23CA1580 Peo v Caime 06-18-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1580 Arapahoe County District Court No. 15CR1883 Honorable Eric White, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jeffrey Thomas Caime,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Johnson and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jillian J. Price, Deputy Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Chelsea E. Mowrer, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Jeffrey Thomas Caime, appeals the district court’s
order concluding that his sixty-four-year habitual criminal sentence
does not raise an inference of gross disproportionality. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2015, the People charged Caime with possession with intent
to distribute a controlled substance and possession of a controlled
substance, both as a special offender. At Caime’s trial, the jury
heard evidence that two officers spotted a parked car that had been
reported stolen. They observed a man get out of a truck and
approach the stolen car, where he ultimately got into the passenger
seat. Caime was in the driver’s seat.
¶3 The officers pinned the car with their vehicle and approached
both sides of the vehicle. The officer on the driver’s side
commanded Caime to show his hands, stop moving, and turn the
car off. Instead, the officer testified, Caime reached toward the
center console area, which, in the officer’s experience, was
consistent with retrieving a weapon. An officer used his baton to
break the driver’s side window. The passenger complied with orders
to exit the car, and Caime was pulled out of the passenger’s side
after he dove toward it.
1 ¶4 Both men were placed in custody, and a search of the car
revealed a bag of methamphetamine on the driver-side floorboard,
and a semiautomatic pistol shoved between the driver’s seat and
the center console. DNA evidence found on the pistol established a
match to Caime’s DNA profile. In a police interview, a recording of
which was played at trial, Caime admitted that he dealt
methamphetamine, possessed methamphetamine during the
incident in question, and was there to sell some to the man who got
into the car with him. People v. Caime, 2021 COA 134, ¶ 5.
¶5 The jury acquitted Caime of the intent to distribute charge but
convicted him of the lesser offense of possession of a controlled
substance. The jury also entered a specific finding that Caime was
a special offender based on the presence of the semiautomatic
pistol. The jury’s special offender finding meant that the sentence
for Caime’s level 4 drug felony conviction would be enhanced to the
sentence applicable to a level 1 drug felony. See
§ 18-18-407(1)(d)(II), C.R.S. 2025 (a defendant who commits any
drug felony commits a level 1 drug felony and is a special offender if
the defendant or a confederate possessed a firearm to which the
defendant or confederate had access in a manner that posed a risk
2 to others or in a vehicle the defendant was occupying at the time of
the commission of the violation); People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 201,
204 (Colo. App. 2001) (the special offender statute is a sentence
enhancing provision).
¶6 In addition to his possession conviction, Caime was charged
and adjudicated as a habitual offender based on a finding that he
had five prior adult felony convictions between 2004 and 2014:
criminal mischief; vehicular assault (reckless driving); possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance
(methamphetamine); and two separate instances of possession of a
weapon by a previous offender (POWPO).
¶7 The district court imposed the statutorily mandated
sixty-four-year habitual criminal sentence and, after conducting an
abbreviated proportionality review, found no inference of gross
disproportionality. Caime, ¶¶ 47, 39. In doing so, the court
concluded that the predicate offenses of possession with intent to
distribute a controlled substance, POWPO, and vehicular assault
were all per se grave or serious offenses. Id. at ¶ 47.
¶8 On direct appeal, however, a division of this court concluded
that Caime was entitled to a new abbreviated proportionality review
3 because those three offenses are not per se grave or serious. Id. at
¶¶ 56-57 (vehicular assault (reckless driving) is not per se grave or
serious); Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M, ¶¶ 71-72 (possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance is not per se grave
or serious); People v. Wright, 2021 COA 106, ¶¶ 73-79 (POWPO is
not per se grave or serious).
¶9 The division remanded the case to the district court for a new
abbreviated proportionality review with specific instructions to
consider (1) the factual circumstances underlying Caime’s five
predicate offenses to determine the gravity or seriousness of those
crimes; and (2) “the harshness of Caime’s sixty-four-year sentence
in light of the gravity or seriousness — or lack thereof — of these
offenses along with Caime’s triggering offense of possession of a
controlled substance as a special offender, as well as his parole
eligibility.” Caime, ¶ 58. The division expressed “no opinion
regarding the proper outcome of the proportionality review.” Id. at
¶ 57 n.4.
