Peo in Interest of ZRV

Opinion

26CA0310 Peo in Interest of ZRV 08-20-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 26CA0310 Mesa County District Court No. 24JV77 Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado, Appellee, In the Interest of Z.R.V., a Child, and Concerning M.F., Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Freyre and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 20, 2026

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

¶1 M.F. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent- child legal relationship with Z.R.V. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mother was incarcerated when it was discovered she was pregnant with the child. She was granted furlough leave from her Department of Corrections (DOC) sentence to give birth out of confinement. The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect shortly after the child’s birth alleging concerns about mother’s substance use and that the child lacked proper parental care. Shortly after giving birth, mother was remanded to DOC custody.

¶3 Mother admitted to the allegations in the petition, and the court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. The court then adopted a treatment plan for mother.

¶4 Several months later, mother was transitioned to community corrections, though she soon absconded. Around the same time, the Department moved to terminate her parental rights.

¶5 Mother was arrested four months later and returned to the DOC, where she remained at the time of the termination hearing.

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Following a contested hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental rights.

II. Analysis

¶6 Mother now appeals, contending the juvenile court erred by finding the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and failing to consider less drastic alternatives to termination.

A. Standard of Review

¶7 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights presents a mixed question of law and facts because it involves application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8 (applying the same standard of review to whether a department of human services satisfied its obligation to make reasonable efforts). We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶8 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We

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therefore may not “reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.” People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

B. Reasonable Efforts

¶9 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it determined that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 10 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Before a juvenile court may find a parent unfit, the department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family following the out-of-home placement of abused or neglected children. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-100.5, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

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care” to reunify parents with their children, and services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 11 As relevant here, “[f]amily time services for parents with children or youth in out-of-home placement” are required. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts, the court should consider whether the provided services “were appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan.” People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 12 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the provided services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). A court may thus consider a parent’s unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether a department made reasonable efforts. People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

2. The Record Supports That the Department Made Reasonable Efforts

¶ 13 Mother doesn’t assert that the Department wholly failed to provide family time services, as required under section

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19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). Rather, she asserts that the Department’s efforts were inadequate because (1) the Department did “not show why or what efforts [it] made” to make up missed family time, and (2) she “received less than half of the court-ordered family time.”

¶ 14 In relevant part, the juvenile court found that the Department made reasonable efforts — noting that the caseworker “did her best to facilitate visitation” — but those efforts were unsuccessful in rehabilitating mother. The court further found that mother’s participation in family time “was inconsistent” and that, while she occasionally missed family time for reasons that were not her fault, “there were other occasions she missed visits for reasons that are unknown and unexcused.” The record supports the court’s findings for three reasons.

¶ 15 First, mother doesn’t cite any law, and we are aware of none, that would require the Department to explain why each individual family time session was missed. Likewise, we can find no authority requiring the Department to make up missed family time sessions. Notably, mother does not argue, and the record does not reflect, that the family time sessions were missed due to reasons within the Department’s control.

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¶ 16 Second, the record shows, and mother does not dispute, that the Department provided family time sessions once a week for the majority of the case. To the extent that mother argues that the Department failed in its duty when it didn’t provide twice weekly family time visits, we conclude she failed to raise this argument to the juvenile court. Nothing in the record suggests mother ever brought any alleged family time deficiencies to the juvenile court’s attention or requested additional family time. Thus, we decline to address this argument on appeal. See People in Interest of K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[A]rguments never presented to, considered by, or ruled upon by a [juvenile] court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 17 Third, the record shows that mother’s family time attendance was largely inconsistent. True, some of the missed family time visits were likely due to DOC facility constraints outside of mother’s control. But the caseworker testified that mother’s attendance was sporadic even after she moved to a less secure facility that was more amenable to ensuring family time occurred. And despite her continued access to virtual family time, her attendance became even less frequent after she absconded from custody.

