Peo v. Esparza

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 11, 2024
• Docket: 22CA2050
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

22CA2050 Peo v Esparza 07-11-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA2050

Arapahoe County District Court No. 04CR1256

Honorable Joseph Whitfield, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Gabriel Esparza,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*

Harris and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced July 11, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Alejandro Sorg, Assistant Attorney General,

Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Gabriel Esparza, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.

1

¶ 1 Defendant, Gabriel Esparza, appeals the district court’s order

denying his motion for return of seized property. We reverse the

order and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶ 2 In 2005, a jury convicted Esparza of murder in the first

degree, aggravated motor vehicle theft in the first degree, and

violation of a protection order. The district court sentenced him to

life without parole in the custody of the Department of Corrections

(DOC) consecutive to twelve-year and one-year DOC sentences.

Esparza appealed his judgment of conviction and a division of this

court affirmed. See People v. Esparza, (Colo. App. No. 05CA1952,

Apr. 30, 2009) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).

¶ 3 In 2014, Esparza filed a motion for return of certain property

seized. This ultimately culminated in an appeal to a division of this

court, which reversed and remanded with directions for the district

court to determine if there was any pending litigation and if not, to

make detailed factual findings concerning whether the prosecution

had a continuing need to retain each of the seized items. See

People v. Esparza, (Colo. App. No. 16CA1985, Oct. 26, 2017) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

2

¶ 4 On remand, Esparza filed a motion requesting the return of

the following seized property: (1) $9,300.00 in cash; (2) Baptismal

Catholic records and certificates; (3) Catechism Catholic records

and certificates; and (4) assorted family photos. The prosecution

did not respond to Esparza’s motion, and the district court issued

an order concluding that the prosecution’s silence indicated it no

longer needed the requested property and ordered that the items be

returned to Esparza’s representative. It appears that at least some

of that property was returned to Esparza.

¶ 5 However, as part of his effort to retrieve the listed items,

Esparza learned that the police department had seized and kept

other property. Esparza then filed a motion requesting an itemized

list of the property that was seized. After receiving the list, Esparza

filed a new motion requesting return of the following property:

• $160.15 in cash;

• the victim’s diary;

• a beige filing cabinet and its contents;

• records from an upstairs office/den;

• a Gateway computer;

• computer discs and papers from an upstairs office/den;

3

• a brown leather day planner;

• a large book, a checkbook, and receipts from an upstairs

office/den;

• a checkbook, cards, and print-outs from a cardboard box in

the office;

• a two-drawer metal file cabinet and its contents;

• computer discs;

• two rolls of film;

• all family photos;

• the contents of a gray safe;

• resume references and business cards from a master

bedroom;

• car rental paperwork; and

• all financial, marital, and legal paperwork.

¶ 6 The prosecution objected to releasing the property, primarily

on the ground that there is no time limit to challenge a conviction

for a class 1 felony under section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2023. In

reply, Esparza acknowledged the lack of a time limit but argued

that any appeal would be successive and subject to laches unless

4

there was new evidence of his innocence. Esparza also argued that

the prosecution’s failure to respond to his previous motion for

return of property should bar its objection to this new motion.

Esparza further argued that the property at issue was not used as

evidence in his trial and that the prosecution previously agreed to

release the victim’s diary to him.

¶ 7 The district court denied Esparza’s motion for return of the

seized property based on “the posture of this case, the potential for

further litigation, and the lack of a waiver . . . by [Esparza] to said

further litigation.” This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

¶ 8 Esparza contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion for return of the seized property. We agree that Esparza is

entitled to the return of his cash, but we must remand the case to

the district court for detailed findings with respect to the remaining

items.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 9 We review a district court’s interpretation of legal questions

regarding return of seized property de novo and defer to its factual

determinations of ownership unless clearly erroneous. See United

5

States v. Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1996); see also People v.

Fordyce, 705 P.2d 8, 9 (Colo. App. 1985) (credibility determinations

are within the purview of the trial court and are binding on

reviewing courts).

¶ 10 We liberally construe pro se pleadings so that litigants are not

denied review of important issues based on their inability to

articulate arguments like a lawyer. Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61,

¶ 5.

B. The Record Does Not Support a Need to Retain All of the

Seized Property

¶ 11 Esparza contends that the district court erred by denying the

return of the seized property because (1) the seized property was

not evidence at his trial; (2) a requirement that, to obtain the

property, he waive his right to seek further postconviction review

violates his due process rights; and (3) the prosecution could retain

the property only if it initiated forfeiture proceedings.

