24CA2110 Peo v Castleberry 04-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2110 Alamosa County District Court No. 23CR267 Honorable Crista Newmyer-Olsen, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joleen Eleathe Castleberry,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE TOW Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Alternate Defense Counsel, Florissant, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Joleen Eleathe Castleberry, appeals the judgment
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of second
degree burglary and harassment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The jury heard evidence that would support the following
findings.
¶3 Darbara Funk was the landlord of a property with multiple
apartment units. Darbara’s ex-brother-in-law, Bradley Bennett,
occupied one unit.1 Bradley’s son, Keegan Bennett, occupied
another unit with the son’s wife and child.
¶4 One afternoon, Darbara, accompanied by four other people —
Castleberry and Amber Bickett (Darbara’s daughters), Joe Funk
(Castleberry’s father), and Dennis Medina (Castleberry’s
boyfriend) — confronted the Bennetts outside the property. Bradley
attempted to retreat into his apartment. But Castleberry pushed
him from behind and entered the apartment with him. Medina and
1 Because several of the parties involved in this incident share the
same last name, we will refer to those parties by their first name when necessary to avoid confusion, intending no disrespect.
1 Bickett followed closely behind and some combination of the three
of them assaulted Bradley.
¶5 Keegan eventually made his way inside the apartment, where
he and Castleberry engaged in a physical altercation. Keegan’s wife
called the police, and Officer Seth Hoffman and Officer Sylvia
Moreno responded to the scene. The officers interviewed the parties
involved but made no arrests at the scene.
¶6 The prosecution charged Castleberry with second degree
burglary, third degree assault, and harassment. A jury convicted
Castleberry on the burglary and harassment charges but acquitted
her on the assault charge. The court sentenced Castleberry to four
years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for the
burglary conviction and a concurrent ninety-day jail sentence for
harassment.
II. Plain Error
¶7 Castleberry argues that the trial court plainly erred when it
(1) admitted prior bad acts character evidence and (2) failed to
provide a limiting jury instruction. We discern no reversible error.
2 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶ 14. A trial court
abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Sims, 2019
COA 66, ¶ 44.
¶9 When a defendant failed to contemporaneously object to the
admission of the evidence, we will reverse only if any error was
plain. People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 79. A plain error is one
that is obvious and substantial. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63,
¶ 18. “For an error to be this obvious, the action challenged on
appeal ordinarily ‘must contravene (1) a clear statutory command;
(2) a well-settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law.’” People v.
Wambolt, 2018 COA 88, ¶ 70 (quoting Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16,
¶ 16). “We have recognized plain error as those errors that ‘so
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.’”
Hagos, ¶ 18 (quoting Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo.
1987)).
3 B. Any Error Was Not Plain
¶ 10 Castleberry argues that the trial court plainly erred when it
allowed (1) Officer Hoffman to testify about previous calls made to
the property in the month leading up to the incident and (2) Bradley
and Darbara to testify about restraining orders that existed between
members of their families.2 Specifically, she contends that this
testimony constituted prior acts evidence under CRE 404(b). And
based on that, she argues that the prosecution failed to provide
reasonable notice of its intent to use prior bad acts as required by
CRE 404(b)(3) and that the evidence did not meet the Spoto test
established for the admission of such evidence. See People v. Spoto,
795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 11 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that the person acted in
2 We note that the People contend that defense counsel invited any
error by addressing the prior calls and restraining orders on cross-examination with different witnesses. See People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34. We acknowledge this is a close call, as it is possible the defense counsel’s strategy was to demonstrate the prosecution witnesses’ bias by informing the jury of the long history of conflict between the two groups. But because the first mention of the subject was during a somewhat nonresponsive answer to the prosecutor’s question of the first witness, we decline to treat the error as invited.
4 conformity with that character on a particular occasion. CRE
404(b).