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¶ 18 Accordingly, because we reject mother’s assertions and the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we discern no error in the court’s conclusion that the Department made reasonable efforts. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

C. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 19 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it determined there were no less drastic alternatives to termination of parental rights. Again, we disagree.

1. Additional Background

¶ 20 At the filing of the petition, mother alleged that R.V. was the child’s father. Genetic testing later excluded R.V. as a potential biological father, and the court dismissed him from the case. The Department subsequently moved to amend the petition to add “John Doe” as the child’s father, which the juvenile court granted. After the Department served John Doe by publication, the court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected with respect to John Doe and found that no appropriate treatment plan could be devised for him.

¶ 21 One week prior to the termination hearing, mother notified the Department of another potential biological father, W.H. The

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caseworker attempted to contact W.H. but was unable to do so by the time of the hearing.

2. W.H. Wasn’t a Less Drastic Alternative

¶ 22 Mother contends that the juvenile court didn’t eliminate less drastic alternatives to termination because the Department didn’t properly investigate W.H. as a potential father. She further argues that locating W.H. could’ve resulted in a less drastic alternative through an allocation of parental responsibilities to him. We reject these arguments.

¶ 23 To begin, mother’s argument is based on layers of speculation. Not only does it assume that W.H. could be located, but it also assumes that: (1) he would be the biological father; (2) he would be fit or that he would participate in the case and be able to become fit within a reasonable time; and (3) placement with W.H. would be in the child’s best interest.

¶ 24 Moreover, the juvenile court did consider whether an APR would be in the child’s best interests. The court included the following in its oral ruling:

I’ve considered less drastic alternatives like more time. I’ve considered [an APR] as well, but that[,] given everything I’ve said[,] would be

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a very poor choice. [Mother] for all the reasons I’ve state[d] is unlikely to rehabilitate at any point in the foreseeable future. And certainly rehabilitate to a degree to be a parent to the child. [The child] deserves certainty, permanency, and the like. [An APR] would not serve this child’s best interest and . . . would, if anything, create a great amount of uncertainty going forward.

¶ 25 The juvenile court’s conclusion was driven by the child’s needs, including her need for permanency. And the record supports the juvenile court’s findings and conclusion. Mother’s speculation about W.H., his relationship to the child, his fitness to parent, or his willingness to participate in an APR is not sufficient to overcome either the record or the court’s findings on this point. And because the juvenile court considered the APR, concluded that termination was still in the child’s best interests, and made findings supported by the record, we are bound to affirm its decision. See People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

¶ 26 Finally, to the extent that mother argues the juvenile court’s actions were contrary to W.H.’s rights, we conclude that she cannot pursue those arguments in support of her appeal. Generally, in dependency or neglect appeals, parties “lack standing to assert the rights of other parties” to the proceedings. People in Interest of C.N.,

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2018 COA 165, ¶ 10. Indeed, the “parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights.” City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000). Accordingly, a parent does not have standing to object to the termination of the other parent’s, or, as here, other potential parent’s rights. See People in Interest of J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790, 792 (Colo. App. 2002) (concluding that father lacked standing to challenge the appropriateness of mother’s treatment plan); People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 261 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that mother lacked standing to challenge the juvenile court’s determination that father was unfit and unlikely to change within a reasonable time).

3. Continuance of the Termination Hearing

¶ 27 Mother also seemingly contends that the juvenile court failed to properly consider that a less drastic alternative to termination of her parental rights was to continue the termination hearing or hold the matter in abeyance to allow for additional time to investigate W.H. as a potential father. We construe mother’s argument as an

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assertion that the court erred when it failed to continue the termination hearing.

¶ 28 Notably, at no point did mother request a continuance of the termination hearing, nor did she ever request the court hold the matter in abeyance while the Department further investigated W.H. Accordingly, we conclude she failed to preserve this argument. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14 (“[G]enerally, appellate courts review only issues presented to and ruled on by the lower court.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 29 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.