Peo v. Allender

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 24CA1241
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1241 Peo v Allender 01-22-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1241 Adams County District Court No. 21CR2074 Honorable Sean Finn, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Matthew Anthony Allender,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE DUNN Moultrie and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 22, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Everett Pritchard, Alternate Defense Counsel, Breckenridge, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Matthew Anthony Allender appeals the denial of his Crim. P.

35(c) motion after an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the order.

I. Background

¶2 The prosecution charged Allender with two counts of second

degree assault — class 4 felonies — based on evidence that he had

strangled the victim, his mother, and broken her tibia. In exchange

for dismissal of the felony charges, Allender pleaded guilty to one

count of third degree assault — a class 1 misdemeanor. The parties

stipulated to a probationary sentence including substance abuse

and mental health evaluations and treatment. The district court

sentenced Allender to two years of probation with standard terms

and conditions, plus the requirement that he complete substance

abuse and mental health evaluations and treatment.

¶3 After the probation department moved to revoke Allender’s

probation, Allender filed a pro se motion under Crim P. 35(c),

alleging, as relevant here, ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

The district court appointed postconviction counsel, who

supplemented the Crim. P. 35(c) motion and alleged that plea

counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise

1 Allender about the different levels of probation supervision and

failing to interview the victim.

¶4 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the

motion.

II. Discussion

¶5 Allender contends that the district court erred by denying his

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶6 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must

show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 (Colo.

2003). Failure to prove either of these two prongs defeats an

ineffective assistance claim. People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117,

¶ 50.

¶7 To establish prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a

defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial. People v. Sifuentes, 2017 COA 48M, ¶ 20.

This standard requires some objective evidence corroborating a

2 defendant’s own testimony that he would have made a different

decision about the plea. Id.; Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800,

807 (Colo. 2009), overruled on other grounds as recognized by People

v. Delgado, 2019 COA 55. “In the end, the defendant ‘must

convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would

have been rational under the circumstances.’” Sifuentes, ¶ 20

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).

¶8 In a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding, we presume the validity of the

conviction, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that he is

entitled to postconviction relief. Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054,

1061 (Colo. 2007). We review a district court’s post-hearing denial

of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion as a mixed question of fact and law. See

Sifuentes, ¶ 16. We defer to the court’s factual findings if supported

by the evidence, and we review de novo the court’s legal

conclusions. See id.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶9 Allender first argues that his plea counsel was deficient for not

advising him about “the possibility of intensive supervised

probation.” But we needn’t consider whether counsel was required

to do that because Allender presented no objective evidence

3 corroborating his claim that had he known about the “possibility” of

intensive supervised probation, he would have rejected the plea

offer and proceeded to trial. See Sifuentes, ¶ 20; see also

Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 807 (a defendant’s self-serving claim of

prejudice is insufficient without some objective, corroborating

evidence).

¶ 10 Beyond that, Allender introduced no evidence to show that

rejecting the plea offer under the circumstances presented would

have been rational. See Sifuentes, ¶ 20. That’s most likely because

the evidence against Allender was considerable, and the risks of

going to trial on two felony counts was significant. See id. at ¶ 21

(holding that a rationality analysis is informed by the strength of

the prosecution’s case and the attractiveness of the plea deal versus

the risks of going to trial). Indeed, the victim told officers that

Allender had strangled her and thrown her to the ground, and the

victim’s statements were made soon after the incident and captured

on an officer’s body-worn camera. The police observed injuries,

including petechiae in her eyes and redness and scratches on her

neck. They also observed knee swelling and a substantial amount

of blood around the victim’s nose and mouth. Photographs

4 documented the victim’s injuries and a physician’s statement

confirmed that she had suffered serious bodily injury — a tibial

fracture. And had Allender been convicted at trial on both felonies,

he faced up to thirty-two years in prison. See

§§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), (8)(a)(I), (10)(a); 18-1.3–406(1)(a), (2)(a)(I),

(II)(C), C.R.S. 2025. Instead, he received a plea offer to a single

misdemeanor count with a stipulated probationary sentence. Given

these circumstances, it would have been irrational for Allender to

reject the plea offer.

¶ 11 For similar reasons, we reject Allender’s claim that he would

have rejected the plea offer and gone to trial had his plea counsel

made additional efforts to interview the victim. The victim did not

testify at the Crim. P. 35(c) hearing and Allender presented no

evidence that the victim would have recanted or testified that

Allender did not assault her. And even had she recanted, as

outlined above, given the strength of the evidence along with the

significant risks of going to trial, it would not have been rational for

Allender to reject a plea offer to a class 1 misdemeanor with a

stipulated probationary sentence. See Sifuentes, ¶ 20.

5 ¶ 12 Because Allender did not establish a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would have rejected the

misdemeanor plea offer and insisted on going to trial, we agree with

the district court that his ineffective assistance claims fail. See

Thompson, ¶ 50; Sifuentes, ¶ 20.

III. Disposition

¶ 13 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE BERNARD concur.