21CA1446 Peo v Eden 04-03-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 21CA1446 San Miguel County District Court No. 17CR30 Mesa County District Court No. 21CR192 Honorable Keri A. Yoder, Judge Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ika Eden,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE TOW Dunn and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 3, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Casey J. Mulligan, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Ika Eden, appeals the judgment of conviction
entered following jury verdicts finding her guilty of two counts of
child abuse resulting in death. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Evidence at trial demonstrated the following.
¶3 Eden was a member of a small religious group, which included
three other adults and two children.1 The two children were the
biological children of one of the other members. With the
permission of a local farmer, Eden and the group settled on the
farmer’s land. In 2017, the leader of the group determined that the
spirits of the two children were impure. The leader banished the
children to a car on the property and forbade the other members to
give the children food or water. The bodies of the children were
discovered after a neighbor contacted the police.
¶4 Eden was charged with two counts of child abuse resulting in
death.2 The jury found her guilty on both counts. The court
1 The group consisted of two additional children, who are the
biological children of the group’s leader and who have no bearing on this proceeding. 2 Other members of the group were also charged in the deaths of
the children and were tried separately.
1 sentenced Eden, on each count, to forty-eight years in the custody
of the Department of Corrections to be served consecutively.
II. Competency to Proceed to Trial
¶5 Eden argues that the trial court erred by determining that she
was competent to proceed to trial. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶6 “We review a trial court’s competency determination for an
abuse of discretion.” People v. Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936, 939 (Colo.
App. 2009). “A trial court abuses its discretion where its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or where it applies an
incorrect legal standard.” Id. (citation omitted). Abuse of discretion
is a deferential standard of review that “serves to discourage an
appellate court from second-guessing [a trial court’s decisions]
based on a cold record.” Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo.
1999). “To say that a court has discretion in resolving [an] issue
means that it has the power to choose between two or more courses
of action and is therefore not bound in all cases to select one over
the other.” People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Colo. 1987).
¶7 “Subjecting a defendant to trial when [they are] incompetent
violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Mondragon, 217 P.3d
2 at 939. A defendant is “[i]ncompetent to proceed” if, “as a result of
a mental disability . . . , the defendant does not have sufficient
present ability to consult with the defendant’s lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the
defense.” § 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2024. Alternatively, a defendant
is incompetent to proceed, when “as a result of a mental
disability . . . , the defendant does not have a rational and factual
understanding of the criminal proceedings.” Id. A mental disability
“means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, or
cognitive ability that results in marked functional disability,
significantly interfering with adaptive behavior.” § 16-8.5-101(15).
¶8 Once a defendant is deemed incompetent, “the party asserting
that the defendant is competent has the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.” § 16-8.5-113(6), C.R.S. 2024.
Upon the party’s timely request, the court must hold a restoration
hearing at which “the court shall determine whether the defendant
is restored to competency.” § 16-8.5-113(5)-(6). To make a proper
competency determination, the court must decide whether the
defendant has “both a factual understanding and cognitive ability
and perceptions and understandings that are rational and
3 grounded in reality.” Mondragon, 217 P.3d at 941. “Thus, a
defendant’s factual understanding of the proceedings[;] proper
orientation as to time, place, and person[;] and [their] ability to
furnish accurately information as to [their] past history and the
events at issue are not alone sufficient to establish the defendant’s
competence.” Id. at 940.
B. Additional Background
¶9 In March 2018, shortly after Eden’s arraignment, defense
counsel requested the trial court order Eden to undergo a
competency evaluation. Dr. Dawn Dawson conducted the
examination and found that Eden did “not have a mental disability”
and that she was, at that time, “competent to proceed to trial.”
After a hearing, without objection from either party, the trial court
found Eden competent to proceed.
¶ 10 A few months later, the prosecution requested another
competency evaluation based on writings discovered in Eden’s jail
cell. Those writings included assertions about her spirit, the spirits
of the children, and the spirits of the judge and lawyers involved in
her case. For example, Eden claimed that she was “the first of
[Yahweh’s] creation” and that she was “6,384,964 years old.” She
4 also wrote that the children placed in the car were “the two Headed
dragon,” that “in one of their reincarnation[s,] . . . had randomly
kidnapped eight (8) children for the sole pleasure of watching [them]
die of hunger and starvation” and that their death in the car was
“judgement [sic] that was meted out to their consciousness.”
¶ 11 The trial court granted the prosecution’s request and
Dr. Dawson again evaluated Eden. This time, Dr. Dawson found
that “Eden has a mental illness,” that “her writings are delusional,”
and that she portrayed a “grandiose tone that [indicates] a possible
mood disorder.” Dr. Dawson concluded that Eden was incompetent
to proceed to adjudication.
