Peo v. Armstrong

Opinion

24CA2001 Peo v Armstrong 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2001 Pueblo County District Court No. 17CR2114 Honorable Deborah J. Grohs, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Perry Taylor Armstrong, Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I

Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Erin Wigglesworth, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.

¶1 Defendant, Perry Taylor Armstrong, appeals the postconviction court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief without a hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A jury found Armstrong guilty of five felony counts of child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, one felony count of first degree assault, and nine misdemeanor counts of child abuse. The district court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 192 years in prison. A division of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentences. See People v. Armstrong, (Colo. App. No. 19CA1740, Apr. 7, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). ¶3 Thereafter, Armstong filed a timely pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion and a request for the appointment of counsel. The postconviction court declined to summarily rule on the motion under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) because some of Armstrong’s claims, if true, would entitle him to relief. Therefore, the court appointed counsel to supplement the motion under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). See People v. Segura, 2024 CO 70, ¶¶ 4, 6-8. After the public defender moved to withdraw as counsel due to a conflict, the court appointed alternate defense counsel (ADC) to represent Armstrong.

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¶4 ADC later filed a supplemental motion, along with eight attached exhibits. The prosecution filed a response to the pro se and supplemental motions, along with fifteen attached exhibits. In a written order, the postconviction court denied the motions without a hearing. In doing so, the court stated that it had “reviewed [Armstrong’s] pro se petition, his supplemental petition, . . . the prosecution’s response[,] [and] . . . the court file” and that it read “the transcript[s] of pre-trial hearings, the trial and the sentencing hearing.”

II. Analysis

¶5 As relevant here, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) provides that, after the parties have submitted their postconviction briefs, “the court shall grant a prompt hearing on the motion unless, based on the pleadings, the court finds that it is appropriate to enter a ruling containing written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” ¶6 Armstrong argues that the term “pleadings” for purposes of Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) should be read as “a document requesting relief or objecting to relief, not the entire case file, and not attachments” and that, specifically, “pleadings” include only a postconviction motion, a supplemental motion, the prosecution’s response, and the

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defendant’s reply. Relying on this definition, he contends that the postconviction court committed reversible error by considering information outside the pleadings when it denied some of his claims without a hearing and that the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on those claims. Armstrong concedes that some of his claims were properly resolved on the pleadings, and he does not challenge the court’s summary denial of those claims. ¶7 Initially, we reject the People’s argument that Armstrong failed to preserve this issue. Once the court granted Armstrong’s request for counsel, the court was obligated to follow the requirements of Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). See Segura, ¶¶ 4, 7; People v. Higgins, 2017 COA 57, ¶¶ 1, 5. Thus, Armstrong’s request for counsel was sufficient to preserve his challenge to the postconviction court’s noncompliance with Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V). See People v. Nozolino, 2023 COA 39, ¶ 9; Higgins, ¶ 10. ¶8 We do recognize some merit to the People’s other argument that Armstrong invited the error he now asserts on appeal because the supplemental motion referenced parts of the record, included exhibits, and asked the court to grant a hearing as an “alternative” to other relief. But we need not apply the invited error doctrine

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because we adopt the reasoning of the division in People v. Martinez, 2026 COA 7, and conclude that the postconviction court did not err by denying Armstrong’s motions without a hearing. ¶9 In Martinez, the defendant argued, similar to Armstrong, that “the phrase ‘based on the pleadings’ in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V) confines the postconviction court’s review to only the briefing on the motion, and not the files and record of the case.” Id. at ¶ 11. The division rejected this argument, concluding that the defendant’s “narrow interpretation of the phrase ‘based on the pleadings’ [would] produce[] . . . illogical and absurd result[s]”: (1) litigants could assert facts in their briefs that are not supported by the record, but the court would be precluded from verifying the accuracy of such assertions without holding a hearing; (2) an appellate court could consider the entire record when reviewing the summary denial of a postconviction motion, but the postconviction court would be prohibited from considering the record when ruling on the motion; and (3) a court could review “the motion and the files and record of the case” when considering a motion pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV), but, when considering the same motion pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V), “the parameters of review would shrink after all

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parties have had a full opportunity to present their positions to the court in writing.” Id. at ¶¶ 13-23. Regarding the third scenario, the division elaborated that

[i]f, after thoughtful briefing from counsel on both sides of the issue, it is clear from the pleadings (and any reference to the record)

that the defendant will be unable to prevail at a hearing, it would be absurd to require expending the parties’ and the court’s resources to conduct a futile exercise of holding a hearing.

Id. at ¶ 22. ¶ 10 The division clarified that it was not deciding “the outer bounds of what the phrase ‘based on the pleadings’ means.” Id. at ¶ 25. Instead, it concluded that “the phrase ‘the pleadings’ in [Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(V)] includes, at a minimum, materials that are found within the files and record of the case that are either attached to or referenced in the defendant’s motion (including any supplemental motion) or the parties’ briefing on the motion.” Id. at ¶ 2. In other words, “when a party’s briefing references or attaches a portion of the existing record, the postconviction court can consider it when determining whether a hearing is warranted.” Id. at ¶ 25.

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¶ 11 We agree with this reasoning and conclude that the postconviction court did not err by basing its denial of Armstrong’s motions on information that was attached to, or referenced in, the pro se and supplemental motions. See People v. Roberts, 2026 CO 45, ¶ 15 (“When interpreting rules [of criminal procedure], we . . . construe unambiguous words plainly, giving them their ordinary meaning,” but, “[i]n so doing, we generally avoid interpretations that ‘lead to illogical or absurd results.’” (quoting Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95, ¶ 22)). ¶ 12 Because Armstrong only asserts that the court procedurally erred by denying his motions without a hearing, we do not reach the merits of the court’s denial of his claims. See People v. Lulei, 2026 CO 17, ¶¶ 28-29 (Under the party presentation principle, “courts ‘rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision’” because we presume “‘that the parties know what is best for them[] and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief’”; therefore, “[f]idelity to the party presentation principle . . . generally precludes a court from spontaneously deciding an issue that the parties have not raised or had the

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opportunity to address.” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))).

III. Disposition

¶ 13 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE DUNN concur.