Peo v. Abeyta

Opinion

25CA0105 Peo v Abeyta 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0105 Delta County District Court No. 23CR115 Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Abeyta, Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE WELLING

Schock and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Christina Van Wagenen, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

¶1 Defendant, Richard Abeyta, appeals the district court’s order designating him a sexually violent predator (SVP) following his guilty plea and conviction for multiple counts of attempted sexual assault on a child. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Abeyta and the victim’s father were distant cousins. Abeyta had known the victim since she was born, was the victim’s godfather, and often spent time at the victim’s house with her and her family. At some point in 2019, when the victim was about ten years old, Abeyta asked if he could pick up the victim on Fridays after he got off work to spend time with her. With the victim’s parents’ consent, Abeyta started spending time alone with the victim nearly every Friday. The victim reported that after a few years of these outings, Abeyta began sexual contact with her, which then turned into sexual intercourse; and by Abeyta’s own admission, he began engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim in 2022 and did so almost every Friday afternoon for about a year. When the victim disclosed the abuse to her mother in 2023, Abeyta was arrested and charged with forty-nine counts of sexual assault of a child by one in a position of trust.

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¶3 Abeyta entered into a plea agreement, in which he pleaded guilty to six counts of attempted sexual assault of a child and one count of violation of a protection order in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and the imposition of a stipulated sentence of an aggregate of eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed the stipulated sentence. The court also made a preliminary determination at the sentencing hearing that Abeyta met the criteria to be designated an SVP. Abeyta objected to that determination, challenging only the court’s finding that he met the relationship criterion of the SVP statute. In December 2024, following a hearing, the court re-affirmed its SVP determination finding that Abeyta had promoted his relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization, and, therefore, met the relationship criterion of the SVP statute.

II. Discussion

¶4 On appeal, Abeyta contends that (1) the SVP designation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and, therefore, is unconstitutional, and (2) the district court erred by finding that he

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met the statutory definition of an SVP by promoting the relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization. We disagree with both contentions.

A. Sexually Violent Predator Designation in Colorado

¶5 To be designated as an SVP, an offender must (1) be eighteen years of age or older when the offense is committed; (2) be convicted of an enumerated sex offense or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy thereof; (3) have committed this offense against a victim who was a stranger to the offender or who was a person with whom the offender established or promoted a relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization; and (4) be likely to commit another qualifying sex offense based on the results of the SVP Assessment Screening Instrument. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(I)-(IV), C.R.S. 2025.

B. The SVP Designation Does Not Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment

¶6 We review de novo the constitutionality of statutes. Beagle v. People, 2026 CO 24M, ¶ 15. Because statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, we won’t declare a statute unconstitutional without a showing that it’s unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

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¶7 To evaluate whether a law imposes a punishment that is cruel and unusual, we must first determine if it imposes a punishment. Id. at ¶ 16.

¶8 After the district court determined that Abeyta met the statutory requirements for the SVP designation and after the briefs in this appeal were filed, our supreme court announced Beagle. In Beagle, the supreme court, determining that the General Assembly didn’t intend for the SVP designation to be punishment and that the designation’s punitive effects don’t outweigh this nonpunitive intent by the clearest proof, held that the SVP designation and its accompanying requirements don’t constitute punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at ¶ 58.

¶9 Because we are bound by Beagle, we reject Abeyta’s claim that the SVP designation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See People v. Woo, 2025 COA 77, ¶ 35 (the court of appeals is bound by Colorado supreme court precedent).

C. No Error in Designating Abeyta an SVP

¶ 10 As he did in the district court, Abeyta challenges the SVP determination only as to the third prong — that he promoted a

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relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization purposes. Specifically, he argues that (1) the weekly outings with the victim fell within the traditional duties of a godfather; (2) the weekly outings occurred for years before the charged crimes; and (3) the cases describing the promoting a relationship criterion include behavior that broadens or expands a relationship, not behavior that falls within an existing relationship. We aren’t persuaded.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 The district court’s SVP designation is a mixed question of fact and law. We defer to its factual findings if they have record support and review de novo its legal conclusion that an offender should be designated as an SVP. Allen v. People, 2013 CO 44, ¶ 4.

¶ 12 “[A]n offender ‘promoted a relationship’ if, excluding the offender’s behavior during the commission of the sexual assault that led to his conviction, he otherwise encouraged a person with whom he had a limited relationship to enter into a broader relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.” People v. Gallegos, 2013 CO 45, ¶ 14. The type of conduct that indicates an offender promoted a relationship primarily for sexual

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victimization must demonstrate that the offender engaged in some conduct, beyond the sexual assault itself, that was designed to expand an existing relationship into one primarily for sexual victimization purposes. Id. at ¶ 15.

