24CA0593 Peo v Davidson 12-18-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0593 El Paso County District Court Nos. 22CR658 & 23CR1451 Honorable Diana K. May, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Edward Lewis Davidson, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ J. Jones and Grove, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced December 18, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Suzan Trinh Almony, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 A jury convicted defendant, Edward Lewis Davidson, Jr., of
several counts of second degree burglary, criminal mischief, and
theft. He appeals his convictions, contending that the trial court
erred (1) by permitting three detectives to testify that they had
identified him as a suspect in their investigation and (2) by joining
two of his cases. We disagree with these contentions and therefore
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 After a lengthy investigation, police identified Davidson as a
suspect in a string of burglaries occurring between late 2021 and
early 2022.1 During these burglaries, two or three people stole large
quantities of cigarettes and vaping products from convenience
stores. Police identified Philip Owens, who was Davidson’s
roommate, and Derek Jones as the other two suspects.
¶3 Cameras in the stores captured video footage of the 2022
burglaries. At least two men were visible in all the videos and a
third was present in two of the videos. Police first identified Owens
because the suspects used a truck registered to him during at least
1 El Paso County Case No. 22CR658 (2022 burglaries).
1 one of the burglaries. In the truck, police found several objects and
clothing items that appeared similar to those in the surveillance
videos. Owens also had a distinctive neck tattoo that was visible in
at least one video. Police identified Jones because he did not cover
his face during one of the burglaries.
¶4 After he was arrested, Jones called Davidson from jail,
prompting police to investigate Davidson’s participation in the
burglaries. They learned that Davidson and Owens lived together in
Davidson’s house. Detectives later obtained a warrant directed to
Davidson’s cell phone service provider, which produced texts
referencing “selling smokes” and “cartons for sale,” and stating, “I
was in the middle of a lick when you called,” which a detective
testified was slang for a theft or burglary.
¶5 The People eventually charged Davidson with second degree
burglary, criminal mischief, theft, possession of burglary tools, and
attempted second degree burglary (twelve counts total) for these
crimes.
¶6 In early 2023, the police investigated another string of
burglaries that were similar to the 2022 burglaries. Again, the
perpetrators stole large quantities of cigarettes and vaping
2 products. Police identified Davidson in the video surveillance from
the stores based on common clothing — including a plaid jacket —
as well as “physical characteristics and movements” and his “height
and weight.” Police also determined that the same laundry bag
used in the 2022 burglaries — a black bag with white cursive
writing on it — was used in the 2023 burglaries.
¶7 After reviewing still photos obtained from the video of a body-
worn camera during a traffic stop of Davidson, detectives identified
Davidson as the third suspect. At the time of the traffic stop,
Davidson was driving a vehicle that was recorded on surveillance
video leaving the scene of one of the burglaries. Police found in the
vehicle items of clothing and a black laundry bag that appeared
similar to those seen in the 2023 surveillance videos. The
prosecution eventually filed a second case charging Davidson with
twelve counts total of second degree burglary, criminal mischief,
and theft for the 2023 burglaries.2
¶8 Prior to trial, despite Davidson’s objection, the court
consolidated the 2022 and 2023 cases but declined to consolidate a
2 El Paso County Case No. 23CR1451.
3 separate case involving a burglary charge from 2021. At the
consolidated trial, three detectives testified how and why their
investigations led them to identify Davidson as a primary suspect in
both the 2022 and 2023 burglaries. The jury convicted Davidson
on five counts of second degree burglary, four counts of criminal
mischief, and six counts of theft.
II. Analysis
A. Detective Identifications
¶9 Davidson contends that the trial court erred by permitting the
three detectives to testify about their identification of Davidson as a
suspect in both strings of burglaries. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Preservation
¶ 10 “[A] witness cannot testify that he believes that the defendant
committed the crime at issue.” People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 31.
However, “[a] lay witness may testify about the identity of a person
depicted in a surveillance video ‘if there is some basis for
concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the
defendant from the [video] than is the jury.” People v. Grant, 2021
COA 53, ¶ 64 (quoting Robinson v. People, 927 P.2d 381, 384 (Colo.
1996)).
4 ¶ 11 “We review evidentiary rulings, including those concerning the
admission of lay witness testimony, for an abuse of discretion.”
People v. Williams, 2025 COA 26, ¶ 28. “A trial court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, or when it misapplies the law.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 12 The parties agree that this issue was not raised in the trial
court and therefore is unpreserved. See People v. Ujaama, 2012
COA 36, ¶ 37. So we review for plain error. Id. at ¶ 40. “Plain
error assumes that the [trial] court should have intervened sua
sponte because the error was so obvious” that no objection was
required to bring it to the court’s attention. Id. at ¶ 42 (citation
omitted). To warrant reversal, plain error must not only be obvious,
but also so prejudicial that it “undermine[s] the fundamental
fairness of the trial.” Id. at ¶ 43 (citation omitted).
