23CA2026 Peo v Coleman 07-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA2026 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR3800 Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Racaun Shavod Coleman,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jenna Baker, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 In this domestic violence case, Racaun Shavod Coleman
appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding
him guilty of first degree assault and harassment. He contends
that (1) the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that it
“may” consider evidence of self-induced intoxication; (2) the district
court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his two prior
acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (3) the cumulative
effect of these two errors denied him the right to a fair trial. We
affirm the conviction.
I. Background
¶2 Coleman and the victim had been in an on-again, off-again
relationship since high school and had a child together. One
afternoon in 2022, Coleman was fired from his job and began a
four-day binge of excessive drinking, from Wednesday through
Saturday. During that time, he and the victim continuously
1 argued. By Friday, the victim told Coleman she was breaking up
with him and took her children1 to her mother’s house.
¶3 On Saturday night, Coleman texted the victim that he had left
their apartment and that it was okay for her to return home. The
victim took the children back to the apartment and put them to bed
before going outside to smoke, whereupon she saw Coleman
returning to the apartment building. She tried to lock the
apartment door but did not manage to do so in time, and Coleman
forced his way into the apartment.
¶4 Feeling unsafe, the victim knocked on a neighbor’s door.
While she was waiting for the neighbor to answer, Coleman
approached her, shoved her into the wall, stabbed her in the
shoulder with a knife, and then walked away. Coleman testified
that he was blackout drunk and had no recollection of anything
that happened that Thursday through Saturday, including the
stabbing.
¶5 The People charged Coleman with, as relevant here, first
degree assault, harassment, and second degree assault as a lesser
1 The victim also has a daughter from a previous relationship.
2 included offense. At trial, Coleman did not dispute that he had
stabbed the victim; instead, he claimed that his level of intoxication
prevented him from forming the specific intent needed to commit
first degree assault or harassment. The jury convicted him of both
charges.
II. Voluntary Intoxication Instruction
¶6 At Colman’s request, the district court instructed the jury on
the defense of voluntary intoxication:
The evidence presented in this case has raised the question of self-induced intoxication with respect to the offenses of Assault in the First Degree and Harassment.
For those offenses, you may consider evidence of self-induced intoxication in determining whether or not such intoxication negates the existence of the element of “with intent” or “intentionally”.
The prosecution has the burden of proving all the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant was intoxicated to such a degree that he did not have the mental state of “with intent” or “intentionally”, which is a required element of the crimes of First Degree Assault and Harassment, you should find the defendant not guilty of those charges.
This defense does not apply to the crime of Assault in the Second Degree (Recklessly).
3 (Emphasis added.) This language essentially tracks the model
criminal jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. See
COLJI-Crim. H:34 (2024).
¶7 Coleman contends that the district court plainly erred by
using the permissive word “may,” rather than the mandatory word
“must,” in the instruction. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 The district court has a duty to accurately instruct the jury on
all matters of law applicable to a case. People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO
83, ¶ 15. We review jury instructions de novo, examining them as a
whole, to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of
the governing law. Johnson v. People, 2019 CO 17, ¶¶ 8, 14.
¶9 Because Coleman did not object to the instruction, we would
typically apply a plain error standard in determining whether any
error warrants reversal. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.
However, we need not determine if there was plain error because we
conclude that no error occurred. See Cardman v. People, 2019 CO
73, ¶ 19 (“[P]lain error occurs when there is (1) an error, (2) that is
obvious, and (3) that so undermines the fundamental fairness of the
4 trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment
of conviction.”).
