24CA0031 Peo v Cardenas 06-04-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0031 Mesa County District Court No. 11CR813 Honorable Richard T. Gurley, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jaime Sahagun Cardenas,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE FOX J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 4, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
James West, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jaime Sahagun Cardenas, appeals the district
court’s order granting him 1,593 days of presentence confinement
credit (PSCC). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2011, police sought a warrant to arrest Cardenas for
various charges related to a July 2011 crime spree in Grand
Junction. However, police failed to apprehend Cardenas and only
discovered his whereabouts in 2014 when the Mesa County District
Attorney’s Office (DA) learned he was incarcerated in Mexico.
¶3 The record is unclear as to Cardenas’s criminal history in
Mexico. An email from a United States government employee stated
that Cardenas was incarcerated “in approximately March 2012”
with a sentence of “approximately [three] years [and] [eight]
months.” A pleading from the prosecution indicated that Cardenas
was “arrested in Mexico sometime between 2012-2014.” A Mexican
record shows that he was arrested in March 2012, but a second
1 record suggests that he committed another crime in May 2014.1
The record does not state whether he was incarcerated at the time
of the 2014 offense, nor does it indicate the type of crime or provide
sentencing information.
¶4 In May 2016, the Mexican government sent the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) an extradition agreement in Spanish.
There is no official translation in the record, but an email from the
DOJ indicates that Mexico granted the extradition request.
However, in August 2016, the DOJ informed the DA that Cardenas
had “pending criminal charges” in Mexico, and his extradition was
“suspended until further notice.” In July 2017, the DOJ told the
DA that the “Mexican domestic case was still in the early
stages . . . , so it will likely be a while still before that process is
complete.” In November 2017, the DOJ wrote that “[t]he case is in
the early stages of the process (presentation of evidence).” The DOJ
1 The 2012 record shows a “Fecha Captura,” or arrest date, of
March 21, 2012. The 2014 record shows a “fecha de delito,” or offense date, of May 17, 2014. See Sean Dean Stromberg, Legal Terminology Dictionary: A Bilingual Dictionary for Legal Translation and Court Interpreting 139, 156, 166 (Darlene M. Johnson ed., 2018) (defining “fecha” as “date,” “delito” as “offense, crime,” and “captura” as “capture, apprehension, arrest”).
2 also indicated that “the U.S. matter [was] deferred pending the
resolution of the [Mexican] case,” presumably referring to the
extradition matter. In October 2018, the DOJ again stated that the
Mexican case was “still at the early stages of the process
(presentation of evidence phase).” And in May 2019, the DOJ
reiterated that Cardenas’s extradition was “deferred due to Mexican
charges.”
¶5 Finally, in June 2019, the DOJ notified the DA that Cardenas
had been acquitted in the 2016 Mexican case. He was surrendered
to the United States government on July 19, 2019.
¶6 In 2023, he pleaded guilty to second degree murder and first
degree assault and was sentenced to a total of seventy-five years in
the Department of Corrections’ custody. At the sentencing hearing
and in later briefs, Cardenas argued that he was entitled to PSCC
starting in May 2016, while the prosecution argued that he was
only entitled to PSCC beginning in July 2019 when he was
extradited. The district court rejected Cardenas’s argument and
granted PSCC from July 19, 2019, until sentencing on November
17, 2023. On appeal, Cardenas argues that the court should have
granted PSCC beginning in 2016. We disagree and affirm.
3 II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 “We review de novo whether a defendant is entitled to PSCC.”
Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). PSCC is not
discretionary and must be granted if a defendant is entitled to such
credit. Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138, 1144 (Colo. 2008).
¶8 “A person who is confined for an offense prior to the
imposition of [a] sentence for said offense is entitled to credit
against the term of his or her sentence for the entire period of such
confinement.” § 18-1.3-405, C.R.S. 2025. Two factors guide our
determination of whether a defendant is entitled to PSCC. First,
there must be “a substantial nexus between the conduct or charges
for which he is confined and the sentence ultimately imposed.”
