23CA1855 Peo v Eddington 02-19-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1855 Douglas County District Court No. 19CR479 Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Harlan Nelson Eddington,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCE AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE LUM J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 19, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Harlan Nelson Eddington, pleaded guilty to two
crimes involving the death of his romantic partner. He appeals his
sentence and the order imposing restitution.
I. Background
¶2 Eddington and his romantic partner, Molly Sadler, got into a
verbal dispute while Eddington was driving on Highway 67.
Eddington suddenly turned his doorless Jeep into oncoming traffic,
and a car collided with the passenger side of the vehicle, where
Sadler was sitting. Eddington got out of the vehicle immediately
after the collision and ran from the scene. Police apprehended him
on foot several hours later and noted that he appeared to be under
the influence of alcohol. Sadler was taken to the hospital and died
the next day due to injuries sustained in the crash. At the time of
the collision, a protection order prohibited Eddington from
interacting with Sadler and from using alcohol or controlled
substances.
¶3 Eddington pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident in
violation of section 42-4-1601(1), (2)(c), C.R.S. 2025, and vehicular
homicide in violation of section 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The
plea agreement contained a stipulated sentencing range of four to
1 eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections
(DOC). The sentencing court imposed an eighteen-year sentence.
The court also ordered Eddington to pay $5,487 in restitution to
compensate the Crime Victim Compensation Board (CVCB)1 for
payments it made to Sadler’s family for her funeral and burial
expenses.
¶4 Eddington now argues that (1) the sentencing judge was
biased against him, and (2) the sentencing judge erred by ordering
him to pay the full amount of restitution to the CVCB when Sadler’s
family had also received donations from a GoFundMe campaign.
We address each contention in turn.
1 The terms “Crime Victim Compensation Board” and “Crime Victim
Compensation Fund” are used interchangeably throughout the record in this case. Prior opinions from this court discussing restitution use both “board” and “fund” and also refer to a “Crime Victim Compensation Program.” As best we can discern, all these terms refer to an entity that is a “victim” under the restitution statute because it is a “victim compensation board that has paid a victim compensation claim.” § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, for consistency, we use the term “CVCB” throughout this opinion.
2 II. Sentencing
¶5 Eddington argues that his eighteen-year sentence (the
maximum possible sentence under the plea agreement) is the result
of actual bias on the part of the sentencing judge. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶6 At the sentencing hearing, the court heard testimony from
eight witnesses for the State, one mitigation witness for the defense,
and from Eddington. After the testimony and while sentencing
Eddington, the judge made the following remarks:
• People who never met Sadler “will never get to see this
beautiful face. People who never met her, like myself,
will never get to hear this beautiful laugh. We’ll never get
a kiss on the lips and a hug when I meet her. And that’s
a loss. Everyone’s a victim.”
• “You killed [Sadler] . . . And like what your witness said,
it is all your fault.”
• Sadler “suffered a year of abuse under the hands of Mr.
Eddington.”
• The most haunting part of the case is Sadler’s words that
“were overheard by a witness about Mr. Eddington killing
3 her, and Mr. Eddington’s father warning her. [Sadler]
knew she was going to die in the hands of Mr. Eddington.
She didn’t know when; she didn’t know how, but I think
she knew.”
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 Because Eddington didn’t move to disqualify the sentencing
judge, our review is limited to whether the judge displayed “actual
bias.” People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶¶ 6-7. We review claims of
actual bias de novo. People v. Jennings, 2021 COA 112, ¶¶ 27-28.
¶8 Actual bias is “bias or prejudice that in all probability will
prevent [a judge] from dealing fairly with a party.” People v. Julien,
47 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2002). A defendant arguing that the trial
judge was biased “must establish that the judge had a substantial
bent of mind against him.” People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1249
(Colo. 1988). Mere speculative statements are not enough, and the
record must clearly establish such bias. Id.
¶9 In Colorado, “[t]he general rule of law is that what a judge
learns in his judicial capacity is a proper basis for judicial
observations, and that the use of such information is not the kind
of matter that results in disqualification.” Smith v. Dist. Ct., 629
4 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1981). “[O]pinions formed by the judge on
the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the
current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Dobler,
¶ 25 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).