¶ 13 Additional Facts
¶ 14 During trial, three detectives testified. Detective Rebecca
Rannow was the first. She testified about her extensive
investigation of the 2022 burglaries and a warrant she obtained
relating to Davidson’s phone. On redirect, the prosecutor asked
her, “Was there any one single factor that you based your
5 conclusion on that this was Mr. Davidson committing these
burglaries?” Detective Rannow stated, “There was a mountain of
different pieces of evidence that linked back to Mr. Davidson . . .
being suspect number one in these cases.”
¶ 15 Detective Monique Garcia testified that she was present during
an interview of Davidson; she also recounted her extensive review of
the burglary videos. During her direct testimony, the following
exchange occurred with the prosecutor:
Q: And through the course of your combined investigation, did you develop a common suspect or suspects?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who were those individuals?
A: It was Edward Davidson and Philip Owens.
¶ 16 Lastly, Detective Steven Collins testified that he primarily
investigated the 2023 burglaries. He stated that he initially did not
have any suspects for the 2023 burglaries until he shared the
surveillance footage with Garcia, who thought that one of the men
in the videos looked like Davidson. Collins testified about how
police attempted to identify the individuals in the videos based on
their distinguishing characteristics, including clothing, shoes,
6 movement, height, and shape. He also identified several objects in
the surveillance videos that appeared similar to items subsequently
found in Davidson’s possession, such as the black laundry bag with
white writing, a plaid jacket, and a pair of gloves that appeared in
one or more of the videos. Detective Collins also testified that he
obtained and reviewed photos of Davidson taken during the traffic
stop.
2. Analysis
¶ 17 Davidson argues that the three detectives “usurped the jury’s
role” by identifying him as a primary suspect in both strings of
burglaries. More specifically, in his opening brief he repeatedly
asserts that the detectives “opined that Davidson was guilty,” and
because identification was the central issue in the case, the
detectives’ testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the
trial and therefore warrants reversal under the plain error standard.
¶ 18 As a threshold matter, we find no record support for
Davidson’s assertion in his opening brief that the detectives “all
opined that . . . Davidson committed the crimes, and that the
detectives know this simply because they know.” Davidson did not
cite any portion of the record to support this claim or similar
7 assertions that appear throughout the opening brief. Moreover, our
review of the record reveals no testimony from any detective in
which they opined that Davidson was guilty of any of the asserted
¶ 19 In his reply brief, Davidson implicitly concedes that the
detectives did not offer such opinions of guilt: “Even if the detectives
did not use the term ‘guilty,’ the testimony was unequivocal that
Davidson was one of the men in the videos committing the crimes.”
But there is a wide gulf between identifying a person in a video and
opining that the person is guilty of the charged crime. See Gallegos
v. People, 403 P.2d 864, 873 (Colo. 1965) (“[T]o say [the witness]
identified the defendants does not give rise to the conclusion that
they were, therefore, guilty of the crime charged.”); Robinson, 927
P.2d at 384. The first is permitted in appropriate circumstances;
the second is improper. So we now turn to the properly framed
issue: whether the trial court erred by admitting the detectives’ lay
testimony identifying Davidson as one of the suspects in the videos.
¶ 20 In evaluating the propriety of lay witness testimony, we first
look to CRE 701, which authorizes a lay witness to provide
“opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
8 perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness’[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.” As previously noted, a court may
admit a lay opinion identifying a suspect in a video if there is some
basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly
identify the suspect than the jury. Id.
¶ 21 Here, the detectives reviewed surveillance videos in which the
perpetrators’ facial features were either obstructed or not captured.
They testified that Davidson was a primary suspect and described
their investigative and identification processes. In doing so, the
detectives explained their perceptions of the perpetrators’
movements, builds, heights, and clothing, as well as the tools they
used.
¶ 22 The detectives also testified that they identified Davidson as a
primary suspect based on the videos and then verified that
suspicion through other means:
• They reviewed still shots taken by a body-worn camera
during Davidson’s traffic stop.
9 • They determined the ownership of Owens’s truck that
was used in one of the burglaries.
• They learned that Davidson and Owens lived together
and that Jones called Davidson from jail.
• They found that another car used to flee one of the
burglaries was the car Davidson was driving at the time
of a subsequent traffic stop.
• They found in that car several items of clothing and
accessories that were similar to those appearing in the
videos.
