22CA0825 Peo v Amoako-Asiamah 08-07-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA0825 Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR1019 Honorable Jason D. Carrithers, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Riddick Jones Amoako-Asiamah,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Schutz and Martinez*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 7, 2025
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Defendant, Riddick Jones Amoako-Asiamah, appeals his
convictions for intent to manufacture or distribute more than fifty
pounds of marijuana, conspiracy to do the same, and cultivation of
more than thirty marijuana plants. Because Amoako-Asiamah did
not receive a fair trial, we reverse the judgment and remand for a
new trial. Nevertheless, we address the court’s rulings on the
motion to suppress and motion to dismiss for a speedy trial
violation because they are likely to arise in the same context on
remand.
I. Background
¶2 The evidence the jury heard at trial would have allowed it to
find the following facts. Amoako-Asiamah and his wife, Melina
Chacon,1 rented a home in Jefferson County. After several people
in the neighborhood submitted complaints regarding a constant
very strong odor of marijuana emanating from the home, West
Metro Drug Task Force (WMDTF) Detective Janie Enriquez began an
investigation. She conducted surveillance on Amoako-Asiamah’s
1 Melina Chacon was a codefendant with Amoako-Asiamah, but
their cases were severed before trial. She is not a party to this appeal.
1 home for approximately six months before the WMDTF obtained a
warrant and searched the home and his vehicle. The search found
approximately 362 marijuana plants, 53 pounds of marijuana
product, approximately $47,500 in cash, expenditure lists regarding
the marijuana grow, and ledgers detailing business operations and
transactions.
¶3 The prosecution initially charged Amoako-Asiamah with intent
to manufacture or distribute more than fifty pounds of marijuana in
violation of section 18-18-406(2)(b)(I), (III)(A), C.R.S. 2024, and
cultivation of more than thirty marijuana plants in violation of
section 18-18-406(3)(a)(I), (III)(A). It later added charges for
conspiracy to manufacture or distribute marijuana in violation of
section 18-18-406(2)(b)(I), (III)(A), and harassment in violation of
section 18-9-111(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024. The prosecution dismissed the
harassment charge during trial.
¶4 Over the course of the proceedings, Amoako-Asiamah had
three attorneys but eventually elected to proceed pro se. On the
day of his trial, Amoako-Asiamah requested counsel, but the trial
court found that he had waived his right and denied his request to
revoke that waiver. Amoako-Asiamah then decided to remain in his
2 holding cell instead of participating in the trial. On the second day
of trial, he returned to the courtroom and made an unsworn
statement to the jury. But aside from that statement, he was
absent for the entire trial, and the defendant’s table lay empty. The
jury convicted him on all submitted charges, and he was sentenced
to twelve years in prison, with all counts running concurrently.
II. Analysis
¶5 Amoako-Asiamah contends that the trial court erred by
(1) permitting him to make an unsworn statement to the jury,
resulting in a fundamentally unfair trial; (2) denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained from the search of his home;
(3) violating his right to a speedy trial; (4) failing to obtain a waiver
of his right to be present for trial and violating Crim. P. 43; and
(5) denying his day-of-trial request to appoint counsel. We address
each of these contentions in turn.
A. Amoako-Asiamah Did Not Receive a Fundamentally Fair Trial
¶6 Amoako-Asiamah contends that the trial court erred when it
allowed him to make a statement to the jury, violating his rights to
due process and a fair trial. Viewing the statement within the full
3 context of his trial, we agree that the result was so prejudicial that
it violated his right to a fair trial.
1. Additional Background
¶7 The course of this case was difficult, and the trial court
managed multiple contentious situations as the case progressed
toward trial. The day of trial arrived after multiple continuances,
delays, appearances and withdrawals of counsel, and interlocutory
appeals. On that day, Amoako-Asiamah refused to leave his cell
and go to court. So he was extracted from his cell and arrived for
the trial wearing his jail clothes.
¶8 The court called the case outside the presence of the
prospective jurors, and Amoako-Asiamah immediately asked to be
represented by an attorney, specifically the deputy public defender
who had appeared at a previous hearing. He said, “It is my
constitutional right to be represented by an attorney. And I am not
waiving my Sixth Amendment right, right to counsel.” Additionally,
he asked to be released on a personal recognizance bond and to
again waive the speedy trial deadline. The court found that he had
previously waived the right to counsel and that he was making the
request for the purpose of delay.