C. Analysis
¶ 10 Eddington argues that the sentencing judge was biased for two
reasons. First, he argues that the sentencing judge exhibited actual
bias by “counting himself as a victim” and by telling Eddington that
Sadler’s death was “all [Eddington’s] fault.” Second, Eddington
contends that the judge based his opinions about Eddington (and,
thus, the sentence) on facts that weren’t in the record. We address
each argument in turn.
1. “Victim” and “Fault” Remarks
¶ 11 Eddington argues that the sentencing judge exhibited actual
bias when he said, “We’ll never get a kiss on the lips and a hug
when I meet [Sadler]. And that’s a loss. Everyone’s a victim.” He
also contends the judge exhibited bias when he admonished
Eddington by telling him, “[I]t is all your fault.” We disagree.
5 ¶ 12 Read in context, the record reveals that the judge’s
observation that “[p]eople who never met [Sadler], like myself,”
would never receive a “kiss on the lips and a hug” related directly to
the following testimony from Sadler’s niece:
I loved introducing new people to her, without warning, and she would go in for that kiss and big old hug and surprise them. No one will ever get that experience again. There are not that many people in the world that are willing to show that much love as she did to anyone she met, to anyone. ¶ 13 The judge’s statements showed empathy to Sadler’s family,
acknowledged their testimony about the warm greetings Sadler gave
to strangers, and acknowledged the impact the family believed
Sadler’s loss had had on the community. They don’t display
“deep-seated favoritism” toward Sadler or “deep-seated . . .
antagonism” against Eddington. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; Dobler,
¶¶ 25-26.
¶ 14 Regarding the sentencing court’s statement, “[I]t is all your
fault,” we likewise disagree with Eddington that this statement
displays a “deep-seated . . . antagonism” amounting to actual bias.
Id. Instead, we view this statement as an opinion formed based on
the following facts introduced during the proceedings. Id.
6 ¶ 15 During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor recounted that
before police arrested Eddington, he told officers, “No, this was
[Sadler]’s fault,” and “It’s her fault, not mine. I’m a Good
Samaritan. I just wanted to get her help.” Defense counsel
acknowledged, “But, certainly, something we do all agree in this
room, I think every single person, is that Ms. Sadler did not need to
die; she shouldn’t have died, and Mr. Eddington’s conduct was —
was the result — or her death was a result of Mr. Eddington’s
conduct.” Viewed in context, the judge’s comment merely
admonished Eddington for initially attempting to place blame on
Sadler and reflected Eddington’s admitted guilt for the conduct that
caused her death.
2. Facts in the Record of the Proceeding
¶ 16 Next, Eddington contends that the judge’s statement that
Sadler “suffered a year of abuse under the hands of Mr. Eddington”
and his opinion that Sadler “knew she was going to die in the hands
of Mr. Eddington” aren’t supported by the record and, therefore,
indicate actual bias. We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 17 During the sentencing hearing, the People discussed
Eddington’s criminal history and noted that he was charged with
7 assaulting Sadler in 2018 (about six months before Sadler’s death),
his driver’s license was later revoked for driving under the
influence, and a protection order was put in place protecting Sadler
from Eddington. Defense counsel said during the hearing, “So Mr.
Eddington and Ms. Sadler were together for about a year prior to
her death. And by all accounts, it was a tenuous relationship. You
see from Mr. Eddington that he has a history of domestic violence.”
¶ 18 Based on these remarks and Eddington’s prior charge for
assaulting Sadler, the court seemingly concluded that Eddington
had abused Sadler throughout their yearlong relationship. At most,
this reflects an unsupported factual finding, which is insufficient to
show that the judge was biased against Eddington. Cf. People v.
Schupper, 2014 COA 80M, ¶ 58 (“[R]ulings of a judge, although
erroneous, numerous[,] and continuous, are not sufficient in
themselves to show bias or prejudice.” (quoting Saucerman v.
Saucerman, 461 P.2d 18, 22 (Colo. 1969))).