Detectives Rannow and Collins also testified to interviewing
Davidson face-to-face.3
¶ 23 Rannow’s testimony also discussed her investigation into the
2022 burglaries and that there were several pieces of evidence
linking Davidson to the burglaries, not just her perception of the
men in the videos. Collins likewise discussed his investigation into
the 2023 burglaries and finding several clothing items and tools in
Davidson’s possession that also resembled those in the videos.
3 Detective Garcia was also present during that interview.
10 ¶ 24 Davidson primarily takes issue with Garcia’s testimony. He
argues that Collins and Rannow both stated that Davidson was a
suspect only because Garcia told them so. But even if Garcia first
identified Davidson as a potential suspect in both strings of
burglaries, both Rannow and Collins testified about the many other
pieces of evidence that tied Davidson to these crimes. Therefore,
their identification of Davidson as one of the suspects was not
based solely on Garcia’s identification.
¶ 25 The detectives’ lay opinions were helpful to the jury. See
Robinson, 927 P.2d at 384. The identifications were grounded in
their intense study of the videos along with other evidence they
collected across the multiple burglaries. Thus, we perceive no
abuse of discretion — much less plain error — in the admission of
their testimony explaining why Davidson was a primary suspect in
these burglaries. See id.; Gallegos, 403 P.2d at 873.
B. Joinder of Cases
¶ 26 Davidson next contends that the trial court erred by joining
the two cases. Specifically, he reasons that the relevance of the two
sets of burglaries to each other was minimal because they were
separated by fifteen months and there were several aspects of the
11 2022 burglaries that were not present in the 2023 burglaries.
Davidson argues that the perceived marginal relevance was
substantially outweighed by the prejudice associated with joining
the multiple offenses for a single trial, and therefore reversal is
warranted. We are not persuaded.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 27 “The decision to consolidate cases is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 983, 985
(Colo. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the joinder
causes “actual prejudice as a result of the jury’s inability to
separate the facts and legal theories applicable to each offense.
There is no prejudice where evidence of each [offense] would be
admissible in separate trials.” Id. at 985-86 (citation omitted).
¶ 28 Under Crim. P. 8(a)(2),
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar character or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
12 Crim. P. 13 allows the court to join cases, subject to the provisions
of Crim. P. 14. And Rule 14 provides that a defendant is entitled to
a separate trial if the court determines that a joint trial would result
in the prosecution presenting inadmissible, and prejudicial,
evidence.
¶ 29 CRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of other acts is not
admissible if it is used to prove the character of a person and that
the person acted in conformity with that character on a particular
occasion. However, evidence of prior bad acts can be admitted
under CRE 404(b)(2) if the evidence is relevant to proving, among
other things, “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” When
determining the admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts under CRE 404(b), a court must apply the
factors listed in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 30 Spoto provides a four-part test for determining whether
evidence is admissible under CRE 404(b): (1) the evidence must
relate to a material fact; (2) the evidence must be logically relevant;
(3) the logical relevance must be “independent of the intermediate
inference . . . that the defendant has a bad character” and therefore
13 is acting in conformity with that bad character; and (4) the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Spoto, 795 P.2d at
1318.
¶ 31 With these standards in mind, we turn to the substance of the
court’s ruling to join the two cases.
¶ 32 Several weeks before trial, the prosecution filed a motion to
join the 2022 and 2023 burglary cases with another burglary case
filed in 2022,4 and it provided notice of its intent to introduce
evidence of similar transactions. The court reviewed the motion
and joined the 2022 and 2023 burglary cases, leaving the other
2022 case (charging a burglary of a private residence) to stand
alone in a separate trial because the facts of that case were
significantly different from those of the others.5
4 El Paso County Case No. 22CR4289. 5 In addition to being a burglary of a house rather than a
convenience store, the trial court noted that the items taken in Case No. 22CR4289 included medications and personal items, not smoking- or vaping-related products.
14 ¶ 33 In its analysis, the court noted that although the 2022 and
2023 burglaries occurred over a year apart, they shared enough
common facts that they could be construed as part of a common
scheme. These commonalties included the time of day the
burglaries occurred; how the perpetrators got into the stores; the
type of goods stolen; the type of equipment used; and the masks,
clothing, and physical similarities of the suspects in each burglary.
Based on these similarities, the court determined that there was a
sufficient factual basis to establish a common scheme or plan,
which fulfilled the requirements of joinder under Crim. P. 8(a)(2).
See Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26, ¶¶ 41, 66 (joinder of charges
was proper because “the two cases shared common evidence, and
the investigations in the cases were intertwined”).
¶ 34 The trial court also found that evidence of the respective cases
would be cross-admissible in each case under CRE 404(b) and
Spoto if the cases were tried separately. This was so, the court
reasoned, because the evidence was relevant to material facts — the
common plan or scheme and the identity of Davidson as one of the
perpetrators — and that relevance was not substantially outweighed
15 by any nonprobative prejudice associated with the evidence. See
CRE 403.
