Peo v. Byrne

Opinion

24CA1207 Peo v Byrne 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1207 Boulder County District Court No. 21CR448 Honorable Ingrid S. Bakke, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick J. Byrne, Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUDGE DUNN

J. Jones and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 27, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Solicitor General and Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Claire Pakis, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.

¶1 Defendant, Patrick J. Byrne, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After an incident between Byrne and his girlfriend, the prosecution charged Byrne with second degree assault and third degree assault. Byrne later agreed to plead guilty to second degree assault (the felony) and attempted third degree assault (the misdemeanor). Under the plea agreement, the parties agreed to an eighteen-month deferred judgment and sentence (DJS) on the felony to run concurrent with an eighteen-month probationary sentence on the misdemeanor.

¶3 Before the court accepted his pleas at the November 2021 providency hearing, it reviewed the plea agreement with Byrne and specifically explained that a conviction would be entered on the misdemeanor but that a felony conviction “would never enter” if Byrne successfully complied with the terms of his DJS. The court also clarified that if Byrne violated the terms of the DJS “in any way,” the prosecution would move to revoke the DJS, and, if the prosecution proved the violation, the court would enter the felony conviction and could sentence Byrne to up to six years in prison.

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Byrne confirmed that he understood the DJS and wished to plead guilty. The court then accepted the pleas, entered a judgment of conviction on the misdemeanor, and imposed the stipulated sentences.

¶4 Within months, Byrne violated the terms of his DJS and probation, and his probation officer filed a complaint to revoke both.

¶5 By September 2023, Byrne had been taken into custody. Byrne then moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel. As relevant here, he alleged that plea counsel misadvised him that the records of his case could be sealed if he successfully completed his DJS and probation, and, but for that advice, he “would have elected” to take the case to trial.

¶6 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. Although it concluded that plea counsel’s performance was deficient in some respects, it found no prejudice. Because no sentence had yet been imposed on the felony, the court denied the motion to withdraw the felony plea under Crim. P. 32(d). And because a conviction had been entered on the misdemeanor, the

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court denied the motion seeking to withdraw the misdemeanor plea under Crim. P. 35(c).1 II. Discussion

¶7 Byrne maintains that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the ability to “seal any record of this case” if he successfully completed his DJS and probation. Thus, he contends, the district court erred by denying (1) his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to the felony under Rule 32(d) and (2) his motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea to the misdemeanor under Rule 35(c). We disagree.

A. Withdrawal of the Felony Plea Under Rule 32(d)

¶8 A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 32(d). Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 14. Rather, a defendant must establish a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Crumb v. People, 230 P.3d 726, 730 (Colo. 2010).

1 Byrne filed his motion under Crim. P. 32(d). He doesn’t appear to contend that the district court erred by denying his motion to withdraw the felony plea under Crim. P. 32(d) but construing the motion seeking to withdraw the misdemeanor plea as one under Crim. P. 35(c). See Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶¶ 14, 16 (noting that a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before a sentence is imposed under Crim. P. 32(d) but must challenge a conviction under Crim. P. 35(c)).

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“Ineffective assistance of counsel at the time a guilty plea is entered may constitute a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea prior to sentencing.” Kazadi, ¶ 21.

¶9 Claims of ineffective assistance within the context of a plea agreement require the defendant to show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, in that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶¶ 34-35 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Failure to prove either prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id. at ¶ 38 (if a defendant has failed to show prejudice, a court may resolve an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that basis and need not address whether counsel’s performance was deficient).

¶ 10 The district court has discretion to determine whether a defendant has demonstrated a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea, and we will not reverse its decision absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Kazadi, ¶ 15. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

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unfair, or when it applies an incorrect legal standard. People v. Rodriguez, 2022 COA 98, ¶ 12.

¶ 11 We agree with the district court that plea counsel misadvised Byrne regarding his ability to seal the records of a case involving a successfully completed DJS under the sealing statute then in effect. See § 24-72-705(1)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2021.

¶ 12 Even so, the record supports the district court’s finding that Byrne failed to establish a reasonable probability that, had he been properly advised, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to trial. At the evidentiary hearing, Byrne elected not to testify. But plea counsel testified that, although sealing the case records was “a consistent part of” his discussions with Byrne, he did not recall Byrne making his acceptance of the plea contingent on the ability to seal the records. Counsel explained that while Byrne was interested in sealing his criminal records, he also wanted to stay out of prison and avoid a felony conviction. The plea agreement expressly accomplished two of those objectives by allowing Byrne to stay out of prison and avoid a felony conviction if he complied with the terms of his DJS. See People v. Vicente- Sontay, 2014 COA 175, ¶¶ 41-42 (the defendant failed to establish

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that he was prejudiced by plea counsel’s deficient advice because the record showed that he based his decision to plead guilty on other factors).

