24CA0330 Peo v Dobler 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0330 Jefferson County District Court No. 11CR2082 Honorable Christopher B. Rhamey, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Zachariah Clark Dobler,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, James S. Hardy, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Zachariah Clark Dobler, appeals the
postconviction court’s order denying his motion to reconsider the
denial of his motion to enforce his plea agreement. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Dobler sped through an accident scene, killed a tow
truck driver, and then fled the scene, the prosecution charged him
with multiple crimes. In 2012, Dobler pleaded guilty to vehicular
homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. In
exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charges.
¶3 Dobler stipulated in his plea agreement, in relevant part, as
follows:
• He “fully underst[oo]d” that he “shall be sentenced to a
term of at least 24 years but not more than 48 years” in
prison.
• The court could determine the presence of any
aggravating circumstances.
• “[T]he [c]ourt c[ould] order the sentence on each count to
run concurrent with or consecutive to the other count.”
1 • There was a factual basis for the guilty plea, and he
“waive[d] the requirement of showing a factual basis for
the plea.”
¶4 At the plea hearing, defense counsel and the prosecution
stipulated “that a factual basis exist[ed].” The court confirmed that
Dobler had read and understood the plea agreement. And Dobler
specifically confirmed his understanding that “the prison sentence
[wa]s going to be for a definite term of 24 to 48 years.” He also
confirmed that he had no questions about “the possible penalties.”
The court then accepted Dobler’s guilty pleas.
¶5 The court later sentenced Dobler to twenty-four years in
prison on each count, to be served consecutively, for a total prison
sentence of forty-eight years.
¶6 Dobler directly appealed his sentence. A division of this court
affirmed, concluding that Dobler could not challenge the propriety
of his sentence because it was within the agreed upon range.
People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶¶ 5, 28.
¶7 Over the next several years, Dobler filed multiple unsuccessful
motions under Crim. P. 35(a) and Crim. P. 35(c), challenging,
among other things, the legality of his sentence.
2 ¶8 Then, in 2023, Dobler filed his motion to enforce the plea
agreement and asked the postconviction court to “correct the illegal
sentence imposed.” He asserted that (1) the sentencing court
breached the plea agreement when it imposed an aggravated
sentence; and (2) his consecutive sentences were illegal because the
convictions were based on identical evidence, requiring the court to
impose concurrent sentences under section 18-1-408(3), C.R.S.
2025. The postconviction court denied the motion.
¶9 Not long after, Dobler filed the motion to reconsider the
postconviction court’s denial of his motion to enforce the plea
agreement — the motion currently at issue. In the motion to
reconsider, Dobler again argued that the sentencing court
improperly aggravated his sentence in breach of the plea agreement
and erred by imposing illegal consecutive sentences.
¶ 10 In a detailed written order, the postconviction court denied the
motion to reconsider. The court concluded that the sentencing
court adhered to the plea agreement when it sentenced Dobler in
the stipulated range and that his consecutive sentences were not
illegal because his convictions weren’t based on identical evidence.
3 II. Analysis
¶ 11 Dobler contends that the postconviction court erred by
denying his motion to reconsider. As we understand it, Dobler
maintains that the sentencing court (1) improperly sentenced him
to an aggravated sentence in breach of the plea agreement and (2)
imposed illegal consecutive sentences. Because different
procedural rules apply to these contentions, we consider them
separately.
A. Breach of the Plea Agreement
¶ 12 We first consider Dobler’s claim that the court improperly
sentenced him to an aggravated sentence in breach of his plea
agreement. We conclude that Rule 35(c) bars this claim.
¶ 13 A postconviction claim alleging the breach of a plea agreement
is cognizable under Rule 35(c).1 See Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I) (providing
for postconviction review of a defendant’s claim that his sentence
was imposed in violation of the United States or Colorado
1 Because the substance — not the caption — of a postconviction
motion controls how the court resolves it, People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006), we disagree with Dobler’s claim that his motion asserting breach of the plea agreement falls outside Crim. P. 35(c).
4 Constitutions or laws); St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1030-32
(Colo. 1997) (addressing the defendant’s claim for breach of a plea
agreement under Rule 35(c)); see also People v. Wilbur, 890 P.2d
113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995) (addressing a motion to enforce a plea
agreement under Rule 35(c)).
¶ 14 Absent certain exceptions not applicable here, a court shall
deny any claim that either was raised or could have been raised in a
previous appeal or postconviction proceeding. See Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(VI), (VII). This procedural bar is “mandatory.” People v.
Taylor, 2018 COA 175, ¶ 17.