¶ 12 Eden was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute
in Pueblo (CMHIP)3 for restoration treatment, where she underwent
five competency evaluations with Dr. Katherine Reis over the course
of fourteen months. In each evaluation, Dr. Reis deemed Eden
incompetent to proceed and diagnosed her with “Rule/Out
Delusional Disorder,” which Dr. Reis explained meant she was
3 We recognize that, as of 2022, CMHIP underwent a name change
and is now known as the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (CMHHIP). We will refer to it by its name at the time of Eden’s inpatient stay.
5 unable to “rule in or out” whether Eden’s beliefs were in fact
delusional. Because Dr. Reis was no longer making progress with
Eden, she requested that a new psychologist take over the case.
¶ 13 Dr. Nicole Glover completed the next competency evaluation.
Her report noted that Eden’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Graham
Hoffman, “removed the diagnosis of delusional disorder”; that Eden
appeared to have a factual and rational understanding of the legal
proceedings against her; and that any decision to express her
religious convictions to the court were “more likely volitional choices
to convey her philosophies, as opposed to an inability to control her
behavior.” Dr. Glover concluded that Eden did not have a mental
disability and was competent to proceed to adjudication.
¶ 14 Defense counsel timely requested an additional competency
evaluation. Dr. Sarah Lukens conducted the final competency
evaluation. Dr. Lukens found that while Eden “has a reasonable
understanding of court processes and the allegations against her,
her delusional ideation interferes with her rational
decision-making.” Dr. Lukens further opined that “because of
[Eden’s] delusional disorder, she does not think rationally regarding
the present legal matter despite her adequate factual knowledge.”
6 Dr. Lukens concluded that Eden did have a mental disability and
was incompetent to proceed to adjudication.
¶ 15 The trial court scheduled a restoration hearing, and over the
course of two days, heard testimony from Dr. Glover, Dr. Lukens,
and Dr. Reis. The court also reviewed the competency reports
submitted by the testifying witnesses, as well as Eden’s CMHIP
records. Based on all this information, the trial court found “Dr.
Glover’s opinion [to be] the most reliable” and that it was consistent
with Dr. Hoffman’s opinion. The court concluded that Eden “does
not suffer from a diagnosable delusional disorder, but, rather, that
she holds extreme religious beliefs” and that Eden’s “persistence in
applying her beliefs to the facts in this case demonstrates her
unwillingness, rather than her inability, to hold a rational
understanding of the proceedings.” The court found Eden
competent to proceed to trial.
C. Analysis
¶ 16 Eden contends the trial court found her competent because
she did not have a diagnosable mental disorder. This argument
misconstrues the court’s findings. While the court referred to the
diagnostic criteria for “delusional disorder,” see Am. Psychiatric
7 Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 90 (5th
ed. 2013), it did so because “the only suggested mental disability
that [Eden] may suffer from is delusional disorder.”
See § 16-8.5-101(12).
¶ 17 According to the trial court, one of the challenges presented by
Eden’s case was “differentiating delusional disorder from radicalized
religious or political beliefs.” Dr. Reis maintained her “Rule/Out
Delusional Disorder” diagnosis because “Eden’s delusions could not
be disproven[, and] there was diagnostic uncertainty.” Under these
circumstances, the only possible mental disability Eden may have
had was a delusional disorder. But the testifying psychologists
differed as to whether Eden suffered from delusions.
¶ 18 It was, therefore, within the trial court’s province to weigh the
competing expert views. See People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665, 668
(Colo. 1982) (“Where expert testimony is in conflict, the resolution of
the conflict and the weight to be given to the testimony is solely the
province of the trier of fact.”). Having considered the competing
views, the trial court found that Eden’s views were “extreme
religious beliefs” rather than a “delusional disorder.” Accordingly,
the court concluded that Eden did not have a mental disorder and,
8 based on this conclusion and not the lack of any official diagnosis,
determined that she was competent to proceed.
¶ 19 Eden also argues that the trial court improperly based its
finding of competence on its visual observation of Eden’s behavior
in the courtroom. Relying on Lafferty v. Cook, Eden argues that
“the physical demeanor of a person suffering from a paranoid
delusional system sheds no light on the extent to which [their]
defense decisions are driven by a deluded perception of reality.”
949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th Cir. 1991). Specifically, she contends
that “the court’s visual observation of Eden’s behavior provided no
information about whether she had a reasonable degree of rational
understanding so that she could assist in her defense.”
¶ 20 We first note that the language Eden quotes from Lafferty is
not that of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but that of an expert
who had provided uncontroverted testimony in that case. While the
court ultimately accepted this premise in Lafferty, it did so while
“recogniz[ing] that a defendant’s trial demeanor may in some cases
constitute relevant evidence on the issue of competency.” Id.
