Peo v. Cordova

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 30, 2025
• Docket: 24CA0708
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0708 Peo v Cordova 01-30-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0708 El Paso County District Court Nos. 85CR1116 & 85CR1501 Honorable Samuel A. Evig, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Larry L. Cordova,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE LUM Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 30, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Larry L. Cordova, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Larry L. Cordova, appeals the district court’s

denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion alleging the unlawful revocation

of parole. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 1985, Cordova entered into a plea agreement to resolve

charges filed against him in two cases. Cordova pleaded guilty in

each case to one count of first degree sexual assault in exchange for

the dismissal of other charges. He stipulated to a sentence under

the Colorado Sex Offenders Act of 1968 in one case and a

determinate aggravated-range sentence in the other case. In

accordance with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced

Cordova, in the first case, to one day to life in the custody of the

Department of Corrections (DOC), and it imposed a concurrent

sixteen-year sentence to the DOC in the second case. Cordova filed

multiple postconviction motions in both cases, which were denied

by the district court and affirmed on appeal. See People v. Cordova,

(Colo. App. No. 96CA1927, Aug. 14, 1997) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Cordova, (Colo. App. No. 99CA0936, Jul.

6, 2000) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Cordova,

(Colo. App. No. 04CA2638, Apr. 20, 2006) (not published pursuant

1 to C.A.R. 35(f)); People v. Cordova, (Colo. App. No. 10CA1473, Jun.

30, 2011) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).

¶3 On February 29, 2024, Cordova filed a “Motion to Correct an

Unlawful Revocation of Parole under Crim. P. 35(c).” He asserted

that he had been released to parole in 2017 after serving thirty-two

years in the DOC. He further asserted that the parole board

revoked his parole two months after his release and “listed the

revocation period as the remainder of Cordova’s sentence,” which

was up to life. Cordova challenged the parole board’s action,

arguing that the statutes only authorized the board to set a

revocation period of the remainder of his parole period, which was

five years.

¶4 The district court denied Cordova’s motion in a written order.

The court found that the motion was untimely under section

16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2024, because Cordova had filed it more than

six years after his parole revocation. The court also denied the

motion on the merits, concluding that the statutory provisions

applicable to his conviction and sentence did not place a “five-year

cap . . . on any period of revocation.” Rather, the court determined,

2 Cordova’s revocation period of the remainder of his sentence — up

to life — was proper.

II. Discussion

¶5 Cordova contends that the district court erred by denying his

Crim. P. 35(c) motion. Specifically, he argues that (1) the three-year

time limitation under section 16-5-402(1) is not applicable to his

parole revocation challenge, and (2) the court erred by denying his

motion on the merits. Reviewing de novo, see People v. Cali, 2020

CO 20, ¶ 14, we conclude that Cordova’s challenge is untimely and

therefore do not address the merits.

¶6 Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(VII) permits a criminal defendant to seek

postconviction relief based on allegations that there has been an

unlawful revocation of parole. People v. Harper, 111 P.3d 482, 486

(Colo. App. 2004). Subject to exceptions not argued here, a

defendant convicted of a non-class 1 felony must seek

postconviction relief within three years of his conviction becoming

final. § 16-5-402(1); People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 671 (Colo. App.

2006) (if no direct appeal is sought, a conviction is final when the

trial court enters judgment and sentence is imposed).

3 ¶7 Cordova argues that section 16-5-402(1) is not applicable to

his claim because he is challenging his parole revocation, not his

conviction. But, “[b]ecause [Cordova] relies upon grounds that may

only be considered under Crim. P. 35(c), his motion is subject to the

time bar of § 16-5-402(1).” People v. Shepard, 151 P.3d 580, 585

(Colo. App. 2006) (applying section 16-5-402(1) to a probation

revocation challenge cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c)); see also

Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 377-78 (Colo. 1994) (applying section

16-5-402(1) to a parole revocation challenge under Crim. P. 35(c)

and concluding that defendant’s challenge wasn’t time barred

because he was convicted of a class 1 felony). And even if we

compute the start of the three-year time bar from the date of

Cordova’s parole revocation in 2017, he did not file his Crim. P.

35(c) motion until February 29, 2024, which is beyond the three-

year timeframe. See Shepard, 151 P.3d at 585. Furthermore,

Cordova doesn’t set forth any circumstances that might constitute

excusable neglect. His claim is therefore time barred.

III. Disposition

¶8 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.