¶ 13 At the providency hearing, Byrne confirmed his understanding that the DJS allowed him the opportunity to “avoid a felony conviction” but that a felony conviction would be entered and he could be sentenced to prison if he didn’t comply with the terms of the DJS. By contrast, Byrne said nothing to suggest that his plea was contingent on his belief that the DJS would be sealed should he be successful on probation.

¶ 14 To the extent Byrne argues that an email exchange with his counsel shows that had he been correctly advised about record sealing, he would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to trial, we are not persuaded. The email exchange occurred about nine months after Byrne had pleaded guilty. While Byrne expressed confusion and concern about sealing the records of his case, nothing in the email exchange suggested that Byrne would not have accepted the plea offer if counsel had correctly advised him about the record sealing. More significantly, Byrne’s inquiry about record sealing was sent after he had violated the terms of his DJS and

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after a motion to revoke the DJS had been filed. Thus, even had plea counsel been correct about sealing the DJS — which he wasn’t — Byrne knew that if he did not comply with the terms of the DJS, the felony conviction would be entered. Byrne doesn’t argue that he believed he would still have been eligible for record sealing once the felony conviction was entered. Thus, the evidence presented supports the district court’s finding that Byrne did not demonstrate that had he been correctly advised, he would have insisted on going to trial on the felony.

¶ 15 We are not persuaded by Byrne’s contention that the district court misapplied Crumb when denying his Rule 32(d) motion. See Crumb, 230 P.3d at 730. Crumb says only that a court should consider certain nonexclusive factors under Rule 32(d), including whether the prosecution would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea, whether the defendant promptly moved to withdraw the guilty plea, and whether the defendant has shown that justice will be subverted if the motion is denied. Id.

¶ 16 While the parties dispute whether the prosecution would suffer any prejudice should Byrne be allowed to withdraw his plea, we can hardly say the court abused its discretion by finding that

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the prosecution would be prejudiced if it had to proceed to trial years after the assault with a seemingly recanting victim. And all agree that Byrne did not promptly seek relief. Indeed, he filed his motion to withdraw long after he entered his plea and after probation had filed a motion to revoke the DJS. Beyond that, the victim’s contemporaneous report to police, along with the victim’s physical injuries, bolstered the prosecution’s case. At the very least, the case exposed Byrne to the risk of a significant prison term and a felony conviction if he lost at trial. Knowing the facts and the significant risk if he went to trial, Byrne accepted an opportunity to avoid the risk of a prison sentence and a felony conviction by pleading guilty to the DJS. Because Byrne received significant benefit from the plea agreement, he did not promptly seek to withdraw the plea, and no evidence showed that the plea was contingent on record sealing, the district court acted within its discretion by finding that the denial of Byrne’s motion did not subvert justice.

¶ 17 Finally, we are unpersuaded that the court misapplied the prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of plea counsel. The court correctly identified the prejudice standard and, though it

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might have used some imprecise language, we are confident that it applied the correct prejudice standard and that the record supports its finding that Byrne would not have insisted on going to trial even had his plea counsel correctly advised him that the records of his case could not be sealed.

¶ 18 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion by denying Byrne’s motion to withdraw the felony plea under Rule 32(d).

B. Withdrawal of the Misdemeanor Plea Under Rule 35(c)

¶ 19 Finally, we reject Byrne’s claim that the district court erred by denying his motion seeking to withdraw his plea to the misdemeanor under Rule 35(c).

¶ 20 Even assuming that Byrne alleged sufficient facts that plea counsel misadvised him that he could seal the entire case if he successfully completed the DJS and probation, the motion still fails.2 As already explained, the record supports the district court’s

2 Because we will assume plea counsel misadvised Byrne about

whether he could seal the entire case, we needn’t address the district court’s conclusion that plea counsel correctly advised Byrne that he could “apply” to seal the records of the misdemeanor conviction.

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finding that Byrne failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for plea counsel’s error, he would have rejected the plea offer and “insisted on going to trial.” Corson, ¶¶ 34-35 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). Because Byrne did not show that he was prejudiced by plea counsel’s performance, the court properly denied the motion. See Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164, 1169 (Colo. 2007) (noting that a defendant has the burden to show that his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense).

III. Disposition

¶ 21 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.