23CA0952 Peo v Dockins 01-02-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0952 Weld County District Court No. 20CR1916 Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eric James Dockins,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 2, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Eric James Dockins, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of vehicular
eluding and driving under restraint (DUR). Dockins contends that
the district court erred by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial;
(2) allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct; and (3) admitting
evidence of a prior conviction. Dockins further contends that the
cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 On August 27, 2020, Officer Albert Castillo was on patrol in
Lochbuie, Colorado, at approximately 1 a.m. when he noticed a
man he recognized as Dockins standing next to a motorcycle in
front of a house. As he drove by, Officer Castillo ran Dockins’ name
through Colorado and national criminal database systems, which
returned a photograph that matched Dockins’ appearance as well
as information that Dockins’ driving status was revoked. Officer
Castillo also confirmed that the motorcycle was registered to
Dockins.
¶3 When Officer Castillo circled back, Dockins started to drive
away on the motorcycle. Officer Castillo attempted to stop Dockins,
first activating his overhead lights and then his sirens. Dockins did
1 not stop. Instead, he accelerated, almost lost control in a
roundabout, and continued onto I-76, driving at speeds faster than
110 miles per hour. Officer Castillo ultimately terminated his
pursuit. He went back to the house where he first saw Dockins and
spoke with Dockins’ mother, who lived in the house and said she
did not know where Dockins was.
¶4 For this conduct, the prosecution later charged Dockins with
vehicular eluding and DUR. A jury convicted Dockins as charged.
II. Mistrial
¶5 Dockins contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion for a mistrial after his alleged alibi witness failed to appear.
We perceive no abuse of discretion.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶6 “A mistrial is a drastic remedy that is warranted only when the
prejudice to the accused is so substantial that its effect on the jury
cannot be remedied by other means.” People v. Cousins, 181 P.3d
365, 373 (Colo. App. 2007) (quoting People v. Dore, 997 P.2d 1214,
1221 (Colo. App. 1999)). A trial court has broad discretion to grant
or deny a motion for a mistrial, and we will not reverse its decision
absent an abuse of that discretion and prejudice to the defendant.
2 People v. Salas, 2017 COA 63, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion if
its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when
it misapplies the law. People v. Grant, 2021 COA 53, ¶ 12.1
B. Additional Background
¶7 The district court initially set Dockins’ trial for May 2022. At
the pretrial readiness conference, defense counsel requested a
continuance because he was having issues contacting Dockins’ alibi
witness, later identified as Kimberly Collins. The court granted the
continuance over the prosecutor’s objection.
¶8 Dockins first proceeded to trial in July 2022. On the morning
of the second day, after the prosecution rested its case, defense
counsel told the court that Collins was scheduled to testify that
afternoon but was unable to appear due to an emergency with her
autistic son. Defense counsel represented that Collins could appear
1 The parties dispute whether we review the alleged error under the
constitutional harmless error standard or the harmless error standard. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶¶ 11-12 (we review preserved constitutional trial errors for constitutional harmless error and preserved nonconstitutional trial errors for harmless error). Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion or deprive Dockins of his right to present a defense, we need not resolve this dispute.
3 the following morning, so the court continued the trial to the next
day to accommodate her.
¶9 Early the next morning, however, Collins texted defense
counsel’s investigator that she was not willing to come to court due
to ongoing issues with her son. Defense counsel requested, and the
court agreed, to allow Collins to testify by Webex. But Collins did
not respond to any attempts by counsel or the court to contact her.
¶ 10 Eventually, defense counsel requested a mistrial. She argued
that Collins was an essential witness and made an offer of proof
regarding her testimony. The prosecutor objected, noting that the
trial had already been continued once before because of Collins and
that Collins had twelve prior failures to appear in her own criminal
cases. The prosecutor said she had “zero confidence . . . regardless
of a mistrial that [Collins] w[ould] actually show up on a subpoena.”
The court granted the mistrial, reasoning that there appeared to be
a “true emergency,” which was not the product of any of the parties’
or the court’s actions, and that “there’s no question that she’s a
substantial material witness.”
