Peo v. Apple

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 30, 2026
• Docket: 23CA1118
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23CA1118 Peo v Apple 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1118 El Paso County District Court No. 22CR4992 Honorable Marcus Henson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ryan John Apple,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Pawar and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 30, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kirstiana Perryman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Defendant, Ryan John Apple (Apple), appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of illegal

discharge of a firearm and prohibited use of a weapon — discharge.

On appeal, Apple contends that the district court erred by

(1) admitting certain statements he made that were recorded on the

police officers’ body cameras, because the footage had little

probative value, was unduly prejudicial, and was cumulative of

other evidence; and (2) allowing the prosecutor to engage in

misconduct by misstating the evidence. We disagree with his

contentions and, therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. Background

¶2 Apple lived in the upstairs unit of a split-level duplex; another

family lived in the downstairs unit. Apple owned a handgun which

he used for protection. One night while preparing for bed, Apple

was loading the firearm when it discharged. A bullet entered the

lower unit and narrowly missed a resident but did not cause any

injuries.

¶3 The neighbor called 911, and police arrived. An officer

testified that Apple appeared “highly intoxicated, combative, and

verbally argumentative” and said that Apple smelled of alcohol; had

1 bloodshot, watery eyes; and slurred his speech throughout the

interaction.

¶4 Apple was charged with illegal discharge of a firearm, two

counts of prohibited use of a weapon — discharge and under the

influence of alcohol, and reckless endangerment. The jury found

him guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm and prohibited use of a

weapon — discharge, but it acquitted him of the other counts. The

court sentenced Apple to two years of supervised probation, among

other conditions.

II. Evidentiary Rulings

¶5 Apple contends that the district court erred by admitting

certain footage from the police officers’ bodycams in violation of

CRE 403. We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶6 At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce four separate

videos. Defense counsel objected to portions of two of the videos.

¶7 The first video shows interactions between Apple, his

neighbor, and the police. Apple objected to the following portions of

the video:

2 • He tells the police, “She [(the neighbor)] shouldn’t have

done that. Trying to talk shit, like, who are you, ma’am?”

and tells the neighbor, “My lawyer will make you cry. I

don’t have to shut up, I have a freedom of speech, I know

my rights.”

• The officer informs Apple, “If you keep acting up, I’m

gonna put you in handcuffs and I’m gonna put you in the

back of the car. Do you understand? Okay, this is the

last warning I’m going to give you.”

• Apple talks to his family members, who are off-screen,

asking, “Are you guys recording this? . . . They can’t put

me in handcuffs.”

• Apple, still speaking with his family, says, “They gonna

regret it, trying to handcuff me. They are gonna regret it,

I’m smarter than both these cops combined. It don’t

matter, let them do it, I wish they would, I really wish

they would, Mom.”

¶8 The second video shows police trying to locate the bullet hole

resulting from Apple’s discharged firearm. Apple objected to the

following portions of this video:

3 • He refers to the bullet hole and asks one of the officers,

“Can I show you Ma’am, before you try to kill me and put

me at gunpoint?”

• An officer asks, “Where did it [the bullet] go? If I had you

at gunpoint, then it would have already happened.”

• The officers prevent Apple from entering his apartment,

telling him to “stay out there and tell me where you shot

it.”

• Apple responds by pointing and saying, “It’s over there by

the fridge, like look left, by the fridge. Damn, you guys

really on some uptight killa shit huh?” in addition to

using the “n” word and other expletives.

• The officer assures Apple, “Nobody has drawn a gun on

you, nobody has done anything, what are you talking

about at gun point?” and asks him if he understood the

concerns about the bullet entering another unit.

• Apple acknowledges, “[The bullet] did go into the floor,

I’m sorry.”

¶9 The court admitted the first video with some redactions (which

did not include any of the portions described above) and the second

4 video in full, finding that the admitted statements went to Apple’s

state of mind following the incident and showed his intoxicated

state or level of functioning.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Burnell, 2019 COA 142, ¶ 26. A district court

abuses its discretion when its rulings are manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. People v.

