24CA1708 Peo v Contreras 01-22-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1708 El Paso County District Court No. 17CR456 Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David Contreras, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Lindsey Parlin, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, David Contreras, Jr., appeals the district court’s
order denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion for sentence
reconsideration. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury found Contreras guilty of one count of sex assault on a
child and one count of aggravated sex assault on a child for
sexually abusing his thirteen-year-old sister-in-law. The jury
further found, as to each conviction, that Contreras applied force
against the victim, he was in a position of trust with the victim, and
the sexual assault was part of a pattern of sexual abuse. The
district court sentenced Contreras to a controlling term of fifteen
years to life. A division of this court affirmed his convictions. See
People v. Contreras, (Colo. App. No. 18CA1298, Sept. 9, 2021) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶3 Contreras timely filed a Crim. P. 35(b) motion asking the
district court to reduce his controlling sentence. In support of his
request, Contreras (1) detailed the steps he has taken while in
prison to improve himself; (2) submitted a Department of
Corrections assessment demonstrating his low recidivism risk; (3)
indicated that he and his family provide reciprocal support to each
1 other; (4) accepted responsibility for his convictions; (5) provided
letters of support from individuals familiar with him; and (6) argued
that reducing his minimum sentence would expedite his ability to
participate in the mandatory Sex Offender Treatment and
Monitoring Program, thereby advancing the rehabilitative goals of
his sentence.
¶4 The postconviction court conducted a hearing on Contreras’s
motion. It heard from several people, including Contreras and the
victim; listened to the parties’ arguments; and accepted written
statements from individuals who could not be present at the
hearing.
¶5 At the end of the hearing, the postconviction court denied
Conteras’s motion, explaining that a different judge had tried the
case and, “as a result[, it] very carefully reviewed the record[,] . . .
very carefully listened to everybody who” spoke at the hearing, and
“reviewed all the filings . . . including all the exhibits,
correspondence, et cetera” filed over the course of more than two
years while the motion was pending. In addition to the materials
that were related to the motion, the postconviction court reviewed
this court’s opinion affirming Contreras’s conviction, the trial court
2 record to the extent it was available, and the law applicable to Crim.
P. 35(b) motions. The postconviction court noted that, under Crim.
P. 35(b), it had “an affirmative obligation to exercise judicial
discretion in deciding whether to modify the sentence,” highlighted
the factors it was required to consider, and thoroughly reviewed the
evidence supporting and against Contreras’s motion. It noted that
the sentencing judge, who had presided over Contreras’s trial, “was
in a much better position . . . to determine what was appropriate,”
and then remarked, “Beyond that, I find the sentence appropriate
and necessary to promote respect for the law and deterrence.”
Thus, the postconviction court upheld the original sentence and
denied Contreras’s motion.
¶6 Later that day, the postconviction court issued a written order
denying the motion “for the reasons set out from the bench.”
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 Crim. P. 35(b) allows district courts an opportunity to
reconsider a sentence previously imposed before it becomes final.
People v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988). The district court’s
review of a Crim. P. 35(b) motion focuses on the fairness of the
sentence in light of the purposes of the sentencing laws. Ghrist v.
3 People, 897 P.2d 809, 812 (Colo. 1995). Any decision whether to
grant a motion for sentence reconsideration under Crim. P. 35(b) is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See People
v. Dunlap, 36 P.3d 778, 782 (Colo. 2001) (“Crim. P. 35(b) affords
trial judges a large amount of discretion when considering [a]
defendant’s motion.”); Ghrist, 897 P.2d at 814.
¶8 In ruling on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion, the district court should
consider all relevant and material factors, including new evidence
as well as facts known at the time the court pronounced the original
sentence. People v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1992). A
district court abuses its discretion in denying a Crim. P. 35(b)
motion only if it refuses to consider any information in mitigation
and fails to make findings in support of its decision. See Mikkleson
v. People, 618 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo. 1980); People v. Olivas, 911
P.2d 675, 677 (Colo. App. 1995).
III. The Postconviction Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
¶9 Here, the postconviction court’s oral and written order indicate
that it reviewed all the information Contreras submitted, including
4 Contreras’s “evidence of admirable progress while incarcerated”1
and Contreras’s significant familial support. Despite that
information, however, the postconviction court concluded that,
considering the purposes of sentencing and all the evidence “on the
other side of the ledger,” Contreras’s original sentence was fair and
appropriate and need not be disturbed. We discern no abuse of
discretion in that ruling.
¶ 10 As the postconviction court noted during the hearing, the
sentence Contreras sought to reduce is just below the midpoint of
the applicable sentencing range of eight to twenty-four years to life
in prison. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2025 (presumptive
sentencing range for class 3 felony is four to twelve years in prison);
§ 18-1.3-406(1)(a), (1)(d), (2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (a sex offense
constituting a crime of violence shall be punished by an
indeterminate sentence of at least the midpoint of, but not more
than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range up to a
maximum of the person’s natural life). Further, the postconviction
1 Contreras argues that several documents filed with his motion
concerning his progress while incarcerated “did not appear to be considered by the judge.” The postconviction court specifically discussed most of these items at the hearing.