¶ 11 Dockins’ second trial began on November 28, 2022. Collins
appeared by Webex that morning, despite having been subpoenaed
4 to appear in person, and the court told her to appear in person at
8:30 or 9 a.m. the following day. Again, the prosecution presented
its entire case and rested at the end of the first day of trial.
¶ 12 By 9:52 a.m. on November 29, Collins had not yet appeared,
so defense counsel moved for a second mistrial. Counsel argued
that denying the motion for a mistrial would be extremely
prejudicial to Dockins because it would essentially deny him a
defense. The court delayed ruling on the motion to allow Collins
more time to appear, particularly given that it had snowed the night
before. But by 10:30 a.m., Collins had still not appeared or
contacted anyone to explain her absence.
¶ 13 Defense counsel supplemented her prior offer of proof
regarding Collins’ anticipated testimony, stating that Collins would
testify that she hired Dockins to do remodeling work at her house in
Colorado Springs from August 26-29, 2020, when she was
scheduled to be in Las Vegas; she picked Dockins up from his home
in Lochbuie on August 26, drove him to her home in Colorado
Springs, and then left for Las Vegas; Dockins was “still at her
house” on August 29 when she returned; and at some point that
day, Dockins’ girlfriend picked him up.
5 ¶ 14 The prosecutor objected to the court declaring a mistrial,
arguing that Dockins could establish his whereabouts through his
mother’s testimony because they lived in the same house at that
time, his girlfriend’s testimony because she picked him up from
Colorado Springs, or his own testimony. The prosecutor also
argued that Collins’ behavior indicated that “she ha[d] no intention
of complying with court orders or appearing before this [c]ourt.”
Based on the prosecutor’s record, the absence of any
communication from Collins, and the procedural history of the
case, the court denied the motion for a mistrial.
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Dockins’ Second Motion for a Mistrial
¶ 15 Dockins contends that the district court erred by denying his
second motion for a mistrial because identity was the central issue
at trial, and his ability to present an alibi witness was critical for
his defense. For three reasons, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Dockins’ request for a mistrial.
¶ 16 First, we are not persuaded that Collins’ anticipated testimony
was probative of Dockins’ whereabouts at the time the charged
crimes were committed. We acknowledge that Collins’ testimony
6 that she drove Dockins to Colorado Springs on August 26 would
have made it somewhat less likely that Dockins was in Lochbuie
early the following morning. But the offer of proof was not specific
regarding what time Collins drove Dockins to Colorado Springs and,
more importantly, did not account for Dockins’ whereabouts at
1 a.m. on August 27. After Collins dropped Dockins off at her
house in Colorado Springs, she took a trip to Las Vegas and did not
return until August 29.
¶ 17 So, while Collins may have been able to account for Dockins’
whereabouts at some point in time on August 26 and at another
point in time on August 29, she could not provide an alibi for
Dockins at the time of the charged offenses. And it is certainly
plausible for Dockins to have made it back to Lochbuie from
Colorado Springs between some unspecified time on August 26 and
1 a.m. on August 27. See People v. Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235,
1238 (Colo. 1989) (“The defense of alibi has been defined as ‘[a]
defense that places the defendant at the relevant time in a different
place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to
render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.’” (quoting Black’s
Law Dictionary 66 (5th ed. 1979))) (emphases added); see also
7 People v. Merklin, 80 P.3d 921, 927 (Colo. App. 2003) (affirming the
trial court’s rejection of a theory of defense instruction claiming the
defendant was elsewhere during the crime when the defendant did
not present evidence showing he was in a different place at the
relevant time).
¶ 18 Second, there were other ways in which Dockins could have
presented his alibi defense — at least to the same extent that
Collins’ testimony would have been probative of that defense. For
example, Dockins could have (1) questioned his mother, who had
been called as a prosecution witness and testified that Dockins was
at her house on August 26 in the early afternoon,2 or (2) presented
his girlfriend’s testimony that she picked him up from Lochbuie on
August 29. In addition, Dockins had ample opportunity to
challenge Officer Castillo’s identification and the balance of the
evidence presented against him. As a result, Dockins was not
2 Although Dockins could have relied on his mother’s testimony
that he left her house sometime on August 26, we note that she also testified that she thought Dockins “came back for awhile” and “was there when [she] went to bed” sometime between midnight and 3 a.m. This testimony underscores our conclusion that Collins could not provide Dockins with a true alibi because of her inability to account for Dockins’ whereabouts at the time the charged crimes were committed.