¶ 12 On direct examination, Officer Hoffman testified that “[i]n the
month of October, before [the incident], [they] had 17 calls for
service” at the property, involving the same people. And on direct
examination, the prosecution asked Bradley whether Darbara and
her family, “at some point, use[d] the courts to evict [him] out of
[the property]?” Bradley stated, “They did and they even had
restraining orders on us.” Later in the proceedings, Darbara
testified that she “had gotten restraining orders” before the incident.
¶ 13 Notably, none of these statements directly implicated
Castleberry. While Officer Hoffman testified that the incident
involved “the same parties and all the same people” as the previous
calls, Castleberry was not identified as a participant in the prior
incidents. And Castleberry acknowledges as much in her own brief
when she states that “no witness testified on direct examination
that [she] was involved in any of the 17 prior calls to law
enforcement.” Similarly, neither Bradley nor Darbara indicated that
Castleberry was a party to the restraining orders. And again,
Castleberry acknowledges this in her brief, noting that “no witness
5 expressly testified on direct examination that there was a
restraining order against Castleberry, who did not even reside at the
apartments.”
¶ 14 “If evidence doesn’t implicate the defendant’s character, Rule
404(b) doesn’t govern its admissibility.” Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8,
¶ 43. Because the testimony did not unequivocally reflect that the
previous calls to the property or the restraining orders directly
involved Castleberry, and thus did not clearly implicate CRE 404(b),
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24CA2110 Peo v Castleberry 04-16-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2110 Alamosa County District Court No. 23CR267 Honorable Crista Newmyer-Olsen, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Joleen Eleathe Castleberry,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE TOW Welling and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Robert W. Kiesnowski, Jr., Alternate Defense Counsel, Florissant, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Joleen Eleathe Castleberry, appeals the judgment
of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of second
degree burglary and harassment. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The jury heard evidence that would support the following
findings.
¶3 Darbara Funk was the landlord of a property with multiple
apartment units. Darbara’s ex-brother-in-law, Bradley Bennett,
occupied one unit.1 Bradley’s son, Keegan Bennett, occupied
another unit with the son’s wife and child.
¶4 One afternoon, Darbara, accompanied by four other people —
Castleberry and Amber Bickett (Darbara’s daughters), Joe Funk
(Castleberry’s father), and Dennis Medina (Castleberry’s
boyfriend) — confronted the Bennetts outside the property. Bradley
attempted to retreat into his apartment. But Castleberry pushed
him from behind and entered the apartment with him. Medina and
1 Because several of the parties involved in this incident share the
same last name, we will refer to those parties by their first name when necessary to avoid confusion, intending no disrespect.
1 Bickett followed closely behind and some combination of the three
of them assaulted Bradley.
¶5 Keegan eventually made his way inside the apartment, where
he and Castleberry engaged in a physical altercation. Keegan’s wife
called the police, and Officer Seth Hoffman and Officer Sylvia
Moreno responded to the scene. The officers interviewed the parties
involved but made no arrests at the scene.
¶6 The prosecution charged Castleberry with second degree
burglary, third degree assault, and harassment. A jury convicted
Castleberry on the burglary and harassment charges but acquitted
her on the assault charge. The court sentenced Castleberry to four
years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for the
burglary conviction and a concurrent ninety-day jail sentence for
harassment.
II. Plain Error
¶7 Castleberry argues that the trial court plainly erred when it
(1) admitted prior bad acts character evidence and (2) failed to
provide a limiting jury instruction. We discern no reversible error.
2 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶ 14. A trial court
abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Sims, 2019
COA 66, ¶ 44.
¶9 When a defendant failed to contemporaneously object to the
admission of the evidence, we will reverse only if any error was
plain. People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 79. A plain error is one
that is obvious and substantial. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63,
¶ 18. “For an error to be this obvious, the action challenged on
appeal ordinarily ‘must contravene (1) a clear statutory command;
(2) a well-settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law.’” People v.
Wambolt, 2018 COA 88, ¶ 70 (quoting Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16,
¶ 16). “We have recognized plain error as those errors that ‘so
undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.’”
