23CA0005 Peo v Czeponis 11-14-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0005 Boulder County District Court No. 19CR2137 Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Michael David Czeponis,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Fox and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 14, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Lauretta A. Martin Neff, Alternate Defense Counsel, Montrose, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Michael David Czeponis (Czeponis), appeals the
judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of
five counts of sexual assault on a child and one count each of
criminal mischief, assault, cruelty to animals, and harassment.
¶2 He contends that the district court erred by (1) giving a time-
fused deliberation instruction and making a mid-deliberation juror
replacement, depriving him of a fair trial; and (2) allowing the jury
to rewatch A.S.’s forensic interview during deliberations. We
disagree with his contentions and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶3 Czeponis and his five children, A.S., E.S., K.C., S.C., and M.C.,
lived in an apartment. Due to housing instability, Czeponis’ friends
and their three children, T.L., S.L., and A.L., later moved in with
Czeponis and his children. Czeponis spent a lot of time with the
children, as well as K.L., who was a friend of the children.
¶4 One day, Czeponis and his oldest daughter, A.S., got into an
argument over A.S.’s relationship with her partner. Czeponis lost
his temper and punched A.S. giving her a bloody nose and black
eye. During the same incident, Czeponis also injured his friends’
dog; poured alcohol on E.S.’s bed; kicked E.S.; and sent threatening
1 text messages to R.E., A.S.’s partner. Czeponis then got drunk and
added graffiti to a skate park with angry language targeting his
children.
¶5 A few days after this incident, the friends’ child T.L. disclosed
to family and social workers that Czeponis had been sexually
assaulting her. T.L. stated in a forensic interview that, on several
instances, Czeponis had touched her breasts and vagina. And on at
least one occasion, T.L. woke up naked, and Czeponis was touching
her breasts and vagina with his hands and mouth and then rubbed
his penis against the outside of T.L.’s vagina. Following this
interview, all the children were removed from Czeponis’ home.
¶6 Five days later, A.S. recounted the events that led to Czeponis
punching her. In addition to the physical assault, A.S. disclosed
that Czeponis had inappropriately touched her and that he would
cuddle with her while he was completely naked. Ten months after
A.S.’s interview, S.L. came forward and accused Czeponis of
inappropriately touching her. S.L. stated that Czeponis touched
her breasts over her bra on several occasions.
¶7 About six months after S.L.’s disclosure, K.L., the friend of
Czeponis’ children, stated in a forensic interview that on two
2 separate occasions Czeponis pushed her up against a wall and then
ran his hand up under her shirt and touched her bra.
¶8 Czeponis was charged with five counts of sexual assault on a
child — two counts of sexual assault on a child by one in a position
of trust – pattern of abuse (T.L. and A.S.); two counts of sexual
assault on a child by one in a position of trust – victim less than
fifteen and as part of a pattern of abuse (S.L. and K.L.); and sexual
assault on a child – pattern of abuse (T.L.) — two counts of third
degree assault (A.S. (punch) and A.S. (choke)); child abuse (S.L.);
two counts of harassment (S.L. and E.S.); criminal mischief; cruelty
to animals; and violation of a protection order.
¶9 Czeponis did not testify at trial but defended on theories that
there was no corroborating evidence, and the children were
motivated to get out of a bad living situation. A jury convicted
Czeponis on all charges but acquitted him of third degree assault
(A.S. (choke)) and child abuse (S.L.).1 He was sentenced to sixty-six
years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
1 The harassment and violation of a protection order charges were
severed and dismissed after Czeponis’ conviction.
3 II. Time-Fused Deliberation and Alternate Juror
¶ 10 Czeponis contends that the district court misspoke and gave
the jury a time-fuse instruction depriving him of a fair trial. He also
contends that the court’s error was further exacerbated when the
jury had to begin deliberations anew with an alternate juror. We
disagree.
A. Additional Facts
¶ 11 After the first day of deliberations, the district court told the
jury, “[The bailiff] has been in communication with the alternate
jurors and they remain available as alternates, but it remains most
efficient if you are able to complete the deliberations tomorrow.”