8 deprived of his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
See People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 93 (“A defendant’s right to
present a defense is violated only where the defendant was denied
virtually his only means of effectively testing significant prosecution
evidence.” (citing Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo.
2009))).
¶ 19 Third, denying the mistrial was justified by the procedural
history of the case and Collins’ repeated failures to appear. The
court had previously continued the trial twice and declared a
mistrial once to accommodate the same witness. By the time
Dockins requested his second mistrial, the prosecution had
presented and rested its case twice. Had the court granted another
mistrial, the prosecution would have had to present its case a third
time after yet further delay in the proceedings. See People v.
Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 697 (Colo. 2010) (“The months invested in
preparing for the trial, and the burdens already placed on the lives
of witnesses, should not be lightly tossed aside once the trial has
begun.”); cf. People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 943 (Colo. 1983) (that
the “mistrial motion was made at the very outset of the trial, before
the expenditure of time and effort in the presentation of testimony
9 and evidence to the jury” favored granting a mistrial), overruled on
other grounds by West v. People, 2015 CO 5. And given Collins’
historic behavior and her lack of communication with the court or
counsel, it is speculative whether she would have shown up if
another mistrial had been granted. See People v. Marsh, 396 P.3d
1, 14 (Colo. App. 2011) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying a continuance where defendant could not establish a
reasonable probability that the witness would ever be available to
testify), aff’d, 2017 CO 10M; People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206,
1213 (Colo. 1987) (a defendant’s constitutional rights were not
violated where a defense witness left the jurisdiction after being
subpoenaed and the witness’ unavailability was not due to the
prosecution or the court).
¶ 20 Considering all these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dockins’
second motion for a mistrial and that “the type of substantial
prejudice that requires a mistrial was absent” here. People v.
Williams, 2012 COA 165, ¶ 23; see also Grant, ¶ 12; Cousins, 181
P.3d at 373.
10 III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 21 Dockins contends that the district court erred when it allowed
the prosecutor to commit misconduct during opening and closing
arguments. We are not persuaded.
¶ 22 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims of
prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096
(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct
was improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Second, if the conduct was improper, we decide whether it warrants
reversal under the proper standard of review. Id.
¶ 23 While prosecutors can use every legitimate means to bring
about a just conviction, they have a duty to avoid using improper
methods designed to obtain an unjust result. Domingo-Gomez v.
People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005). We evaluate claims of
improper argument in the context of the argument as a whole and
in light of the evidence before the jury. People v. McMinn, 2013 COA
94, ¶ 60.
¶ 24 If the defendant objected at trial, we review the trial court’s
ruling for a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice and a
11 denial of justice.” People v. Camarigg, 2017 COA 115M, ¶ 39
(quoting People v. Garner, 2015 COA 175, ¶ 26). If the defendant
failed to object at trial, we review for plain error. Id. “To constitute
plain error, prosecutorial misconduct must be flagrant or glaringly
or tremendously improper, and it must so undermine the
fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the
reliability of the judgment of conviction.” McMinn, ¶ 58.
B. “I Believe That I Have Proven”
¶ 25 During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury,
This is your opportunity to — dig into the facts that you heard, into the physical documents you have and then, look at the law that he just provided you and make sure that I met my burden. If I did not meet my burden, you will find Eric Dockins not guilty. That’s your duty as a juror; however, I’m up here and I believe that I have proven —
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel objected, arguing that
“[c]ounsel’s belief is irrelevant,” and the district court sustained the
objection.
¶ 26 The prosecutor rephrased, “I have met my burden beyond a
reasonable doubt of the two counts that I charged [Dockins] with.”
But because defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s
12 rephrased statement, we will not consider this alleged error further.
See People v. Alemayehu, 2021 COA 69, ¶ 101 (declining to consider
alleged error where prosecutor rephrased the comment and defense
counsel requested no further relief); People v. Douglas, 2012 COA
57, ¶ 65 (declining to consider alleged error where court sustained
objection and defense counsel requested no further relief).