4 ¶9 Amoako-Asiamah then engaged in an exchange with the court
about whether he would change into civilian garb for the trial.
Amoako-Asiamah asserted that he was “not here to go to trial or
anything.” And after another back-and-forth conversation,
Amoako-Asiamah stated, “I want you to proceed this trial without
me. Please take me back to my cell, as I have — I was trying to do.
I am — not without a lawyer, I’m not going to participate in the
trial.”
¶ 10 The trial court inquired further regarding Amoako-Asiamah’s
intent to be absent from the trial. Amoako-Asiamah then spoke to
“make the record” regarding speedy trial and his right to counsel.
He then said, “I don’t want to see the jury. I want to go back to my
cell.” The court found that Amoako-Asiamah made a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to be present for the
trial. And Amoako-Asiamah was then returned to his cell.
¶ 11 After this decision, the court sent a deputy to ask if he wanted
to return to trial every hour throughout the trial. On the second
day of trial, Amoako-Asiamah decided to return to make a
statement to the jury, but after a recess he again went back to his
cell. So other than the trial statement — described below —
5 Amoako-Asiamah was absent from the trial proceedings, without
counsel, and the defense table was empty throughout the course of
the trial.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 12 “The due process clauses of the United States and Colorado
constitutions guarantee every criminal defendant the right to a fair
trial.” Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo. 2000); see also
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 25. And the
right to a trial by jury “comprehends a fair verdict, free from the
influence or poison of evidence which should never have been
admitted, and the admission of which arouses passions and
prejudices which tend to destroy the fairness and impartiality of the
jury.” Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1962). We review
de novo whether a defendant’s due process rights were violated.
People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54, ¶ 40.
¶ 13 “The order of proof at trial is a matter within the trial court’s
sound discretion, and courts are given wide latitude in deciding
these matters.” People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 376 (Colo. App.
2009) (citing CRE 611(a)). However, a court’s discretion is always
6 limited by the requirements of the Colorado and Federal
Constitutions. Id.
3. Amoako-Asiamah’s Trial Statement Deprived Him of Due Process
¶ 14 We view the overall fairness of a trial retrospectively and
recognize that this is “an advantage which the trial court does not
have.” Oaks, 371 P.2d at 447. We also recognize the difficult
choices these proceedings presented to the trial court and the pains
it took to manage the case.
¶ 15 During the middle of the prosecution’s case, Amoako-Asiamah
requested that the trial court allow him to make a statement to the
jury. The trial court inquired as to what he meant by a statement
and explicitly clarified the following:
THE COURT: Okay. And so sir, I want . . . to make sure I understand you. You’re intending to -- when I bring the jury in, you want to make a statement to them, not under oath, and not as part of closing, and then you would like to be let out of the courtroom and returned back to your cell voluntarily; . . . am I understanding?
[AMOAKO-ASIAMAH]: Yes.
¶ 16 The court informed Amoako-Asiamah that it believed the
action he was requesting would be prejudicial to his case. But after
7 Amoako-Asiamah persisted in wishing to address the jury, the trial
court nevertheless allowed him to make the statement after advising
him that doing so would waive his right to remain silent. The court
also advised him that it would instruct the jury that his statement
was not under oath and that the jury should disregard any portion
of the statement that went outside of the evidence presented. The
prosecution objected to the idea, noting that the case was “still on
the People’s [case-in-chief] at [that] moment in time.” The trial
court noted the objection, and then it permitted Amoako-Asiamah
to make his unsworn statement.2
¶ 17 It is at this point, in our view, that the trial went off the tracks.
Amoako-Asiamah’s statement was rambling and incoherent,
triggered over thirty objections from the prosecution, and contained
numerous instances of Amoako-Asiamah arguing with the
2 The People argue that Amoako-Asiamah invited any error arising
from the trial statement. We are not convinced that this is the correct lens through which to view this issue. Amoako-Asiamah’s argument does not turn on the statement in isolation. Instead, we look at the entirety of the trial with the benefit of hindsight. See Oaks v. People, 371 P.2d 443, 447 (Colo. 1962). In doing so, we determine that his trial was no longer fundamentally fair and violated his due process rights. While Amoako-Asiamah undoubtedly kindled the flame, we cannot ignore the resulting blaze or conclude that it was entirely a result of his actions.