(Emphasis added.) The next morning, outside of the presence of the
jury, defense counsel asked the court, “When we were breaking last
night with the jurors, I might have misheard, but I thought I heard
the Court say something about it would be most efficient if you
could complete your deliberations tomorrow, meaning today.” The
district court interrupted and stated, “I hope you did. The Court
said, of course, we have the alternates available, but it would be
most efficient if the [jury] would be able to return tomorrow to
complete [its] deliberation.” Defense counsel replied, “That’s
4 probably what you said. And I, in my sleep deprived state, heard it
wrong.” Czeponis did not seek any further inquiry or relief.
¶ 12 The district court and the parties then continued their
conversation about the need to replace a juror who was unavailable
to continue deliberations due to an emergency. The district court
brought in the eleven remaining members of the jury, explained
that one of the previous jurors was unable to continue
deliberations, and inquired whether the jurors would be able to
“incorporate a new juror into [the] deliberations and begin anew.”
The district court gave the jurors an opportunity to meet and
discuss this development in private.
¶ 13 The jury returned; the court confirmed with each member of
the jury that they could begin deliberations anew by setting aside
any prior discussions. The district court then conducted a detailed
inquiry into the alternate juror before adding her to the jury,
ensuring that the juror heeded the court’s instructions even though
she was not a member of the original twelve jurors. The court
provided the jury with new verdict forms, at the jury’s request, and
the alternate juror joined the deliberations.
5 B. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 14 The Attorney General argues that Czeponis waived the time-
fused instruction issue. We conclude that Czeponis forfeited it.
¶ 15 The purpose of an objection is to afford the district court “an
opportunity to focus on the issue and hopefully avoid the error.”
Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 22 (quoting Martinez v. People, 244
P.3d 135, 139 (Colo. 2010)). “[M]erely calling an issue or fact to the
court’s attention, without asking for any relief, is insufficient to
preserve an issue for review.” Id. at ¶ 23. But here, the court’s
response to defense counsel implies its recognition that if it had
given the jury a time limitation, such would have been improper.
This position is reflected when the court said that it “hope[d]” that
defense counsel misheard the court’s statement. But even though
defense counsel brought this issue to the court’s attention, there
was no further inquiry or relief sought. In this situation, we
conclude that this issue is, at most, forfeited.
¶ 16 Forfeiture is “the failure to make the timely assertion of a
right” and generally occurs through neglect. Id. at ¶ 29; People v.
Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 41-44 (acquiescence is forfeiture, not
6 waiver). Unlike waiver, forfeiture does not extinguish appellate
review, and therefore, we review for plain error. Forgette, ¶ 30.
¶ 17 Plain error is error that is both “obvious and substantial” and
that “so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so
as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of
conviction.” People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)
(quoting People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Colo. 2003)).
¶ 18 “[W]ith respect to jury instructions, reversal under a plain
error standard requires a defendant to ‘demonstrate not only that
the instruction affected a substantial right, but also that the record
reveals a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to his [or
her] conviction.’” People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001)
(quoting Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 255-56 (Colo. 1997)).
“[A]n erroneous jury instruction does not normally constitute plain
error where the issue is not contested at trial or where the record
contains overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Miller,
113 P.3d at 750.
¶ 19 Czeponis preserved his argument that the district court’s time-
fuse instruction deprived him of a fair trial.
7 C. Time-Fuse Jury Instruction
¶ 20 Defense counsel was correct that the court misspoke because
the court’s instruction suggested that the jury must complete
deliberations by the end of the next day. Although we agree with
Czeponis that the district court’s jury instruction was erroneous, we
conclude it is not reversible error.
¶ 21 It is the district court’s duty to instruct the jury on all matters
of law. Garcia, 28 P.3d at 343. “We review de novo whether a
particular jury instruction correctly states the law.” People v.
Nerud, 2015 COA 27, ¶ 35.
