Peo v. Cendejas

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1158
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1158 Peo v Cendejas 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1158 Arapahoe County District Court No. 12CR1021 Honorable Darren L. Vahle, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Rodolfo Cendejas,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK Harris and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Katharine Gillespie, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rodolfo Cendejas, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, Rodolfo Cendejas, appeals the district court’s order

denying his postconviction motion without a hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Cendejas was convicted of fifteen counts of sexual assault on a

child (pattern of abuse), one count of sexual assault on a child, and

sixteen counts of aggravated incest. He was sentenced to an

aggregate sentence of 120 years to life in the custody of the

Department of Corrections, plus mandatory lifetime parole.

¶3 The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See People v.

Cendejas, (Colo. App. No. 13CA2070, May 25, 2017) (not published

pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The mandate was issued in April 2018.

¶4 Over the next three years, Cendejas filed multiple

unsuccessful postconviction motions, including a Crim. P. 35(b)

motion to reconsider his sentence, filed in August 2018; a motion

for an abbreviated proportionality review of his sentence, filed in

March 2021; and a motion for review of his sentence alleging that

his sentence was illegal and unconstitutional, filed in April 2021.

Cendejas did not appeal the district court rulings on any of them.

¶5 In June 2024, Cendejas filed the postconviction motion at

issue in this appeal. Captioned a “motion to correct illegal

1 sentence,” Cendejas argued that his sentence was illegal because

section 16-11.7-103, C.R.S. 2025, allows the Sex Offender

Management Board (SOMB) to compel sex offender treatment in

violation of an offender’s due process and Fifth Amendment rights.

He asserted that his motion was not subject to any time bars

because it alleged an illegal sentence claim under Crim. P. 35(a),

Crim. P. 35(c)[(2)](IV), and section 18-1-410(1)(d), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 The district court denied the motion without a hearing,

concluding that (1) Cendejas’s claim was properly construed as a

Crim. P. 35(c) claim, not a Crim. P. 35(a) claim; and (2) so

construed, the motion was time barred because it was filed more

than three years after the mandate in Cendejas’s direct appeal.

II. Analysis

¶7 Cendejas contends that the district court erred by denying his

postconviction motion without a hearing. Again characterizing his

motion as one to correct an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a), he

asserts that it was not subject to any time bar because an illegal

sentence may be corrected “at any time.” Crim. P. 35(a). Reviewing

the issue de novo, People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14, we disagree.

2 ¶8 The substance of a motion, not its label, determines whether it

falls under Crim. P. 35(a) or Crim. P. 35(c). People v. Collier, 151

P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006). A sentence is “not authorized by

law” for purposes of Crim. P. 35(a) when it is inconsistent with the

statutory scheme. Tennyson v. People, 2025 CO 31, ¶ 25; see also

People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, ¶ 19 (“[A] sentence is not authorized

by law within the meaning of Rule 35(a) if any of the sentence’s

components fail to comply with the sentencing statutes.”). In

contrast, a challenge to the constitutionality of the conviction or

sentence falls under Crim. P. 35(c). See Collier, 151 P.3d at 670.

¶9 Cendejas’s motion did not argue that any component of his

sentence violated the statutory sentencing scheme. Instead, he

argued that the sentencing scheme itself is unconstitutional

because SOMB-compelled sex offender treatment violates sex

3 offenders’ constitutional rights. Such a claim arises under Crim.

P. 35(c)(2)(I), not Crim. P. 35(a).1 See Collier, 151 P.3d at 670.

¶ 10 Crim. P. 35(c) claims are subject to section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S.

2025, which generally imposes a three-year deadline to collaterally

attack any non-class 1 felony conviction. Collier, 151 P.3d at 671.

When a defendant’s judgment of conviction is affirmed on appeal,

the three-year time frame begins when the mandate is issued after

the appeal. People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Colo. 1994).

¶ 11 Cendejas’s judgment of conviction became final on April 11,

2018, when this court issued its mandate affirming his conviction.

Cendejas therefore had until April 11, 2021, to collaterally attack

his conviction or sentence under Crim. P. 35(c). His motion, filed in

June 2024, was more than three years too late and did not allege

any of the exceptions to the time limitation in section 16-5-402(2).

1 Cendejas’s citations to section 18-1-410(1)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and

the now-repealed Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(IV) are equally inapposite. These provisions address a claim that the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law — a claim that arises under the current version of Crim. P. 35(a). See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418-19 (Colo. App. 2006) (interpreting current version of Crim. P. 35(a) to codify prior case law defining “illegal sentence”).

4 ¶ 12 Thus, because Cendejas’s motion was untimely, the district

court properly denied it without a hearing. See Collier, 151 P.3d at

671; see also People v. Slusher, 43 P.3d 647, 651 (Colo. App. 2001)

(holding that a hearing was unnecessary when the defendant’s

postconviction motion was time barred and he “failed to allege facts

amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect”). Having so

concluded, we need not address the People’s alternative arguments

that the motion was successive or otherwise fails on the merits.

III. Disposition

¶ 13 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.