¶ 10 On remand, Caime asked the district court to consider various
legislative amendments, including (1) the reclassification of his
triggering offense from a level 4 drug felony to a level 1 drug
4 misdemeanor; and (2) the fact that the direct file statute had been
amended such that, had Caime’s criminal mischief and vehicular
assault offenses “happened today,” he could not have been charged
as an adult under the direct file statute.
¶ 11 In conducting the new abbreviated proportionality review, the
court considered (1) the specific factual circumstances underlying
the triggering and predicate offenses; (2) the legislative changes
identified by defense counsel; (3) Caime’s history of recidivism; and
(4) the harshness of the penalty. In combination, the court
concluded, Caime’s triggering and predicate offenses were not so
lacking in gravity and seriousness as to raise an inference that the
sixty-four-year habitual criminal sentence imposed on the triggering
offense was grossly disproportionate.
II. Discussion
¶ 12 Caime contends that a particularized analysis of the facts and
circumstances of his triggering and predicate offenses “reveals [that]
none of them are grave and serious.” Thus, in his view, his
triggering and predicate offenses are, in combination, so lacking in
gravity or seriousness as to suggest that his sixty-four-year
sentence is grossly disproportionate. We disagree.
5 A. Proportionality: Legal Principles and Standard of Review
¶ 13 The habitual criminal statute, when applicable, strips a
district court of its discretion in sentencing. Wells-Yates, ¶ 20.
“But the legislature’s authority to prescribe harsher punishment for
habitual criminals is not without constitutional contours.” Id. at ¶
1. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits the imposition of a sentence that is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment); Wells-Yates, ¶ 5. The Eighth
Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime
and sentence.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Rather, it
forbids only extreme sentences. Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 536
(Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by, Wells-Yates, ¶¶ 16-17.
¶ 14 When, as here, a defendant challenges the proportionality of a
habitual criminal sentence, the district court must first conduct an
abbreviated proportionality review assessing (1) the gravity or
seriousness of both the triggering and predicate offenses and (2) the
harshness of the penalty imposed for the triggering offense.
6 Wells-Yates, ¶ 23. If a crime has not been designated per se grave
or serious, the gravity or seriousness of the offense requires a
fact-based inquiry into several factors, including but not limited to
the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society; whether the
offense involved violence or the threat of violence; the “absolute
magnitude of the crime”; whether the offense is the lesser included
or greater offense; whether the offense was an attempted or a
completed crime; whether the defendant was an accessory,
complicitor, or principal; and the defendant’s culpability and
motive. McDonald v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).
Also, “[i]n determining the gravity or seriousness of [an] offense
during an abbreviated proportionality review, the trial court should
consider relevant legislative amendments enacted after the date of
the offense, even if the amendments do not apply retroactively.”
Wells-Yates, ¶ 45.
¶ 15 In analyzing the gravity or seriousness of the triggering and
predicate offenses, a court need not classify each crime as grave or
serious. People v. Terry, 2019 COA 9, ¶ 41, overruled on other
grounds by, People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70. Instead, it determines
whether, in combination, those offenses “are so lacking in gravity or
7 seriousness so as to suggest that the sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate to the crime.” Wells-Yates, ¶ 23.
¶ 16 In assessing the harshness of the penalty, the court should
consider both the length of the sentence and the defendant’s
eligibility for parole, affording “great deference” to the legislature’s
determination. Id. at ¶ 62. Given the “primacy of the General
Assembly in crafting sentencing schemes,” an abbreviated
proportionality review will almost always result in a conclusion that
the sentence is not unconstitutional. Id. at ¶ 21 (citation omitted).
¶ 17 We review de novo whether a sentence raises an inference of
gross disproportionality. See id. at ¶ 35.
B. The Gravity or Seriousness of the Predicate and Triggering Offenses
¶ 18 Although Caime asserts that none of his predicate and
triggering offenses are grave or serious on their facts, we partially
agree with the district court’s assessment that they are.
¶ 19 Caime’s predicate offense of criminal mischief involved more
than thirty victims and damage to multiple vehicles using rocks and
golf clubs totaling more than $23,000. The probable cause affidavit
reflects that Caime drove a group of friends around and, though not
8 the one to come up with the idea, he was among the first of the
group to participate in smashing car windows along an entire block.
