Peo in Interest of ZRG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 25, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0740
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0740 Peo in Interest of ZRG 09-25-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0740 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30750 Honorable Elizabeth McCarthy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.R.G., a Child,

and Concerning L.L.M. and Z.R.G.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Fox and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced September 25, 2025

Michiko Ando Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for Appellant L.L.M.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant Z.R.G. ¶1 Z.R.G. (father) and L.L.M. (mother) appeal the judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with Z.R.G. (the

child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2023, the Denver Department of Human

Services received a report that mother had given birth to a

substance-exposed child. Mother also tested positive for

methamphetamine and admitted that she had used illicit drugs a

few days before the child’s birth. Based on this information, the

Department removed the child and filed a petition in dependency or

neglect. The Department also alleged that father had a history of

substance abuse and domestic violence with mother.

¶3 The parents admitted the allegations in the petition, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or neglected. After

dispositional hearings, the court adopted treatment plans for the

parents. Mother’s treatment plan required her to address her

substance abuse and mental health issues and participate in family

time, while father’s plan required that he address his substance

abuse, attend family time, and refrain from further criminal activity.

1 ¶4 In January 2025, the Department moved to terminate the

parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary

hearing the following March. After hearing the evidence, the court

granted the Department’s motion and terminated the parent-child

legal relationships between the parents and the child.

II. Father’s Appeal

¶5 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by terminating

his parental rights because (1) he could become fit within a

reasonable time, and (2) termination was not in the child’s best

interests. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not

been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct

or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. In addition to the statutory criteria,

the court must also consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives.

People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122 (Colo. 1986). The

2 court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical,

mental, and emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); People

in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 38.

¶7 When deciding whether a parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider whether any

change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo.

App. 2003). What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific and

varies from case to case. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874,

876 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶8 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

under section 19-3-604 is a mixed question of fact and law. People

in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶9 The juvenile court found that the Department had proved the

termination criteria in section 19-3-604(1)(c) by clear and

3 convincing evidence. Specifically, the court found that father did

not successfully participate in monitored sobriety, substance abuse

treatment, individual therapy, or family time. Because father had

not addressed any of the issues in the case, the court determined

that he was unfit. See People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408

(Colo. App. 2008) (a parent’s noncompliance with treatment can be

considered in determining unfitness). And based on the length of

the case, father’s lack of progress during that time, and his

unwillingness to participate in treatment, the court concluded that

father could not become fit within a reasonable time. See D.L.C., 70

P.3d at 588-89.

¶ 10 The juvenile court also found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination and that termination and adoption was in

the child’s best interests. The court noted that the child “thrives on

consistency,” and while the kinship placement could “give him

permanency and stability,” father could not. Therefore, the court

found that it was in the child’s best interests “to have the

permanency that only adoption [could] provide.”

¶ 11 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that after father was released from the county

4 jail in August 2024, he completed a substance abuse evaluation but

did not participate in substance abuse treatment or individual

therapy. Father provided only three drug screens during the case,

all of which were positive for tetrahydrocannabinol. The caseworker

testified that father was unlikely to make any progress because he

“doesn’t believe he needs treatment.”

¶ 12 The record also shows that father did not adequately

participate in family time. When father attended family time, the

family time supervisor reported that the visits went well. But the

supervisor said that father stopped attending consistently in

December 2024, and she observed negative changes in the child

because of father’s inconsistency.

¶ 13 The caseworker opined that termination was in the child’s best

interests. She said that the child needed a safe and sober caregiver

that could provide him with consistency because he “thrives” on

routine. The caseworker also said that the child was in a kinship

home that wanted to adopt him and that met his need for stability.

Finally, the caseworker noted that adoption would give the child the

consistency and permanency that he needed.

5 ¶ 14 Father asserts that the juvenile court erred by terminating his

parental rights because the evidence established that he made

“significant progress in treatment” and had “a positive and loving

bonded relationship with the child.” But as described above, the

record shows that father made very little progress on his treatment

plan after he was released from jail. See People in Interest of V.W.,

958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that even

“increased compliance” over the course of a case may not justify

additional time). And although the evidence shows that father had

a bond with the child, see D.P., 181 P.3d at 408-09, the court

weighed this evidence against other evidence showing that father

had not addressed the issues in this case and that the child needed

stability and permanency that father could not provide, see People

in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38 (noting that the court

“may consider various factors” in determining whether termination

is in the child’s best interests). Ultimately, we must reject father’s

argument because it would require us to reweigh the evidence and

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we

cannot do. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

6 ¶ 15 Finally, father asserts that the juvenile court erred because

the Department did not present any evidence “to show what impact

termination of parental rights would have on the child.” Although a

court must always consider the child’s best interests, K.D. v. People,

139 P.3d 695, 701 (Colo. 2006) (noting that the “primary and

controlling issue” in a termination proceeding is the child’s best

interests), nothing in section 19-3-604(1)(c) requires the

Department to present evidence of the impact of termination on the

child. Nor has father directed us to any case law to support his

position.

