Peo v. Craft

Opinion

24CA0905 Peo v Craft 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0905 Adams County District Court No. 21CR3982 Honorable Sean Finn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Colby Craft, Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Dunn and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Rheiner, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.

¶1 Defendant, Colby Craft, appeals the judgment of conviction entered after the district court revoked his deferred judgment and sentence (DJS). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Craft was originally charged with attempt to commit first degree assault following a domestic violence incident with his partner in which he illegally discharged a firearm. ¶3 Craft agreed to plead guilty to illegal discharge of a firearm as an act of domestic violence, the prosecution agreed to the dismissal of the original attempted assault charge, and the parties entered into an eighteen-month deferred judgment and sentence agreement (the agreement). After accepting the plea, the district court entered the DJS requiring Craft to successfully complete eighteen months of probation. ¶4 The agreement required Craft to comply with all terms and conditions of probation, including not committing any offense. It also provided,

In the event that the District Attorney or the Probation Department has probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of any of the conditions upon which the entry of a judgment of conviction and the imposition of

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sentence have been deferred, the District Attorney may file a written motion with the Court requesting the entry of a judgment of conviction on the defendant’s plea of guilty, and requesting the imposition of sentence, or other sentencing alternative . . . . The District Attorney’s motion shall set forth the time, the place, and the nature of the alleged violation of any condition upon which the entry of judgment and the imposition of sentence were deferred.

¶5 Six months before the deferral period was going to end, Craft’s probation officer filed a complaint and special report to revoke Craft’s DJS, alleging that Craft had violated terms of his probation. ¶6 Seventeen days after the deferral period ended, the district attorney filed a motion to revoke the DJS, alleging that Craft violated the same terms of his probation. ¶7 Craft filed a motion to dismiss the DJS, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his DJS because the agreement (1) provided that only the district attorney (not his probation officer) could file a motion to revoke and (2) didn’t provide that a motion to revoke could be filed after the deferral period ended. ¶8 The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the deferred judgment statute, § 18-1.3-102, C.R.S. 2025,

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controlled over the agreement. The court found that (1) the probation officer’s complaint and special report were sufficient to constitute a request for the DJS to be entered and (2) the district attorney’s motion to revoke was timely filed because it was filed within thirty-five days after the end of the deferral period. ¶9 Following the revocation hearing, the district court found that Craft had committed a new offense and thus had violated a term of his probation. The court therefore revoked his DJS and entered a judgment of conviction for illegal discharge of a firearm as an act of domestic violence.

II. Revocation of the DJS ¶ 10 Craft contends that the district court lacked authority to revoke his DJS because the district attorney didn’t file a motion to revoke within the deferral period, in violation of the agreement. We reject this contention.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 Whether the district court had authority to revoke Craft’s DJS requires us to interpret the deferred judgment statute and the agreement, both of which we review de novo. See McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37 (“We review issues of statutory interpretation de

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novo.”); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 960 (Colo. 1999) (interpreting a plea agreement is a question of law reviewed de novo). ¶ 12 The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. People v. Subjack, 2021 CO 10, ¶ 14. To do that, “we first look to the plain language of the statute.” Id. “If the plain language is unambiguous, we apply the statute as written.” Id. ¶ 13 Similarly, we look at the plain language of the agreement and resolve any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Craig, 986 P.2d at 960; People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 24. We don’t rewrite the agreement but interpret the reasonable intent of the parties to the agreement in light of the defendant’s right to be treated fairly by the government. Craig, 986 P.2d at 960-61.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 14 A deferred judgment is an alternative to a traditional guilty plea allowing a defendant to plead guilty but deferring entry of the judgment and sentence for a specified period of time. Williams v. People, 2019 CO 101, ¶ 20. Deferred judgments are “created and authorized by statute.” Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, ¶ 21. The statute “strictly controls a trial court’s authority to

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impose a deferred judgment, and a trial court lacks authority to impose a deferred judgment outside the statute’s limits.” Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Carbajal, 198 P.3d 102, 104 (Colo. 2008)). ¶ 15 Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the district court can continue the defendant’s case without entering a judgment for up to four years from the date of the plea and implement probation-like supervision conditions in return for the continuance. § 18-1.3-102(1)(a), (2). If the defendant complies with these conditions, then at the end of the deferral period, the court must withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea and dismiss with prejudice the charges underlying the deferred judgment. § 18-1.3-102(2). ¶ 16 “But, if the defendant violates ‘any condition regulating the conduct of the defendant,’ the court ‘shall enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty plea.’” Williams, ¶ 22 (quoting § 18-1.3-102(2)). The court is required to determine whether the defendant breached any condition of the deferred judgment “upon application of the district attorney or a probation officer and upon notice of hearing thereon.” § 18-1.3-102(2).

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¶ 17 As pertinent to this appeal, “[a]pplication for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence may be made by the district attorney or a probation officer at any time within the term of the deferred judgment or within thirty-five days thereafter.” Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 18 Craft contends that the agreement authorized only the district attorney to file a motion to revoke. He further contends that the agreement provided that the motion to revoke must be filed within the deferral period. Even assuming without deciding that his first contention is correct, we reject his second contention. We therefore conclude that the district court had authority to consider the district attorney’s motion to revoke. ¶ 19 The agreement didn’t provide that the district attorney’s motion to revoke must be filed within the term of the deferred judgment. Indeed, the agreement specified no time frame within which the motion must be made. Section 18-1.3-102(2) gives the district attorney thirty-five days after the end of the term of the deferred judgment to move for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence. The district attorney filed the motion to revoke seventeen

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days after the deferral period ended, and therefore the district court had authority to consider the motion. ¶ 20 We reject Craft’s remaining contentions. ¶ 21 Craft contends that the DJS wasn’t extended and therefore expired by operation of law on the date the deferral period ended. But, as noted, under the deferred judgment statute, the district attorney had thirty-five days after the deferral period ended to file a motion to revoke before the court would lose authority to consider it. See id.; Carbajal, 198 P.3d at 106-07 (noting that the district attorney had thirty-five days after the deferred judgment period expired by operation of law to file the motion to revoke for the trial court to hear it). ¶ 22 To the extent Craft argues on appeal that his due process rights were violated because the district court didn’t enforce the terms of the agreement, we reject that contention because, as discussed, the agreement can’t be read as Craft proposes. The district attorney complied with the agreement’s terms, and the court therefore didn’t fail to enforce the agreement.

III. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

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JUDGE DUNN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.