Under these circumstances, Caime’s criminal mischief conviction is
serious. See People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. 1994)
(examining the facts and circumstances underlying the crime of
attempted criminal mischief and concluding that it constituted a
serious crime where the defendant was seen knocking over traffic
signs, which he then used to smash the window and body of a car,
causing approximately $4,400 worth of damage), abrogated on other
grounds by, Melton v. People, 2019 CO 89.
¶ 20 Five months after the criminal mischief offense, Caime pleaded
guilty to the offense of vehicular assault (reckless driving). A
witness observed that Caime “blew through a stop sign,” making no
attempt to stop, and “T-Boned” another vehicle. The driver of the
other vehicle suffered serious bodily injury — broken ribs, a
fractured hip, and internal injuries to his spleen. Law enforcement
determined that Caime was traveling twenty-two miles per hour
over the posted speed limit at the time of the collision. Given
Caime’s admitted culpability and the grave harm caused to the
victim, this crime was likewise grave and serious on its facts.
9 ¶ 21 The next year, Caime pleaded guilty to one count of POWPO.
The conviction arose after individuals reported hearing gunshots in
their neighborhood. One witness reported hearing twelve shots and
a responding officer concluded that the “shots were fired
indiscriminately into the neighborhood.” Law enforcement
contacted a car in which Caime and several others were riding. One
of the passengers reported that all of the passengers who were
sitting by windows, including Caime, had fired shots from the
vehicle, and a 9mm gun was recovered from the floorboard. A
round of 9mm ammunition was found in Caime’s pocket.
Notwithstanding Caime’s assertion that no people or homes were
targeted or harmed and this was not a violent crime, this completed
crime was grave and serious due to the serious threat of harm it
presented and Caime’s level of culpability in admitting to possessing
a firearm.
¶ 22 Caime’s next POWPO conviction stemmed from evidence that
he was contacted by law enforcement while in a vehicle. An illegal
switchblade was located under the driver’s seat cover, beneath
where Caime had been sitting. In exchange for the dismissal of
other felony counts, Caime pleaded guilty to an added count of
10 POWPO. Although possession of a weapon by a convicted felon
always presents some risk to society, possession of a switchblade
without some corresponding evidence of harm or threatened harm
leads us to conclude that this crime was not, on its own, grave or
serious.
¶ 23 Likewise, we conclude that Caime’s prior conviction for
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine was,
standing alone, not grave or serious. After law enforcement
discovered he was driving with a revoked license, they searched his
person and vehicle and discovered a methamphetamine pipe in his
pants pocket and a case containing empty, individual baggies of
varying sizes, and two larger baggies containing what was later
identified as methamphetamine. Caime’s guilty plea indicated that
the weight of the methamphetamine was fourteen grams or less.
Although our supreme court has “anticipate[d] that many
convictions for possession with intent will be grave or serious,”
Wells-Yates, ¶ 70, the quantity of methamphetamine found in
Caime’s possession was small. See id. at ¶¶ 30, 69 (characterizing
seven grams or less of methamphetamine as a “small amount” such
11 that the person found with it might not be engaged in a grave or
serious crime).
¶ 24 Last, we consider the triggering offense. Based on the facts set
forth in Part I of this opinion, we conclude that it was serious.
True, Caime was found guilty of the lesser offense of simple
possession of only a small amount of methamphetamine. But this
was not Caime’s first felony conviction, indicating a greater level of
seriousness. See id. at ¶ 23 (concluding that a defendant’s “history
of felony recidivism” is a relevant consideration to the grave or
serious inquiry). Moreover, the circumstances showed that he
appeared to be reaching for a weapon when confronted by law
enforcement, and a semiautomatic pistol containing his DNA was
recovered from the area into which he was reaching.
¶ 25 Nonetheless, Caime advances four reasons why we should find
that, taken together, his crimes raise an inference of gross
disproportionality.
¶ 26 First, relying on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473 (2012),
and similar cases addressing the constitutionality of juvenile
sentencing, he notes that his criminal mischief and vehicular
assault convictions were committed when he had not yet reached
12 the age of eighteen, and he thus had a diminished culpability
because “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 471. He further notes that, though
he was no longer a juvenile when he committed his first POWPO
offense, “neurologically speaking he was still a child.” But Caime
was an adult when he received the enhanced sentence here. And
when a defendant receives such a sentence because of prior felonies
he committed, “his age at the time of the prior felonies doesn’t
impact the validity of the adult sentence under the Eighth
Amendment.” People v. Porter, 2019 COA 73, ¶ 19.