¶ 13 This definition requires that the offender make an effort to encourage the victim to enter into a broader relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. People v. Tixier, 207 P.3d 844, 848 (Colo. App. 2008). Likewise, an offender can “promote a proscribed relationship when he and the victim have had a previous relationship, which was limited in its nature, purpose, and customary time and place of interaction, but the offender encouraged the expansion of that relationship to foster sexual victimization.” People v. Valencia, 257 P.3d 1203, 1207 (Colo. App. 2011).

2. Additional Facts

¶ 14 At the SVP hearing, the victim’s mother testified that she, her husband, and the rest of the family, including the victim, spent most weekends socializing with Abeyta. When the victim was about ten years old, Abeyta asked if he could spend one-on-one time with the victim. With her and her husband’s consent, Abeyta began

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taking the victim on outings with him nearly every Friday and would take her to get food or buy her gifts or things she wanted. Before those outings began, however, Abeyta had not spent time alone with the victim.

¶ 15 Additionally, the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant indicated that, during the forensic interview, the victim said that the sexual contact with Abeyta occurred for about two years, until she told her parents about it.

¶ 16 In its SVP order, the court noted that it was undisputed that Abeyta satisfied three of the four criteria to be designated an SVP — he was over eighteen years old, was convicted of one of the statutorily enumerated offenses, and was likely to reoffend based on the results of the SVP assessment screening instrument because he had a prior sex offense conviction. Addressing the relationship criterion of the SVP designation, the court found that Abeyta’s relationship with the victim didn’t satisfy the first two relationship scenarios — Abeyta was neither a stranger to the victim prior to the sexual assaults, nor did he establish the relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization purposes. The court, however, found that Abeyta’s actions satisfied the third relationship

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scenario, that is, he promoted the relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization purposes.

¶ 17 In support of that conclusion, the court found that Abeyta had expanded his relationship with the victim when she was about ten years old by “regularly picking her up after school on Fridays for outings just with him.” The court noted that prior to beginning these Friday outings, Abeyta’s interactions with the victim occurred at the victim’s family’s home for special occasions, holidays, or social gatherings, and involved other members of the victim’s family, not just the victim. Thus, the court found that this pattern of Friday afternoon outings was a marked change in Abeyta’s interactions with the victim and her family and that the purpose of the Friday outings was to isolate the victim from family members and spend time alone with her. Further, because Abeyta would frequently buy the victim gifts or other items she wanted during these outings, the court found that these weekly outings could easily be characterized as grooming behavior.

¶ 18 Thus, the court concluded that Abeyta promoted the relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization purposes because he “entered into a broader relationship with the

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victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization,” by greatly expanding the scope, duration, and nature of his contact with the victim after she turned ten, which ultimately led to the sexual victimization. Because Abeyta’s actions satisfied the relationship criterion of the SVP statute, the court found that Abeyta met the statutory criteria to be designated an SVP.

3. Analysis

¶ 19 The court’s conclusion that Abeyta promoted the relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization is amply supported by the record. There is no dispute that Abeyta initiated the one-on-one outings with the victim when she turned ten and that, prior to that time, Abeyta’s interactions with the victim were limited to family gatherings with other people present. It was the expansion of this relationship that allowed Abeyta to be alone with the victim and led to the sexual victimization which began a few years after the one-on-one outings began.

¶ 20 Nevertheless, Abeyta argues that he couldn’t have promoted his relationship with the victim primarily for sexual victimization because, unlike other instances where a teacher, coach, or clergy member had a limited relationship with the victim that they then

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expanded, his relationship with the victim wasn’t limited and his one-on-one outings with the victim were part of his role as her godfather, not an expansion of their relationship. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 21 Although Abeyta’s relationship with the victim was broader than that of a teacher, coach, or clergy member in that he was considered part of the victim’s family, Abeyta encouraged the expansion of his relationship with the victim, which was previously limited in its nature, purpose, and customary time and place of interaction when he began taking the victim on one-on-one outings with him. It was that change in the scope and location of his interactions with the victim that facilitated him sexually assaulting her. Accordingly, the record supports the district court’s finding that Abeyta promoted his relationship with the victim within the meaning of the SVP statute. See id. at 1207.

III. Disposition

¶ 22 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE SCHOCK and JUDGE LUM concur.