Russell v. People, 2020 CO 37, ¶ 5. Thus, “a defendant is entitled to
PSCC if ‘the presentence confinement [was] actually caused by the
charge or conduct for which the defendant is to be sentenced.’” Id.
at ¶ 22 (citation omitted). A substantial nexus exists if “the
defendant would have remained confined on the charge or conduct
for which credit is sought in the absence of any other charge.” Id. at
¶ 24. In other words, if he would have remained confined “if only
4 the sentencing charge existed,” he “is entitled to PSCC so long as
the credit would not be duplicative.” Id. (citation omitted).
Additionally, “[w]hen determining whether a substantial nexus
exists, causation, not geography, is the defining question.” Id. at
¶ 25. Therefore, “when a defendant is confined on charges from two
different jurisdictions,” we ask whether his confinement was
“caused by the charges in both jurisdictions.” Id.
¶9 Second, “a defendant is not entitled to duplicative PSCC.” Id.
at ¶ 26. Therefore, if he “commits a new crime while already
serving a sentence . . . , the period of confinement prior to
sentencing on the new offense will be credited only against the
original sentence.” Id.
B. Application
¶ 10 Cardenas argues that he was entitled to PSCC from May 31,
2016, when the DOJ received the extradition agreement, until his
2023 sentencing. He contends that there was a substantial nexus
between his Mexican confinement and the charges underlying his
2023 sentence because — according to his unofficial translation —
the extradition agreement stated that the Mexican government
provisionally detained him pending his extradition. So, he argues,
5 Mexico would have retained custody of him even if he was eligible
for release from his 2012 and/or 2014 sentence(s). We reject this
argument.
¶ 11 First, even accepting Cardenas’s unofficial translation of the
extradition agreement, his argument would only entitle him to
PSCC from the time the extradition agreement was received until
the 2016 Mexican charges were filed (at most three months). And
although the first mention of those charges was an August 2016
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA0031 Peo v Cardenas 06-04-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0031 Mesa County District Court No. 11CR813 Honorable Richard T. Gurley, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jaime Sahagun Cardenas,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE FOX J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 4, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
James West, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jaime Sahagun Cardenas, appeals the district
court’s order granting him 1,593 days of presentence confinement
credit (PSCC). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2011, police sought a warrant to arrest Cardenas for
various charges related to a July 2011 crime spree in Grand
Junction. However, police failed to apprehend Cardenas and only
discovered his whereabouts in 2014 when the Mesa County District
Attorney’s Office (DA) learned he was incarcerated in Mexico.
¶3 The record is unclear as to Cardenas’s criminal history in
Mexico. An email from a United States government employee stated
that Cardenas was incarcerated “in approximately March 2012”
with a sentence of “approximately [three] years [and] [eight]
months.” A pleading from the prosecution indicated that Cardenas
was “arrested in Mexico sometime between 2012-2014.” A Mexican
record shows that he was arrested in March 2012, but a second
1 record suggests that he committed another crime in May 2014.1
The record does not state whether he was incarcerated at the time
of the 2014 offense, nor does it indicate the type of crime or provide
sentencing information.
¶4 In May 2016, the Mexican government sent the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) an extradition agreement in Spanish.
There is no official translation in the record, but an email from the
DOJ indicates that Mexico granted the extradition request.
However, in August 2016, the DOJ informed the DA that Cardenas
had “pending criminal charges” in Mexico, and his extradition was
“suspended until further notice.” In July 2017, the DOJ told the
DA that the “Mexican domestic case was still in the early
stages . . . , so it will likely be a while still before that process is
complete.” In November 2017, the DOJ wrote that “[t]he case is in
the early stages of the process (presentation of evidence).” The DOJ
1 The 2012 record shows a “Fecha Captura,” or arrest date, of
March 21, 2012. The 2014 record shows a “fecha de delito,” or offense date, of May 17, 2014. See Sean Dean Stromberg, Legal Terminology Dictionary: A Bilingual Dictionary for Legal Translation and Court Interpreting 139, 156, 166 (Darlene M. Johnson ed., 2018) (defining “fecha” as “date,” “delito” as “offense, crime,” and “captura” as “capture, apprehension, arrest”).
