Peo v. Elvira

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 17, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0981
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0981 Peo v Elvira 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0981 Douglas County District Court No. 22CR813 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Juan Lucio Elvira,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Harris and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jenna Baker, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Eric A. Samler, Alternate Defense Counsel, Hollis A. Whitson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Juan Lucio Elvira, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with

intent to distribute fentanyl.1 We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Police saw Elvira enter a car that had been reported stolen.

When officers attempted to block him in, Elvira rammed one of the

patrol cars. He then attempted to flee on foot before he was

arrested. As relevant to this appeal, police found 1,442 fentanyl

pills (worth approximately $30,000) and 54.07 grams of

methamphetamine in an unzipped backpack on the front passenger

seat.

¶3 The prosecution charged Elvira with two counts of possession

with intent to distribute a controlled substance (one count for

fentanyl and one for methamphetamine) and multiple other charges

not relevant to this appeal. A jury convicted him of both possession

counts. Elvira appeals, arguing the prosecution presented

1 Elvira was also convicted of, and pled guilty to, other offenses. He does not appeal those convictions.

1 insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed the drugs in the

backpack. We affirm.

II. Applicable Law

¶4 A person commits the crime of possession of a controlled

substance if he knowingly possesses a controlled substance. § 18-

18-403.5, C.R.S. 2024.

¶5 In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty

verdict, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact might

accept the evidence, taken as a whole and in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, as sufficient to support a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Alemayehu, 2021 COA

69, ¶ 17. We consider all relevant evidence, both direct and

circumstantial. People v. Yeadon, 2018 COA 104, ¶ 20, aff’d, 2020

CO 38. The prosecution must be given the benefit of every

inference that may fairly be drawn from the evidence. Alemayehu,

¶ 18. Where reasonable minds could differ, the evidence is

sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id.

¶6 A conviction for possession of a controlled substance may be,

and often must be, predicated upon circumstantial evidence.

People v. Robinson, 226 P.3d 1145, 1154 (Colo. App. 2009); see also

2 Alemayehu, ¶ 18 (an actor’s state of mind is normally not subject to

direct proof and must be inferred from his actions and the

surrounding circumstances). The jury may infer knowing

possession from a defendant’s exclusive possession of the place

where drugs are found. Alemayehu, ¶ 19. When that place is a car,

knowledge can be inferred from the fact that the defendant is the

driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Id. If there is no exclusive

possession, the jury can still infer knowing possession if there are

other circumstances tending to buttress the inference of knowing

possession. Robinson, 226 P.3d at 1154.

¶7 We review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence before a jury was substantial and sufficient to sustain a

conviction. Yeadon, ¶ 20.

III. Discussion

¶8 Elvira argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his

knowledge or possession of the drugs found in the backpack

because he did not have exclusive possession of the car. He points

to the fact that two drink cups were found in the car’s cupholders,

and that bags of clothing — some of which appeared too small to fit

him — were found in the back seat. He also argues that the

3 prosecution failed to prove knowing possession because the drugs

were not in plain view and the backpack in which they were found

did not contain any of his personal effects. We are not persuaded

for two reasons.

¶9 First, the evidence suggested that Elvira was in exclusive

possession of the car. He was the driver and sole occupant of the

stolen car at the time of his arrest. Even if some evidence

suggested that other individuals may have had access to the car at

some point, this evidence was inconclusive. Elvira might have had

a passenger, consumed two soft drinks, or been transporting

clothes that did not belong to him for any number of reasons. See

People v. Moya, 899 P.2d 212, 218 (Colo. App. 1994) (evidence is

not rendered insufficient just because it is conflicting); People v.

Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 13 (“[T]he possibility someone else was in

the car earlier that day does not change the fact that [the

defendant] was in exclusive possession of the vehicle when it was

stopped and searched . . . .”).

¶ 10 Second, even if Elvira had not had exclusive possession of the

car, other circumstances buttress the inference that he knowingly

possessed the drugs found in the backpack. The backpack was

4 found on the front passenger seat, next to where Elvira was seated.

And based on photographs taken of the car’s interior after Elvira’s

arrest, the bag of blue fentanyl pills was visible, poking through the

open zipper. Police also found a matching blue fentanyl pill in

Elvira’s pocket, suggesting the pills found in the backpack were his.

The three guns found inside the car, including two on the front

floorboards, further suggest Elvira knew there was something of

value in the car. Finally, that the car was reported stolen and

Elvira was the only person seen entering it also supports the

inference that he possessed the drugs found inside.

¶ 11 Viewed together and in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude this evidence was substantial and

sufficient to support Elvira’s convictions beyond a reasonable

doubt.

IV. Disposition

¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE GROVE concur.