¶ 15 Because a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35(c)
motion, like Dobler’s motion to reconsider, is “essentially a
successive motion for postconviction relief,” People v. Thomas, 195
P.3d 1162, 1165 (Colo. App. 2008), we conclude, albeit on different
grounds, that the postconviction court properly denied the motion
to reconsider Dobler’s claim that the court aggravated his sentence
in breach of the plea agreement, see People v. Cooper, 2023 COA
113, ¶ 7 (“We may affirm the postconviction court’s ruling on any
ground supported by the record, whether or not the postconviction
court relied on or considered that ground.”).
5 B. Illegal Consecutive Sentences
¶ 16 We next consider Dobler’s argument that the court imposed
illegal consecutive sentences in violation of section 18-1-408(3). We
construe this claim under Rule 35(a), which allows a court to
correct a sentence not authorized by law or imposed without
jurisdiction at any time, but allows a court to correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner only within 126 days after sentencing.
¶ 17 Because Dobler maintains that his consecutive sentences are
not authorized under section 18-1-408(3), we disagree with the
People that Dobler’s claim is a time-barred illegal manner claim.
See People v. Green, 36 P.3d 125, 126 (Colo. App.
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24CA0330 Peo v Dobler 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0330 Jefferson County District Court No. 11CR2082 Honorable Christopher B. Rhamey, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Zachariah Clark Dobler,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Lipinsky and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, James S. Hardy, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Zachariah Clark Dobler, appeals the
postconviction court’s order denying his motion to reconsider the
denial of his motion to enforce his plea agreement. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After Dobler sped through an accident scene, killed a tow
truck driver, and then fled the scene, the prosecution charged him
with multiple crimes. In 2012, Dobler pleaded guilty to vehicular
homicide and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. In
exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining charges.
¶3 Dobler stipulated in his plea agreement, in relevant part, as
follows:
• He “fully underst[oo]d” that he “shall be sentenced to a
term of at least 24 years but not more than 48 years” in
prison.
• The court could determine the presence of any
aggravating circumstances.
• “[T]he [c]ourt c[ould] order the sentence on each count to
run concurrent with or consecutive to the other count.”
1 • There was a factual basis for the guilty plea, and he
“waive[d] the requirement of showing a factual basis for
the plea.”
¶4 At the plea hearing, defense counsel and the prosecution
stipulated “that a factual basis exist[ed].” The court confirmed that
Dobler had read and understood the plea agreement. And Dobler
specifically confirmed his understanding that “the prison sentence
[wa]s going to be for a definite term of 24 to 48 years.” He also
confirmed that he had no questions about “the possible penalties.”
The court then accepted Dobler’s guilty pleas.
¶5 The court later sentenced Dobler to twenty-four years in
prison on each count, to be served consecutively, for a total prison
sentence of forty-eight years.
¶6 Dobler directly appealed his sentence. A division of this court
affirmed, concluding that Dobler could not challenge the propriety
of his sentence because it was within the agreed upon range.
People v. Dobler, 2015 COA 25, ¶¶ 5, 28.
¶7 Over the next several years, Dobler filed multiple unsuccessful
motions under Crim. P. 35(a) and Crim. P. 35(c), challenging,
among other things, the legality of his sentence.
2 ¶8 Then, in 2023, Dobler filed his motion to enforce the plea
agreement and asked the postconviction court to “correct the illegal
sentence imposed.” He asserted that (1) the sentencing court
breached the plea agreement when it imposed an aggravated
sentence; and (2) his consecutive sentences were illegal because the
convictions were based on identical evidence, requiring the court to
impose concurrent sentences under section 18-1-408(3), C.R.S.
2025. The postconviction court denied the motion.
¶9 Not long after, Dobler filed the motion to reconsider the
postconviction court’s denial of his motion to enforce the plea
agreement — the motion currently at issue. In the motion to
reconsider, Dobler again argued that the sentencing court
improperly aggravated his sentence in breach of the plea agreement
and erred by imposing illegal consecutive sentences.
¶ 10 In a detailed written order, the postconviction court denied the
motion to reconsider. The court concluded that the sentencing
court adhered to the plea agreement when it sentenced Dobler in
the stipulated range and that his consecutive sentences were not
illegal because his convictions weren’t based on identical evidence.
3 II. Analysis
¶ 11 Dobler contends that the postconviction court erred by
denying his motion to reconsider. As we understand it, Dobler
maintains that the sentencing court (1) improperly sentenced him
to an aggravated sentence in breach of the plea agreement and (2)
imposed illegal consecutive sentences. Because different
procedural rules apply to these contentions, we consider them
separately.
A. Breach of the Plea Agreement
¶ 12 We first consider Dobler’s claim that the court improperly
sentenced him to an aggravated sentence in breach of his plea
agreement. We conclude that Rule 35(c) bars this claim.
¶ 13 A postconviction claim alleging the breach of a plea agreement
is cognizable under Rule 35(c).1 See Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I) (providing
for postconviction review of a defendant’s claim that his sentence
was imposed in violation of the United States or Colorado
1 Because the substance — not the caption — of a postconviction
motion controls how the court resolves it, People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006), we disagree with Dobler’s claim that his motion asserting breach of the plea agreement falls outside Crim. P. 35(c).