¶ 19 We don’t perceive the judge’s statement that Sadler “knew she
was going to die in the hands of Mr. Eddington” to show actual bias
either. Sadler’s mother testified that Eddington’s father told Sadler
at one point, “Molly, you need to stay away from him. He’s going to
8 kill you.” Sadler’s mother then testified, “His dad knew what was
going to happen to [Sadler].” The prosecution also recounted
statements made by a man who overheard parts of the argument
between Eddington and Sadler before the collision, including
overhearing Sadler say to Eddington, “Oh, I suppose now you’re just
gonna kill me.” The judge’s remarks about Sadler’s knowledge were
based on reasonable inferences drawn from the record at the
sentencing.
III. Restitution
¶ 20 Eddington next argues that the sentencing court erred by
ordering him to pay the CVCB the amount of restitution requested
by the prosecution even though Sadler’s family had also received
donations from community fundraising. We disagree.
¶ 21 After the sentencing hearing, the People filed a “Restitution
Payout Order/Judgment” requesting restitution in the amount of
$5,487 to compensate the CVCB for funds it paid to Sadler’s family
for her funeral and burial expenses. Eddington filed an objection.
Screenshots attached to the objection indicated that Sadler’s sister
had organized a GoFundMe campaign, requesting donations for
9 (1) veterinary expenses for Sadler’s dog; and (2) expenses related to
Sadler’s funeral, burial, and cremation. The screenshots also
indicated that the campaign had raised $2,608 for Sadler’s family.
Eddington argued — as he does here — that the CVCB was entitled
to reimbursement from Sadler’s family under section 24-4.1-110,
C.R.S. 2025, because the GoFundMe donations provided the family
with a collateral source of funds for the same expenses covered by
the CVCB. Thus, Eddington continued, he was entitled to a setoff
or reduction in the amount of restitution owed to the CVCB.
¶ 22 The People responded to the objection, attaching an email
from the director of the CVCB, who noted that the CVCB didn’t
require reimbursements of private donations because it couldn’t
confirm how donated funds were used. (For example, in this case,
it couldn’t confirm that Sadler’s family used the donated funds for
her funeral expenses.)
¶ 23 After a brief hearing at which the court heard further
argument but didn’t receive evidence, the court concluded that
Eddington hadn’t met his burden to show that the restitution
amount should be set off or decreased because there were “no
strings attached” and “no restrictions placed” on the family’s use of
10 the donated funds. Therefore, the court concluded, Sadler’s family
wasn’t required to reimburse the CVCB. The court then ordered
Eddington to pay $5,487 in restitution.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 24 We interpret statutes de novo. People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74,
¶ 17. In construing a statute, we aim to give effect to the legislative
intent. Id. To discern the legislature’s intent, we look first to the
plain language of the statute and give “its words and phrases their
plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 25
(citation omitted). We must construe a statute “as a whole” with an
eye toward “giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all
of its parts” while avoiding “constructions that would render any
words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd results.”
McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 38. When the language is clear
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning
“and look no further.” Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 12.
C. Applicable Law
1. Statutory Law
¶ 25 Convicted offenders must “make full restitution to those
harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025.
11 Restitution means “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim. . . [that
is] proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can be
reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2025. The purposes of restitution are to
deter future criminality and to “lessen the financial burdens
inflicted upon” crime victims as compensation for hardship and
suffering. § 18-1.3-601(1)(d)-(e).
¶ 26 Crime victims and their family members may seek
compensation from the CVCB for losses caused by an offender’s
criminal conduct. §§ 24-4.1-102(1), -108, -109(1), C.R.S. 2025. A
“victim compensation board that has paid a victim compensation
claim” is a “[v]ictim” for purposes of the restitution statute.
§ 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). And if a CVCB has provided assistance to or
on behalf of a victim, “the amount of assistance provided and
requested by the [CVCB] is presumed to be a direct result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 27 Under certain circumstances, a defendant may be entitled to a
reduction or setoff in the amount of restitution owed to a victim. A
restitution order may be (1) decreased if the “defendant has
otherwise compensated the victim . . . for the pecuniary losses
12 suffered” or (2) set off by the amount of “compensatory damages”
recovered by the victim “in any federal or state civil proceeding.”