¶ 22 There is no per se ban on “time-fuse” jury instructions in
Colorado. Cf. Goff v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971);
Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966). Rather,
our supreme court has chosen a “case-by-case examination of the
particular facts of each case where the instruction is given” to
determine whether the time-fuse instruction has a coercive effect.
Allen v. People, 660 P.2d 896, 899 (Colo. 1983).
¶ 23 For four reasons, we are not convinced the erroneous
instruction constituted plain error.
8 ¶ 24 First, the district court made its incorrect statement while
referencing the potential need for alternate jurors and how it would
remain most efficient if the original jurors were able to complete
deliberations without substitutions. And the court’s statement did
not stress the time deadline or threaten a mistrial. See People v.
Fell, 832 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Colo. App. 1991); Goff, 446 F.2d at 626.
Nor did the court say that the jury had to meet the purported
deadline, only that it would be “most efficient” if it did so.
¶ 25 Second, the jury heard the district court read through the
formal instructions and received copies of the same. The formal
instructions had no mention of any deadline. Johnson v. People,
2019 CO 17, ¶ 16 (“[W]e must presume that the jury followed all of
the court’s instructions.”); Smit v. Anderson, 72 P.3d 369, 375
(Colo. App. 2002) (Absent a contrary showing, jurors are “presumed
to have understood and heeded the trial court’s instructions.”).
Indeed, the alternate juror was instructed in the presence of the
other jurors to begin deliberations anew, the venire confirmed they
could conduct deliberations anew, and the court provided the jury
with new verdict forms.
9 ¶ 26 Third, time-fuse instructions generally have a “coercive effect”
when the court orders deliberations to be completed within a short
time period. See Allen, 660 P.2d at 898 (a fifteen-minute deadline
to reach a verdict before the court would declare a mistrial may
have prevented the jury from reaching a well-considered verdict);
People v. Hill, 355 N.Y.S.2d 612, 612 (App. Div. 1974) (per curium)
(a ten-minute deadline was coercive considering the court’s threat
that jurors would be sequestered overnight if they did not reach a
verdict); State v. Mason, 588 S.W.2d 731, 734-35 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (a fifteen-minute deadline was coercive). In this case, there
was an entire day of deliberations between the erroneous
instruction and the verdict.
¶ 27 But even if we were to consider the district court’s statement
about the alternates out of context, the parties have not cited, nor
are we aware of, any Colorado case law finding a “time-fuse”
instruction to be coercive when the jury was provided a full day to
deliberate. Our conclusion is bolstered by two other considerations
on this point. There was no evidence that the jury was then
deadlocked and that this erroneous instruction caused them to
reach a verdict. Cf. Gibbons, ¶ 35; People v. Lazdins, 728 P.2d 354,
10 355-56 (Colo. App. 1986). And the jury returned a split verdict
indicating that they considered the evidence and that the error did
not contribute to the verdict. See Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789,
795-96 (Colo. 1987).
¶ 28 Fourth and finally, there was substantial evidence supporting
the verdict. There were four outcry witnesses who made claims
against Czeponis. Three of the outcry witnesses came forward after
they were already out of Czeponis’ house and no longer living with
or relying on him for care. And the prosecution presented text
message screenshots between S.L. and Czeponis demonstrating
Czeponis’ manipulative and inappropriate tendencies.
¶ 29 The victim outcries and statements reflect age-appropriate
descriptions of the assaults. See Pierson v. People, 2012 CO 47, ¶
19 (“[T]he sexual knowledge displayed by the child-victim in this
case involved little more than a basic awareness of male sexual
anatomy and an awareness that applying pressure to her own
external genitalia could be painful.”). T.L. stated Czeponis was
rubbing her “lower area,” and she was “scared and confused.” T.L.
was “visibly upset, sniffling and appeared to be wiping away tears”
during her forensic interview.