4 Constitutions or laws); St. James v. People, 948 P.2d 1028, 1030-32
(Colo. 1997) (addressing the defendant’s claim for breach of a plea
agreement under Rule 35(c)); see also People v. Wilbur, 890 P.2d
113, 118-19 (Colo. 1995) (addressing a motion to enforce a plea
agreement under Rule 35(c)).
¶ 14 Absent certain exceptions not applicable here, a court shall
deny any claim that either was raised or could have been raised in a
previous appeal or postconviction proceeding. See Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(VI), (VII). This procedural bar is “mandatory.” People v.
Taylor, 2018 COA 175, ¶ 17.
¶ 15 Because a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35(c)
motion, like Dobler’s motion to reconsider, is “essentially a
successive motion for postconviction relief,” People v. Thomas, 195
P.3d 1162, 1165 (Colo. App. 2008), we conclude, albeit on different
grounds, that the postconviction court properly denied the motion
to reconsider Dobler’s claim that the court aggravated his sentence
in breach of the plea agreement, see People v. Cooper, 2023 COA
113, ¶ 7 (“We may affirm the postconviction court’s ruling on any
ground supported by the record, whether or not the postconviction
court relied on or considered that ground.”).
5 B. Illegal Consecutive Sentences
¶ 16 We next consider Dobler’s argument that the court imposed
illegal consecutive sentences in violation of section 18-1-408(3). We
construe this claim under Rule 35(a), which allows a court to
correct a sentence not authorized by law or imposed without
jurisdiction at any time, but allows a court to correct a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner only within 126 days after sentencing.
¶ 17 Because Dobler maintains that his consecutive sentences are
not authorized under section 18-1-408(3), we disagree with the
People that Dobler’s claim is a time-barred illegal manner claim.
See People v. Green, 36 P.3d 125, 126 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[A]n illegal
sentence is one that is inconsistent with the terms specified by
statutes.”); see also Hunsaker v. People, 2021 CO 83, ¶ 19 (listing
sentences that “should have been imposed to run concurrently” but
“were imposed to run consecutively” as an example of an illegal
sentence claim). And because successive illegal sentence claims are
analyzed under the law of the case doctrine (which the People do
not argue), we likewise disagree with the People that this claim is
successive under Rule 35(c). See People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5-6
6 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that Rule 35(c)’s procedural bars do not
apply to Rule 35(a) claims).
¶ 18 We review de novo the legality of a defendant’s sentence. Veith
v. People, 2017 CO 19, ¶ 12.
¶ 19 When a defendant is convicted of multiple counts committed
against a single victim, section 18-1-408(3) requires concurrent
sentencing only if (1) the counts are based on the same act or series
of acts arising from the same criminal episode, and (2) the evidence
supporting the counts is identical. Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896,
901 (Colo. 2007).
¶ 20 Though not addressed by the parties, we question whether
Dobler waived this claim. That’s because, in his plea agreement,
Dobler waived the factual basis for his guilty plea and agreed that
the court could order his sentences to run consecutively, rather
than concurrently. See People v. Maestas, 224 P.3d 405, 408-09
(Colo. App. 2009) (noting that, when a defendant pleads guilty and
waives the establishment of a factual basis, he waives the right to
rely on section 18-1-408(3)).
¶ 21 But even if Dobler did not waive the right to rely on section 18-
1-408(3), we conclude that the postconviction court properly
7 determined that his convictions were based on separate and distinct
acts. See Juhl, 172 P.3d at 902 (noting that convictions are not
based on identical evidence when the charges result “from two or
more acts fairly considered to be separate acts”). Evidence that
Dobler drove his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and
then hit and killed the victim supported the vehicular homicide
charge. See § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (outlining the elements
of vehicular homicide while under the influence). After Dobler killed
the victim, he fled the accident scene and did not return. That
separate act supported his conviction for leaving the scene of an
accident resulting in death. See § 42-4-1601(1), C.R.S. 2011
(outlining the elements for leaving the scene of an accident resulting
in death).2 Though Dobler never stopped driving, “[t]he mere fact
that the offenses took place during one continuous criminal episode
does not establish that they were supported by identical evidence.”
People v. Jurado, 30 P.3d 769, 773 (Colo. App. 2001).
2 Since the statute for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in
death has since been amended, see Ch. 261, sec. 1, § 42-4-1601(1), 2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 1354, we cite the statute in effect at the time of the charged crime.
8 ¶ 22 Because the evidence required to prove the two convictions
was not identical, the sentencing court did not impose an illegal
consecutive sentence, and the postconviction court properly denied
the motion to reconsider.
III. Disposition
¶ 23 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE KUHN concur.