Peo in Interest of ZD

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 25CA1084
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1084 Peo in Interest of ZD 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1084 El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30933 Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z’L.D., C.S., and D.S., Children,

and Concerning C.S.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Welling and Bernard*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025

Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie Gavisk, Assistant County Attorney, Charlotte Mary Burton, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, C.S. (father)

appeals the judgment terminating his parent-child legal

relationships with Z’L.D., C.S., and D.S. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In November 2023, the El Paso County Department of Human

Services filed a petition in dependency and neglect concerning the

then-nine-month-old, two-year-old, and three-year-old children.

The Department alleged concerns about the parents’ substance use,

domestic violence, and involvement with the criminal justice

system. The Department also expressed concerns that father had

left the children with various friends who hadn’t provided the

children with proper care.

¶3 The juvenile court granted temporary legal custody of the

children to the Department, and the children were placed in foster

care. Despite efforts to locate and personally serve father, the

Department was unable to do so. As a result, the Department

served father by publication. The court later adjudicated the

children dependent or neglected by default, finding that father had

abandoned the children. The court also found that no appropriate

treatment plan could be devised for father.

1 ¶4 Several months later, father appeared in court and requested

that the juvenile court order the Department to create a treatment

plan for him. The juvenile court granted the request and later

adopted a treatment plan that required father to maintain contact

with the caseworker, develop and demonstrate parental protective

capacity, address domestic violence concerns, and address his

substance use issues.

¶5 The Department later moved to terminate father’s parental

rights. Father didn’t appear at the termination hearing, and the

caseworker testified that father hadn’t complied with any part of his

treatment plan and that his whereabouts were unknown to the

Department. After considering the evidence, the juvenile court

granted the Department’s termination motion.

II. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶6 Father sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court

erred by finding that there were no less drastic alternatives to

termination. Specifically, he argues that the Department failed to

investigate the children’s paternal relatives as potential placement

options who might have been willing to accept an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR). We discern no error.

2 A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change in a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025. Consideration and elimination of less

drastic alternatives is implicit in the statutory criteria for

termination. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40.

¶8 In analyzing less drastic alternatives, the juvenile court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020

COA 3M, ¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other

things, (1) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see People

in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009), and

(2) whether an APR would provide adequate permanence and

stability for the child, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905,

910 (Colo. App. 2005).

3 ¶9 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequate[ly]” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be the “best” option for the child. A.M., ¶ 27.

Long-term or permanent placement with a family member, short of

termination, may not be in a child’s best interests if it doesn’t

provide the permanence assured by adoption or otherwise meet that

child’s needs. People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 41.

¶ 10 To aid the court in determining whether a less drastic

alternative to termination exists, the department must evaluate a

reasonable number of persons the parent identifies as placement

options. People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 532 (Colo. App.

2004). But the department isn’t obligated to “independently identify

and evaluate other possible placement alternatives.” People in

Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 215 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 11 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Accordingly, when a juvenile court considers a less drastic

alternative but instead finds that termination is in a child’s best

interests, we are bound to affirm the court’s decision so long as the

4 record supports its findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39,

¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 12 To start, we reject father’s argument that the juvenile court

erred by finding that the Department sufficiently investigated his

relatives as potential placement options for the children who may

have been willing to accept an APR. The juvenile court found, with

record support, that the Department made efforts to investigate

both maternal and paternal family members as potential placement

options but that none of those family members “stepped forward [to]

indicate . . . [that] they [could] take these children.”

¶ 13 Specifically, the caseworker testified that she investigated

every family member suggested by the children’s mother. Although

one out-of-state relative that mother suggested was approved as a

placement option, that relative told the caseworker that she was

unable to care for the children. Moreover, the caseworker testified

that all of the other relatives suggested by mother either didn’t

respond when the caseworker reached out to them or didn’t pass

the background check that is required to be considered as a

placement option.

5 ¶ 14 As to father’s relatives, the caseworker testified that the

Department typically relies on “communications from the parents”

to help identify potential kin placement options. Although the

caseworker testified that father had mentioned that he had relatives

in Kentucky, nothing in the record shows that father ever provided

specific names or any contact information for those relatives. Even

so, the caseworker testified that when a parent doesn’t provide

information about their relatives, the Department can run a family

search and engagement study, which utilizes the parent’s contact

information to identify their relatives. The caseworker said that the

Department conducted two of those studies, which revealed eight

relatives as potential placement options. The Department sent

letters to those relatives on two different occasions, but none of

them responded. Based on that information, the caseworker

concluded that, at the time of the termination hearing, no “family

members or kin-like individuals” were available as a placement

option for the children.

¶ 15 Accordingly, we disagree with father’s assertion that the

juvenile court erred by finding that the Department had adequately

investigated his relatives, especially considering that no evidence

6 indicates that father provided any specific information about his

relatives at any time during the proceedings. See Z.P., 167 P.3d at

215 (a department isn’t obligated to independently identify possible

placement alternatives); see also D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532 (rejecting a

less drastic alternative argument because the parent didn’t identify

the relatives to the department or the court before the termination

hearing).

¶ 16 In any event, even assuming, as father asserts, that one of his

relatives would have been deemed appropriate and willing to accept

an APR, we still discern no error. To an extent, father’s argument

conflates placement options with less drastic alternatives. See A.R.,

¶ 44 (While placement preferences are relevant when determining

which among a choice of placements is in the child’s best interest,

“a less drastic alternative analysis considers whether any

placement, short of termination, would be in the child’s best

interest.”). And here, the juvenile court categorically rejected any

APR, finding that termination and eventual adoption were in the

children’s best interests.

¶ 17 Specifically, the court found that the children “don’t know”

father and, thus, “there is not really a loss there in that

7 relationship.” Further, although the court acknowledged that

termination could potentially result in the loss of the children’s

relationships with their extended family or their culture, it found

that the benefits of adoption “greatly outweighed” those potential

losses. To that end, it found that termination and adoption would

provide the level of stability and permanency the children needed,

particularly because they needed to know who would care for them

and where they would be “for the rest of their lives.” Additionally,

the court found that an APR would create the “potential of trauma

down the line” because the parents might “show back up,” and that

wasn’t in the children’s best interests. In sum, the court

determined that any APR, regardless of the placement option,

wasn’t a viable less drastic alternative to termination.

¶ 18 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. First, the

caseworker testified that father hadn’t attended family time at any

point during the proceedings; father had last seen the children a

year-and-a-half before the termination hearing. The caseworker

also testified that she had met with the children at least once a

month, and the children never asked about father.

8 ¶ 19 Second, the caseworker, who testified as an expert in child

protection and child welfare, opined that termination and eventual

adoption would provide the permanency that the children needed.

She opined that the children needed to know that they wouldn’t “be

moving around from home to home” and that they would be in a

“safe and stable environment.” Because father hadn’t engaged or

complied with any part of his treatment plan, the caseworker didn’t

believe that father could provide a safe and stable environment for

the children. Thus, she opined that termination and eventual

adoption were in the children’s best interests.

¶ 20 Given all this, we conclude that the juvenile court properly

considered and rejected an APR based on the lack of a bond

between father and children, see N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 421, and the

children’s need for permanency and stability, which wouldn’t be

provided by an APR, see T.E.M., 124 P.3d at 910. Because the

record supports the juvenile court’s finding that termination, not an

APR, was in the children’s best interests, we perceive no basis to

reverse. See B.H., ¶ 80.

III. Disposition

¶ 21 We affirm the judgment.

9 JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE BERNARD concur.