11 ¶ 30 In fact, all victims appeared shaken and scared when giving
their forensic interviews. K.L. stated that Czeponis “pushed [me] up
against the wall and hurt me; sexually assaulted me, I guess.” She
continued, he “held me there and touched me in places where a
grown man shouldn’t touch a little girl.” She stated, “[H]e touched
my top area.” S.L. stated that Czeponis forced her to cuddle with
him, and he would “run his hand up and down her leg and side and
chest area.” S.L. also said that Czeponis, while cuddling with her,
made her put her hand “really close” to his penis.
¶ 31 Accordingly, we discern no reversible error.
D. Alternate Juror
¶ 32 Czeponis argues that the incorporation of an alternate
juror the next morning “exacerbate[d] this time pressure,” and he
suggests that the cumulative impact of the “mistaken time-fuse”
and “mid-deliberation juror substitution” deprived him of a fair
trial. We disagree.
¶ 33 In Castro v. People, 2024 CO 56, ¶ 75, our supreme court
reaffirmed its case law holding that, while a mid-deliberation
replacement of a juror raises a presumption of prejudice to the
defendant’s right to a fair trial, the presumption may be rebutted if
12 the district court follows the procedures in People v. Burnette, 775
P.2d 583, 588 (Colo. 1989). See also Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d
478, 490 (Colo. 1999). Burnette identified specific concerns that,
because of a mid-deliberation substitution, the substitute juror
• may not have a realistic opportunity to express her views
and to persuade others;
• will not have been part of the dynamics of the prior
deliberations, including the interplay of influences among
and between jurors, that advanced the other jurors along
their paths to a decision;
• will not have the benefit of the unavailable juror’s views;
and
• may be thrust into service due to a lone juror who cannot
in good conscience vote for conviction and feigns illness
in order to place the burden of decision on an alternate.
Burnette, 775 P.2d at 588. To overcome the presumption of
prejudice, Burnette indicates a court should take “extraordinary
precautions” such as
13 • instructing the alternate that she is not discharged, must
continue to follow the court’s instructions, and must not
form an opinion based on external information;
• questioning the alternate about her activities and
information received after being released and whether he
or she followed the court’s instructions;
• instructing the original jurors that they must put their
previous deliberations out of their minds and begin
deliberations anew;
• asking the original jurors individually if they can put
their prior deliberations out of their minds and start over;
• asking the original jurors if they can be receptive to the
alternate’s attempt to assert a nonconforming view.
See id. at 590-91; see also Carrillo, 974 P.2d at 491-93.
¶ 34 Further, “an appellate court must be satisfied that ‘under the
circumstances of the case, the precautions were adequate to
achieve that result.’” Carrillo, 974 P.2d at 493 (quoting Burnette,
775 P.2d at 590). Castro, ¶ 75, went through the precautions
undertaken by the district court in that case and indicated the
14 procedure was a “model for trial courts” confronted with
substitution of a juror mid-deliberation.
¶ 35 We conclude that any presumption of prejudice the alternate
juror substitution caused was rebutted by the district court’s
precautions, which substantially included the procedures from
Castro and Burnette.
¶ 36 It explained the situation clearly and gave the original jurors
time to think about and discuss whether they would be able to
properly include the alternate juror. The jury convened for about
five to seven minutes. When the jury returned, the district court
instructed the eleven jurors that they must incorporate and respect
the alternate juror’s opinions, that they must inform the alternate of
any previous discussions, and that any partial verdicts reached
“would need to be set aside, [and must incorporate] the new juror’s
opinions and positions, perspectives before finalizing any verdict.”
See Johnson, ¶ 16. The foreperson of the original jury stated that,
after a private discussion with the jury panel, “we felt comfortable
integrating the alternate juror.” And the district court polled each
of the original jurors to ensure that the foreperson’s statement was
accurate as to every juror.
15 ¶ 37 The court also took all appropriate precautions with respect to
the alternate juror. Before seating the alternate, the court gave her
specific instructions to follow the court’s previous directives, to not
form an opinion about the case, and to keep an open mind. The
district court ensured that the alternate juror “did not have any
communication with anyone about the trial” and that the juror did
“not research any issues concerning the trial.” The court confirmed
that the alternate juror was not approached by anyone about the
case, had not formed any opinions, and was not exposed to any
information concerning the case. And at the conclusion of
evidence, the district court did not discharge the alternate jurors
but advised them of their ongoing responsibilities, although they
would not begin deliberations with the twelve original jurors.
