24CA1887 Peo in Interest of ZF 04-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1887 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30337 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of Z.F., a Child,
and Concerning D.F.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE LUM Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Kate Harvey, Guardian Ad Litem
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for Z.F.
Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, D.F. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with Z.F. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services
(Department) initiated this case based on concerns about mother’s
substance use and mental health. The child was thirteen years old
when the Department filed the petition in dependency and neglect.
The child had been adjudicated dependent and neglected as to
mother on three previous occasions in Colorado, all of which
opened due to substance use concerns.
¶3 In this case, the juvenile court adjudicated the child
dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother,
which required her to (1) address her mental health and medical
needs; (2) maintain communication with the Department; and
(3) engage in family time. The first objective required, among other
things, that mother participate in a substance use assessment and
complete any recommended substance use treatment.
¶4 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights. A year and a half after the Department filed the petition and
1 after a termination hearing, the court terminated the parent-child
legal relationship between mother and the child.
II. Reasonable Efforts
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable
time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶6 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department of human services made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest
of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”
means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in
out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services
provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
2 ¶7 Among other services, section 19-3-208 requires screenings,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; family
time services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other
services, such as transportation assistance, mental health services,
and drug and alcohol treatment services, must be provided if
determined “necessary and appropriate” and if the government has
sufficient funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
¶8 In assessing the department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile
court should consider whether the services provided were
appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d
at 915, by measuring the services and resources provided
holistically rather than in isolation, People in Interest of E.D., 2025
COA 11, ¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for using
those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011). “The court may therefore consider a parent’s
unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether
3 a department made reasonable efforts.” E.D., ¶ 12; see People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
¶9 Whether a department of human services satisfied its
obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and
law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the
court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal
determination, based on those findings, as to whether the
department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id. A factual
finding is clearly erroneous only when there is no support for it in
the record. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo.
2010).
B. Additional Background
¶ 10 Mother and the child were living in Monument when the case
opened. The child was placed in foster care in Colorado Springs.
Mother moved multiple times but ultimately relocated to a
permanent home in Denver about a year into the case. At the time
of the hearing, mother had one supervised family time session every
Saturday in Colorado Springs.
4 C. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother argues that the Department did not make reasonable
efforts because it failed to provide services in areas reasonably
accessible to her, which substantially hindered her ability to access
the services. We are not convinced.
¶ 12 In support of its determination that the Department made
reasonable efforts, the court made several factual findings. The
court found there was “no doubt that during the entirety of this
case,” the caseworker was “repeatedly trying to engage mother.”
But it found mother’s lack of communication and unwillingness to
share her address information “created a barrier” for the
Department’s ability to locate service providers. And it found
mother’s lack of communication and cooperation had a “devastating
impact” on her ability to complete the treatment plan because “it
directly interfered with the [D]epartment’s ability to ensure that
there was always an available referral for services.”
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings and shows that
mother’s lack of communication about her whereabouts hindered
the Department’s ability to refer her for services. For instance, the
caseworker testified that the Department found services in the
5 Loveland area when mother indicated she intended to move there,
but — without notifying the Department — mother moved to Denver
instead. When the Department learned of mother’s move to Denver,
it located services in Denver, but because mother didn’t provide her
exact address, the services were still “farther from [mother] than
was ideal.” And when the Department finally learned mother’s
address and found a drug-testing facility minutes from mother’s
apartment, mother moved again. Mother also testified that she did
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24CA1887 Peo in Interest of ZF 04-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1887 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30337 Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of Z.F., a Child,
and Concerning D.F.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE LUM Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 17, 2025
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
Kate Harvey, Guardian Ad Litem
Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for Z.F.
Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, D.F. (mother)
appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal
relationship with Z.F. (the child). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services
(Department) initiated this case based on concerns about mother’s
substance use and mental health. The child was thirteen years old
when the Department filed the petition in dependency and neglect.
The child had been adjudicated dependent and neglected as to
mother on three previous occasions in Colorado, all of which
opened due to substance use concerns.
¶3 In this case, the juvenile court adjudicated the child
dependent and neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother,
which required her to (1) address her mental health and medical
needs; (2) maintain communication with the Department; and
(3) engage in family time. The first objective required, among other
things, that mother participate in a substance use assessment and
complete any recommended substance use treatment.
¶4 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental
rights. A year and a half after the Department filed the petition and
1 after a termination hearing, the court terminated the parent-child
legal relationship between mother and the child.
II. Reasonable Efforts
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶5 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights if it finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated
dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably
complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the
plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the
parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable
time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.
¶6 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court
must consider whether the department of human services made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.
See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest
of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”
means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in
out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024. Services
provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy
the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).