Montoya, 2024 CO 20, ¶ 26.

¶ 11 “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” CRE 401. Although relevant

evidence is generally admissible, it “may be excluded if the risk of

unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.”

People v. Ray, 2025 CO 42M, ¶ 21 (citing CRE 403). But because

CRE 403 “strongly favors admissibility of relevant evidence,” an

appellate court “must afford the evidence the maximum probative

value attributable by a reasonable fact finder and the minimum

5 unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected.” People v. Gibbens, 905

P.2d 604, 607 (Colo. 1995).

C. Analysis

¶ 12 Apple contends that the probative value of the challenged

portions of the videos was substantially outweighed by the risk of

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and presentation of

cumulative evidence. He argues the challenged portions of the

videos (1) were only marginally probative of his level of functioning

and intoxication; (2) risked inflaming a reasonable juror to punish

him for his actions after the accident; (3) misled the jury to believe

his actions were intentional; and (4) were cumulative. The Attorney

General disagrees, arguing that the statements showed Apple’s

belligerence, intoxication, and attitude toward the victim

immediately following the shooting. For three reasons, we discern

no abuse of discretion.

¶ 13 First, the statements were probative of Apple’s level of

functioning immediately following the incident. Specifically, the

challenged statements showed that Apple was belligerent and

intoxicated. To prove that Apple illegally discharged a firearm, the

prosecution had to demonstrate that he acted knowingly or

6 recklessly when he discharged his firearm into a dwelling or

occupied structure. See § 18-12-107.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. Therefore,

showing video evidence of Apple’s intoxicated state was probative to

proving one element of the charged offense. Cf. People v. Arzabala,

2012 COA 99, ¶ 89 (noting that a jury is free to consider a

defendant’s alcohol consumption when determining whether the

defendant drove in a reckless manner).

¶ 14 Second, even though the officers testified about Apple’s

intoxication and level of functioning, “[t]he fact that evidence is

cumulative does not, by itself, render the evidence inadmissible.”

People v. Morrison, 985 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. App. 1999), aff’d, 19 P.3d

668 (Colo. 2000); accord People v. White, 606 P.2d 847, 849 (Colo.

1980) (noting that evidence does not become inadmissible under

CRE 403 merely because the facts have already been established

through the testimony of a prosecution witness). Apple seems to

argue that the district court abused its discretion because the

statements were “needlessly cumulative.” Because the videos

corroborate the officers’ testimony, we cannot say that they were

cumulative to the point of constituting an abuse of discretion.

7 ¶ 15 Finally, Apple’s statements were made during the course of the

police investigation and arrest, and evidence regarding his

demeanor and behavior was admissible to demonstrate

consciousness of guilt. See People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 60

(holding that describing a defendant’s behavior as “guilty-looking” is

not meant to be a legal statement of guilt but rather a description of

behavior that would lead a jury to the reasonable conclusion that

the defendant is conscious of guilt); People v. Kyle, 111 P.3d 491,

499 (Colo. App. 2004) (“Evidence of a defendant’s behavior . . . may

be admissible to show that the defendant was conscious of guilt

and, by further inference, committed the crime charged.”),

abrogated on other grounds by, Zoll v. People, 2018 CO 70.

Contrary to Apple’s contention that his behavior risked the jury

convicting him as punishment for his behavior toward the police

and neighbor, his actions and statements were evidence of his

consciousness of guilt that he acted recklessly in loading his

firearm while intoxicated.

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 16 Apple contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by

referring to facts not in evidence during closing and rebuttal

8 argument. Apple objected to two of the prosecutor’s statements but

not two others. Even assuming it was error to allow the statements,

we discern no abuse of discretion.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 17 “Whether a prosecutor’s statements constitute misconduct is

generally a matter left to the trial court’s discretion.” Domingo-

Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Colo. 2005). We will not

disturb a district court’s rulings regarding such statements absent

a showing of an abuse of discretion. People v. Strock, 252 P.3d

1148, 1152 (Colo. App. 2010), overruled on other grounds by, People

v. Kennedy, 2025 CO 63.