¶ 38 The court provided the jurors with new verdict forms, and the
jurors, after the alternate was placed, posed a question to the court,
indicating that the jurors started deliberations anew. The jurors
deliberated for nearly an entire day before reaching a split verdict.
This is even longer than in Castro, where that jury’s deliberations of
five and a half hours was noted by the supreme court to be “a
16 substantial amount of time to deliberate.” Castro, ¶ 80.2 And there
was no evidence presented that the dismissed juror was a lone
holdout for acquittal.
¶ 39 Because the district court painstakingly followed the
procedures outlined in Burnette and Carrillo, and because the
specific circumstances of this case do not demonstrate that
Czeponis was prejudiced, we conclude that the district court’s
substitution of an alternate juror did not deprive him of a fair trial.
III. A.S.’s Forensic Interview
¶ 40 Czeponis contends that the district court failed to fulfill its
responsibility to guard against unfair or prejudicial use of A.S.’s
forensic interview during jury deliberations prejudicing Czeponis.
We disagree.
2 We acknowledge that, unlike in Castro v. People, 2024 CO 56,
¶ 77, the court in this case did not take any notes the jurors may have had in their possession from the first deliberation. But the district court substantially complied with the procedures from Castro and People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583, 590 (Colo. 1989), and given the amount of time they deliberated, the record does not indicate that the possession of any notes adversely affected the jury beginning deliberations anew.
17 A. Additional Facts
¶ 41 After the court seated the alternate juror, the jury asked the
court if it could review A.S.’s forensic interview. The district court
noted its inclination was to say, “[Y]es” and that “[j]urors are
referred to the information in the court’s policy for electronic
exhibits, reminded to not give special weight to this evidence, and
asked to review jury instruction number 9 and instruction number
25.” The prosecution agreed with the district court.
¶ 42 Czeponis objected, citing DeBella v. People, 233 P.3d 664
(Colo. 2010), and People v. Jefferson, 2017 CO 35. Czeponis argued
that the video “operate[s] as the functional equivalent of unsworn
testimony, unsworn and unconfronted,” and that since the jury will
not be able to rewatch the testimony provided in the court room,
viewing the forensic interview again will have “undue weight.”
Czeponis argued that it would violate “his rights to cross-
examination and confrontation, violat[ing] due process and a fair
trial.”
¶ 43 Although Czeponis maintained his objection, he stated that if
the video was going to be shown to the jury, it should be “done in
the courtroom with all of us present, and the court reading the
18 limiting instruction as opposed to anyone else.” The prosecutor
responded that A.S. testified in court, and Czeponis had the
opportunity to cross-examine her but chose not to do so.
¶ 44 The district court concluded that the jury could view the video.
The court reiterated the instructions it had already given to the jury
and noted that the video included limiting instructions at three
separate times. The court noted that A.S. was also present and
available for cross-examination after she testified.
¶ 45 In response to the jury’s questions, the district court
responded, “Yes. Please: (1) refer to the letter addressing viewing of
electronic exhibits; (2) do not give special weight to this evidence;
and (3) review jury instructions #9 and #25.” The jury then
rewatched A.S.’s forensic interview in the courtroom, and the bailiff
read the limiting instructions three times. In relation to the charges
concerning only A.S., the jury found Czeponis guilty of sexual
assault on a child by one in a position of trust and guilty of one
count of third degree assault (punch) but not guilty of the other
count of third degree assault (choking).
19 B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 46 “[C]ontrol over the use of exhibits during jury deliberations
remains firmly within the discretion of the trial court.” DeBella, 233
P.3d at 666; Jefferson, ¶¶ 25, 29.
¶ 47 “It is a long-standing principle of appellate review that an
appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the
trial court where a matter is committed to the trial court’s
discretion.” Debella, 233 P.3d at 666. Therefore, appellate courts
will not disturb the district court’s decision unless the decision “was
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair” or if “it misapplie[d]
the law.” Jefferson, ¶ 25.