8 prosecutor and the court about what topics he was allowed to
discuss. It was unclear what, if anything, Amoako-Asiamah was
actually allowed to say to the jury. The end result is a garbled
record reflecting the trial court’s valiant, but ultimately futile,
attempts to address the objections, keep Amoako-Asiamah within
the bounds of trial procedure, and maintain control over the
proceedings. The statement ultimately concluded with the trial
court excusing the jury in the midst of an argument between
Amoako-Asiamah, the prosecution, and the court about the
presentation of evidence.3
¶ 18 At this point in the trial, the jurors had seen the following:
• an empty defendant’s table during voir dire;
• no opening statement from the defense;
• an empty defendant’s table during the entirety of the trial
except for the unsworn statement;
• Amoako-Asiamah appearing in jail garb and giving an
unsworn, incoherent, rambling statement devoid of
3 We note that Amoako-Asiamah did not argue that he was in fact
permitted to testify about the multitude of objected-to topics he sought to raise.
9 connection to the evidence presented so far, which drew
constant objections from the prosecutor that the trial
court sustained;
• Amoako-Asiamah yelling, screaming, and arguing with
the court and the prosecutor; and
• an empty defendant’s table upon the jurors’ return to the
courtroom.
¶ 19 In effect, the only impression that jurors were left with of
Amoako-Asiamah himself was that of him ranting.4 The trial court
recognized this fact, noting that “[it] would not be surprised if a
reasonable juror certainly drew some impressions upon Mr.
Amoako[-Asiamah]’s presence here today. And they’re probably not
favorable, because he was yelling and screaming.” Further, there is
evidence in the record that, after the statement, the jurors were
actually confused by the trial’s procedures. When the jury
re-entered the courtroom, the trial court received a jury question
asking why Amoako-Asiamah did not have a defense attorney. And
while the court correctly answered it, that question demonstrated
4 We note that Amoako-Asiamah’s competency to stand trial was
not raised in this appeal.
10 that the impact of Amoako-Asiamah’s statement was front and
center in the jurors’ minds. See Oaks, 371 P.2d at 446
(“[N]umerous formal irregularities, each of which in itself might be
deemed harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair
trial, in which event a reversal would be required.”).
¶ 20 Additionally, the statement was outside the boundaries
prescribed for a trial. CRE 611(a) requires that a “court shall
exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth.” But Amoako-Asiamah’s statement could not serve as
testimony, as he was not sworn to tell the truth. See CRE 603
(“Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that
the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness’s
conscience and impress on the witness’s mind the duty to do so.”).
Yet it was also not a closing argument because the evidence had not
closed, Amoako-Asiamah had not observed any of the evidence and
testimony admitted at trial, and the jury had not yet been
instructed. See People v. Rojas, 181 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Colo. App.
11 2008) (“Closing argument must be confined to the evidence
admitted at trial, the inferences that can reasonably and fairly be
drawn from it, and the instructions of law submitted to the jury.”).
¶ 21 Further the statement itself could never have been beneficial
to Amoako-Asiamah’s case. At best, the jury could not consider it,
and at worst, as the trial court correctly predicted, it would
prejudice Amoako-Asiamah to the jury. See People v. Avila, 2019
COA 145, ¶ 53 (“A jury’s exposure to extraneous information
implicates a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.”), overruled
on other grounds by Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1. The end result
was that the jury’s only exposure to Amoako-Asiamah (or his case)
was a highly prejudicial rant with no grounding in the evidence or
appropriate trial procedure. See Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125
P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005) (The right to a fair trial “includes the
right to have an impartial jury decide the accused’s guilt or
innocence solely on the basis of the evidence properly introduced at
trial.”).
¶ 22 We recognize that, by allowing the statement, the trial court
was attempting to protect Amoako-Asiamah’s right to present his
case. Nonetheless, the attempt failed, and the result was too great
12 a deviation from the rules of evidence and standard procedure of a
criminal trial. See CRE 603; CRE 611(a)(1). When viewed alongside
the other irregularities during the trial — such as the lack of
counsel and Amoako-Asiamah’s absence from the proceedings — we
cannot conclude that Amoako-Asiamah received a fundamentally
fair trial, and thus due process. See People v. Dahl, 160 P.3d 301,
304 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Due process is satisfied by ‘a jury capable
and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a
trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to
determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.’”