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24CA1708 Peo v Contreras 01-22-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1708 El Paso County District Court No. 17CR456 Honorable Eric Bentley, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David Contreras, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Lindsey Parlin, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, David Contreras, Jr., appeals the district court’s
order denying his Crim. P. 35(b) motion for sentence
reconsideration. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 A jury found Contreras guilty of one count of sex assault on a
child and one count of aggravated sex assault on a child for
sexually abusing his thirteen-year-old sister-in-law. The jury
further found, as to each conviction, that Contreras applied force
against the victim, he was in a position of trust with the victim, and
the sexual assault was part of a pattern of sexual abuse. The
district court sentenced Contreras to a controlling term of fifteen
years to life. A division of this court affirmed his convictions. See
People v. Contreras, (Colo. App. No. 18CA1298, Sept. 9, 2021) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶3 Contreras timely filed a Crim. P. 35(b) motion asking the
district court to reduce his controlling sentence. In support of his
request, Contreras (1) detailed the steps he has taken while in
prison to improve himself; (2) submitted a Department of
Corrections assessment demonstrating his low recidivism risk; (3)
indicated that he and his family provide reciprocal support to each
1 other; (4) accepted responsibility for his convictions; (5) provided
letters of support from individuals familiar with him; and (6) argued
that reducing his minimum sentence would expedite his ability to
participate in the mandatory Sex Offender Treatment and
Monitoring Program, thereby advancing the rehabilitative goals of
his sentence.
¶4 The postconviction court conducted a hearing on Contreras’s
motion. It heard from several people, including Contreras and the
victim; listened to the parties’ arguments; and accepted written
statements from individuals who could not be present at the
hearing.
¶5 At the end of the hearing, the postconviction court denied
Conteras’s motion, explaining that a different judge had tried the
case and, “as a result[, it] very carefully reviewed the record[,] . . .
very carefully listened to everybody who” spoke at the hearing, and
“reviewed all the filings . . . including all the exhibits,
correspondence, et cetera” filed over the course of more than two
years while the motion was pending. In addition to the materials
that were related to the motion, the postconviction court reviewed
this court’s opinion affirming Contreras’s conviction, the trial court
2 record to the extent it was available, and the law applicable to Crim.
P. 35(b) motions. The postconviction court noted that, under Crim.
P. 35(b), it had “an affirmative obligation to exercise judicial
discretion in deciding whether to modify the sentence,” highlighted
the factors it was required to consider, and thoroughly reviewed the
evidence supporting and against Contreras’s motion. It noted that
the sentencing judge, who had presided over Contreras’s trial, “was
in a much better position . . . to determine what was appropriate,”
and then remarked, “Beyond that, I find the sentence appropriate
and necessary to promote respect for the law and deterrence.”
Thus, the postconviction court upheld the original sentence and
denied Contreras’s motion.
¶6 Later that day, the postconviction court issued a written order
denying the motion “for the reasons set out from the bench.”
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶7 Crim. P. 35(b) allows district courts an opportunity to
reconsider a sentence previously imposed before it becomes final.
People v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988). The district court’s
review of a Crim. P. 35(b) motion focuses on the fairness of the
sentence in light of the purposes of the sentencing laws. Ghrist v.
3 People, 897 P.2d 809, 812 (Colo. 1995). Any decision whether to
grant a motion for sentence reconsideration under Crim. P. 35(b) is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See People
v. Dunlap, 36 P.3d 778, 782 (Colo. 2001) (“Crim. P. 35(b) affords
trial judges a large amount of discretion when considering [a]
defendant’s motion.”); Ghrist, 897 P.2d at 814.
¶8 In ruling on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion, the district court should
consider all relevant and material factors, including new evidence
as well as facts known at the time the court pronounced the original
sentence. People v. Busch, 835 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. App. 1992). A
district court abuses its discretion in denying a Crim. P. 35(b)
motion only if it refuses to consider any information in mitigation
and fails to make findings in support of its decision. See Mikkleson
v. People, 618 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo. 1980); People v. Olivas, 911
P.2d 675, 677 (Colo. App. 1995).
III. The Postconviction Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
¶9 Here, the postconviction court’s oral and written order indicate
that it reviewed all the information Contreras submitted, including
4 Contreras’s “evidence of admirable progress while incarcerated”1
and Contreras’s significant familial support. Despite that
information, however, the postconviction court concluded that,
considering the purposes of sentencing and all the evidence “on the
other side of the ledger,” Contreras’s original sentence was fair and
appropriate and need not be disturbed. We discern no abuse of
discretion in that ruling.
¶ 10 As the postconviction court noted during the hearing, the
sentence Contreras sought to reduce is just below the midpoint of
the applicable sentencing range of eight to twenty-four years to life
in prison. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S. 2025 (presumptive
sentencing range for class 3 felony is four to twelve years in prison);
§ 18-1.3-406(1)(a), (1)(d), (2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (a sex offense
constituting a crime of violence shall be punished by an
indeterminate sentence of at least the midpoint of, but not more
than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range up to a
maximum of the person’s natural life). Further, the postconviction
1 Contreras argues that several documents filed with his motion
concerning his progress while incarcerated “did not appear to be considered by the judge.” The postconviction court specifically discussed most of these items at the hearing.
5 court extensively discussed the information provided in connection
with Contreras’s motion, including his accomplishments while
incarcerated and the support he receives from his family, and
analyzed the fairness of the sentence in light of the goals of
sentencing.
¶ 11 Contreras argues the postconviction court “simply adopt[ed]”
the sentencing judge’s decision on a “personal whim” and “exercised
no independent discretion” in rendering its ruling. The record
belies Contreras’s argument. The postconviction court’s mere
reference to the propriety of the sentencing judge’s decision does
not demonstrate, given its thorough review of all relevant and
material factors during the hearing, that it failed to exercise
independent discretion when deciding to uphold the original
sentence and deny Contreras’s motion.
¶ 12 Because the order adequately demonstrates that the
postconviction court considered the information presented in the
motion and determined that a sentence reduction was not
appropriate, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the denial of the
motion. See Dunlap, 36 P.3d at 782; Olivas, 911 P.2d at 677
(affirming the denial of a Crim. P. 35(b) motion where the trial court
6 noted the matters it considered before denying the defendant’s
motion and provided a detailed reason for the denial).
IV. Disposition
¶ 13 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.