1. The Prosecution Has Not Met its Burden to Show a Right to

Retain All of the Seized Property

¶ 12 Esparza contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion and adopting the prosecution’s argument that it had a

continuing need for the seized property. This error is clear with

6

respect to the $160.15 in cash. No reason was advanced for the

court to refuse to return this cash.

¶ 13 “It is fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice

system that seized property against which the government has no

claim must be returned to its lawful owner.” People v. Buggs, 631

P.2d 1200, 1201 (Colo. App. 1981). A defendant must make a

prima facie showing that (1) he owned or otherwise is entitled to

possess the requested property and (2) law enforcement seized the

requested property as part of their case. Woo v. El Paso Cnty.

Sheriff’s Off., 2022 CO 56, ¶ 45. A prima facie showing may be

established through “[a] verified motion asserting that law

enforcement took the requested property from the defendant at the

time of his arrest,” “proof that law enforcement seized the requested

property from the defendant,” or “the mandatory receipt

documenting the property taken.” Id. If a defendant makes the

prima facie showing, then the prosecution has the burden to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the

defendant is not the owner of the requested property or entitled to

possess it; (2) the prosecution may need the requested property

later, including during postconviction proceedings; or (3) based on

7

any relevant factors, including the type of case and nature of the

requested property, it would be inappropriate to grant the motion.

Id. at ¶ 46; see also Fordyce, 705 P.2d at 9.

¶ 14 Here, it appears undisputed that the police collected the seized

property at issue in connection with search warrants for Esparza’s

case. Thus, a prima facie showing has been established that the

property seized belonged to the defendant. See Woo, ¶ 45.

However, we conclude the prosecution has not met its burden to

show by a preponderance of the evidence that Esparza does not

own the property, the seized property could be required for further

postconviction proceedings, or there is some other reason the court

should not return the property. See id. at ¶ 46.

¶ 15 Under section 16-5-402(1), any person convicted of a class 1

felony may collaterally attack their conviction at any time, which

includes motions under Crim. P. 35. See People v. Robinson, 833

P.2d 832, 837 (Colo. App. 1992). We acknowledge that Esparza

previously filed a direct appeal and a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, the

denials of which were affirmed by divisions of this court. See

Esparza, No. 05CA1952; People v. Esparza, (Colo. App. 10CA0540,

Jan. 19, 2012) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). However,

8

Esparza could still file a Crim. P. 35 motion based on an exception

to the rule’s procedural bars or raise a Crim. P. 35(a) challenge.

1

¶ 16 On appeal, the People argue that handwritten letters found in

the safe and the victim’s emails to her coworkers might have

evidentiary value at a second trial. They also contend that there

“was a real dispute as to who owned” some of the seized items, and

that it would be improper “to release the victim’s diary to her

murderer.” But they say nothing about the remaining property.

Regardless, the district court did not make any specific findings,

even with respect to the letters, the emails, and the diary.

¶ 17 As a result, we cannot determine whether the prosecution is

entitled to retain the property, except with respect to the cash

recovered from Esparza at the time of his arrest. There does not

appear to be any dispute that the cash belongs to Esparza, has no

evidentiary value, and should not otherwise be retained by the

government.

1

Esparza argued below that any postconviction challenge would be

barred by the doctrine of laches, but he does not cite any case law,

and we are not aware of any law, that laches could apply to bar a

Crim. P. 35(a) claim. Cf. Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 390

(Colo. 2005) (concluding that laches bars Crim. P. 35(c) motions).

9

¶ 18 But as for the remaining property at issue, the district court

must hold further proceedings, if necessary, and make detailed

factual findings concerning whether the prosecution has met its

burden to show its right to retain those items. We therefore

conclude that the district court erred by denying Esparza’s motion

without further inquiry into the prosecution’s reasons for retaining

these items.

2. Esparza’s Remaining Arguments

¶ 19 Esparza contends that requiring him to waive further

postconviction proceedings in return for release of the seized

property violates his due process rights and that the prosecution

could not retain the property unless it initiated forfeiture

proceedings. In light of our disposition, we need not address these

arguments.

III. Disposition

¶ 20 We reverse the district court’s order and direct the district

court to order the return of Esparza’s $160.15 in cash. We

otherwise remand the case for further proceedings to consider what

additional property, if any, should be returned to Esparza.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE LUM concur.