C. “Uncontested Facts”
¶ 27 During closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, “There
are several uncontested facts here. The first one is that [Dockins]
does not have a driver’s license and he hasn’t for the last . . . seven
years.” Counsel objected to the prosecutor’s “characterization of
uncontested facts.” The court viewed “this as [the prosecutor’s]
argument that there’s uncontested facts” but reminded the jurors
they were to “determine what the facts are.”
¶ 28 The prosecutor rephrased, “I believe it’s uncontested, based
upon Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 8.” The prosecutor summarized Exhibit
8, which was a video of Dockins twice admitting he did not have a
license, and Exhibit 6, which was Dockins’ Department of Motor
Vehicle (DMV) record, reflecting that his license had been revoked
13 since 2015. Then the prosecutor stated, “So, that’s the basis for
why I believe this is uncontested.”
¶ 29 Dockins contends that these comments improperly conveyed
the prosecutor’s personal opinion to the jury. True, a prosecutor’s
expression of personal opinion or belief as to the guilt of the
defendant or the truth or falsity of witness testimony is improper.
Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049. But when viewed in context,
the prosecutor’s statements did not reveal her personal opinion
about the evidence but instead amounted to an argument that
certain facts should be viewed by the jury as uncontested based on
the admitted evidence. Because the statements were properly
tethered to the evidence — indeed, the prosecutor walked the jury
through the two exhibits on which she based her argument — we
do not see any impropriety. See People v. Rogers, 220 P.3d 931,
938 (Colo. App. 2008) (a prosecutor’s statements about what “the
People believe” or what “we believe” had been proved, when tied to
specific evidence, was not improper), overruled in part on other
grounds by Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6.
14 D. “I Charged Mr. Dockins”
¶ 30 During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “You’re here
because I charged Mr. Dockins with two counts: [v]ehicular eluding
and [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint.” Defense counsel did not object.
The prosecutor then reviewed the elements of each charge with the
jury. Similarly, after discussing the evidence that was presented,
the prosecutor said, “I charged [Dockins] with [v]ehicular [e]luding
and [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint. I’ve met each and every one of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt and I am standing up
here asking that you find him guilty.” Again, defense counsel did
not object.
¶ 31 Dockins contends that by “[r]epeatedly noting that she,
personally, charged Mr. Dockins with the crimes,” the prosecutor
insinuated she had more knowledge about the case than did the
jury. Although a prosecutor “cannot intimate that she has personal
knowledge of evidence unknown to the jury,” Domingo-Gomez, 125
P.3d at 1049, we discern no reversible misconduct here, see People
v. Sauser, 2020 COA 174, ¶ 80. Although the prosecutor’s
comments irrelevantly informed the jury that she was the
prosecutor who charged Dockins, they did not suggest that the case
15 had gone through a special screening process or imply that
additional evidence supporting guilt existed. See Domingo-Gomez,
125 P.3d at 1049. The jury knew Dockins had been charged with
and was being tried for the two crimes the prosecutor identified.
And the prosecutor’s statements bookended her discussion of the
elements of each offense and the evidence that was presented to
prove each element. See Rogers, 220 P.3d at 938. Under the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the statements were
not flagrant or glaringly or tremendously improper. See McMinn,
¶ 58; People v. Walters, 148 P.3d 331, 334 (Colo. App. 2006)
(“During closing argument, a prosecutor has wide latitude and may
refer to the strength and significance of the evidence, conflicting
evidence, and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence.”).
E. “I Am Telling You It Was Dockins”
¶ 32 The prosecutor made two almost identical statements during
opening statement and closing argument. During opening, the
prosecutor told the jury,
[T]his entire case will come down [to], was it Eric Dockins on that motorcycle? And at the end of this trial, I will tell you that yes, it was
16 and I believe that you should find [Dockins] guilty of [e]luding Officer Castillo that night and [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint, because he did not have an active driver’s license at that time.
(Emphasis added.) Defense counsel did not object.
¶ 33 Similarly, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated,
“What’s in dispute here is that it was Eric Dockins. And I am up
here telling you that it was Eric Dockins . . . .” This time, defense
counsel objected. The court overruled the objection but reminded
the jurors that closing arguments are not evidence. The prosecutor
reiterated, “The only thing that’s in dispute here is the Defendant’s
identity,” and then recounted the evidence that had been presented
to establish Dockins’ identity.