¶ 48 Not all abuses of discretion warrant reversal. Debella, 233
P.3d at 667. “Only those erroneous rulings that ‘substantially
influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial’ should be
upset.” Id. (quoting People v. Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 310 (Colo. 2003)).
“However, if the influence of the error on the trial is apparent, or if
one is left ‘in grave doubt’ as to its effect on the verdict or the
fairness of the trial proceedings, the conviction cannot stand.” Id.
(quoting Welsh, 80 P.3d at 310).
20 C. Analysis
¶ 49 In Debella, our supreme court held that a district court failed
to ensure that evidence given to a jury with unfettered access
during deliberations would not be given undue weight or emphasis
because it “did not (1) give a limiting instruction with respect to the
victim’s videotaped statement; (2) wait for a jury request to review
the videotape; or (3) obtain counsel’s agreement to allow the jury to
have access to the tape.” 233 P.3d at 668 (quoting People v.
DeBella, 219 P.3d 390, 404 (Colo. App. 2009) (Daily, J.,
dissenting)).
¶ 50 In this case, however, the district court appropriately exercised
its discretion by limiting the jury’s access to A.S.’s forensic
interview. The district court waited for the jury to request a review
of a videotape. See Jefferson, ¶ 56 (citing Frasco v. People, 165 P.3d
701, 702 (Colo. 2007)). After hearing Czeponis’ objections to the
rewatching of the interview, the district court, in responding
affirmatively to the jury’s request, specifically instructed the jury to
“not give special weight to this evidence.” See id. at¶ 19; see Smit,
72 P.3d at 375.
21 ¶ 51 In addition to the “weight” instruction, the district court
instructed the jury to “review jury instructions #9 and #25.” Jury
instruction #9 stated, “You are again instructed that you cannot
consider that evidence except for the limited purpose I told you
about when it was admitted.” Jury instruction #25 identified the
evidence of out-of-court statements made by A.S. and instructed
the jury that it is its duty to “determine the weight and credit to be
given any such statements.” It further instructed the jury that it
should “consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of
the statements, the circumstances under which the statements
were made, and any other evidence that has been admitted that you
choose to consider for this purpose.”
¶ 52 The district court had also established rules controlling how
the jury was able to view the interview, which it reiterated in its
response to the jury’s request. The district court required the
exhibit to be “played or viewed once . . . in its entirety.” The district
court also prohibited “slow mode or fast forwarding” and instructed
the jury to “not deliberate in front of the bailiff.” See Jefferson, ¶ 57
(district courts have discretion to “craft alternative mitigation
22 procedures.” (citing DeBella, 233 P.3d at 669)). The jury watched
the video in the courtroom in the presence of the bailiff.
¶ 53 In this case, the district court exercised control over the jury’s
access to the videotape and “observe[d] caution” that the jury was
not giving undue weight to the video, and the video was one of
several videos depicting descriptions of Czeponis’ abuse. Id. at ¶ 38
(quoting DeBella, 233 P.3d at 669); see also People v. Johnson, 2016
COA 15, ¶¶ 38-40 (district court did not abuse its discretion when it
imposed certain restrictions and controlled access to the videotaped
interview); People v. Smalley, 2015 COA 140, ¶¶ 64-68 (district
court properly exercised its discretion when it waited for the jury to
request the recorded calls, sought input from counsel, assessed the
benefits of the exhibits to the jury and whether it would cause
undue prejudice, and then crafted a limiting instruction); cf.
Jefferson, ¶ 38.
¶ 54 The jury reached a split verdict as to A.S., acquitting Czeponis
of third degree assault (choking). This split verdict further suggests
that the jury was not unduly prejudiced by viewing A.S.’s forensic
video. See People v. Larsen, 2017 CO 29, ¶ 16 (An improper use of
23 prejudicial information “would have been reflected by across-the-
board guilty convictions.”).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 55 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.