Hagos, ¶ 18 (quoting Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 420 (Colo.
1987)).
3 B. Any Error Was Not Plain
¶ 10 Castleberry argues that the trial court plainly erred when it
allowed (1) Officer Hoffman to testify about previous calls made to
the property in the month leading up to the incident and (2) Bradley
and Darbara to testify about restraining orders that existed between
members of their families.2 Specifically, she contends that this
testimony constituted prior acts evidence under CRE 404(b). And
based on that, she argues that the prosecution failed to provide
reasonable notice of its intent to use prior bad acts as required by
CRE 404(b)(3) and that the evidence did not meet the Spoto test
established for the admission of such evidence. See People v. Spoto,
795 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990).
¶ 11 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove a person’s character in order to show that the person acted in
2 We note that the People contend that defense counsel invited any
error by addressing the prior calls and restraining orders on cross-examination with different witnesses. See People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34. We acknowledge this is a close call, as it is possible the defense counsel’s strategy was to demonstrate the prosecution witnesses’ bias by informing the jury of the long history of conflict between the two groups. But because the first mention of the subject was during a somewhat nonresponsive answer to the prosecutor’s question of the first witness, we decline to treat the error as invited.
4 conformity with that character on a particular occasion. CRE
404(b).
¶ 12 On direct examination, Officer Hoffman testified that “[i]n the
month of October, before [the incident], [they] had 17 calls for
service” at the property, involving the same people. And on direct
examination, the prosecution asked Bradley whether Darbara and
her family, “at some point, use[d] the courts to evict [him] out of
[the property]?” Bradley stated, “They did and they even had
restraining orders on us.” Later in the proceedings, Darbara
testified that she “had gotten restraining orders” before the incident.
¶ 13 Notably, none of these statements directly implicated
Castleberry. While Officer Hoffman testified that the incident
involved “the same parties and all the same people” as the previous
calls, Castleberry was not identified as a participant in the prior
incidents. And Castleberry acknowledges as much in her own brief
when she states that “no witness testified on direct examination
that [she] was involved in any of the 17 prior calls to law
enforcement.” Similarly, neither Bradley nor Darbara indicated that
Castleberry was a party to the restraining orders. And again,
Castleberry acknowledges this in her brief, noting that “no witness
5 expressly testified on direct examination that there was a
restraining order against Castleberry, who did not even reside at the
apartments.”
¶ 14 “If evidence doesn’t implicate the defendant’s character, Rule
404(b) doesn’t govern its admissibility.” Rojas v. People, 2022 CO 8,
¶ 43. Because the testimony did not unequivocally reflect that the
previous calls to the property or the restraining orders directly
involved Castleberry, and thus did not clearly implicate CRE 404(b),
we cannot say any error in permitting the testimony was obvious.
See Wambolt, ¶ 70. (Moreover, the possibility that defense counsel
strategically wanted this information before the jury to demonstrate
bias on the part of the prosecution witnesses also dictates against
concluding that any error in admitting this evidence was obvious.)
¶ 15 Castleberry also contends the trial court should have provided
the jury with a limiting instruction explaining the purpose for which
it could consider the prior acts evidence under CRE 404(b). Once
again, because this evidence did not obviously implicate CRE
404(b), any need for a limiting instruction was also not obvious.
See Wambolt, ¶ 70. (We also note that Castleberry did not request
any limiting instruction. And “[u]nless a limiting instruction is
6 either required by statute or requested by a party, a trial court has
no duty to provide one sua sponte.” Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57,
¶ 21.)
¶ 16 Because any error was not obvious, it cannot have been plain.
See Hagos, ¶ 18. Thus, we discern no basis for reversal.
III. Cumulative Error
¶ 17 Castleberry also argues that any errors cumulatively
prejudiced her. But the gist of her argument is that either the
evidence should not have been admitted or the court should have
provided a limiting instruction. These two claims of error are
alternative, not cumulative. Thus, Castleberry’s cumulative error
claim is misplaced.
IV. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.