¶ 34 Dockins contends that the prosecutor’s statements improperly
conveyed her personal opinion that Dockins was guilty. We do not
endorse the prosecutor’s language, which certainly risked conveying
to the jury her personal opinion that Dockins was the person on the
motorcycle who committed the charged offenses. See
Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049. But we see neither a gross
abuse of discretion by the district court in overruling defense
counsel’s objection during closing argument nor flagrant or
17 glaringly or tremendously improper conduct by the prosecutor in
opening statement. See Camarigg, ¶ 39; McMinn, ¶ 58.
¶ 35 Prosecutors have “wide latitude in the language and
presentation style used” to convey their arguments.
Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1048. And “because arguments
delivered in the heat of trial are not always perfectly scripted,
reviewing courts accord prosecutors the benefit of the doubt when
their remarks are ambiguous or simply inartful.” People v. Samson,
2012 COA 167, ¶ 30. Although inartful, we view the prosecutor’s
comments as oratorical embellishments meant to convey to the jury
that the evidence of identity could lead to only one conclusion —
that Dockins was the offender — rather than an invitation for the
jury to jettison its factfinding responsibility and rely on the
prosecutor’s opinion to convict. See People v. Carter, 2015 COA
24M-2, ¶ 70 (“A prosecutor may ordinarily ‘employ rhetorical
devices and engage in oratorical embellishment and metaphorical
nuance.’”) (citation omitted). In the context of the argument as a
whole, and in light of the strong evidence of identity before the jury,
we perceive no error. See id. at ¶ 71.
18 IV. Dockins’ DMV Record
¶ 36 Dockins contends that the district court erred by admitting
evidence of a prior DUR conviction contained in Dockins’ DMV
record as other act evidence under CRE 404(b). We disagree.
A. Driving Under Restraint
¶ 37 A person commits DUR if they drive a motor vehicle on any
highway of the state with the knowledge that their license or
privilege to drive is under restraint. § 42-2-138(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.
“Knowledge” is “actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever
source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a
reasonable person to be aware that such person’s license or
privilege to drive was under restraint.” § 42-2-138(4)(a). “Restraint”
is “any denial, revocation, or suspension of a person’s license or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this state or another state.”
§ 42-2-138(4)(b).
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 38 CRE 404(b) provides that evidence of “any other crime, wrong,
or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity
with the character” but may be admissible “for another purpose,
19 such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” CRE
404(b)(1)-(2).
¶ 39 Even so, the admissibility of other act evidence must be
analyzed under the four-part test set forth in People v. Spoto, 795
P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990). Such evidence is admissible if (1) the
evidence relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence is logically
relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the prohibited
intermediate inference that the defendant was acting in conformity
with his bad character; and (4) the probative value of the evidence
is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Id. at 1318.
¶ 40 A trial court has considerable discretion when determining the
admissibility of evidence. People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 17. We
review a court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People
v. Sims, 2019 COA 66, ¶ 44. A court abuses its discretion when its
ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it
misapplies the law. Id.
20 C. Additional Background
¶ 41 Before trial, the prosecution provided written notice of its
intent to introduce Dockins’ DMV record under CRE 404(b) to
establish that Dockins’ license had been under restraint since 2015
and that he was aware of that fact. Defense counsel filed a written
objection arguing that the DMV record contained “mostly irrelevant
and prejudicial information.”
¶ 42 During a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor offered to
redact significant portions of the DMV record but did not agree to
redact the reason for a 2016 conviction: “Drove
(Motor/Off-Highway) Vehicle When License Under Restraint
(Suspended).” The prosecutor argued that the information was
relevant to establish that Dockins knew his license was restrained,
not just that he did not have one. Defense counsel objected
because the conviction description showed the jury that Dockins
had previously been convicted of the crime he was charged with in
this case and was not necessary because it was cumulative of other
evidence of Dockins’ knowledge. The court ruled that “given the
redactions that have occurred and the relevance of the certified
21 document, the [c]ourt would find that any 401, 403 issues have
been resolved through the redactions.”