¶ 21 Moreover, we are not bound by the decisions of federal courts
of appeal. People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 940 (Colo. 1990) (“Lower
9 federal courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts
and their decisions are not conclusive on state courts . . . .”). And
previous divisions of this court have held that a trial judge’s
observations of a defendant’s actions and demeanor may properly
influence a competency determination. See People v. Morino, 743
P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. App. 1987) (holding a trial judge who “has had
the opportunity [to] observ[e] [the] defendant, [their] actions,” and
their “general demeanor,” has discretion in determining whether
competency was successfully raised). Here, the trial court noted
that during in-person hearings, Eden “worked cooperatively with
[her counsel]” and “spoke with her counsel in a congenial way and
conferred with them during their questioning.” This, in
combination with the expert testimony that Eden knew what was
happening during these legal proceedings and understood her
charges, is sufficient to support a finding that she could consult
with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
and was competent to proceed. See § 16-8.5-101(12).
¶ 22 In any event, the issue in Lafferty was the relevance of the
behavior of “a person suffering from a paranoid delusional system.”
10 949 F.2d at 1555. As noted, the trial court determined that Eden
did not suffer from delusions. Thus, Lafferty is inapposite.
¶ 23 Finally, Eden contends that “[m]ost of the evidence at the
restoration hearing supported a finding of incompetence.” But as
we have noted, it was for the trial court to select between the
competing views of the experts. See Wright, 648 P.2d at 668. And
because the experts gave differing views regarding Eden’s
competence, the trial court had the discretion “to choose between
two or more courses of action.” Milton, 732 P.2d at 1207. Thus, it
was within the court’s discretion to credit Dr. Glover’s conclusion
and find Eden competent to proceed.
III. Competency to Waive Counsel
¶ 24 Eden argues that the trial court erred by finding her
competent to waive her right to counsel. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 25 Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to represent
themselves. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II,
§ 16. “A defendant must validly waive [their] constitutional right to
counsel to exercise the right to self-representation.” People v.
Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 15. “[A] defendant validly waives the[ir]
11 right to counsel if [they] (1) [are] competent to waive the right, and
(2) make[] the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id.
¶ 26 Under the first prong, a defendant who is competent to
proceed to trial is competent to waive their right to counsel. Id. at
¶ 16.
¶ 27 As to the second prong, “[a] ‘voluntary’ waiver . . . is one that
‘was not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue
influence.’” Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115,
1118 (Colo. 1986)). A waiver is knowing and intelligent when “the
defendant understands ‘the nature of the charges, the statutory
offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments
thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in
mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad
understanding of the whole matter.’” People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d
87, 94 (Colo. 1989) (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724
(1948) (plurality opinion)).
¶ 28 “The trial court has the responsibility of ensuring the validity
of a waiver by properly advising the accused.” Id. at 95. The court
must consider a defendant’s decision to waive counsel based on the
totality of the circumstances. Davis, ¶¶ 18-20. This includes
12 considering evidence of a defendant’s mental illness and whether it
has influenced their decision to waive counsel in such a manner
that said waiver is not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. Id.
¶ 29 “Whether a defendant effectively waived the right to counsel,
and therefore can exercise the right to self-representation, is a
mixed question of fact and law.” People v. Lavadie, 2021 CO 42,
¶ 22. “[W]e ‘accept the trial court’s findings of historic fact if those
findings are supported by competent evidence, but we assess the
legal significance of the facts de novo.’” Id. (quoting People v. Coke,
2020 CO 28, ¶ 10).
¶ 30 In June 2018, a few weeks after the court found Eden
competent to proceed following Dr. Dawson’s first evaluation,
Eden’s counsel moved to continue her trial beyond the speedy trial
date because counsel had not yet retained a rebuttal expert.
Though Eden initially refused to waive her right to speedy trial, she
ultimately agreed to do so, and the court granted the motion.
¶ 31 The following day, Eden submitted a written request asking
that she be allowed to represent herself. Eden indicated that she
wished to participate in the proceedings pro se because she did not
13 believe it was necessary to wait for an expert witness in order “to
prove [that she] is not guilty of the charges stipulated.” Upon
completion of an Arguello advisement, the court found Eden
competent to waive her constitutional right to counsel and that her
waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
¶ 32 After Dr. Dawson completed the second competency
evaluation, the trial court concluded that Eden was “not currently
competent to waive her right to an attorney,” reappointed her
previous counsel, and ordered restoration services.
¶ 33 In March 2021, following the court’s renewed finding that
Eden was competent to proceed to trial, Eden once again requested
that she be allowed to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro
se. The trial court conducted another Arguello advisement, during
which it clarified what would be expected of Eden should she
choose to represent herself. The court also confirmed that Eden
was not under the influence of any mind-altering substances, that
she was thinking clearly, and that her decision to proceed pro se
was not based on pressure or coercion. Eden agreed to have
advisory counsel appointed to assist her. Having properly advised
Eden, the court found that “Eden knowingly, voluntarily, and
14 intelligently waive[d] her right to counsel” and that, while it “may
have concerns about her decision to proceed pro se,” it was
“ultimately her right to represent herself.”