2 also indicated that “the U.S. matter [was] deferred pending the
resolution of the [Mexican] case,” presumably referring to the
extradition matter. In October 2018, the DOJ again stated that the
Mexican case was “still at the early stages of the process
(presentation of evidence phase).” And in May 2019, the DOJ
reiterated that Cardenas’s extradition was “deferred due to Mexican
charges.”
¶5 Finally, in June 2019, the DOJ notified the DA that Cardenas
had been acquitted in the 2016 Mexican case. He was surrendered
to the United States government on July 19, 2019.
¶6 In 2023, he pleaded guilty to second degree murder and first
degree assault and was sentenced to a total of seventy-five years in
the Department of Corrections’ custody. At the sentencing hearing
and in later briefs, Cardenas argued that he was entitled to PSCC
starting in May 2016, while the prosecution argued that he was
only entitled to PSCC beginning in July 2019 when he was
extradited. The district court rejected Cardenas’s argument and
granted PSCC from July 19, 2019, until sentencing on November
17, 2023. On appeal, Cardenas argues that the court should have
granted PSCC beginning in 2016. We disagree and affirm.
3 II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶7 “We review de novo whether a defendant is entitled to PSCC.”
Fransua v. People, 2019 CO 96, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). PSCC is not
discretionary and must be granted if a defendant is entitled to such
credit. Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138, 1144 (Colo. 2008).
¶8 “A person who is confined for an offense prior to the
imposition of [a] sentence for said offense is entitled to credit
against the term of his or her sentence for the entire period of such
confinement.” § 18-1.3-405, C.R.S. 2025. Two factors guide our
determination of whether a defendant is entitled to PSCC. First,
there must be “a substantial nexus between the conduct or charges
for which he is confined and the sentence ultimately imposed.”
Russell v. People, 2020 CO 37, ¶ 5. Thus, “a defendant is entitled to
PSCC if ‘the presentence confinement [was] actually caused by the
charge or conduct for which the defendant is to be sentenced.’” Id.
at ¶ 22 (citation omitted). A substantial nexus exists if “the
defendant would have remained confined on the charge or conduct
for which credit is sought in the absence of any other charge.” Id. at
¶ 24. In other words, if he would have remained confined “if only
4 the sentencing charge existed,” he “is entitled to PSCC so long as
the credit would not be duplicative.” Id. (citation omitted).
Additionally, “[w]hen determining whether a substantial nexus
exists, causation, not geography, is the defining question.” Id. at
¶ 25. Therefore, “when a defendant is confined on charges from two
different jurisdictions,” we ask whether his confinement was
“caused by the charges in both jurisdictions.” Id.
¶9 Second, “a defendant is not entitled to duplicative PSCC.” Id.
at ¶ 26. Therefore, if he “commits a new crime while already
serving a sentence . . . , the period of confinement prior to
sentencing on the new offense will be credited only against the
original sentence.” Id.
B. Application
¶ 10 Cardenas argues that he was entitled to PSCC from May 31,
2016, when the DOJ received the extradition agreement, until his
2023 sentencing. He contends that there was a substantial nexus
between his Mexican confinement and the charges underlying his
2023 sentence because — according to his unofficial translation —
the extradition agreement stated that the Mexican government
provisionally detained him pending his extradition. So, he argues,
5 Mexico would have retained custody of him even if he was eligible
for release from his 2012 and/or 2014 sentence(s). We reject this
argument.
