review is limited to plain error. See People
v. Jaeb, 2018 COA 179, ¶¶ 8-9 (evidentiary objection insufficient to
preserve Confrontation Clause claim); Campos, ¶ 29 (defining plain
error).
¶ 28 We discern no error under the federal or state Confrontation
Clauses, plain or otherwise, in the district court’s narrow limitation
11 on French’s cross-examination of Soria. The court didn’t prevent
French from asking Soria about her perceptions of the movements
of French’s daughter. Soria answered the question by saying she
didn’t know, prompting the court to direct French to “[m]ove on.”
¶ 29 But even if the court had prevented French’s questions, its
restriction didn’t relate to Soria’s credibility, bias, prejudice, or
motive for testifying. See Carter, ¶ 36 (rejecting Confrontation
Clause challenge, in part, because the defense’s requested
cross-examination “had little, if any, bearing on [the witness]’s bias,
motives, or credibility as a witness”); Campos, ¶ 38 (concluding that
the court’s limit on cross-examination didn’t violate the
Confrontation Clause where the excluded questions didn’t relate to
the witness’s “bias, prejudice, or motive for testifying”). To the
contrary, defense counsel was still able to effectively cross-examine
Soria on topics bearing on her credibility, including the lack of
damage to her car and her incomplete communications with the
prosecution and law enforcement.
¶ 30 Accordingly, the court’s limit on French’s cross-examination of
Soria didn’t prevent the defense from eliciting testimony that would
12 have given the jury a “significantly different impression” of Soria’s
credibility. Dunham, ¶ 40 (quoting Krutsinger, 219 P.3d at 1061).
D. Party Presentation Principle
¶ 31 French contends that the district court erred by sua sponte
limiting her cross-examination of Soria, violating the party
presentation principle.
¶ 32 The party presentation principle requires a court to rely “on
the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts
the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.” Galvan v. People,
2020 CO 82, ¶ 45. The principle is “supple, not ironclad.” People v.
Lulei, 2026 CO 17, ¶ 30 (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith,
590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020)). “There are no doubt circumstances in
which a modest initiating role for a court is appropriate.”
Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at 376.
¶ 33 Under CRE 611(a), the trial court must “exercise reasonable
control” over the interrogation of witnesses to “(1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect
witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”
13 ¶ 34 We review a trial court’s alleged deviation from the party
presentation principle for an abuse of discretion. Sineneng-Smith,
590 U.S. at 375. Because French didn’t raise the party
presentation principle before the district court, our review is again
limited to plain error. See Campos, ¶ 29.
¶ 35 We perceive no error under the party presentation principle,
let alone plain error, in the district court’s limitation on French’s
cross-examination of Soria. As with French’s CRE 611(b)
argument, Soria’s answer of “I don’t know” when asked about the
movements of French’s daughter meant that there was nothing for
defense counsel to impeach or refresh through the bystander’s
video recording. When defense counsel nonetheless persisted with
the same line of questioning, the court acted within its broad
discretion under CRE 611(a) by instructing counsel to move on to a
different topic. See People v. Hendrickson, 45 P.3d 786, 788 (Colo.
App. 2001) (a trial court “must exercise its discretion to preclude
inquiries that have no probative value, are irrelevant, or are
prejudicial”).
14 ¶ 36 French doesn’t point us to any authority suggesting that the
party presentation principle overrode the court’s responsibility
under CRE 611(a) to exercise reasonable control over the
presentation of evidence. And since the party presentation principle
isn’t “ironclad,” Lulei, ¶ 30 (quoting Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at
376), we decline to apply it in a manner that would inhibit the court
from exercising its considerable discretion to secure the effective
interrogation of witnesses and avoid the needless consumption of
time. See CRE 611(a); cf. Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26 (the
party presentation principle doesn’t “prevent a court from properly
characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a
party”).
¶ 37 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err under the party
presentation principle by limiting French’s cross-examination of
Soria.
IV. Authentication
¶ 38 French contends that the district court erred by admitting a
video of the altercation that wasn’t properly authenticated. We
disagree.