¶ 27 Second and related to his first point, Caime notes that his
criminal mischief and vehicular assault offenses are no longer
direct file eligible and, thus, would not today be eligible to serve as
predicate offenses for habitual criminal purposes. This too doesn’t
impact our proportionality analysis because, in our view, this is an
attack on his habitual criminal adjudication, not the proportionality
of his sentence, which is the limited issue before us.
¶ 28 Third, we are not persuaded that statutory changes to the
classification of criminal mischief render Caime’s criminal mischief
offense not grave or serious. Although such legislative changes are
13 evidence of evolving standards of decency, Wells-Yates, ¶ 49, this
fact does not alter our conclusion that the particularized facts of
Caime’s criminal mischief offense were serious. People v. McRae,
2019 CO 91, ¶ 16 (While statutory reclassifications are relevant,
“they are not determinative of whether an offense is grave or
serious.” Rather, “they must be analyzed in conjunction with the
facts and circumstances surrounding the crime committed.”). And
to the extent Caime faults the district court for stating that he acted
“intentionally” rather than “knowingly” in committing this offense,
this likewise doesn’t change our calculus such that we would
conclude that Caime’s actions of smashing numerous cars were less
¶ 29 Fourth and finally, we note — as the district court did — that
Caime’s triggering offense has been reclassified from a level 4 drug
felony to a level 1 drug misdemeanor for offenses committed on or
after March 1, 2020. See § 18-18-403.5(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025
(possession of material containing less than four grams of a
schedule I or II controlled substance is a level 1 drug misdemeanor).
Though we are mindful that the reclassification of an offense can
provide “evidence of the legislature’s view of the gravity or
14 seriousness of the crime,” Wells-Yates, ¶ 50, we think that an
additional factor here — that Caime was reaching for a firearm and
was found by a jury to be a special offender — indicates that his
crime was grave or serious notwithstanding the legislative change.
This is because “[t]he presence of a gun undoubtedly increases the
seriousness of a drug offense.” People v. Wells-Yates, 2023 COA
120, ¶ 45 (concluding that the possession of a handgun was an
“additional factor” to consider notwithstanding legislative
reclassification of a triggering offense); see also People v. Hopper,
284 P.3d 87, 91 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting “the well-known potential
for danger that exists whenever drugs and deadly weapons are
present”).
¶ 30 We also note, like the district court, Caime’s lengthy criminal
history, beginning in 2004 and continuing to the triggering offense.
Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 23 (“[T]he grave or serious inquiry
includes consideration of the defendant’s history of felony
recidivism.”). Though the district court noted a “break in
criminality between 2005 and 2012,” it surmised that this was due
to “enforced law-abiding behavior,” which the record supports as
Caime was under supervision for much of that time frame.
15 ¶ 31 Thus, notwithstanding our conclusion that two of Caime’s
predicate offenses were not grave or serious, we nonetheless agree
with the district court that, in combination, the predicate and
triggering offenses are not so lacking in gravity or seriousness so as
to suggest that the sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate
to the crime. Id.
C. The Harshness of the Penalty
¶ 32 Next, we consider whether the sixty-four-year sentence was
unduly or unconstitutionally harsh. We conclude that it was not.
¶ 33 “[T]he fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a
substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is
properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” Harmelin,
501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (citation modified). Thus, “[r]eviewing courts should
grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures
necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of
punishments for crimes.” Id. at 999 (citation modified). Caime’s
sixty-four-year sentence, though lengthy, was within the range
permitted — indeed, mandated — at the time of his offense.
16 ¶ 34 In addition, the record indicates that Caime will be eligible for
parole after serving less than half his sentence. Though the
sentence might seem harsh on its face, Caime’s eligibility for parole
may “reduce the actual period of confinement and render the
penalty less harsh.” Wells-Yates, 2019 CO 90M, ¶ 14.
¶ 35 Because Caime’s sentence falls within the range fixed by the
legislature and he will be eligible for parole after serving less than
half his sentence, we conclude that his sentence isn’t
unconstitutionally harsh.
III. Disposition
¶ 36 Under the circumstances, the sentence does not raise an
inference of disproportionality, and consequently, we discern no
error in the district court’s order so concluding. Thus, we affirm.
JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE KUHN concur.