§ 18-1.3-603(3)(b)(II), (6); see also § 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(I) (“[A] court
may not award restitution to a victim concerning a pecuniary loss
for which the victim has received or is entitled to receive benefits or
reimbursement under a policy of insurance or other indemnity
agreement.”). The defendant bears the burden of proving
entitlement to any such reduction or setoff. People v. Lassek, 122
P.3d 1029, 1034 (Colo. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by,
Sullivan v. People, 2020 CO 58, ¶ 18.
¶ 28 The Crime Victim Compensation Act (the compensation act)
describes the CVCB’s obligations if the victim or the victim’s family
seeks funds from the CVCB and also receives compensation from a
collateral source, including a “private source.” § 24-4.1-110(1)-(2).
In such cases, the CVCB “may” deduct the amount received from
the collateral source from the compensation it pays out.
§ 24-4.1-110(1). Likewise, any person receiving CVCB
compensation who “also receives a collateral sum” that has not
been deducted “shall refund to the [CVCB] the lesser of the
13 sums . . . unless the aggregate of both sums does not exceed the
person’s losses.” § 24-4.1-110(2).
2. Lassek, Stanley, and Gregory
¶ 29 Because both parties’ arguments before the sentencing court
and before this court are guided by People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d
1029; People v. Stanely, 2017 COA 121; and People v. Gregory, 2019
COA 184, we briefly discuss those cases.
a. People v. Lassek
¶ 30 In Lassek, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges related to a
fatal traffic accident. Lassek, 122 P.3d at 1031. The sentencing
court ordered restitution that included burial, travel, and lodging
expenses incurred by the victim’s parents. Id. at 1034-35. The
defendant sought a $50,000 setoff based on a settlement payment
made by his automobile insurer to the victim’s family. Id. However,
the settlement agreement “did not identify any particular losses
covered by the payment.” Id. at 1035. As a result, a division of this
court noted that the victim’s parents could “allocate the entire
settlement to noneconomic damages,” which weren’t covered by
restitution. Id. Thus, the division held that the defendant wasn’t
14 entitled to set off the insurance settlement against his restitution
order. Id.
b. People v. Stanley
¶ 31 In Stanley, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony vehicular
assault, driving under the influence, and careless driving. Stanley,
¶ 6. The prosecution sought restitution in the amount of $30,000
to compensate the CVCB for payments made to the direct victim for
lost wages and medical expenses. Id. at ¶ 7. The defendant sought
a setoff of $25,000, arguing that his insurer had settled with the
victim for that amount through an agreement that covered “any and
every claim, demand, right or cause of action” including “personal
injuries and consequences thereof” and any “loss of services”
resulting from the incident. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 5, 11-12. The sentencing
court awarded the defendant a $25,000 setoff, and the People
appealed. Id. at ¶ 12.
¶ 32 A division of this court concluded that the settlement
agreement’s references to “personal injuries” and “loss of services”
sufficiently established that the defendant met his initial burden of
demonstrating that the insurance settlement was intended to cover
lost wages and medical expenses, which were the same losses
15 covered by the CVCB’s payment to the victim. Id. at ¶ 28. The
division applied section 18-1.3-603(3) and (6) to conclude that, once
a defendant demonstrates that a civil settlement includes the same
categories of losses or expenses for which the victim received CVCB
compensation, the defendant has met the initial “burden of going
forward” with evidence that the victim received a double recovery.
Id. at ¶¶ 30, 34. The division remanded the case for further
proceedings to give the prosecution an opportunity to rebut the
inference. Id. at ¶ 34.
c. People v. Gregory
¶ 33 In Gregory, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of
vehicular homicide. Gregory, ¶ 2. The defendant’s insurance
company settled with the deceased victims’ families, who each
received $500,000 in exchange for release of all claims stemming
from the incident. Id. The CVCB paid the deceased victims’
families $15,513.43, collectively, to cover expenses for funerals,
travel, and mental health counseling. Id. at ¶ 3. Noting that the
CVCB wasn’t a party to the settlement agreements, the court
entered a restitution order for the entire amount requested by the
16 prosecution.2 Id. at ¶ 4. A division of this court reversed and
concluded that “when a settlement agreement is clearly intended to
cover all categories of loss for which restitution could be imposed,
the defendant has met his burden of going forward.” Id. at ¶ 29.