(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982))).
¶ 23 Given all of this, we conclude that the appropriate remedy is
“to put the train back on the tracks [before] the point [at which] it
derailed.” People v. Chalchi-Sevilla, 2019 COA 75, ¶ 23. Thus, we
reverse for a new trial. See Oaks, 371 P.2d at 446.
B. The Motion to Suppress
¶ 24 We address two of Amoako-Asiamah’s remaining contentions
as they are likely to arise in the same context on remand. He first
contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
13 suppress evidence obtained from the search of his home because
the underlying affidavit lacked probable cause. We disagree.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 25 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. People v. Cox, 2018 CO 88,
¶ 7. “Under both constitutions, ‘a search warrant may only be
issued upon a showing of probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.’” Id. (quoting People v. Kerst, 181 P.3d 1167,
1171 (Colo. 2008)).
¶ 26 “Probable cause exists when an affidavit for a search warrant
alleges sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located at
the place to be searched.” People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1112
(Colo. 2003). “An affidavit is considered ‘bare-bones,’ and therefore
an officer cannot reasonably rely on it, where the affidavit fails to
establish a ‘minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity
and the place to be searched.’” People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925,
14 941 (Colo. 2009) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591,
596 (6th Cir. 2004)).
¶ 27 “A magistrate’s probable cause determination is generally
given ‘great deference’ and is not subject to de novo review.” Cox,
¶ 10 (quoting People v. Hebert, 46 P.3d 473, 481 (Colo. 2002)).
Therefore, our task is to assess whether the magistrate had a
“substantial basis” for issuing the search warrant. Id. And “[a]ny
doubts must be resolved in favor of the magistrate’s probable cause
determination.” Id.
¶ 28 When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to
the court’s factual findings and will not disturb those findings if
they are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v.
Brown, 217 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo. 2009). However, we review the
trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Id.
2. The Magistrate Did Not Err in Finding Probable Cause
¶ 29 Amoako-Asiamah argues that the affidavit to support probable
cause for the search warrant was so bare bones that it failed to
establish a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity
and the place to be searched.
15 ¶ 30 The affidavit, sworn by Detective Enriquez, detailed her
investigation and included the following statements:
• Detective Enriquez and nearby neighbors observed the
very strong odor of marijuana emanating from the home.
• Detective Enriquez surveilled the home for six months,
from September 2019 to March 2020.
• Detective Enriquez noted a dramatic decrease in the
smell of unburned marijuana from October 2019 until
late February 2020.
• Detective Enriquez then noted a dramatic increase in the
smell of unburned marijuana in March over the course of
a week, which was also observed by two other law
enforcement officers.
• Based on Detective Enriquez’s training and experience, a
cyclical decrease in the smell of unburned marijuana
over a period of months, followed by a dramatic increase,
was indicative of growing and harvesting plants.
• The home had two visible electrical boxes and a modified
or aftermarket system, indicating increased electricity
usage.
16 • The home had seven cameras, with one pointed directly
at the electrical box, indicating a high concern for
security.
• Based on Detective Enriquez’s training and experience, it
was unusual for those who grow the legal amount of
twelve plants to have a modified or aftermarket electrical
system on the home, as well as such a high concern for
¶ 31 None of these statements, in isolation, conclusively
demonstrate criminal activity. However, “the totality of the
circumstances test for probable cause is an ‘all-things-considered
approach,’ and its ‘ultimate touchstone’ is reasonableness.” People
v. Zuniga, 2016 CO 52, ¶ 20 (first quoting Florida v. Harris, 568
U.S. 237, 244 (2013); and then quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 381 (2014)).
¶ 32 Amoako-Asiamah argues that having two electrical boxes and
many cameras is wholly innocent and doesn’t suggest criminality.