B. Discussion
¶ 10 Two divisions of this court have held that the use of the term
“may” in a voluntary intoxication instruction does not constitute
error. See People v. Lucas, 232 P.3d 155, 163-64 (Colo. App. 2009)
(concluding that a jury instruction stating, “You may consider
evidence of self-induced intoxication,” was not erroneous), overruled
in part on other grounds by People v. Miller, 2024 COA 66; see also
People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429, 433 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding
that a jury instruction stating, “You may consider evidence of
self-induced intoxication,” did not constitute error affecting the
defendant’s substantial rights). In both Lucas and Rosales, the
divisions reasoned that the jury instructions, taken as a whole,
“adequately informed the jury of the applicable law,” did not lower
the prosecution’s burden “to prove each element of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt,” and required the jury to consider all
5 the evidence. Lucas, 232 P.3d at 162-64; see Rosales, 134 P.3d at
434.
¶ 11 Undeterred, Coleman correctly notes that we are not bound by
decisions from other divisions of this court, see Chavez v. Chavez,
2020 COA 70, ¶ 13, and argues that we should not follow Lucas
and Rosales. He asserts that the voluntary intoxication instruction
using the permissive word “may” was erroneous because (1) “it
permitted the jury to disregard all evidence of Mr. Coleman’s sole
defense”; (2) it lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof; and (3) it
did not “track any statutory language.” But we see no reason to
depart from Lucas and Rosales, especially given that they addressed
and rejected two of the arguments Coleman raises here.
¶ 12 First, as in Lucas and Rosales, the jury instructions in this
case, when read as a whole, clearly required the jury to consider all
the evidence presented during trial. See Rosales, 134 P.3d at 434;
Lucas, 232 P.3d at 163. For example, the definitional instructions
for first degree assault and harassment each twice instructed the
jury to consider “all the evidence” when deciding whether the
prosecution proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, and another instruction told the jurors, “In making your
6 decision, you must consider all of the evidence that has been
presented.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the instructions used some
variation of the phrase “after considering all of the evidence” no less
than fifteen times. See People v. McKeel, 246 P.3d 638, 641 (Colo.
2010) (“We presume that jurors follow the instructions that they
receive.”).
¶ 13 We acknowledge that the prosecutor’s statement during
closing argument, “[The voluntary intoxication instruction] says you
may consider it. You do not have to. It’s up to you,” could be read
in isolation as suggesting that the jury was not obligated to
consider evidence of voluntary intoxication.2 But when the
statement is viewed in context with the prosecutor’s subsequent
statements — for example, that “[d]runk minds can still form
intent” and that “[Coleman] intended to [stab the victim] even
though he was drunk, if he even was drunk” — it is clear that she
was not telling the jury that it could ignore voluntary intoxication
evidence altogether; she instead was telling the jury that Coleman
had the requisite intent despite his intoxication. And the jury’s
2 Coleman did not object to the prosecutor’s statement during trial
and does not raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal.
7 submission of a question about Coleman’s blood alcohol content
during deliberations demonstrates that it did consider evidence of
his voluntary intoxication.3 In any event, a potentially
inappropriate statement by counsel during closing argument does
not render a correct jury instruction erroneous.
¶ 14 Second, using the permissive word “may” in the voluntary
intoxication instruction did not lower the prosecution’s burden of
proof. The instruction itself stated that the “prosecution ha[d] the
burden of proving all the elements of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.” See Lucas, 232 P.3d at 163. It also instructed
the jurors, “If you find [Coleman] was intoxicated to such a degree
that he did not have the mental state of ‘with intent’ or
‘intentionally’, which is a required element of the crimes of [f]irst
[d]egree [a]ssault and [h]arassment, you should find [him] not guilty
of those charges.” And as in Lucas and Rosales, multiple other
instructions emphasized that the prosecution carries the burden of
proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt, including one
3 The jury’s question itself is not included in the appellate record,
but the district court’s discussion with the parties about how to respond to the question is.
8 that stated, “The culpable state of mind is as much an element of
the crime as the act itself and must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” See id.; Rosales, 134 P.3d at 434.
¶ 15 Moreover, unlike an affirmative defense, which the prosecution
must separately disprove beyond a reasonable doubt, Ray v. People,
2019 CO 21, ¶ 13, voluntary intoxication is an element-negating
defense and, thus, is necessarily disproved when the jury convicts
the defendant of the crime to which the defense applies, Montoya v.