Like the division in Stanley, the Gregory division indicated that the
prosecution would have the opportunity to rebut the inference of
double recovery on remand. Id. at ¶ 30.
D. Analysis
¶ 34 Eddington contends that the sentencing court erred by
concluding that the GoFundMe donations were “unearmarked” (as
in Lassek) and argues that this case is closer to Stanley and
Gregory because the GoFundMe screenshots indicated that Sadler’s
sister requested donations in part because “[o]ur family needs
financial assists [sic] paying for . . . cremation and services for
[Sadler].” We disagree.
¶ 35 The divisions’ reasoning in Stanley and Gregory relied on the
existence of an enforceable contract (in both cases, a settlement
agreement) in which both parties expressed an intent to
2 The court excluded a small portion of the requested amount for
reasons not relevant here.
17 compensate the victims for losses arising from the crimes
committed against them, including losses covered by restitution.
Stanley, ¶¶ 27-28; Gregory, ¶¶ 27-29. In contrast, a request for
monetary gifts (even a request that contemplates a use for the
funds) doesn’t create a “contract” that “designate[s] the proceeds as
being for any particular purpose,” nor does it indicate that the gift
giver intends for the recipient to spend the funds in a specific way.
Stanley, ¶¶ 24, 27; see Gregory, ¶ 27 (focusing on “the intent of the
parties”). As the district court noted, absent evidence that the
donated funds are required to be used in one or more specific ways,
there are no strings attached to donations or other monetary gifts.
In sum, we conclude that this case is closer to Lassek because
there is no agreement in which both Sadler’s family and the donors
18 expressed an intent to use donated funds for any particular
purpose.3
¶ 36 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by the language of the
compensation act. We need not (and do not) decide whether a
monetary gift is a “collateral sum” that triggers the victim’s
obligation to reimburse the CVCB under section 24-4.1-110
because the CVCB is a victim in its own right, and Eddington
(1) didn’t present any evidence that the CVCB actually received a
3 We also note that the divisions’ reasoning in Stanley and Gregory
was informed partly by the restitution statute’s prohibition on “double recovery” in certain circumstances. People v. Stanley, 2017 COA 121, ¶¶ 20, 30-32; People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶¶ 24, 29. Both divisions noted that the restitution statute provides that a defendant is entitled to a setoff to or reduction in the amount of restitution owed when the victim has otherwise been compensated (1) by the defendant; (2) by amounts recovered by the victim in any federal or state civil proceeding; and (3) by amounts the victim has received or is entitled to receive from benefits or reimbursement under an insurance policy. Stanley, ¶¶ 20-21; Gregory, ¶ 24; § 18- 1.3-603(3)(b)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (The court may decrease restitution “[i]f the defendant has otherwise compensated the victim . . . for the pecuniary losses suffered.”); § 18-1.3-603(6) (Restitution “shall be set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages by such victim in any federal or state civil proceeding.”); § 18-1.3-603(8)(c)(I) (The “court may not award restitution” for a loss “for which the victim has received or is entitled to receive benefits or reimbursement under a policy of insurance or other indemnity agreement.”). There is no similar statutory entitlement to a reduction or setoff in restitution when the victim has received monetary gifts.
19 refund from Sadler’s family; (2) doesn’t otherwise contest the
amount that the CVCB paid to Sadler’s family; and (3) doesn’t
contest that his conduct proximately caused the economic loss.
Further, Eddington doesn’t direct us to any language in the
restitution statute or the compensation act (and we can find none)
that requires a court to reduce the amount of restitution simply
because a victim received a monetary gift. Thus, the court didn’t
err by ordering him to pay the CVCB the full amount of the
compensation that the CVCB paid to Sadler’s family.
IV. Disposition
¶ 37 The sentence and restitution order are affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.