¶ 43 At trial, the prosecutor moved to admit the redacted DMV
record based on the court’s previous ruling and asked the court to
give the jury a limiting instruction. The court admitted the exhibit
and told the jury,
Now, ladies and gentlemen, you’re about to hear or see evidence regarding [Dockins’] driving record. This evidence is admissible for the particular purpose of demonstrating [Dockins’] identity and that [Dockins] knew his license was revoked. It may only be used as evidence for the purpose of showing [Dockins’] identity, knowledge and motive. Such evidence must not be considered for any other purpose and is not admissible to prove the character of [Dockins] in order to show that he acted in conformity with that character.
¶ 44 Officer Castillo then testified that the DMV record
(1) contained a photo of Dockins, who was the person the officer
saw on the motorcycle; (2) showed that Dockins had been served
with notice that his license was under restraint; and (3) reflected
that Dockins’ license had not been reinstated since it was originally
revoked.
22 ¶ 45 There was no testimony about the prior DUR conviction.
During closing argument, however, the prosecutor reviewed the
DMV record with the jury and explained, “You can also see in the
[c]onviction section that there is a prior [d]riving [u]nder [r]estraint
conviction and that’s to show that Eric Dockins knew he did not
have a valid driver’s license and that was in fact because he was
revoked at the time.”
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Evidence of Dockins’ Prior DUR Conviction
¶ 46 Dockins contends that the district court erred by admitting
evidence of his prior DUR conviction because it served only to
inform the jury that Dockins had been previously convicted of the
same crime and to encourage them to convict based on that prior
bad act. Dockins further contends that the court’s limiting
instruction did not mitigate this prejudice. We are not persuaded.
¶ 47 There appears to be little dispute that the first three Spoto
prongs were met. The evidence related to whether Dockins knew
his license was under restraint, which is an essential element of a
DUR charge. See Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d 458, 464 (Colo. 2009)
(the first Spoto prong is met if the purpose for which the prior act
23 evidence is offered is somehow probative of an ultimate or
intermediate fact); People v. Boulden, 2016 COA 109, ¶ 8
(“Knowledge is an essential element of the crime of driving under
restraint.”). The evidence made it more likely than not that Dockins
knew his license was under restraint. See Yusem, 210 P.3d at
464-65 (the second Spoto prong is satisfied if “the prior act evidence
has any tendency to make the existence of the material fact more or
less probable than without the evidence”); CRE 401. And the
prosecution offered the evidence to prove Dockins’ knowledge,
which is independent of the inference that Dockins acted in
conformity with his bad character. See People v. Jones, 2013 CO
59, ¶ 16 (the third Spoto prong is satisfied so long as the logically
relevant evidence achieves its purpose other than through an
impermissible inference); People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076, 1080
(Colo. 1994) (“The third prong of the Spoto test does not demand
the absence of the inference but merely requires that the proffered
evidence be logically relevant independent of that inference.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the prior DUR conviction satisfies the
first three Spoto prongs.
24 ¶ 48 The parties focus on the fourth Spoto prong, which asks
whether “the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Spoto, 795 P.2d at
1318; see CRE 403. “[U]nfair prejudice within the meaning of [CRE
403] still refers only to ‘an undue tendency on the part of the
admissible evidence to suggest a decision made on an improper
basis’ and does not mean prejudice that results from the legitimate
probative force of the evidence.” People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043
(Colo. 2002) (citation omitted). We consider the following factors
when analyzing the fourth prong: the importance of the material
fact for which the evidence is offered and whether it is disputed, the
chain of inferences necessary to establish the material fact, the
availability of other proof, and the effectiveness of a limiting
instruction. Vialpando v. People, 727 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo. 1986).
“In deference to the trial court’s discretion, we must assume the
maximum probative value and the minimum unfair prejudice to be
given the evidence.” Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.
¶ 49 The district court determined that the probative value of the
DMV record was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice in light of the redactions that were made to it. But
25 Dockins contends that the probative value of the prior DUR
conviction was “miniscule” because the prior conviction occurred in
2016, and there was a more recent revocation in 2019.3 While
Dockins concedes that the 2019 revocation was relevant, he asserts
that the reason for the 2016 conviction was not. And even if it was
relevant, Dockins argues it was cumulative of the other evidence
that was also part of the DMV record. We are not persuaded.