¶ 16 In this case, the Department presented evidence that father

was an unfit parent who could not become fit within a reasonable

time and that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination

that would serve the child’s best interests. In turn, the juvenile

court considered the child’s best interests in finding that the

Department had proved the statutory criteria for termination by

clear and convincing evidence and that there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. We therefore discern no error.

7 III. Mother’s Appeal

A. ICWA Due Diligence

¶ 17 Mother asserts that the Department failed to comply with

Colorado’s Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), § 19-1-126, C.R.S.

2024.1 We disagree.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 18 In a dependency or neglect proceeding in Colorado, a juvenile

court must inquire of the parties whether they know or have reason

to know that a child is an Indian child. § 19-1-126(1)(a)(I)(A).

“Indian child” is defined as an unmarried person under the age of

eighteen who is (1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) eligible for

membership in an Indian tribe and the biological child of a member

of an Indian tribe. § 19-1-103(83), C.R.S. 20242; 25 U.S.C.

§ 1903(4) (defining “Indian child” for purposes of the federal ICWA).

If the court knows or has reason to know that a child involved in

the proceeding is an Indian child, ICWA’s notice provisions apply.

§ 19-1-126(1)(b).

1 Because the 2024 version of the statute was in effect during the

relevant proceedings, we cite that version throughout. 2 We also cite the 2024 version of this statute throughout.

8 ¶ 19 “[M]ere assertions of a child’s Indian heritage (including those

that specify a tribe or multiple tribes by name) without more, are

not enough to give a juvenile court reason to know that the child is

an Indian child.” People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42,

¶ 56; see also § 19-1-126(1)(a)(II) (listing factors for a court to

consider when determining whether there is reason to know that a

child is an Indian child). But a general assertion of Indian heritage

does trigger the due diligence requirements in section 19-1-126(3)

of Colorado’s ICWA statute. H.J.B. v. People in Interest of A-J.A.B.,

2023 CO 48, ¶ 5. Specifically, section 19-1-126(3) requires the

juvenile court to direct the department to “exercise due diligence in

gathering additional information that would assist the court in

determining whether there is reason to know that the child is an

Indian child.”

¶ 20 In H.J.B., our supreme court concluded that due diligence is a

“flexible standard” that generally requires a department to do three

things: (1) “earnestly endeavor to investigate the basis for the parent

or other participant’s assertion that the child may be an Indian

child”; (2) “contact those family members or others who are

specifically identified as having knowledge regarding that assertion

9 of general Indian heritage”; and (3) “learn whether additional

information exists that will help the court determine whether there

is a reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” H.J.B., ¶ 57.

Due diligence does not require the department to “succeed in its

efforts” or “exhaust every possible option in attempting to do so.”

Id. at ¶ 58.

¶ 21 “Whether the department has satisfied its due diligence

obligation in any case will ultimately be left to the sound discretion

of the juvenile court, which necessarily requires the court to make

credibility determinations regarding the source of the information

and the basis for the source’s knowledge.” Id.

2. Analysis

¶ 22 We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its

discretion by finding that the Department exercised due diligence in

gathering additional information that would assist it in determining

whether there was reason to know that the child is an Indian child.

¶ 23 At the initial shelter hearing, mother’s counsel indicated that

mother may have Cherokee and “Chinowa” heritage. The juvenile

court found there was no reason to know that the child was an

10 Indian child but that the Department should exercise due diligence

under section 19-1-126(3).

¶ 24 A few months later, the Department filed an affidavit from the

caseworker detailing her efforts to investigate mother’s claim of

Native American heritage. In the affidavit, the caseworker averred

that she had contacted or attempted to contact several family

members, including maternal great-grandmother, two maternal

great-aunts, maternal grandmother and grandfather, maternal aunt

and maternal uncle. For the most part, the relatives told the

caseworker that they did not have any Native American heritage.

However, one of the maternal great-aunt’s said that her mother,

who passed away a few years earlier, might have Native American

heritage. The maternal great-aunt said that she did not know

anyone in the family that might have additional information.