¶ 18 We apply a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial

misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo. 2010).

First, we determine whether, based on the totality of the

circumstances, the prosecutor’s conduct was improper. People v.

Leyba, 2019 COA 144, ¶ 55, aff’d, 2021 CO 54. If the conduct was

improper, we apply the appropriate standard of review to determine

whether reversal is warranted. Id.

¶ 19 For preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, “we subject

the error to general harmless error review.” People v. Rhea, 2014

9 COA 60, ¶ 42 (quoting Wend, 235 P.3d at 1097). Under this

standard, we reverse only if the error substantially influenced the

verdict or affected the fairness of the trial. People v. Walker, 2022

COA 15, ¶ 28.

¶ 20 We review prosecutorial statements to which no

contemporaneous objection was made for plain error. Domingo-

Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053. Plain error occurs only when an error so

undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself that it casts

serious doubt on the reliability of the jury’s verdict. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 21 During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “Now, [Apple]

says he was [loading his gun] in his bedroom but we knew it

happened in the kitchen.” Defense counsel objected to this

statement and the court told the jurors they would have to rely on

their “collective memory of the evidence” presented at trial when

they deliberated.

¶ 22 As to the unpreserved statements, the prosecutor said in

closing, “Where was the bullet hole? And it’s in evidence. Where

was the bullet hole? It wasn’t in his bedroom. It was in the

kitchen.” And then in rebuttal, the prosecutor said, “He kept

10 talking about [loading the weapon] in his bedroom. We know it

happened in the kitchen because of the bullet hole and the

cartridge and somehow a garbage bag got put over there.”

¶ 23 The Attorney General argues that the prosecutor did not

misstate the evidence or refer to facts not in evidence, as Apple told

the police that he was getting ready for bed. But Apple contends

that he never misled the police about where the bullet hole was

located, and implying otherwise led the jury to believe he was lying

because he never told the police that he was in his bedroom when

he was loading his firearm.

¶ 24 Prosecutors may not misstate the evidence or refer to facts not

in evidence, People v. Marko, 2015 COA 139, ¶ 207, aff’d on other

grounds, 2018 CO 97, but they can make “reasonable inferences

stemming directly from the facts in evidence during closing

argument,” Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1051.

¶ 25 We acknowledge that no direct evidence was presented that

Apple told police he was in his bedroom when the firearm

discharged, and telling the police he was getting ready for bed is not

the same as saying he was in the bedroom. But even assuming the

11 prosecutor’s statements were misconduct, we conclude for three

reasons that any error was harmless or not plain.

¶ 26 First, as to the preserved claim, the court directed the jury to

base its decision not on what the prosecutor said, but rather on the

jury’s collective memory. Without any indication in the record

otherwise, we must presume the jury followed the court’s

instructions. See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 29.

¶ 27 Second, it was not disputed at trial that Apple had discharged

the firearm; he contended the discharge was due to a

manufacturing defect. Whether he was in the bedroom or the

kitchen when it occurred was immaterial to whether he acted

recklessly. Although he claims that statements that he fired the

weapon in the bedroom, as opposed to the kitchen, implied that he

intentionally targeted his neighbor, the jury acquitted him of the

reckless endangerment count. See § 18-3-208, C.R.S. 2025 (an

individual commits reckless endangerment if he “recklessly engages

in conduct that creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to

another person”).

¶ 28 Finally, related to the jury’s acquittal of two counts, the split

verdict supports that the jury was not swayed by the prosecutor’s

12 alleged misstatements of the facts. See People v. Snelling, 2022

COA 116M, ¶ 37 (holding that a split verdict suggests that a jury

was not influenced by potentially improper comments).

¶ 29 Therefore, because any error in allowing the prosecutor’s

misstatements was not plain or was harmless, we decline to reverse

on this basis.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 30 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.