Peo in Interest of ZOKS

Opinion

25CA2321 Peo in Interest of ZOKS 07-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2321 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JV30154 Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.O.K.S., a Child,

and Concerning A.W.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Martinez* and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 16, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

A.W., Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.W. (father)

appeals the juvenile court’s order revoking his deferred adjudication

and adjudicating Z.O.K.S. (the child) dependent or neglected. He

also appeals the district court’s order allocating parental rights to

the child’s maternal grandmother. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Denver Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in

dependency or neglect based on mother’s substance use. Initially,

mother was the only respondent. Father’s identity was unknown at

the time and the Department placed the then two-and-a-half-year-

old child with maternal grandmother. The Department later filed an

amended petition to include father. Father admitted paternity and

the court placed the child with him.

¶3 Four months later, father agreed to a deferred adjudication.

The terms of the deferred adjudication required father to (1) follow

all court orders; (2) not leave Colorado with the child without

approval; (3) “maintain stable housing, adequate for himself and his

child, which is maintained in a safe and cleanly manner;”

(4) demonstrate an understanding of the physical, emotional,

mental health, medical, and educational needs of the child; (5) meet

1 with the caseworker to develop a plan for co-parenting; (6) comply

with family time if the child was placed out of father’s home;

(7) have the child “in the custody of a parent, absent a safety plan,

on the date eight months following the adoption of the deferred

agreement;” and (8) cooperate with the Department and the

guardian ad litem (GAL).

¶4 Nearly six months after the initial deferral, the juvenile court

continued the deferred adjudication for an additional six months.

Father, who was represented by counsel at the hearing, did not

object. Shortly before the deferral period expired, mother filed a

motion to remove the child from father. After holding a hearing on

the motion, the court removed the child from father’s custody and

placed him with grandmother.

¶5 The Department moved to revoke the deferred adjudication on

the one-year anniversary of its entry. Before the revocation hearing,

father’s counsel withdrew and father proceeded pro se for the

remainder of the case. At the conclusion of the revocation hearing,

the juvenile court found that father had not complied with the

terms of the deferred adjudication and adjudicated the child

dependent and neglected. Less than a month later, the court held a

2 hearing on the GAL’s motion to allocate parental responsibilities

and allocated parental responsibilities to grandmother.

II. Preliminary Matters

¶6 Father represents himself on appeal, and we, therefore,

liberally construe his arguments. See Adams v. Sagee, 2017 COA

133, ¶ 10. Nonetheless, “pro se parties must comply with

procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by

attorneys.” Id. Under C.A.R. 28, an appellant’s opening brief must

include, among other things, a statement on “the applicable

standard of review with citation to authority;” a statement on

“whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the precise

location in the record where the issue was raised and where the

court ruled;” and “a clear and concise discussion of the grounds

upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal . . ., with citations

to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant

relies.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)-(B).

¶7 Father’s opening brief does not comply with C.A.R. 28. These

requirements are necessary to facilitate our appellate review, and

father’s arguments are difficult to discern. See Cikraji v.

Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10. We exercise our discretion to

3 review father’s contentions, but we are limited by the information

father provided in his brief. See id. We will not develop his

arguments or search the record for the relevant facts that may

support his claims. See id.; see also Castillo v. Koppes-Conway,

148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that it is not the

appellate court’s task to locate and synthesize the relevant facts,

arguments, and legal authority).

III. Deferred Adjudication

¶8 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by revoking his

deferred adjudication. We reject this contention.

A. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶9 In dependency and neglect proceedings, an adjudication

represents the juvenile court’s determination that state intervention

is necessary to protect a child and that the family requires

rehabilitative services to safely care for the child. People in Interest

of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 16. Typically, before adjudicating a child

dependent or neglected, the court must hold a hearing at which the

department is required to prove the allegations in the petition by a

preponderance of the evidence. Id.; see § 19-3-505, C.R.S. 2025.

Alternatively, the court may accept a parent’s admission at an

4 adjudicatory hearing. People in Interest of J.W. v. C.O., 2017 CO

105, ¶ 32. The “court’s acceptance of [a parent’s] admission

establishe[s] the status of the children as dependent or neglected.”

Id.

¶ 10 When a parent admits that a child is dependent or neglected,

the parent may defer adjudication by continuing the adjudicatory

hearing. Section 19-3-505(5) prescribes the process for doing so.

Specifically, when a parent admits that the child is dependent or

neglected, a deferred adjudication allows a juvenile court, with all

parties’ consent, to continue the adjudicatory hearing for six

months and to defer entry of judgment. § 19-3-505(5)(a)-(b), C.R.S.

2025. Following the initial six-month period, the juvenile court may

continue the hearing for another six months, after which the court

must dismiss or sustain the petition. § 19-3-505(5)(b).

¶ 11 Whether a child is dependent or neglected presents a mixed

question of fact and law because it requires the application of the

statutory criteria to evidentiary facts. People in Interest of E.R.,

2018 COA 58, ¶ 5. We review the court’s factual findings for clear

error but review de novo its legal conclusions based on those facts.

People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

5 B. Statutory Violations

¶ 12 First, father contends that the juvenile court lacked statutory

authority to revoke the deferred adjudication because it never

entered a treatment plan. We disagree.