¶ 34 Eden’s presentation of her case centered around her religious
beliefs. She relayed to the jury that this was “cosmic case number
one”; that the children’s spirits “were not of the house of light”; and
that this trial was “unsealing the Book of Daniel and Revelation,”
along with other religious references. As noted, the jury found
Eden guilty on both counts.
¶ 35 Because we find no error in the trial court’s determination that
Eden was competent to stand trial, we necessarily conclude that
she was also competent to waive her right to counsel. See Davis,
¶ 17. We turn, then, to whether Eden voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived her right to counsel.
¶ 36 Eden argues that her mental health issues prevented her from
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving her right to
counsel. Specifically, Eden points to her writings, which she
characterizes as “replete with bizarre delusions,” and her later
presentation of her defense to the jury, which consisted of her
15 firmly held spiritual beliefs and their relation to the case at hand,
as evidence of her mental health issues rendering her unable to
represent herself effectively.
¶ 37 But the trial court found that Eden’s views were not indicative
of mental illness but, rather, were “extreme religious beliefs.” In
other words, the court found that Eden did not suffer from a mental
illness. And we have discerned no error in that determination.
¶ 38 Of course, even a defendant who is competent to proceed to
trial may nevertheless have mental health issues, and those mental
health issues would be relevant to the court’s consideration of
whether a waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. But, other than Eden’s religious beliefs — which,
again, the trial court found (with record support) did not give rise to
a mental health concern — Eden points to nothing in the record
that would indicate she has any mental health issues.
¶ 39 The gist of Eden’s claim is essentially that her waiver was not
wise. “But in this context, ‘intelligently’ does not refer to the
wisdom of the waiver; rather, the court must honor a defendant’s
request to self-represent if it is satisfied that [the] defendant knows
16 what . . . she is doing and understands the consequences.” People
v. Johnson, 2015 COA 54, ¶ 18.
¶ 40 Here, the court asked Eden several questions to determine
why she was choosing to waive her right to counsel. Eden
responded that she felt that her “strategy” was something that the
defense counsel would be unwilling to adopt. This stance is
consistent with Eden’s first request to proceed pro se in 2018, when
she noted that her desire to represent herself stemmed from her
need to explain “what happened and why” and that her truth was
all she needed to convey at trial.
¶ 41 A trial court cannot stop a defendant from invoking their
constitutional right to self-representation, and consequently waiving
their right to counsel, simply because the defendant wishes to
adopt an inadvisable defense strategy. See id. Eden clearly stated
that her waiver was based on her need to share her story with the
jury. When asked by the court, Eden also confirmed that this
decision was not based on “any sort of pressure or coercion” but
rather was her “desire from the first.” See id. at ¶ 23 (holding that a
defendant’s unequivocal request to represent themself, on which
the defendant never wavered or vacillated, weighs heavily in favor of
17 allowing the defendant to proceed pro se). Eden stated that she
understood the charges, the prison sentences she faced should she
be found guilty, her constitutional right to remain silent, and other
legal practices at her disposal during trial.
¶ 42 Eden’s answers were sufficient for the trial court to find that
her waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. And, even when
considered under the totality of the circumstances, there is no
indication that Eden’s alleged mental health issues interfered with
her understanding of the case. Cf. Davis, ¶ 20 (holding the trial
court should consider whether a defendant’s mental illness
“prevent[s] [them] from broadly understanding the charges,
punishments, defenses, and other essential facts of the case”).
¶ 43 Finally, relying on People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1265
(Colo. 1985), Eden contends that the court “failed to monitor the
proceedings to ensure that they did not become so fundamentally
unfair as to result in a denial of due process.” However, in Romero,
the supreme court held that the defendant’s participation in all
phases of the trial was sufficient so as to not be considered a
violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 1266. Eden
participated in the trial proceedings, and while her approach may
18 have been unconventional, it is not within the purview of this court
to hold that a defendant may not proceed pro se solely based on
their defense strategy or lack of technical legal skill. See Johnson,
¶¶ 18, 22.
¶ 44 Furthermore, despite Eden’s argument otherwise, there was
no indication that she was no longer competent to proceed during
the trial. Eden’s extreme religious beliefs were the primary reason
she chose to proceed pro se, and her “persistence in applying her
beliefs to the facts in this case demonstrate[d] her unwillingness,
rather than her inability, to hold a rational understanding of the
proceedings.” See supra Part I.B.
¶ 45 Because Eden was competent to waive her right to counsel,
her waiver of the right to counsel was valid so long as it was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In light of the trial court’s
advisement and its subsequent findings, we agree with the court
that Eden’s waiver satisfied these requirements.
IV. Disposition
¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.