¶ 11 First, even accepting Cardenas’s unofficial translation of the
extradition agreement, his argument would only entitle him to
PSCC from the time the extradition agreement was received until
the 2016 Mexican charges were filed (at most three months). And
although the first mention of those charges was an August 2016
email, the record is silent as to when the charges were filed. The
record also does not state whether or when Cardenas was released
(or scheduled to be released) on the 2012 and/or 2014 charge(s).2
And although the DOJ estimated a sentence of three years and
eight months for the 2012 crime, there is no information about
when that sentence began or if there was an additional sentence for
2 On June 19, 2019, the day after the DOJ informed the DA of
Cardenas’s acquittal of the 2016 charges, a DOJ employee wrote that he “did not know when [Cardenas’s] current sentence is being completed or how [the acquittal] [a]ffects that sentence.” Although Cardenas argues that he was detained after his acquittal solely to await extradition, the record is unclear. A June 18 email said the extradition timing depended on the Mexican prosecution’s decision to appeal, while the June 19 email suggests that Cardenas may have had time left on his original sentence.
6 the potential 2014 crime. Therefore, it is possible that he would
have remained in Mexican custody on those charges even absent
any provisional detention pending extradition. See id. at ¶ 24.
¶ 12 Second, the record is clear that Cardenas’s confinement from
August 2016 until June 2019 was due to the 2016 charges. From
2016 to 2019, the DOJ repeatedly explained that Cardenas’s
extradition was delayed due to the Mexican criminal proceedings.
In other words, his confinement in Mexico was caused by the
charges in Mexico, not the charges in the United States. See id. at
¶ 25. And because he was detained in Mexico due to at least the
2016 charges and possibly the 2012 and/or 2014 charges, we
cannot say his confinement in Mexico was due solely to the charges
for which he was sentenced in the United States. Id. at ¶ 24.
¶ 13 Cardenas also contends that the district court erred by
concluding that Mexico was unable to extradite him after the 2016
charges were filed. Citing the “Delayed Surrender” portion of the
United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T.
5059, he argues that Mexico chose, but was not required, to
7 address the new charges before extradition.3 But whether Mexico
could have extradited him sooner is not the question. What
mattered was why he was not extradited sooner and why he
remained detained in Mexico. See id. at ¶ 22. Moreover, the treaty
undermines Cardenas’s argument that there was a substantial
nexus between the sentencing charges and his confinement in
Mexico. It provides that Mexico can delay extradition (and prolong
confinement in Mexico) not because of the charges for which
extradition is sought but for “a different offense.” Extradition
Treaty, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (emphasis added).
¶ 14 In sum, Cardenas was in Mexican custody from approximately
August 2016 until June 2019 due to (at least) the 2016 Mexican
charges, and he would have remained incarcerated in Mexico on
those charges even if the charges for which he was extradited did
not exist. See id. at ¶ 24. Finally, because it is unclear when his
3 The Treaty says, “The requested Party, after granting the
extradition, may defer the surrender of the person sought when that person is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the territory of the requested Party for a different offense, until the conclusion of the proceeding or the full execution of the punishment that has been imposed.” Extradition Treaty, Mex.-U.S., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
8 original sentence(s) in Mexico ended, we also cannot conclude that
he is entitled to PSCC for the time (1) after the extradition
agreement was finalized and before the 2016 charges were filed or
(2) after he was acquitted of the 2016 charges and awaiting
extradition. See People v. Bray, 819 P.2d 528, 529 (Colo. App.
1991) (discussing PSCC for the defendant’s time “spent in
confinement awaiting extradition after his acquittal of the British
charges”). He may have remained confined in Mexico on the 2012
and/or 2014 charges even if he was not awaiting extradition.
¶ 15 Because there was no substantial nexus between his
confinement in Mexico for offenses committed in Mexico and the
charges he was sentenced for in the United States, the district court
properly calculated PSCC. And because there was no substantial
nexus, we need not address whether PSCC would have been
duplicative.
III. Disposition
¶ 16 We affirm the order.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE DUNN concur.