¶ 35 Davidson argues that the trial court erred by joining the cases
because the offenses were too attenuated in time to be considered
part of a common plan or scheme. We discern no error in the trial
court’s conclusion to the contrary.
¶ 36 Two or more criminal cases may be joined together if the
offense could have been joined in a single complaint, provided that
the joinder does not prejudice the defendant. See Crim. P. 13;
Crim. P. 14. Crim. P. 8(a)(2), in turn, allows two or more offenses to
be charged in a single complaint if the offenses are of the same or
similar character. Davidson argues that the offenses were not of
the same or similar character, pointing to the passage of more than
a year between the underlying crimes in the 2022 and 2023
burglaries. While we agree that the passage of time between the
two series of burglaries was a relevant consideration, we conclude
that the passage of fifteen months did not necessarily bar the
admission of related crimes under CRE 404(b). See Bondsteel, ¶ 40
(assaults separated by six months); see also People v. Janes, 942
P.2d 1331, 1336 (Colo. App. 1997) (concluding, in a sexual assault
16 case, that the seven-year time difference between the crimes
charged and the prior bad acts did not negate the relevance of
evidence showing a common method of operation); State v. Rutchik,
341 N.W.2d 639, 646 (Wis. 1984) (evidence of the defendant’s prior
burglary, committed several years before the current charge, was
relevant and admissible to show common scheme or plan).
¶ 37 Davidson is correct that these crime sprees were separated by
more than a year. There were also minor differences in the clothing
worn by the perpetrators in some of the videos. See People v. Rath,
44 P.3d 1033, 1042 (Colo. 2002) (noting that when other crime
evidence is offered solely to prove that the defendant committed the
charged offense, the distinctiveness and similarity of the crimes
must be greater than when the prior crime is offered to prove one of
the many other purposes set forth in CRE 404(b)). But given the
multiple similarities of the offenses, we conclude that the passage of
fifteen months did not preclude joinder.
¶ 38 We next turn to Davidson’s contention that the joinder was
impermissible because the evidence of each offense would not have
been admissible at separate trials. Initially, we note that “joinder
under Crim. P. 8(a)(2) does not always require the evidence of the
17 respective incidents to be cross-admissible were there to be
separate trials.” Bondsteel, ¶ 44. Indeed, if the cases are of the
same or similar character, “joinder under Crim. P. 8(a)(2) is proper
regardless of whether the evidence would be cross-admissible in
separate trials.” Id. In view of our prior conclusion that the 2022
burglaries and 2023 burglaries were of the same or similar
character, the trial court’s CRE 404(b) analysis is arguably
irrelevant.
¶ 39 In any event, we discern no error in the trial court’s analysis
under CRE 404(b) and Spoto. The first three Spoto factors have to
do with the relevance of the evidence. Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318.
The evidence of other burglaries — with similar methods of entry,
times of day, tools used, and objects taken — is related because it
illustrates a common plan or scheme and points towards the
identity of Davidson as one of the burglars. The relevance of the
collective burglaries was independent of the potential inference that
Davidson simply had a bad character because the focus remained
on the facts demonstrating how the other crimes were committed
and by whom.
18 ¶ 40 Nor was the evidence unduly prejudicial. As the trial court
noted, the common features of, and the methods used by, the
burglars depicted in the videos far outweighed their dissimilarities.
Certainly, the differences were not so numerous or substantial that
their prejudicial impact substantially outweighed the probative
value of their commonalities. See CRE 403(b); Rath, 44 P.3d at
1043 (“Although there were obvious differences in the
circumstances surrounding each transaction admitted in this
prosecution, they shared a number of significant characteristics
that evidenced a pattern of behavior . . . .”). Thus, we conclude that
the noted differences went to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.
¶ 41 Moreover, the consolidated cases were not disparate in terms
of the severity of the offenses committed. For example, this is not a
case in which a homicide charge was consolidated with an
unrelated burglary charge. The risk created by consolidating cases
involving such disparate charges is that the jurors’ passions may be
inflamed by the more severe crime and thereby blur their objectivity
in assessing the merits of the less severe unrelated charge. See
People v. Brown, 2014 COA 130M, ¶ 22 (noting that CRE 404(b)
19 evidence is “unduly prejudicial when it is more inflammatory,
sensational, or disturbing than the charged offense” (citing United
States v. Midyett, 603 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2009))). Here,
in contrast, the consolidated cases, and the charges therein, were
all burglaries. Thus, no risk of potential unfair prejudice was
created by the consolidation.
¶ 42 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining the two
cases.
III. Disposition
¶ 43 The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE GROVE concur.