People, 2017 CO 40, ¶ 29.
¶ 16 Third, we are not persuaded by Coleman’s argument that
using “may” in a voluntary intoxication instruction is erroneous
because it does not “track any statutory language.” The pertinent
statute provides as follows:
Intoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge, except as provided in [the subsection addressing involuntary intoxication], but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant when it is relevant to negative the existence of a specific intent if such intent is an element of the crime charged.
§ 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2024. This statute allows a defendant to
introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication — though not as an
9 affirmative defense — in certain circumstances; it simply does not
touch on how the jury should be instructed to consider such
evidence. In other words, there is no relevant statutory language
for the instruction to track.
¶ 17 In sum, the district court did not err by instructing the jury
that it “may consider evidence of self-induced intoxication in
determining whether such intoxication negates the existence of the
element of ‘with intent’ or ‘intentionally.’”
III. Admission of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence
¶ 18 Over Coleman’s objection, the prosecution elicited testimony
from the victim that Coleman had committed the following two prior
acts of domestic violence:
• Approximately six years before the stabbing, Coleman,
after drinking for “a good portion of that day,” got into
an argument with the victim, struck her with an open
hand, and then “wrestl[ed] [her] to keep [her] in the
house” when she tried to flee.
• Approximately four years before the stabbing, Coleman
and the victim got into an argument while in the
victim’s car; when they got home, he went inside to grab
10 a pocketknife and then stabbed the car’s rear tires. The
victim “had red marks and swelling” from a “little tusk
[sic] that [they] had in the car.” This incident did not
involve alcohol.
Immediately before the victim provided this testimony and again at
the conclusion of trial, the district court instructed the jury that it
could consider the testimony only for the limited purpose of
showing Coleman’s intent.
¶ 19 Coleman contends that the district court abused its discretion
by admitting this evidence. We are not persuaded.
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
¶ 20 CRE 404(b) prohibits using evidence of a defendant’s prior
acts to prove his character to show that he acted in conformity with
that character on a particular occasion. However, evidence of a
prior act may be admissible for another purpose, “such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” CRE 404(b)(2).
¶ 21 Additionally, when the prior act is an act of domestic violence,
the evidence is generally considered “helpful and . . . necessary” to
establish, among other things, the “escalating levels of seriousness”
11 of the domestic violence. § 18-6-801.5(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also
People v. Cross, 2023 COA 24, ¶ 22 (In enacting section 18-6-801.5,
the legislature intended to “place[] its finger on the scale in favor of
admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence in prosecutions
involving domestic violence.”).
¶ 22 Evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) or section
18-6-801.5 only if it satisfies the four-part test articulated in
People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). First, the
evidence must relate to a material fact. Id. at 1318. Second, the
evidence must be logically relevant to that material fact: It must
tend to make the existence of the material fact more or less
probable. Id. Third, the logical relevance must be independent of
the prohibited character inference. Id. Fourth, the evidence’s
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. Id.
¶ 23 The district court has substantial discretion in deciding
whether to admit evidence of other acts. Perez v. People, 2015 CO
45, ¶ 22. We will not disturb the court’s decision absent a showing
that it was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or was
12 based on a misapprehension or misapplication of the law.
Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 25.
¶ 24 Coleman challenges only the district court’s findings under the
third and fourth Spoto prongs: He contends that (1) the prior act
evidence was not logically relevant independent of a prohibited
propensity inference, and (2) the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
¶ 25 We begin by concluding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by finding the prosecution satisfied the third Spoto
prong.
¶ 26 “[T]he requirement that the evidence have relevance
independent of an inference of conformity with bad character does
not ‘demand the absence of the inference’ entirely, but simply
means that the evidence cannot be relevant only to show a
propensity to commit crimes.” People v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23,
¶ 42 (quoting People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Colo. 1994)).
The third prong is satisfied when there is similarity between the
charged and uncharged acts, showing a specific tendency on the
part of the defendant. People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo.
