Peo v. Chandler

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 23CA1844
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1844 Peo v Chandler 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1844 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR1524 Honorable William H. Moller, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Leyonte Deshaunn Chandler,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Lipinsky and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

William Holzer, Alternate Defense Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Leyonte Deshaunn Chandler, appeals the

judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of

several offenses following an incident in which he shot at a friend of

his ex-wife. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Chandler was driving with his ex-wife, Ashly Gutierrez, when

Gutierrez began texting with a friend, Melvin Stewart. Chandler

had previously seen Stewart walking Gutierrez’s dog, but the two

men had never spoken. Chandler took Gutierrez’s phone and began

exchanging insulting messages with Stewart. Chandler drove to

Gutierrez’s house and hit her because he was mad about Stewart.

Twenty minutes later, Chandler and Gutierrez got back in the car.

Gutierrez then told Chandler where Stewart lived, and Chandler

told Stewart he was on his way. Gutierrez was carrying a gun in

her bag. Chandler took Gutierrez’s bag from her and removed her

gun.

¶3 Stewart drove from a friend’s house to his own home to meet

Chandler. When Chandler saw Stewart in his car, he followed him,

bumped into the back of Stewart’s car, and fired Gutierrez’s gun

through the rear window of Stewart’s car. Stewart was not injured.

1 ¶4 The prosecution charged Chandler with attempted first degree

murder, attempted first degree assault, and various other charges.

¶5 The trial court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of

self-defense, based on evidence that Stewart had a gun in his car

during the encounter with Chandler. The court denied Chandler’s

request for an instruction on the heat of passion mitigator for

attempted first degree murder and attempted first degree assault,

however, ruling that no evidence supported it.

¶6 As relevant here, the jury found Chandler guilty of attempted

manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree

murder and attempted first degree assault. It also found him guilty

of some of the additional offenses but acquitted him of others. The

trial court sentenced him as an habitual criminal to thirty-two

years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

¶7 Chandler appeals, arguing the trial court erred by refusing to

instruct the jury on the heat of passion mitigator as it related to the

first degree assault count. We disagree and affirm.

2 II. Heat of Passion Instruction

A. Applicable Law

¶8 The trial court has a duty to correctly instruct the jury on all

matters of law for which there is sufficient evidence to support

giving instructions. Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951, 955 (Colo.

2004). We review de novo whether enough evidence exists to

support a requested instruction. Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶

32. In doing so, we review the evidence in the light most favorable

to the defendant. Cassels, 92 P.3d at 955.

¶9 Attempted first degree assault is generally a class 4 felony but

is a class 6 felony if committed in a sudden heat of passion due to

provocation. §§ 18-2-101(4), 18-3-202(2)(a)-(b), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 10 A defendant is entitled to a heat of passion instruction when

there is “some supporting evidence — regardless of how incredible,

unreasonable, improbable, or slight it may be — to establish each

factor described” in subsection (2)(a) of the first degree assault

statute. Cassels, 92 P.3d at 956 (discussing heat of passion as

applied to second degree murder). That is, the defendant must

produce at least some evidence showing that:

3 1. the act causing the assault was performed upon a

sudden heat of passion;

2. caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the

intended victim;

3. affecting the person causing the injury sufficiently to

excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; and

4. between the provocation and the assault, an insufficient

interval of time passed for the voice of reason and

humanity to be heard.

§ 18-3-202(2)(a). The evidence must support all four elements

before a defendant is entitled to submit the issue to the jury.

People v. Villarreal, 131 P.3d 1119, 1128 (Colo. App. 2005).

B. Discussion

¶ 11 We see no evidence to support the heat of passion elements

here. Chandler argues he was provoked by the confrontational text

messages he exchanged with Stewart before the shooting, by the

fact that Stewart called him a “pussy,” by Stewart’s sexual

relationship with Gutierrez, and ultimately by the fact that Stewart

brought a gun to what was intended to be a fistfight. But none of

4 these facts would be sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a

reasonable person.

¶ 12 Chandler was aware that Stewart had some relationship with

Gutierrez well before the shooting. Chandler and Gutierrez were no

longer married at the time of the offense. And courts examining the

issue have generally concluded that neither the victim’s rejection of

the defendant’s affections nor the defendant’s jealousy of the

victim’s sexual activity is sufficient to warrant a heat of passion

instruction. See People v. Ramirez, 56 P.3d 89, 95 (Colo. 2002)

(collecting cases).

¶ 13 Furthermore, a reasonable person would not be moved to

attempt murder because of the mere exchange of insulting text

messages. Cf. Cassels, 92 P.3d at 957 (by contrast, the victim’s

repeated in-person threats and insults, combined with pushing and

shoving, while the victim was blocking the only exit and the

defendant was naked, were cumulatively sufficient to constitute

provocation). And, at least with respect to the non-gun-related

evidence, the time it took Chandler to drive first to Gutierrez’s

house, wait twenty minutes, and then drive to Stewart’s house, gave

him ample opportunity to hear the voice of reason and humanity.

5 See People v. Suazo, 867 P.2d 161, 168 (Colo. App. 1993) (even

where there is evidence of provocation, a heat of passion instruction

is not warranted where an adequate “cooling off” period has passed)

(citations omitted).

¶ 14 In addition, we are not convinced that Stewart’s possession of

a gun, without more, constitutes a serious and highly provoking

act. Chandler relies on the statement in People v. Grable, 611 P.2d

588, 590 (Colo. App. 1979), that “[w]here a defendant presents a

plausible case for self-defense, heat of passion is an available

alternative inference from the evidence.” But in Grable, the

defendant testified that the victims assaulted him first and he

stabbed them in self-defense. Id. That testimony supported the

theory that the defendant could have committed his act either in

self-defense or under a sudden heat of passion. In contrast, the

evidence here showed only that Stewart had a gun in his car and

had touched it at some point.1 There was no evidence regarding

when Stewart touched the gun, whether he displayed it to

1 Specifically, the police officer who contacted Stewart testified that

Stewart told him there was a gun in his car, he had touched it, and his fingerprints would be on it.

6 Chandler, or whether Chandler was even aware of it. Therefore,

notwithstanding the self-defense instruction, there was no evidence

of provocation.

¶ 15 Because Chandler cannot point to evidence supporting all four

elements of the heat of passion mitigator, the trial court properly

denied his request for a heat of passion jury instruction.

III. Disposition

¶ 16 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE LUM concur.