¶ 25 Following the dispositional hearing about one month later, the

juvenile court found that there was no reason to know that the

child was an Indian child under ICWA. Between the dispositional

hearing and the termination hearing, the court did not receive

additional information. And at the termination hearing, the court

found that the Department had exercised due diligence under

11 section 19-1-126(3), there was no reason to know that the child was

an Indian child, and ICWA did not apply.

¶ 26 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the

Department exercised due diligence under section 19-1-126(3). The

Department had information from a previous case, which revealed

the basis for mother’s assertion of Native American heritage. See

H.J.B., ¶ 57. In that case, the caseworker spoke with mother’s

sister, who said that she and mother had grown up thinking that

they were Cherokee because they had pictures of their

grandparents “who appeared to be Native American.” But mother’s

sister told the caseworker that she and her father had taken genetic

tests that revealed no Native American heritage. The caseworker

also spoke with mother’s paternal aunt who said that she too had

done genetic testing that revealed no Native American heritage and

that she was unaware of any other relative with such heritage. The

Department filed this information with the juvenile court in this

case.

¶ 27 The Department also spoke with mother’s relatives during the

pendency of this case but did not learn of any Native American

heritage. See id. Indeed, all but one relative unequivocally denied

12 having such heritage. The only person who did not — a maternal

great-aunt — was “unsure” whether she might have Native

American heritage and said that the only person that might have

additional information was deceased.

¶ 28 On appeal, mother asserts that the Department failed to

exercise due diligence because it did not attempt to contact tribes.

But as our supreme court concluded in H.J.B., a department need

not contact tribes to satisfy the due diligence requirement. See id.

at ¶ 54 (“[T]he General Assembly could have required contact with

tribes in section 19-1-126(3), and it is significant that it did not.”).

On this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the juvenile

court’s conclusion that the Department exercised due diligence

B. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 29 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify

her with the child. We disagree.

¶ 30 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights, the juvenile

court must consider whether the department made reasonable

13 efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the parent with the

child. See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025.

The reasonable efforts standard is satisfied if the department

provides appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208.

§ 19-1-103(114). These services may include (1) screening,

assessments, and individual case plans; (2) home-based family and

crisis counseling; (3) information and referral services; (4) family

time; and (5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶ 31 The services must be “appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan,” People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011), but the parent is responsible for using those

services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the plan,

People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).

The juvenile court should consider the totality of the circumstances

and account for all services and resources provided to a parent,

measuring them holistically rather than in isolation with respect to

specific treatment plan objectives. People in Interest of My.K.M. v.

V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶¶ 33, 35.

¶ 32 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

14 Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile

court’s factual findings for clear error and review de novo its legal

determination, based on those findings, as to whether the

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

¶ 33 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to provide mother with substance abuse and

mental health services, but mother did not participate in those

services to become a fit parent. The record supports the court’s

findings. The caseworker explained that mother had completed a

dual diagnosis evaluation in a previous case, so she referred mother

for an “addendum” to the previous evaluation. The evaluator

recommended that mother complete intensive outpatient treatment.

Initially, mother told the caseworker that she would find her own

treatment provider; mother identified three different providers, but

she did not engage in treatment with any of them. At that point,

the caseworker referred mother to one of its approved providers.

The caseworker said that mother completed the intake but never

engaged in treatment.

15 ¶ 34 Despite this record, mother contends that the Department

failed to make reasonable efforts because it did not refer her to

substance abuse or mental health treatment until over a year into

the case. We reject her assertion because the record shows that

this delay occurred because mother wanted to choose her provider.

¶ 35 Mother also asserts that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not refer her to inpatient

treatment. Although the record shows that mother told the

caseworker that she was going to enroll in an inpatient treatment

facility (which she never did), mother never asked the caseworker to

make a referral. And mother’s evaluation recommended outpatient

treatment, not inpatient treatment. We therefore cannot say that

the Department failed to make reasonable efforts in this area.

¶ 36 Finally, mother submits that the Department did not provide

her with housing resources. Mother testified that the Department

did not give her any resources for housing, except a list of shelters.

That said, mother indicated that she had found resources and

acquired housing, which she had been in for over a year. We reject

mother’s assertion because (1) the Department provided her with

some housing resources; (2) section 19-3-208 does not explicitly

16 require the Department to provide a parent with anything more;

(3) mother acquired stable housing without the Department’s

assistance; and (4) the juvenile court credited mother for having

stable housing.

¶ 37 We conclude that the juvenile court did not err by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and

reunify her with the child.

IV. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.