Peo v. Campbell

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 6, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0307
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0307 Peo v Campbell 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0307 Arapahoe County District Court No. 05CR1568 Honorable Joseph Whitfield, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

George Campbell,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

George Campbell, Pro Se ¶1 Defendant, George Campbell, appeals the district court’s order

summarily denying his most recent postconviction motion. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Nearly twenty years ago, Campbell pleaded guilty to

aggravated robbery, a class 3 felony. He was sentenced in May

2007, and he did not directly appeal the judgment of conviction.

¶3 In 2010 and 2018, Campbell unsuccessfully sought

postconviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c). In the 2018

proceedings, the district court denied relief on the basis that

Campbell’s claims were time barred and successive.

¶4 In January 2025, Campbell filed another postconviction

motion. He asserted that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent because (1) he was not competent at the time of his Crim.

P. 11 advisement; and (2) in the course of that advisement, no one

explained to him that he would not be eligible for “any earned time

on his charges,” resulting in what amounted to “a virtual life

sentence for a man of his age.”

1 ¶5 The district court denied the motion, concluding that it was

cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c) but, as with the 2018 motion, it was

both time barred and successive.

II. Discussion

¶6 Campbell contends that the district court erred by construing

his most recent motion “as an exten[s]ion of his [2018] motion.” He

reasserts his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary,

or intelligent. We discern no error.

¶7 We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a Crim. P.

35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

We also review de novo whether a Crim. P. 35(c) claim is time

barred or successive. People v. Bonan, 2014 COA 156, ¶ 16;

People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 42.

¶8 As a factual matter, we reject the premise that the district

court construed Campbell’s 2025 motion as an “extension” of his

2018 motion. Nowhere in the district court’s order do we see such

a determination. Instead, the court “liberally construe[d] the

pleading,” concluded that it was a “subsequent” Crim. P. 35(c)

motion, and denied it “on the same grounds” as the 2018 motion —

namely, timeliness and successiveness.

2 ¶9 Further, we perceive no error in the district court’s legal

conclusions.

¶ 10 A postconviction claim that a defendant’s guilty plea was not

knowing, voluntary, or intelligent is, as the district court

determined, cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c). People v. Rockwell,

125 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. 2005) (challenges to the validity of a guilty

plea, or the manner in which it was taken, are cognizable under

Crim. P. 35(c)); People v. Moore-El, 160 P.3d 393, 395 (Colo. App.

2007) (same).

¶ 11 But Crim. P. 35(c) imposes specific procedural requirements

that a person seeking relief under the rule must follow.

¶ 12 First, a defendant convicted of a non-class 1 felony must file a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion within three years of his conviction becoming

final. § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025. Any motion filed outside this

time limit must allege facts which, if true, would establish one of

the exceptions to timeliness listed in section 16-5-402(2). Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(I); see also § 16-5-402(2)(a)-(d) (listing the “only exceptions

to the time limitations specified in subsection (1) of this section”).

¶ 13 Campbell’s conviction became final upon sentencing in May

2007. See, e.g., People v. Shepard, 151 P.3d 580, 582 (Colo. App.

3 2006) (“A conviction is final on the date the defendant’s direct

appeal has been exhausted if an appeal is pursued, or on the date

of sentencing if no appeal is pursued.”). He therefore had until May

2010 to file any Crim. P. 35(c) claims. His 2025 Crim. P. 35(c)

motion is time barred because it was filed fifteen years too late and

did not allege any facts supporting an exception to the time

limitation.1

¶ 14 Second, absent exceptions not applicable here, a court “shall”

deny as successive any claim that was previously raised and

resolved, or could have been presented in an earlier postconviction

proceeding. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)–(VII). To the extent Campbell did

not raise his 2025 postconviction claims during either his 2010 or

2018 Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings, he could have. Accordingly, his

claims are also successive, and the district court did not err by so

concluding.

1 True, Campbell’s motion appeared to rely on the “recency of”

People v. Guyton, 999 N.W.2d 393 (Mich. 2023), to argue that the district court should accept and consider his motion. But he did not tether this assertion to a claim that an exception to timeliness applied. And, in any event, Colorado courts are not bound by opinions of the Michigan Supreme Court.

4 III. Disposition

¶ 15 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.