That may be true in some circumstances, but our courts have noted
that “hydroponic growing equipment and excessive electrical usage
can be inherently suspicious activities known to indicate indoor
17 marijuana cultivation.” People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1171
(Colo. 1998). Regardless, “[a] possible innocent explanation or
lawful alternative may add a level of ambiguity to a fact’s probative
value in a probable cause determination, but it does not destroy the
fact’s usefulness outright and require it to be disregarded.” Zuniga,
¶ 20.
¶ 33 Multiple law enforcement officers and other individuals
corroborated the consistent smell of unburned marijuana,
indicating cultivation. And in her affidavit, the detective described
the cyclical nature of the unburned marijuana odor, how that
cyclical odor indicates cultivation, the aftermarket electrical
equipment, and how that additional electrical equipment indicates
an impermissible number of plants. Given these circumstances, we
conclude that the affidavit was not “bare-bones” and that the
magistrate had a substantial basis for issuing the search warrant.
See Cox, ¶ 10; see also Kerst, 181 P.3d at 1172 (“Due consideration
should be given to a law enforcement officer’s experience and
training in determining the significance of the observations set forth
in the affidavit.”).
18 ¶ 34 Thus, we discern no error in the trial court’s denial of
Amoako-Asiamah’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the
search of his home.
C. Speedy Trial
¶ 35 Amoako-Asiamah next contends that the trial court violated
his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The People
argue that Amoako-Asiamah failed to present any argument or
analysis explaining how the trial court abused its discretion by
continuing trial or violated his statutory or constitutional rights.
We agree with the People.
¶ 36 Amoako-Asiamah first cites the speedy trial statute, section
18-1-405, C.R.S. 2024. But the sum total of his argument
regarding his statutory right is: “The court here granted the State’s
continuance owing to witness availability issues. See
[§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(I)]. The defendant contends that the court abused
its discretion when it did so, violating his right to speedy trial, and
that the convictions should therefore be vacated.”
¶ 37 He next cites Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972),
which contains the factors used to evaluate whether a defendant’s
19 constitutional speedy trial right has been violated. He argues in
support:
Here, Mr. Amoako-Asiamah was out of custody at the time and the length of the delay was unreasonable. Second, the reason for the delay — the unavailability of witnesses for the case — constituted an insufficient reason for delay. Third, Mr. Amoako-Asiamah had asserted his right to a speedy trial. Fourth, the prejudice to Mr. Amoako-Asiamah was significant as he was out of custody and a prompt resolution of the case very important under the circumstances. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion when it did so, violating his right to speedy trial, and that the convictions should therefore be vacated.
¶ 38 In the answer brief, the People point out that these arguments
are bare bones and undeveloped. But Amoako-Asiamah doesn’t
respond to those arguments in his reply brief or attempt to expand
his argument by explaining how the court’s actions violated his
statutory or constitutional speedy trial rights. Instead, he lets his
arguments stand as bald assertions.
¶ 39 “[W]e will not consider a bald legal proposition presented
without argument or development.” People v. Rios, 2020 COA 2, ¶ 7
n.1; see C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B); see also People v. Simpson, 93 P.3d 551,
555 (Colo. App. 2003). And while we don’t do so here, we note that
20 “[a]n appellant’s failure to respond in the reply brief to an argument
made in the answer brief may be taken as a concession.” People v.
Bondsteel, 2015 COA 165, ¶ 61 n.6, aff’d, 2019 CO 26, and
overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6. Under
these circumstances, we decline to review this issue further.
D. Remaining Contentions
¶ 40 Finally, Amoako-Asiamah contends that the trial court
(1) violated his right to be present at trial under the Colorado and
Federal Constitutions and Crim. P. 43; and (2) erred by denying his
day-of-trial request to appoint an attorney to represent him or, in
the alternative, by failing to sua sponte appoint him advisory
counsel. We conclude that these contentions of error are unlikely
to arise in the same context on remand. We therefore decline to
address them. See People v. Newton, 2022 COA 59, ¶ 7 n.1.
III. Disposition
¶ 41 Thus, we perceive no error in the trial court’s rulings on the
motion to suppress and the motion to dismiss for a speedy trial
violation. See Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 906 P.2d 72, 79
(Colo. 1995) (“Conclusions of an appellate court on issues presented
21 to it as well as rulings logically necessary to sustain such
conclusions become the law of the case.”).
¶ 42 The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the case is
remanded for a new trial.
JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.