Peo in Interest of ZG

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1076
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1076 Peo in Interest of ZG 02-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1076 El Paso County District Court No. 22JV30126 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.G., E.G., Cay.G., and Cal.G., Children,

and Concerning M.G-G. and C.G.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Kuhn and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced February 5, 2026

Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney, Mathew Feldman, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chealsea A. Carr, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant M.G-G.

Ainsley E. Baum, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant C.G. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, M.G-G. (mother) and

C.G. (father) appeal the judgment terminating their parent-child

legal relationships with Z.G., E.G., Cay.G., Cal.G. (the children).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services (the

Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect raising

concerns about mother’s and father’s substance dependence and

the living conditions in the home. Shortly after, E.G., Cay.G.,

Cal.G., and a sibling were returned to mother’s custody under a

safety plan. While the children were back in the home, mother gave

birth to Z.G. The Department filed an amended petition, adding

newborn Z.G. and alleging that she was hospitalized at two months

old due to extreme malnutrition. The children were again removed

from mother’s care and custody and remained in out-of-home

placement for the remainder of the case.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected and adopted treatment plans for both parents. In

separate criminal cases based on the same underlying facts as the

amended petition, both parents then pleaded guilty to child abuse

1 resulting in serious bodily injury to Z.G. The Department later

moved to terminate both parents’ parental rights under section 19-

3-604(1)(b)(II) and (IV), C.R.S. 2025 (no appropriate treatment plan

due to serious bodily injury of the child and serious bodily injury to

a sibling), and 19-3-604(1)(c) (an appropriate treatment plan has

not been reasonably complied with, the parent is unfit and the

parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable

period of time).

¶4 Three years after the petition was filed, the juvenile court

terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights following a

contested hearing.

II. Analysis

¶5 Mother and father contend that the juvenile court erred by

modifying their dispositional orders to find that no appropriate

treatment plan could be devised, notwithstanding the fact that the

court had previously adopted treatment plans for them both. We

disagree.

¶6 It is well settled that a court may “find that no appropriate

treatment plan can be devised for a parent after it has already

approved a treatment plan for the parent.” People in Interest of

2 Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 19. And while “changed circumstances may

render a treatment plan, previously approved at a dispositional

hearing, no longer appropriate,” our jurisprudence is clear that “the

court’s authority to modify the dispositional order is not limited to

those situations in which circumstances have changed.” Id. at

¶¶ 26, 32.

¶7 Mother also generally suggests that the court erred by

terminating their parental rights under both section 19-3-604(1)(b)

and (c), asserting that the court improperly conflated the two

standards. We discern no error. Mother and father received notice

that the Department sought termination under both paragraphs,

and the court separately applied the two paragraphs in different

parts of its termination order. See Z.P.S.. ¶ 43; see also People in

Interest of D.C-M. S., 111 P.3d 559, 561 (Colo. App. 2005) (no error

where the motion to terminate alleged multiple statutory grounds as

the basis for termination).

¶8 Father also contends that the juvenile court erred by

recognizing a nurse practitioner as an expert witness without

following the procedure and making the four required findings

under People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001). But father did not

3 make this argument at trial, where he did not raise Shreck and

objected only to the qualifications of this specific witness. The

juvenile court appropriately addressed father’s objection by

determining that the witness’s qualifications went to weight and not

admissibility. See People in Interest of A.F., 2025 COA 76, ¶ 23 (“If

a witness is sufficiently qualified to offer the proposed opinion, and

the juvenile court so finds, any challenges to the witness’s

qualifications go to the weight of the testimony, not its

admissibility.”). Because the Shreck objections father raises on

appeal were not presented to the juvenile court, we decline to

address them. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA 13, ¶ 14;

People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (explaining that issues are

unpreserved when the grounds raised on appeal are different from

those raised below).

¶9 In any event, neither mother nor father contests the juvenile

court’s findings or conclusions terminating their parental rights

under section 19-3-604(1)(c). Those findings are “an independent

basis for termination,” which remain unchallenged. D.C-M.S., 111

P.3d at 562; see also IBC Denv. II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183

P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo. App. 2008) (if the tribunal gives multiple

4 reasons for its decision, the appellant must challenge each reason

on appeal).

¶ 10 The judgment is therefore affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.