13 App. 2009). A lack of similarity, in contrast, raises the risk that a
prior act does not show a specific tendency that can be separated
from the prohibited inference that the defendant acted badly in the
past and therefore must have committed the charged offense. Id.
¶ 27 In both prior acts of domestic violence, Coleman had a
physical altercation with the same victim after an argument. Thus,
evidence of the prior acts showed a specific tendency for Coleman to
respond to arguments with the victim by getting angry and acting
violently toward her. This specific tendency was logically relevant to
the critical disputed issue in the case — whether Coleman’s act was
intentional despite his intoxication — and its relevance was
independent of any propensity inference. See Cross, ¶ 24 (evidence
of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim
was admissible to prove motive, intent, and lack of accident);
People v. Vasquez, 2022 COA 100, ¶ 77 (evidence of the defendant’s
prior act of breaking the victim’s television during an argument was
admissible to prove lack of accident); McBride, 228 P.3d at 227
(evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of punching, beating, and
choking the victim was admissible to prove intent and to rebut a
claim of accident); People v. Gross, 39 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Colo. App.
14 2001) (evidence of prior acts of domestic violence against the victim
was admissible to prove motive and intent).
¶ 28 We are not persuaded otherwise by Coleman’s contention that
the two prior acts were too dissimilar to the charged offense to have
any relevance apart from a propensity inference. As with the
stabbing, Coleman committed both prior acts after having an
argument with the victim, and he committed the first of the prior
acts while he was drunk. See McBride, 228 P.3d at 227 (“The prior
and charged acts were similar because all involved defendant’s
violent behavior toward the same victim in an ongoing
relationship.”). Coleman points out that, unlike with the prior acts,
this argument with the victim occurred the day before the stabbing,
and he was allegedly blackout drunk. But these differences do not
outweigh the other similarities, particularly given that, through
section 18-6-801.5, “the General Assembly placed its finger on the
15 scale in favor of admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic
violence in prosecutions involving domestic violence.” Cross, ¶ 22.
¶ 29 Turning to the fourth Spoto prong, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in balancing the relevance of the prior acts
against the risk of unfair prejudice.
¶ 30 Although the evidence of prior acts carried a risk of undue
prejudice, we are not persuaded that this risk substantially
outweighed the probative value of the evidence. See People v.
Hamilton, 2019 COA 101, ¶ 70 (CRE 403 favors the admission of
relevant evidence and requires us to afford the evidence its
“maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact finder
and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected.”).
The prior acts evidence was relevant to whether Coleman had the
intent to stab the victim despite his intoxication — the central
dispute at trial — and therefore was highly probative.
¶ 31 Further, the district court minimized the prejudicial effect by
contemporaneously instructing the jury to consider the evidence
only for the purpose of assessing Coleman’s intent. Absent
evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury followed the court’s
limiting instruction and did not consider the evidence for any other
16 purpose. See McKeel, 246 P.3d at 641. Thus, “while prior act
evidence always carries a risk of unfair prejudice, it was within the
district court’s discretion to find this risk did not substantially
outweigh the probative value of the evidence.” Denhartog, ¶ 47; see
McBride, 228 P.3d at 227.
¶ 32 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the evidence of Coleman’s prior acts of
domestic violence.
IV. Cumulative Error
¶ 33 Finally, Coleman contends that the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors in his trial mandates reversal. Under the cumulative
error doctrine, “numerous formal irregularities, each of which in
itself might be deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the
absence of a fair trial, in which event a reversal would be required.”
Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo. 1962). But “[f]or reversal
to occur based on cumulative error, a reviewing court must identify
multiple errors that collectively prejudice[d]” the defendant’s
substantial rights. Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25.
Because we conclude that the district court did not err, a
cumulative error analysis is not required, and reversal is not
17 warranted. See People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343, 359 (Colo. App. 2009)
(cumulative error analysis is required only when multiple errors
have been identified).
V. Disposition
¶ 34 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.