15 A. Additional Background
¶ 39 Before trial, French moved in limine to exclude a video of the
altercation that the prosecution planned to introduce through a
bystander, N.H. French argued that N.H. couldn’t authenticate the
video because he witnessed the altercation from a different angle
than the person who recorded the video. Although French
stipulated to the video being introduced through another witness,
she didn’t want the prosecution to introduce the video through N.H.
The district court denied French’s motion.
¶ 40 At trial, N.H. testified that he was driving in the opposite
direction as Soria and French when he witnessed their altercation.
N.H. explained that he witnessed “all” of the interaction, except “the
initial contact between the two cars.” After the altercation ended
and French drove away, N.H. pulled his car over to the side of the
road and ran over to see if Soria needed medical attention. Another
witness who stayed on scene, a truck driver, had recorded the
incident. N.H. asked the truck driver for a copy of the video. The
prosecution moved to admit the video into evidence during N.H.’s
testimony.
16 ¶ 41 After voir dire, defense counsel reraised her pretrial objection
to N.H.’s authentication of the video. The court overruled the
objection and admitted the video. The prosecution played the video
but didn’t question N.H. about it.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 42 The proponent of physical evidence must authenticate the
evidence to admit it at trial. See CRE 901(a). Authentication
requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.” Id. The burden of
authentication is “minimal — all that’s required is a prima facie
showing that the evidence is what its proponent claims.” Gonzales
v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 42. Evidence is admissible under
CRE 901(a) if “the proponent has offered a satisfactory foundation
from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is
authentic.” Gonzales, ¶ 27 (quoting People v. Glover, 2015 COA 16,
¶ 13). Once the proponent meets this prima facie burden,
authenticity is a question for the jury. Id. at ¶ 6; see People v.
Brown, 313 P.3d 608, 614 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Any question as to
the authenticity of evidence is properly decided by the jury.”).
17 ¶ 43 CRE 901 doesn’t prescribe an exclusive method for
authenticating evidence. Gonzales, ¶ 30. Rather, it contemplates a
“flexible, fact-specific inquiry,” id. at ¶ 5, and “vests trial courts with
broad discretion to consider a variety of foundational circumstances
depending on the nature of the proffered evidence,” id. at ¶ 30. “To
authenticate a video recording, the proponent needs to establish
that the recording is an accurate reproduction of a scene with
which the witness is familiar.” People in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA
163, ¶ 51, overruled in part on other grounds by, People in Interest of
E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42.
¶ 44 We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence
for an abuse of discretion. Gonzales, ¶ 25. “A trial court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. People, 2019 CO 66, ¶ 21).
C. Analysis
¶ 45 The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in overruling
French’s objection to N.H.’s authentication of the video. N.H.’s
testimony that the recording accurately captured the scene he
witnessed was sufficient foundation for the court to admit the
recording into evidence. See M.V., ¶ 51.
18 ¶ 46 French’s argument that N.H. couldn’t authenticate the video
because he viewed the altercation from a different angle doesn’t
convince us otherwise. After the prosecution met its prima facie
burden, any question about the video’s authenticity — either
because N.H. observed the altercation from a different angle than
the truck driver who recorded it, or for any other reason — became
an issue for the jury to decide. See Brown, 313 P.3d at 614; see
also People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 16 (once a proponent of
evidence meets its prima facie burden, questions about authenticity
“go to the weight of evidence and not its admissibility”). In addition,
defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined N.H. regarding his
viewing angle, inconsistencies in his recollection, and the
differences between his version of events and what the video
depicted.
¶ 47 Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s admission of the video.
V. Cumulative Error
¶ 48 French contends that, even if none of her contentions of error
individually warrants reversal, their cumulative effect does. To
warrant reversal under the cumulative error doctrine, a reviewing
19 court must identify multiple errors that collectively prejudiced the
defendant’s substantial rights. Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO
69, ¶ 25. Because we haven’t identified any errors, the cumulative
error doctrine isn’t implicated. People v. Jones, 2025 COA 43, ¶ 56
(cert. granted Jan. 20, 2026).
VI. Disposition
¶ 49 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.