¶ 50 The material fact for which this evidence was introduced was
crucial — indeed, knowledge is an element of the offense that the
prosecution was required prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See
§ 42-2-138(1)(a); Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 (we consider “the
importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence is
offered”); Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶ 10 (the prosecution has
the burden to “prove every factual element necessary to constitute
the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt”) (citation omitted).
Although the primary dispute at trial was identity, Dockins did not
admit or stipulate that he knew his license was under restraint at
the relevant time. So the knowledge element remained disputed,
3 We note that Dockins did not raise this specific argument before
the district court.
26 and the prosecution had the burden to prove it. See Vialpando, 727
P.2d at 1096 (we consider “whether the fact of consequence for
which the evidence is offered is being disputed”).
¶ 51 Other portions of the DMV record showed that Dockins’
license was under restraint or had not been reinstated since it was
last revoked, but that does not establish that Dockins knew his
license was under restraint. See Boulden, ¶ 10 (“Colorado’s
‘knowledge’ requirement limits punishment to ‘those who are
subjectively aware of circumstances that would lead a responsible
driver to realize his license was under restraint and thus not
continue to drive.’” (quoting People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034, 1039
(Colo. 2000))). Evidence that Dockins had been convicted of driving
while his license was under restraint before, combined with
evidence that his license had not been reinstated since, was highly
probative of the knowledge element. See id.; Vialpando, 727 P.2d at
1096 (we consider “the strength and length of the chain of
inferences necessary to establish the fact of consequence”).
¶ 52 By comparison, the other evidence Dockins claims would have
satisfied the prosecution’s burden was not as clear or compelling.
Attached to the DMV record was a “proof of service” form that had
27 purportedly been served on Dockins while he was in custody in
2016 and that advised him, “[I]t is unlawful for you to operate a
motor vehicle on any roadway in Colorado.” But the prosecution
redacted the “signature of the person served” box, which contained
an “x with a circle” next to “In Custody,” in order to eliminate any
prejudicial reference to the fact that Dockins was in custody at that
time. Although Officer Castillo testified that Dockins was given
notice, the form does not contain Dockins’ signature or otherwise
reflect that he received it. Thus, as best we can tell, no other part
of the DMV record established Dockins’ knowledge that his license
was under restraint. Compare Boulden, ¶¶ 16-17 (concluding that
the knowledge element of the driving under restraint charge was not
proven by a driving record indicating notice of the suspension had
been mailed with no verification that the defendant received the
notice), with People v. Espinoza, 195 P.3d 1122, 1128 (Colo. App.
2008) (concluding that “the jury could infer that defendant drove
with knowledge that his license had been revoked because he was a
habitual traffic offender”).
¶ 53 Moreover, the court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to
cabin the jury’s use of the evidence before it was admitted. See
28 § 16-10-301(4)(d), C.R.S. 2024 (requiring a limiting instruction);
Vialpando, 727 P.2d at 1096 (we consider “the potential
effectiveness of a limiting instruction in the event of admission”).
We are not persuaded by Dockins’ argument that the instruction
was ineffective because it allowed the jury to use the evidence for
several purposes other than knowledge — including identity.
During trial, Officer Castillo testified that the person in the photo
contained in the DMV record was Dockins and was the same
individual he initially saw standing in the driveway next to the
motorcycle and later saw driving away on the motorcycle. So
“identity” was a proper purpose for which the evidence was
admitted. And defense counsel did not object to using the DMV
record to establish identity in this way or to using a single limiting
instruction for the entire DMV record.
¶ 54 Affording the evidence its maximum probative value and
assuming its minimum unfair prejudice, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of
the prior DUR conviction. See Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467.
29 V. Cumulative Error
¶ 55 Dockins contends that, even if the district court’s alleged
individual errors do not require reversal, their cumulative
prejudicial impact does. Because we found no errors, Dockins’
contention necessarily fails. See People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148,
1155 (Colo. App. 2010) (“Cumulative error applies only if the trial
court committed numerous errors; a defendant’s mere assertions of
error are insufficient to warrant reversal.”) (citation omitted).
VI. Disposition
¶ 56 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.