2 ¶7 Among other services, section 19-3-208 requires screenings,
assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;
home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral
services to available public and private assistance resources; family
time services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other
services, such as transportation assistance, mental health services,
and drug and alcohol treatment services, must be provided if
determined “necessary and appropriate” and if the government has
sufficient funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).
¶8 In assessing the department’s reasonable efforts, the juvenile
court should consider whether the services provided were
appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d
at 915, by measuring the services and resources provided
holistically rather than in isolation, People in Interest of E.D., 2025
COA 11, ¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for using
those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the
treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285
(Colo. App. 2011). “The court may therefore consider a parent’s
unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether
3 a department made reasonable efforts.” E.D., ¶ 12; see People in
Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.
¶9 Whether a department of human services satisfied its
obligation to make reasonable efforts is a mixed question of fact and
law. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the
court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo its legal
determination, based on those findings, as to whether the
department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id. A factual
finding is clearly erroneous only when there is no support for it in
the record. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 250 (Colo.
2010).
B. Additional Background
¶ 10 Mother and the child were living in Monument when the case
opened. The child was placed in foster care in Colorado Springs.
Mother moved multiple times but ultimately relocated to a
permanent home in Denver about a year into the case. At the time
of the hearing, mother had one supervised family time session every
Saturday in Colorado Springs.
4 C. Analysis
¶ 11 Mother argues that the Department did not make reasonable
efforts because it failed to provide services in areas reasonably
accessible to her, which substantially hindered her ability to access
the services. We are not convinced.
¶ 12 In support of its determination that the Department made
reasonable efforts, the court made several factual findings. The
court found there was “no doubt that during the entirety of this
case,” the caseworker was “repeatedly trying to engage mother.”
But it found mother’s lack of communication and unwillingness to
share her address information “created a barrier” for the
Department’s ability to locate service providers. And it found
mother’s lack of communication and cooperation had a “devastating
impact” on her ability to complete the treatment plan because “it
directly interfered with the [D]epartment’s ability to ensure that
there was always an available referral for services.”
¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings and shows that
mother’s lack of communication about her whereabouts hindered
the Department’s ability to refer her for services. For instance, the
caseworker testified that the Department found services in the
5 Loveland area when mother indicated she intended to move there,
but — without notifying the Department — mother moved to Denver
instead. When the Department learned of mother’s move to Denver,
it located services in Denver, but because mother didn’t provide her
exact address, the services were still “farther from [mother] than
was ideal.” And when the Department finally learned mother’s
address and found a drug-testing facility minutes from mother’s
apartment, mother moved again. Mother also testified that she did
not want to provide the Department with any of her information.
¶ 14 To the extent that mother contends on appeal that the
Department did not sufficiently assist her with travel from Denver
to Colorado Springs for family time, the court found, with record
support, that the Department provided more than $5,000 in
financial assistance, which included assistance intended to offset
her travel costs. That assistance included gas cards, rental
assistance, a new phone, and a two-month stay at a hotel. The
Department also offered further rental assistance, but mother did
not return the paperwork required to initiate it.
¶ 15 Moreover, despite the services and financial assistance offered,
mother did not engage in services. The juvenile court properly
6 considered this and made extensive findings about the same. For
example, the court found that mother “refused” to engage in
substance use treatment, rejected expanding visits from one to two
days a week “because that would interfere with her . . . personal
time,” and did not sign necessary releases of information (ROIs).
¶ 16 The record supports these findings as well. The Department
sent three referrals for mother’s substance use evaluation, which
took mother six months to complete. Then, after she declined to
participate in outpatient substance use treatment in person, the
Department eventually referred her for virtual treatment, which she
did not participate in either. Mother testified that while she was
willing to do substance use treatment virtually, she did not think
she needed substance use treatment. And the caseworker testified
that mother did not sign or revoked necessary ROIs and, further,
that mother maintained she did not have time for a treatment plan.
Finally, mother testified that she would not agree to expanding her
family time if it took place in Colorado Springs; specifically, she
testified, “I’m not driving back and forth and not having any time for
me to take care of my house and myself.”
7 ¶ 17 Accordingly, the court properly considered mother’s lack of
engagement in services and communication with the Department in
its determination that the Department made reasonable efforts. See
E.D., ¶ 12 (the court may consider a parent’s unwillingness to
participate in treatment in reasonable efforts determination); see
also J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285 (the parent is ultimately responsible
for utilizing the services provided); cf. A.V., ¶ 12 (“[T]he Department
is not required to provide active efforts to a parent who voluntarily
absents himself or herself from a proceeding and cannot be
located.”). And because the record supports the court’s findings
about the Department’s efforts and mother’s lack of engagement
and communication, we won’t disturb its reasonable efforts
determination.
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.