¶ 13 The deferred adjudication agreement contained detailed terms

and conditions, which served as the functional equivalent to a

treatment plan; indeed, after the juvenile court revoked father’s

deferred adjudication, the court adopted its terms as the treatment

plan. By signing the deferred adjudication agreement, father agreed

to “fulfill[]” the terms of the agreement. Thus, contrary to father’s

argument, “there were [] enforceable terms to violate.” And neither

section 19-3-505(5) nor People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625,

632 (Colo. 1982), mandates a treatment plan, as father argues.

¶ 14 Father also argues that the court violated section 19-3-505(5)

because it continued the deferral period without making oral

findings, without advising father, and without obtaining father’s

consent. But the authority father cites in support of his arguments

relates only to the initial entry of the deferred adjudication. See

People in Interest of T.M., 2022 COA 88M, ¶ 17. Father does not

cite, and we are not aware of, any Colorado authority that requires

6 new findings, a new advisement, or renewed consent for the court to

exercise its statutory authority to extend the deferral period for an

additional six months. Section 19-3-505(5)(b) requires only “review

by the court” to “continue the case for an additional period not to

exceed six months;” the statute requires no additional findings,

advisement, or consent. At the time the court entered the deferred

adjudication, it advised father that after the initial six-month

deferral period, the court could defer the adjudication for an

additional six months.

¶ 15 To the extent father argues that the court “lacked jurisdiction”

because of its purported failure to comply with statutory

requirements, even if there was such a failure, it does not divest the

court of subject matter jurisdiction. See People in Interest of N.D.V.,

224 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. App. 2009) (failure to follow the statute

amounts to an erroneous decision not affecting jurisdiction). A

court that has already acquired subject matter jurisdiction — as

was the case here when the court accepted father’s admission that

the child was dependent and neglected — is not divested of that

jurisdiction by a later failure to follow statutory requirements. See

J.W., ¶ 24; N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 416.

7 C. Due Process Violations

¶ 16 Next, father claims that the juvenile court violated his right to

due process when it admitted “fault-based and other-acts evidence”

and by failing to timely rule on his motion in limine related to this

purportedly inadmissible evidence. Specifically, father argues that

this evidence was “outside the scope of his admission” and that the

Department could not rely on evidence not pled in its petition for

dependency or neglect. We disagree.

¶ 17 We review the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse

of discretion. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11,

¶ 32. The court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

Id. We review procedural due process claims de novo. People in

Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4, ¶ 25.

¶ 18 According to the deferred adjudication agreement, which

father signed, he was advised that as part of the entering into the

agreement, he “waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of

whether the child is dependent or neglected.” The court advised

father that he was “entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter,

but that the issue to be decided at such evidentiary hearing [was]

8 whether or not [father] ha[d] sufficiently complied with the terms of

this deferred adjudication.” If he had not complied with the terms

of the deferred adjudication, his admission would enter and the

court would adjudicate the child dependent or neglected. The

record reveals that at the hearing, the Department presented

evidence regarding father’s noncompliance with the terms of the

deferred adjudication consistent with the issue then properly

before the court.

¶ 19 Even so, at the beginning of the revocation hearing, the court

addressed father’s motion in limine, noted his objections, and

encouraged him to object if he thought “that something [was]

happening that [was] objectionable.” Father does not cite, and we

are aware of, any authority that holds a juvenile court abuses its

discretion when it defers ruling on a motion in limine to the hearing

at which the evidence actually is offered.

¶ 20 Father generally argues that the court admitted evidence

“regarding domestic violence and parental unfitness” but does not

specifically identify testimony or evidence that was erroneously

admitted over his objection. Cikraji, ¶ 10 (an appellate court is not

9 required to “comb the record” for facts supporting a party’s

argument that are not cited in the briefs).

¶ 21 Father has not identified a protected liberty interest. See

R.J.B., ¶ 26 (“To establish a violation of due process, one must first

establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest that warrants

due process protections.”) Father received notice of the hearing

when the Department filed its motion to revoke the deferred

adjudication, had previously waived his right to counsel, and

participated in the hearing. See id. at ¶ 27 (due process requires

the state to provide fundamentally fair procedures which include

notice of the hearing, advice of counsel, and the opportunity to be

heard and defend).

D. Conclusion

¶ 22 The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that father

failed to comply with the conditions of his deferred adjudication.

Thus, we conclude that the court did not err by revoking the

deferred adjudication and adjudicating the child dependent and

neglected.

10 IV. Remaining Contentions

¶ 23 Father claims that the juvenile court erred in denying his

C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion because “the adjudication was void due to

jurisdictional defects, statutory noncompliance, and violations of

due process.” But beyond the arguments we have already

addressed and rejected above, father does not further develop any

arguments related to his Rule 60(b) motion. See R.J.B., ¶ 35 (we

will not consider a claim which is “merely a bald assertion without

argument or development”).

¶ 24 Similarly, father does not develop his arguments that we

should reverse the judgment allocating parental responsibilities;

that the court made no permanency findings; that the court did not

address reasonable efforts; and that the removal of the child was

unlawful. Thus, we will not consider them. See id.

¶ 25 Finally, father asks us to apply the cumulative error doctrine

to reverse the judgment. Divisions of this court, however, have

declined to extend the cumulative error doctrine to civil cases, such

as those in dependency and neglect. See Acierno v. Garyfallou, 2016

COA 91, ¶ 66; Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 66. Because we

11 agree with those other divisions, we decline to address the claim of

cumulative error.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE BERGER concur.